Can these things be resolved?

This is a report of a presentation on 5th July 2006 by DavidTatham. It focuses on introducing the Uniform Domain Name DisputeResolution Policy (UDRP) and on the ADR procedure of the (then)newly launched .eu domain. The first part provides an excellentintroduction to lawyers     

Risk adjustment and risk equalization: what needs to be done?

In this paper, we first deal with the rationale of risk adjustment and risk equalization in health insurance markets. Then we discuss the state of the art concerning the application of risk adjustment and risk equalization in practice. Finally, we focus on: What needs to be done?     

Can an employer-based health insurance system be just?

It is America's distinctive practice to tie private health insurance to employment, and recent proposals have tried to retain this link through mandating that all employers provide health insurance to their employees. My primary approach to these issues is neither economic, nor historical, nor political but ethical. After a brief historical overview, I outline a general approach to evaluating the ethical significance of linking the distributions of distinct goods. I examine whether an unjust distribution of jobs spoils justice in the distribution of health insurance, taking as a central example gender inequities in employment and exploring their impact on job-based health insurance. Second, I explore the possibility that justly awarding jobs guarantees justice in employment-sponsored insurance. However, linking the distributions of different goods remains problematic, because such links inevitably undermine equality by enabling the same individuals to enjoy advantages in many different distributive areas. Finally, I examine recent proposals to reform America's health care system by requiring all employers to provide health insurance to their employees. I argue that such proposals lend themselves to the same ethical problems that the current system does and urge greater attention to alternative reform options.     

Chilling Journalism: Can Newsgathering be Harassment or Stalking?

Newsgathering often requires journalists to ask uncomfortable questions or make multiple attempts to talk to unwilling sources. Some journalists have been accused of harassment, even when the plain language of state laws would not classify their actions as criminal conduct. In the rare instances that journalists actually were charged with harassment or subject to protective orders for stalking, district attorneys or judges typically did not allow them to be punished. This study, however, found nine statutes that might be applied to punish newsgathering activities that are neither hounding nor harassing. It also identifies language from statutes that clearly could not be applied to punish newsgathering communications by journalists. The article recommends that prosecutors and judges continue to prevent the application of criminal harassment and stalking laws to newsgathering activities.     

Can the AML system be evaluated without better data?

The Anti-Money Laundering regime has been important in harmonizing laws and institutions, and has received global political support. Yet there has been minimal effort at evaluation of how well any AML intervention does in achieving its goals. There are no credible estimates either of the total amount laundered (globally or nationally) nor of most of the specific serious harms that AML aims to avert. Consequently, reduction of these is not a plausible outcome measure. There have been few efforts by country evaluators in the FATF Mutual Evaluation Reports (MERs) to acquire qualitative data or seriously analyze either quantitative or qualitative data. We find that data are relatively unimportant in policy development and implementation. Moreover, the long gaps of about 8 years between evaluations mean that widely used ‘country risk’ models for AML are forced still to rely largely on the 3rd Round evaluations whose use of data was minimal and inconsistent. While the 4th round MERs (2014–2022) have made an effort to be more systematic in the collection and analysis of data, FATF has still not established procedures that provide sufficiently informative evaluations. Our analysis of five recent National Risk Assessments (a major component of the new evaluations) in major countries shows little use of data, though the UK is notably better than the others. In the absence of more consistent and systematic data analysis, claims that countries have less or more effective systems will be open to allegations of ad hoc, impressionistic or politicized judgments. This reduces their perceived legitimacy, though this does not mean that the AML efforts and the evaluation processes themselves have no effects.     

Can justice be achieved for slave descendents in Mauritius?

This article discusses challenges to achieving justice for slave descendents in Mauritius 177 years after the abolition of slavery. It reflects on the 2009 institution of a Truth and Justice Commission (TJC) in Mauritius to investigate the legacies of slavery and indentured labour. It is argued that time, the ethnic and cultural complexity of Mauritius as well as the TJC itself makes it difficult for Mauritians to achieve restorative justice for slave descendents. Reviewing transitional and restorative justice, the article argues that the Mauritius case study is potentially useful to reflections on the issue of social justice for ancient atrocities and for reflections on the challenges of reparations in complex and democratic societies. It concludes that the greater participation of civil society is required in decisions regarding reparations and that such decisions need to be grounded in contemporary and democratic approaches to achieving justice and the protection of human rights.     

Can computer forensic tools be trusted in digital investigations?

This paper investigates whether computer forensic tools (CFTs) can extract complete and credible digital evidence from digital crime scenes in the presence of file system anti-forensic (AF) attacks. The study uses a well-established six stage forensic tool testing methodology based on black-box testing principles to carry out experiments that evaluate four leading CFTs for their potential to combat eleven different file system AF attacks. Results suggest that only a few AF attacks are identified by all the evaluated CFTs, while as most of the attacks considered by the study go unnoticed. These AF attacks exploit basic file system features, can be executed using simple tools, and even attack CFTs to accomplish their task. These results imply that evidences collected by CFTs in digital investigations are not complete and credible in the presence of AF attacks. The study suggests that practitioners and academicians should not absolutely rely on CFTs for evidence extraction from a digital crime scene, highlights the implications of doing so, and makes many recommendations in this regard. The study also points towards immediate and aggressive research efforts that are required in the area of computer forensics to address the pitfalls of CFTs.     

Why negotiate a legally binding mercury convention?

The purpose of this paper is to explain how and why consensus was reached on a legally binding approach given the opposition of powerful actors. Why did the United States and key emerging economies change their positions? We apply tools from the regime formation literature—classical perspectives on power, interests and knowledge—and the use of different leadership tools to shed light on the issue. Knowledge-based intellectual leadership was exercised by the UNEP Secretariat, providing new information on the seriousness and scope of the problem. Power-based leadership through unilateral action was provided by the United States. When the United States changed position after change in domestic leadership, political costs increased for other opponents. Finally, interest-based instrumental leadership was provided by many proponents, with UNEP and among others the EU in the lead. Still, conflicts remain on control measures and the form of financial mechanism.     

What Can be Done About High-Risk Perpetrators of Domestic Violence?

This article addresses practical implications for preventing lethal and nonlethal domestic violence (DV) that stem from recent research on male domestic homicide perpetrators. The role of risk assessment and batterer intervention programs is emphasized, including specific programming for treatment-resistant perpetrators. Adjunct interventions for related problems (e.g., anger, suicidal behaviour, substance abuse) are offered, and risk management tactics are summarized. The article highlights the significance of safety planning for victims and teaching youth skills for forming and maintaining healthy relationships. Possible solutions to the problem of DV perpetrators who avoid arrest also are highlighted (e.g., public awareness campaigns). Additionally, this article discusses approaches for dealing with psychopathic DV perpetrators, including the possible benefits of community education on psychopathy and early intervention for youth at risk for developing these traits. Some policy implications concerning DV and psychopathy also are covered. The article underscores the importance of coordinated community responses to DV.