Whose House is this Anyway? IDP and Refugee Return in Post-Saddam Iraq

Although many people displaced by Saddam's regime over the yearslooked forward to returning as soon as the 2003 war ended, anumber of problems emerged which continued to bedevil the returnprocess as late as one year after the war. These problems includedan unclear political future for the country, competing politicaland sectarian forces that often view IDPs and refugees as strategictools or weapons, a hesitant and initially undecided Coalitionpolicy on the return issue, unclear mandates for the variousactors that could assist with returns, lack of funding, andmost importantly of all, an extremely poor security situationwhich has impeded or even blocked all progress on the returnissue. Nonetheless, because Iraq's Ba'athist dictatorship wasthe overwhelming cause of displacement in the country to beginwith, the future does hold some hope for Iraqi displaced persons.This paper examines the causes of return problems in Iraq andhow various authorities in post-Ba'athist Iraq are addressingthe return issue. Particularly around the contested city ofKirkuk, problems relating to the return issue risk ignitingethnic conflict and possibly even civil war in Iraq as a whole.The article examines the return issue for the period from March2003 to June 2004, focusing especially on northern Iraq andKirkuk. The research presented here is based on fieldwork conductedin Iraq by the author between September 2003 and May 2004. Theauthor went to Iraq independently, with the assistance of aCanadian Department of National Defence post-doctoral researchgrant. Interviews were conducted with US and Coalition ProvisionalAuthority officials, Iraqi Interim Government officials, KurdistanRegional Government officials, NGO workers, and IDPs themselvesduring visits to camps around Kirkuk and Baghdad.     

Iraq. Country profile

Iraq, with a population of 15.9 million, is blessed with vital natural resources, oil being its chief export product, as well as barley, dates, and wheat. Fertile land and unlimited supplies of water give it enormous productive potential. However, that potential has not been realized because of the war with Iran, which began in 1980 when President Hussein sent troops to Iran, after continual border skirmishes. Prior to that time, there was a pattern of large rural migration to towns, and a period of rapid growth of the economy. The country was run by the Ba'athist Party who instituted a successful program of development. With the advent of war, development plans have been crippled by shortages of electricity, spare parts, and labor, especially in rural areas. Some agricultural and urban projects are maintained but the large-scale plans of the 1970's have been abandoned. The oil glut and the war economy have contributed to Iraq's new status as a debtor nation. In addition, the war has increased the cultural tensions between the Ba'athists and the Kurds of the North and the Shi'ite Arabs of the South. The Ba'athist Party is dominated by the Sunni Arab minority, whose goal during the 1970's was to reassert Iraq's ancient traditions. Toward that end, the government began a program that sought to restore medieval mosques, and reestablish Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul as centers of Arab culture. Arabic is Iran's official language, although Kurdish is used in the North and East. Iraq is overwhelmingly Muslim, with a small Christian minority. Its infant morality rate is 73/1,000 live births. The war with Iran has touched every area of the nation's life, and severely curtailed government development programs.     

Bushwhacking the Democratic Peace

The invasion of Iraq has been justified, ex post , as for the purpose of promoting the democratic peace. It does not, however, appear to have been a principal goal ex ante . Most democratic peace theorists, moreover, do not endorse democratic regime change by great-power external military intervention. Success is difficult to achieve (usually at high cost), and the conditions in Iraq were not promising even had the occupation been carried out more competently. Greater success in democratization has been achieved by UN peacekeeping operations, and by various regional international organizations using a variety of peaceful measures to ensure free elections, constrain authoritarian leaders, and empower democratic forces. International organizations, notably those whose membership is largely composed of democracies, are especially likely to succeed in promoting democracy.     

Capitalism,Democracy and the War in Iraq

Although Saddam Hussein was a bloody tyrant, and although deposing him served a noble purpose, one still may doubt the wisdom of the American war against Iraq. It is quite dubious whether the democratisation of Iraq can serve as a justification of the American war effort. Properly understood, the democratic peace proposition does not promise that poor, emerging, and illiberal democracies surrounded by autocracies are more peaceful than autocracies. By itself, the transition towards democracy is quite likely to imply some semi-democratic phase when the country is at risk of civil war. Moreover, the democratic peace proposition says nothing at all about the likelihood of success of democratisation in a poor, oil-rich, Arab and Muslim country where there is little common ground to unite the democracy-imposing occupier and the defeated country. Finally, defeating the insurgency in the Sunni triangle of Iraq might require means which a democracy cannot even wish to apply. Whereas the promotion of democracy by war looks like a dead end and is doomed to failure, the prospects of promoting peace by exporting capitalism, growth, and prosperity look much better. Such a strategy even serves the purpose of later democratisation of those countries that now accept only creeping capitalism.     

Hitler's Shadow: Historical Analogies and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait

Leaders often turn to history for guidance. Margaret Thatcher and George Bush were no exception when they responded to Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Bush and Thatcher used analogies to the 1930s, the Vietnam War and the Falklands War to frame the crisis, which significantly influenced their policies. They argued that Saddam Hussein was another Adolf Hitler and were determined not to repeat the mistakes of the Western response to the Axis in the 1930s or of the Vietnam War. There would be no 1930s-style appeasement of Iraq, and no slow escalation as had occurred in Vietnam. The prompt use of overwhelming force in the Gulf would succeed, Bush and Thatcher believed, just as the use of force had succeeded in the Falklands crisis, and just as such a policy, they believed, would have deterred the Axis in the early 1930s.     

9/11 and the growing Euro-American Chasm over the Middle East

While Euro-American differences over key issues in the Middle East were notable prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks, they widened significantly after the attacks, with respect to how to approach Iraq, Iran, and the Middle East peace process. This article explores these changes and thus offers a snapshot of the effect of 9/11, a snapshot that can also illuminate the backdrop to the transatlantic imbroglio regarding Iraq in 2003.     

Negotiated peace versus victor's peace: the geopolitics of peace and conflict in Sri Lanka

In examining the failure of the 2002 peace process between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), this essay argues for the need to go beyond the power dynamics of the local actors. The peace process was dismantled and military victory by the Sri Lankan government made possible not so much by the Sinhala nationalist discourse, which opposed administration of development aid by the LTTE, as by the global security discourse associated with geo-strategic interests. The EU-led development discourse, which was informed by the liberal internationalist ethos, could have facilitated resolution and transformation of the conflict. In its place a security-based, realist discourse was prioritized in South Asia by the UK and US governments, particularly after the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. This was the discourse which provided the material basis for the Sinhala nationalists to consolidate their power in pursuing a military victory. The post-war era is marked by geopoliticization of the human rights discourse, deepening the conflict. This essay explores the correlation between the liberal peace model, human rights, international relations and geopolitics.     

A Qualified Success for Collective Security: The Concert of Europe and the Belgian Crisis, 1831

Some scholars claim that collective security always fails. This article analyses a case where it succeeded. When Belgians rebelled against Dutch rule in the early 1830s, all five great powers agreed no fewer than four times to threaten or to use force against one or both sides. Why? Drawing extensively on diplomatic correspondence from Austrian, German and Russian archives, I show that the Concert of Europe functioned as a security regime, helping the powers to agree. Great power consensus broke down when Britain and France imposed a peace settlement on the Dutch in 1832. Yet the Belgian case—like Iraq's 1991 expulsion from Kuwait—shows that collective security can sometimes succeed against cross-border aggression.     

Ripening Within? Strategies Used by Rebel Negotiators to End Ethnic War

This article explores what strategies rebels use to prepare their ethnic community for negotiated peace. Proposed strategies are distilled from relevant theory and systematically investigated in case analyses of peace negotiations in Sri Lanka, Indonesian Aceh, and Senegal. The empirical findings indicate that although a coercive military capacity underpinned claims to ethnic representation, coercion did not dominate during the prenegotiation phase. During negotiations, noncoercive persuasion, as well as collective and selective incentives, clearly dominated. Moreover, the most important measures were internal to the negotiating rebel group. The successful rebel negotiator appeared to “mobilize in reverse” by initially targeting the core of military leaders followed by competitor groups and constituents. The article systematically examines across cases what measures rebel negotiators have used to “ripen” their own community, how these measures have been sequenced, and against whom they have been directed. The findings have important implications for the concepts of ripeness and prenegotiation and their requirements. The study underscores in particular the relevance of rebels' nonviolent commitment signals, something that has been largely overlooked in the research on nonstate armed actors. The policy implications suggest the possible benefits of third‐party assistance to efforts to promote communication, public outreach, and procedural transparency on the nonstate side in connection with peace talks.     

Back to the future: the Arab uprisings and state (re)formation in the Arab world

This article contributes to debates that aim to go beyond the “democratization” and “post-democratization” paradigms to understand change and continuity in Arab politics. In tune with calls to focus on the actualities of political dynamics, the article shows that the literatures on State Formation and Contentious Politics provide useful theoretical tools to understand change/continuity in Arab politics. It does so by examining the impact of the latest Arab uprisings on state formation trajectories in Iraq and Syria. The uprisings have aggravated a process of regime erosion – which originated in post-colonial state-building attempts – by mobilizing sectarian and ethnic identities and exposing the counties to geo-political rivalries and intervention, giving rise to trans-border movements, such as ISIS. The resulting state fragmentation has obstructed democratic transition in Syria and constrained its consolidation in Iraq.     

Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan

Afghanistan is in danger of capsizing in a perfect storm of insurgency that mimics operations and tactics witnessed in Iraq. This article assesses this insurgency and the re-emergent Taliban. The common view of the Taliban as simply a radical Afghan Islamist movement is overly simple, for that organization has been able to build on tribal kinship networks and a charismatic mullah phenomenon to mobilize a critical and dynamic rural base of support. This support, buttressed by Talib reinforcements from Pakistan's border areas, is enough to frustrate the U.S.-led Coalition's counterinsurgency strategy. At the operational level, the Taliban is fighting a classic “war of the flea,” while the Coalition continues to fight the war largely according to the Taliban “game plan.” This is resulting in its losing the war in Afghanistan one Pashtun village at a time.     

Essence of Negotiation: Understanding Appeasement and “The Great Munich Stereotype”

The relative merits of rational choice and behavioral approaches to the study of negotiation continue to be hotly debated. This article tests qualitative postdictions (assertions or deductions about something in the past) from these paradigms as well as the alternative approach of new institutional theory against the extensive record of negotiation process, contractual form, and contract implementation from the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. I find the incomplete relational form of the peace treaty to be consistent with the behavioral and new institutional concepts and find that only behavioral theory can explain how unilateral German moves unraveled the treaty during the 1930s. But the historical record further reveals that the close fit between the behavioral paradigm and these events is more than coincidence. I also discuss the role of conference participants, particularly John Maynard Keynes and Walter Lippmann, in establishing the basis for modern behavioral science. The behavioral paradigm emerged from efforts to understand and fix serious policy mistakes such as those made in the peace negotiations. The study of human error was intended to serve as the basis for broad‐based organizational solutions. Finally, I discuss the impact of “the Munich stereotype” on such recent events as the planning for the American invasion and reconstruction of Iraq; such examples suggest continued imperfections in the system of organized intelligence that has actually evolved in the United States.     

United Nations Security Council Reform Revisited: A Proposal

The United Nations [UN] came into being following the Second World War. Resembling earlier efforts of co-operation by the most powerful states of the international system, it was an attempt to effect global governance through the maintenance of international peace and security amongst states. However, led by its main executive organ, the Security Council, the UN has been unable to prevent and effectively deal with armed conflicts and mass atrocities in a number of situations. Over the years, the inability of the UN Security Council to take collective action has resulted in its ineffectiveness in dealing with war and humanitarian crises. This situation has led to calls for Security Council reform and has generated several initiatives to that end. This analysis discusses major shortcomings of the Security Council, analyses prominent reform initiatives, and introduces a proposal, the “Two-Layered Regional Model,” for Security Council reform.     

U.S. Aid for Foreign Justice and Police

The fundamental objective of the United States in its efforts to reform justice systems abroad has been to develop effective institutions of criminal justice that can support transitions to democratic government. Unfortunately, the United States has not been doing this as well as it might, Iraq being the most dramatic case. These efforts lack coherent Congressional oversight and strategic vision, neglect improving the normative quality of local justice systems and developing the capacity to manage by results, and subordinate local reform to the security needs of foreign countries. To remedy these shortcomings, the United States needs to develop and coordinate justice assistance programs that are context specific, recruit and deploy justice specialists from all sectors and levels of the American justice system, incorporate a developmental perspective in justice assistance programs, and formulate programs that are based on proven “best practices.”     

Blundering into Baghdad: an analysis of strategy,structure, principals and agents

Some postmortems of the Bush Administration's pre-Iraq war decision-making have focused on a dysfunctional National Security Council (NSC) structure as the major reason for the lack of a thorough strategic assessment prior to the March 2003 invasion. Other academic and journalistic accounts have focused on a lack of a first rate conceptual thinker at the top levels of the Bush Administration as an important cause of the strategic shortcomings in Iraq decision-making. This article will assess the relative impact of decision-making structure versus quality of strategic leadership in explaining poor performance in the first five years of the Iraq war.     

Liberal intervention in the foreign policy thinking of Tony Blair and David Cameron

David Cameron was a critic of Tony Blair's doctrine of the ‘international community’, which was used to justify war in Kosovo and more controversially in Iraq, suggesting caution in projecting military force abroad while in opposition. However, and in spite of making severe cuts to the defence budget, the Cameron-led Coalition government signed Britain up to a military intervention in Libya within a year of coming into office. What does this say about the place liberal interventionism occupies in contemporary British foreign policy? To answer this question, this article studies the nature of what we describe as the ‘bounded liberal’ tradition that has informed British foreign policy thinking since 1945, suggesting that it puts a distinctly UK national twist on conventional conservative thought about international affairs. Its components are: scepticism of grand schemes to remake the world; instinctive Atlanticism; security through collective endeavour; and anti-appeasement. We then compare and contrast the conditions for intervention set out by Tony Blair and David Cameron. We explain the similarities but crucially the vital differences between the two leaders' thinking on intervention, with particular reference to Cameron's perception that Downing Street needed to loosen its control over foreign policymaking after Iraq. Our argument is that policy substance, policy style and party political dilemmas prompted the two leaders to reconnect British foreign policy with its ethical roots, ingraining a bounded liberal posture in British foreign policy after the moral bankruptcy of the John Major years. This return to a pragmatic and ethically informed foreign policy meant that military operations in Kosovo and Libya were undertaken in quite different circumstances, yet came to be justified by similar arguments from the two leaders.     

Force Size for the Post-Westphalian World

The quality of the U.S. military has improved steadily since the end of the Cold War, but technological and managerial advancements cannot compensate for the inadequate size of the American armed forces. The post–Cold War years saw a shift from the Westphalian, state-ordered world to one where Western states are at war with transnational, substate terrorist groups. This requires adjustments in the American military establishment. Improvements in quality must be matched by an increase in quantity in order to meet U.S. security needs. As interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have proven, a minimalist force may be sufficient to win a war, but where nation-building is required, it will find it difficult to win the peace.     

The Rise of the “Resistance Axis”: Hezbollah and the Legacy of the Taif Agreement

Abstract

Hezbollah’s direct military presence in Syria and Iraq confirms that their actions transcend Lebanon as a political stage. But why can Hezbollah still not be contained within the boundaries of Lebanon? Exploring how the Taif Agreements both tamed Hezbollah’s rhetoric while simultaneously laying the conditions for transnational activities, this article argues that the conditions of the Taif Agreement have assisted in the rise of Hezbollah’s self-coined Resistance Axis. Post-Taif, Hezbollah has tended relationships with the external forces that helped broker the peace while unlocking the potential in the exceptional decision to allow Hezbollah to retain arms in the name of “resistance.”     

Space-Time Granger Analysis of the War in Iraq: A Study of Coalition and Insurgent Action-Reaction

We investigate insurgent-coalition interaction using the WikiLeaks dataset of Iraq war logs 2004–2009. After a review of existing theoretical interventions on the dynamics of insurgency and presenting a baseline model of violent events, we test a conceptual model of reciprocity using an innovative space-time Granger causality technique. Our estimation procedure retains predicted probabilities of reaction in response to a previous opponent's action across different temporal and spatial configurations in Iraq and in Baghdad. Our conclusions about conflict in Iraq are based on these profiles of risk—what we call space-time signatures. We find strong evidence of “tit-for-tat” associations between coalition/Iraq forces on one side and insurgents/militants on the other. Specifically, we find that the action-reaction association varies strongly by majority ethnic region across Iraq and in Baghdad, by urban and nonurban location, and within Sunni-dominated areas, by district income. While violence is strongly temporally dependent in the same location, the effect of distance varies significantly across the different subsets of the Iraq data.