Economic and Monetary Union: Pillar of a Federal Polity

The Masastricht Treaty commitment to the economic and monetaryunion (Emu) follows a lengthy process of building up monetaryintegration, starting with the European Monetary System (1979),then, in the 1980s, the free movement of capital and integrationof financial markets. Emu, representing the final stage of thisprocess, is seen by most federalists as a pillar in the structureof the European Union, contributing to its development by stagesinto a federal polity. With the economic and monetary union,the European Union's economic and environmental powers are becomingcomparable to those of some federations, and with institutionsthat have over time acquired substantial federal elements, furtherreforms may well make the European Union into a federal system.This article identifies the forces, interests, and methods involvedin an incremental process that may be called a new federalism.     

A Case of Strange Bedfellows in the EU: An Institutional Perspective on the French–Swedish Cooperation on Alcohol Control

Some relationships in modern politics may intuitively be more difficult to understand than others. This article deals with what might be referred to as a case of strange bedfellows, i.e. the French–Swedish cooperation on alcohol control in the European Union (EU). The French government has actively supported the Swedish government on several occasions in discussions and disputes over alcohol control policy issues at the EU level, and this article presents and discusses three different interpretations of this support. It is concluded that, rather than reflecting current economic calculations or matching policies, the French support should be viewed in relation to an institutional perspective emphasising the importance of historical paths and inefficient histories.     

Accountability in the EU's para-regulatory state: The case of the Economic and Monetary Union

This article revisits Majone's famous argument about accountability in the regulatory state in reference to the European Union's (EU) Economic and Monetary Union. We show that the EU has entered the stage of a “para-regulatory state” marked by increasing EU regulation in areas linked to core state powers. Despite the redistributive and politicized nature of these policy areas, the EU's “para-regulatory state” has continued to rely on its regulatory model of accountability, focused on decisionmaking processes, and interest mediation. In line with Majone, we describe the model as procedural and contrast it to substantive accountability – which is necessary when regulation has clear redistributive implications. Using two case studies from fiscal policy and monetary affairs, we illustrate the predominance of procedural accountability as exercised by the European Parliament and EU Courts. We complement the empirical analysis with a normative discussion of how substantive accountability could potentially be rendered in both fields.     

How to not speak the ‘F‐word’: Federalism between mirage and imperative in the euro crisis

The recent financial and debt crisis has resuscitated the debate about European federalism – a theme that seemed not to have survived the painful constitutional adventure that ended with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. With the adoption of significant policy and institutional measures for tightening macroeconomic and budgetary coordination (including a constitutionally enshrined debt brake), the reforms of the monetary union have undisputedly brought the European Union further on the path towards an ever closer union. In an era where EU integration has been increasingly politicised, and Euroscepticism has been on the rise and exploited by anti‐system parties, national leaders have to face a political hiatus and respond to increased needs for symbolic and discursive legitimation of further federalisation. This is all the more crucial for French and German leaders who have brokered the main decisions during the crisis of the eurozone. Against this background, the purpose of this article is not to assess whether, or to what extent, the recent reforms of economic and monetary union have made the EU more federal. Rather, the purpose is to tackle the following puzzle: How have EU leaders legitimised the deepening of federal integration in a context where support for more European federalism is at its lowest? To elucidate this, a lexicographic discourse analysis is conducted based on all speeches held by the German Chancellor Merkel and the two French Presidents Sarkozy and Hollande, previous to, or after European summits from early 2010 until the spring of 2013. The findings indicate that federalism is both taboo and pervasive in French and German leaders' discourse. The paradox is barely apparent, though. While the ‘F‐word’ is rarely spoken aloud, two distinctive visions co‐exist in the French and German discourse. The coming of age of a political union through constitutional federalism is pictured as ineluctable, yet as a distant mirage out of reach of today's decision makers. At the same time, the deepening of functional federalism in order to cope with economic interdependence is a ubiquitous imperative that justifies further integration. The persisting gap between the constitutional and the functional vision of European federalism has crucial implications. Insofar as the Union is held responsible for not delivering successful economic policy, political leaders will fail to legitimise both functional and constitutional federalism.     

Who wants the euro – and why? Economic explanations of public attitudes towards a single European currency

The paper looks at whether public attitudes towards a single European currency held in the European Union member states reflect a rational evaluation of the involved benefits and costs. It finds that they do: the looser monetary and fiscal policy was in the past, and the more time a country spent in the EMS, the more citizens welcome the euro. Attitudes towards the euro do not seem consistent with attitudes towards a European Central Bank, however. Upon closer scrutiny, opponents of a single currency appear to be less consistent and less rational in their responses than proponents.     

From doves to hawks: A spatial analysis of voting in the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England

This article examines the making of monetary policy in the United Kingdom between 1997 and 2008 by analysing voting behaviour in the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). It provides a new set of measures for the monetary policy preferences of individual MPC members by estimating a Bayesian item response model. The article demonstrates the usefulness of these measures by comparing the ideal points of outgoing MPC members with their successors and by looking at changes over time in the median ideal point on the MPC. The analysis indicates that the British Government has been able to move the position of the median voter on the MPC through its appointments to the Committee. This highlights the importance of central bank appointments for monetary policy.     

Transparency, Democratic Accountability, and the Economic Consequences of Monetary Institutions

Debates about the appropriate mix between autonomy and accountability of bureaucrats are relevant to numerous areas of government action. I examine whether there is evidence of a tradeoff between transparency, democratic accountability, and the gains from monetary delegation. I begin by presenting a simple theoretical model which suggests that central banks that are transparent, in the sense of publishing their macroeconomic forecasts, will find it easier to acquire a reputation. Despite making central banks more subject to outside scrutiny then, monetary transparency can lead to improved economic outcomes. I also consider arguments about the effect of accountability provisions involving parliamentary oversight and control over central bankers. The article then uses a new data set to examine these issues empirically, focusing on a natural experiment involving disinflation costs under different central banking institutions during the 1990s. Results suggest that countries with more transparent central banks face lower costs of disinflation while accountability provisions have no clear effect on disinflation costs. My results also concord with earlier findings that the effect of monetary institutions is conditional on other features of the political environment.     

Voting and economic factors in French elections for the European Parliament

This article builds and estimates several econometric models that explain and forecast the outcomes of the French elections for the European Parliament. These models show the influence of the change in the local unemployment rate to explain the vote for the moderate Left and the moderate Right in the French elections for the European Parliament. These models appear to be accurate in forecasting the elections of the past, and their behavior for the 2009 French election for the European Parliament is satisfactory.     

Capital mobility and monetary adjustment in Western Europe, 1973–1991

The western European experience is perhaps the best known instance of formal exchange rate management and attempted monetary integration on a regional basis. This article examines the role of heightened international capital mobility in accounting for this phenomenon. The behavior of ten industrial western European states during the period 1973–1991 is analyzed in this regard. These states vary in terms of size, membership in the European Community (now the European Union), participation in the exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System, and their revealed policy preferences. Nevertheless, all ten states eventually accommodated German monetary policy in an effort to stabilize regional exchange rates around the deutsche mark. The pursuit of increasingly similar policies by states differing in non-trivial ways suggests that, at least by the end of the research period, the external constraint imposed upon each of them as a result of international financial integration had become severe indeed. Recognition of this constraint provides a basis for understanding the nature of the policy choices facing European monetary authorities. Nevertheless, heightened international capital mobility (in isolation from other factors) is found to provide an incomplete explanation of certain key features of the European experience. Suggestions for further research are proposed with this in mind.     

Democratic 'Misfit'? Conceptions of Civil Society Participation in France and the European Union

The European Union's attempts to improve its democratic character increasingly often lead to debates about how to include civil society organizations in its decision-making processes. However, this interpretation of participatory democracy seems at odds with democratic traditions in a number of member states. Among those, France is said to be at the diametrically opposite end of the EU democratization debate spectrum. French democratic thought is based on government through electoral representation. The aim of this article is to analyze both theoretically and empirically the discourse and participatory processes in both the EU and France. While normative approaches to democratic patterns in the EU and French political debate show important differences, empirical evidence suggests that the misfit between the European and French conception of democracy is less developed than one might believe.     

论货币宪法学教学

将货币宪法引入宪法学的教学实践,不仅能够开辟宪法学教学与研究的新领域,丰富财政宪法乃至基础宪法学的教学内容,同时使该学科的教学具有更为重要的理论与实践价值。货币宪法学的教学内容主要包括货币权力的宪法属性、货币权力配置的基本模式、货币权力的宪法规范等。     

Combatting terror in Europe: Euro-Israeli counterterrorism intelligence cooperation in the Club de Berne (1971–1972)

How do intelligence agencies cooperate to counter terrorism and to what extent can it be (ab)used for political purposes? This article focuses on the Club de Berne, an intelligence liaison forum that was founded in 1969 by nine Western European countries and which was also linked to the United States and Israel. This article explores the mechanisms of counterterrorism intelligence-sharing in the early 1970s and examines the motives for cooperation within this framework. On the basis of large-scale recently declassified intelligence records, the article uncovers new aspects in the history of European security cooperation with Israel and the United States, and hopes to lay the groundwork for broader theoretical reflections about counterterrorism intelligence cooperation.     

Monetary Sovereignty: Nature,Implementation, and Implications

Monetary sovereignty is a central concept of Modern Money Theory (MMT). The paper explores the characteristics of monetary sovereignty, the means used to implement it, and some of its theoretical and policy implications. Herein, it is shown that monetary sovereignty involves a high degree of coordination between the central bank and the national treasury. The paper also argues that monetary sovereignty is not special to the United States, does not require direct monetary financing of the treasury, does not tell us anything about the optimal size of the fiscal balance, and is not dependent on the willingness of foreigners to hold the domestic currency.     

The Launching of the EMS: An Analysis of Change in Foreign Economic Policy

Foreign exchange markets are subject to changing international regimes. When and why regimes change is a legitimate focus of political study. This is particularly so as shifts in foreign exchange markets modify relative prices in and between national economies. Authorities presiding over foreign exchange markets are answerable to their national policy communities and to their national electorates. They also operate within an international state system. Applying John S. Odell's framework to an analysis of the launch of the European Monetary System (EMS) in April 1978 by Chancellor Schmidt and President Giscard d'Estaing, it is argued that a market perspective alone would have failed to predict the establishment of the EMS. An analysis of the principal actors and their ideas; of the power political constellation; and of the domestic context in the Federal Republic and in France, contributes most to explaining ex post the shift towards a European managed exchange rate regime. In this case, the neoclassical M arket perspective provided erroneous, inadequate and subsidiary explanations. The article suggests that foreign exchange policy and therefore global financial markets belong firmly in the realm of international and comparative political studies. They are too important to be left to economists alone.     

Trustee strategies,politicization and de-delegation: The case of the European Central Bank

This article shows how the European Central Bank (ECB) reduced the risk of politicization and de facto de-delegation despite experiencing contestation. During the euro area crisis and the coronavirus emergency the ECB's monetary policy measures have been widely praised for their effectiveness. Even though the ECB is an independent trustee that cannot be easily sanctioned, it needs to engage with its principals to receive their political backing for common projects and in order to reaffirm its own centrality in governance. This article identifies different trustee strategies to reduce politicization and thereby to decrease the risk of de facto de-delegation: (i) dualism, (ii) voluntary self-restraint, and (iii) changing the yard stick. It concludes by showing that the ECB has expanded its monetary policy toolbox without triggering neither formal nor de facto de-delegation.     

French Center-Periphery Relations and Science Park Development: Local Policy Initiatives and Intergovernmental Policymaking

This article focuses on new patterns of territorial governance in the aftermath of the 1982 decentralization reforms in France. The traditional "cross regulation" model developed by the Crozier school is wrong to assume culturally grounded stalemate and to suggest that local political power is nothing more than the informal access of local elites to national policymaking. Analyzing the policy of technopoles or science park development, both nationally and by way of detailed local case studies of Montpellier and Rennes, we demonstrate that, on the contray, French local and regional authorities have risen progressively to independent loci of governmental power and policymaking. Local policy initiatives are, however, embedded in a multi-level institutional fabric ranging from the local to the European level. These developments in center-periphery relations need to be placed into the context of the general decline of the traditional French public policy model, which has been stiffly challenged by the norms of market, Europe and subsidiarity. In conclusion, a comparative and interorganizational perspective suggests that France is moving toward a territorial system increasingly characterized by the dynamics of intergovernmental conflict and cooperation and best described as "quasi-federalism in unitary disguise."     

An Independent Central Bank and an Independent Monetary Policy: The Role of the Government Budget—The Case of Poland 1924–26

Poland's 1924 stabilization plan created, as measured by contemporary criteria, an independent central bank. The stabilization's success was undermined by a fiscal disequilibrium when a capital levy failed to raise revenue. The Polish government covered the revenue shortfall by exploiting the right of the state to issue subsidiary coins. Although central bank independence was not compromised, Poland did not have an independent monetary policy. When the fiscal disequilibrium was corrected in 1926, the central bank gained complete control over monetary policy. Thus, a balanced budget may be more important to achieving price stability than arrangements to foster central bank independence.     

The European Central Bank: Independence, accountability and strategy: A review

This paper reviews research on central banking and monetary policy, with special emphasis on the position of the future European Central Bank. Nowadays, it is often thought that an independent central bank with an explicit mandate to aim for price stability constitutes an important institutional device to assure price stability. Indeed, the ECB will be one of the most independent central banks as follows from the codings of various indicators measuring legal independence. Still, it does not follow straightforwardly from the literature that the Statute of the ECB is optimal. It is also argued that the accountability of the ECB is poorly arranged for in comparison with that of several national central banks. Finally, the discussion about the monetary strategy of the ECB is reviewed.     

European Union Institutions and French Political Careers

This article examines one aspect of the relationship between European Union institutions and the French political field: politicians' careers. What is the value of positions in the Commission and the European Parliament for French politicians in terms of career mobility? This study shows that the value of the Commission as a source of domestic political capital has risen since the 1950s, whereas the value of the European Parliament has remained relatively low. The position of Commissioner is now comparable to a ministerial-level position. Membership in the European Parliament has remained secondary to a national political career. Yet, as a result of the European Parliament's peripheral position in the French political field, new social groups, linking the regions to the European institutions or forming cross-partisan interest groups, have been created. Evidence shows that if the European Union institutions present an alternative type of political capital to national political capital, political careers and ambitions are still formed in national terms. National mechanisms for the formation of groups having a vested interest in the relative autonomy of supranational political institutions have not developed sufficiently. This inadequacy might be the single most important reason for the democratic deficit in the European Union. We are not in business at all; we are in politics. (Former President of the EC Commission Walter Hallstein, quoted in Swann 1990, vii)     

CAPITAL MOBILITY, DOMESTIC POLITICS, and FRENCH MONETARY DIPLOMACY

This article evaluates the role of increased capital mobility, sectoral interests, and domestic institutions in bringing about policy change in French capital markets. Capital mobility played an indirect role by making it more costly for French governments to pursue inflationary economic policies. But it was domestic politics, not capital mobility, that led governments to achieve lower inflation by stabilizing the exchange rate. The key domestic political factor was institutional change to regulatory practices, while financial markets reduced bank lending to industry and internationalized French finance, breaking the strong ties and comon monetary diplomacy interests of bankers, industralists, and policymakers, and thereby weaken the political priority of promoting domestic growth and industrial competitiveness.