The Danzig Question in British Foreign Policy, 1918–1920

Among the many and often bitter territorial disputes following the collapse of Germany and Russia in Central and Eastern Europe — to mention only the questions of Vilna, Memel, Teschen, or Lemberg — the problem of the Polish sea access was particularly explosive and became the most vexing territorial problem of the whole conference. This paper examines the question of Danzig and the lower Vistula within the context of contradicting Polish, German and Western, mainly British ambitions and preferences. The author shows that the proclamation of the Free City of Danzig and the creation of the Polish Corridor, dividing Germany into two parts, was a compromise not liked in Warsaw and Berlin and one the British, always fearing fatal repercussions to future stability, only considered to be the lesser choice of evils.     

The Polish Blitz,More than a Mere Footnote to History: Poland and Preventive War with Germany, 1933

The January 1933 appointment of Adolf Hitler as Chancellor of Germany marked the beginning of the end of the fragile post-war peace throughout Europe. The Polish leadership had good reason to fear his threats of revising the Treaty of Versailles. Realising that Hitler was too dangerous to remain in power, the Polish leadership led by Marshal Józef Pi?sudski prepared for a preventive war against Germany. Unfortunately, the appeasement policy among the Western Powers condemned this plan to failure and forced Poland into signing a non-aggression pact with Germany in 1934; thus dooming Poland's existence. To test his premonitions about Hitler, Pi?sudski created several international “incidents” concerning the Free City of Danzig, designed to test both Germany and whether the Western Powers would fight to uphold the Treaty of Versailles. Pi?sudski's efforts offer proof that Poland deserves more credit for its determination to deal with a rising tide of Nazi Germany.     

Sir Eric Phipps, the British Government, and the Appeasement of Germany, 1933-1937

This article argues that Sir Eric Phipps' reputation as an “anti-appeaser” of Germany during his Berlin embassy 1933-1937 is not accurate. While Phipps was not in favor of placating Hitler by making territorial concessions, he had much in common with those who had sought a rapprochement with Germany in the 1920s through a policy of inclusion and reconciliation. Particular importance is placed on Phipps' attitude towards the League of Nations, with detailed consideration also being accorded to his relationship with the British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Office officials of the period, as well as his views on the Entente Cordiale.     

Germany’s Russia Policy in Light of the Ukraine Conflict: Interdependence Theory and Ostpolitik

Germany’s recent Ostpolitik (Eastern Policy) has become a major topic in Western discussions about how to deal best with Vladimir Putin’s Russia. This essay proceeds from Interdependence Theory to argue that the Berlin-promoted Nord Stream gas pipeline projects are loosening Russian-Ukrainian economic ties, and thereby easing conflict between the two post-Soviet states. Ukraine’s surprisingly peaceful development during its first 20 years as an independent state is contrasted with the escalation of tensions between Moscow and Kyiv in 2013–2014. The completion of the first Nord Stream pipe in October 2012 is seen as a crucial development that untied the Kremlin’s hand vis-à-vis Ukraine. The lowering of Moscow’s dependence on the Ukrainian gas transportation system, due to the new Baltic Sea pipeline, eventually led to a territorial conflict between Ukraine and Russia.     

British Policy and the Ruhr Crisis 1922-24

This article provides an overview of British policy during a defining episode in the interwar period — the Ruhr crisis of 1923-4. The author assesses the external considerations influencing Britain's policy (especially the roles of France, Germany, and the United States), and also explores the processes of foreign policy making within Britain's complex bureaucratic system. In particular, the relationship between the Foreign Office and the Treasury is analyzed and its impact on European policy assessed. The article challenges traditional views of British policy at this time, concluding that it was far more complex, but also far more limited and constrained, than previous studies would suggest.     

Sir Eric Phipps,the British Government,and the Appeasement of Germany, 1933–1937

This article argues that Sir Eric Phipps’ reputation as an “anti-appeaser” of Germany during his Berlin embassy 1933–1937 is not accurate. While Phipps was not in favor of placating Hitler by making territorial concessions, he had much in common with those who had sought a rapprochement with Germany in the 1920s through a policy of inclusion and reconciliation. Particular importance is placed on Phipps’ attitude towards the League of Nations, with detailed consideration also being accorded to his relationship with the British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Office officials of the period, as well as his views on the Entente Cordiale.     

Rage of Honor: Entente Indignation and the Lost Chance for Peace in the First World War

Why the First World War ended in 1918 and not earlier remains a major puzzle. We propose a new theory that emphasizes how honor prolongs wars beyond what rationalist theories can explain. It argues that when honor is insulted, an affronted actor will strive to punish the offender. Absent an apology, the pursuit of a satisfactory punishment leads the affronted belligerent to ignore unfavorable battlefield information, hold logically irreconcilable beliefs, process information in emotional terms, and obsess over status. We predict that wars of prevention and territorial occupation are most likely to elicit honor considerations. We test our argument against an obscure episode in the war where Germany and the United States made peace overtures in December 1916. We demonstrate that honor concerns made Entente decision makers see German aggression as an affront to their honor that only the destruction of Germany's political regime could redress.     

The Emergence of a Commercial Heavy-Weight: The Kennedy Round Negotiations and the European Community of the 1960s

The Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations between 1963 and 1967 saw the debut on the international commercial stage of the EEC negotiating as a single entity. The Round thus represents a valuable opportunity to assess the impact of the EEC on the international trading system, the compatibility of regional integration with global trade liberalization, and the effectiveness of the Community system in allowing “Europe” to speak internationally with one voice. Its judgement is largely positive, noting in particular the strong connection between the EEC's emergence and both the original American decision to launch the Round and the main negotiating method employed—that of across-the-board tariff cuts. The Kennedy Round, in other words, constituted both a direct response to the Community's growing economic stature and an imitation at global level of the approach to tariff reduction that it had pioneered. The episode also provides a chance to examine the interplay between the EEC's two largest states, France and West Germany, and to suggest that the contrast between their respective approaches to the Kennedy Round was less profound than is normally suggested.     

A Unified Explanation of Territorial Conflict: Testing the Impact of Sampling Bias, 1919–1992

This article develops a new unified territorial explanation of conflict that accounts for the possibility of certain factors affecting the rise of a militarized dispute, as well as the probability that a dispute will escalate to war. In the past, research linking territorial disputes to a relatively high probability of war outbreak has been criticized for underestimating the potential problem of sampling bias in the militarized interstate dispute (MID) data. This study utilizes newly available data on territorial claims going back to 1919 to determine, using a two-stage estimation procedure, whether the presence of territorial claims in the dispute onset phase affects the relationship between territorial militarized disputes and war in the second stage. It is found that territorial claims increase the probability of a militarized dispute occurring and that territorial MIDs increase the probability of war, even while controlling for the effect of territorial claims on dispute onset. The effect of territory across the two stages is consistent with the new territorial explanation of conflict and war and shows no sampling bias with regard to territory in the MID data.     

Back to the future: How Serbia is heading the way of post‐versailles Germany

This analogy written before Milosevic's ouster theorizes that Serbia in the aftermath of Kosovo mirrors Germany after 1919 as a nation forced to accept an imposed peace. From the evidence a resurgence of Serb nationalism and territorial ambition is still inevitable. Various parallels support this conclusion including the use of post‐war sanctions, demands to hand over a wanted war criminal and owe up to guilt, geographical fragmentation, political uncertainty, economic depression, and military association with Russia. The salient point remains one of oversight by the victors to acknowledge an ignominious settlement is the source of all grievances and patterns of instability.     

Libya: Teetering Between War and Diplomacy The Islamic State’s Role in Libya’s Disintegration

This analysis explores post-Qaddafi Libya as it becomes a failed state, alongside international efforts to mend its internal rifts and restore an effective government and thereby halt its national disintegration. Attaining a modus vivendi amongst the internal rival political and military actors looks to enable a war effort to loosen the grasp of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, which infiltrated Libya’s Mediterranean coast in 2014 and gained a strategic foothold in the heart of Libya and nearby its oil ports – Libya’s economic lifeline. An internal agreement looks to rebuild the state security system that can confront the continuing tribal, ethnic, Salafi-jihadistic, and criminal militarisation of Libya, which also contributes to its bloody chaos. This exegesis focuses on the brief but challenging period of 2014-2016 in terms of the threats to Libya’s governmental and territorial integrity, outlining the principal junctures and actors.     

The Cold War “Special Relationship” Revisited

This article focuses on one of the most potent ideas in world politics: the idea of an Anglo-American “special relationship.” It examines the use and abuse of this relationship, as cultural referent, rhetorical construct, and political imperative, during the long Cold War. It inspects the roots of specialness—the core conditions—in terms of belief and experience as well as need and opportunity. It warns of the hubris inherent in the presumption of specialness on the Churchillian model, a frame of reference (and a set of strategic contingencies) time-expired even before the expiration of the Cold War itself.     

Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt: From New York to Prague

The present article first traces Ambassador Steinhardt's career from his days at Columbia University (1909-1915) to his successful legal career as a partner at Guggenheimer, Untermyer & Marshall in New York City. It then studies Steinhardt's diplomatic career that commenced in 1933, when President Roosevelt sent him as U.S. minister in Sweden. This was followed by appointments—as U.S. ambassador—in Peru and the Soviet Union. His wartime service as U.S. ambassador to Turkey is examined closely since the lessons learned there would have been applicable at his next post, Prague, Czechoslovakia.     

'A conference now': Lloyd George and peacemaking, 1939: Sidelights from the unpublished letters of A.J. Sylvester

Lloyd George's latest infatuation [with Hitler, after his visit to Germany in 1936] was something more than the momentary lapse of a failing dotard. To sup with the devil was completely in character for the man who, at the summit of affairs in 1919, had been drawn to power like a moth to a candle, who had come to worship success for its own sake and on its own terms and to make it the first and last determinant oi his actions; and who, for his final appearance on the world stage, a few years after the Berchtesgaden visit, aspired to a role that would reconcile power with practical politics - that of a British counterpart to Marshal Petain; in which capacity, let it be said, he would doubtless have pulled off a better “deal” than most. (A. Lentin, Lloyd George, Woodrow Wilson and the Guilt of Germany. An Essay in the Pre-history of Appeasement, 1984, p. 154.)     

Indian federalism at the crossroads: Limits of the territorial management of ethnic conflict

ABSTRACT

This article critically examines territorial strategies adopted by the Indian state to accommodate territorially concentrated minority groups in two very recent cases: the formation of Telangana (2014) and the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) (2003). We situate both cases within the broader context of linguistic state reorganization in India since the 1950s. We argue that while the formation of states on the basis of linguistic principle was necessary given the long history of demand for linguistic states in India, it is, as Telangana and BTC clearly bear out, not sufficient to accommodate minorities. This is especially the case when, inter alia, language is: (1) appropriated by the dominant group within a state (or states) as a vehicle to perpetuate political majoritarianism, (2) supplemented by weak power-sharing arrangement, and (3) occasioned by longstanding popular perceptions of historical injustices and relative deprivation.     

“Brighter Futures, Better Times”: Britain, the Empire, and Anglo-American Economic Competition in Cuba, 1898-1920

This article examines Anglo-American economic competition in Cuba in the crucial twenty years after 1898. Anglo-American economic competition on the new island nation suggest a number of things about the nature of British and American imperialism, the difficult position of smaller countries—and economies—like Cuba, and the “inevitability” of American economic pre-eminence in the evolving twentieth century. And as an important corollary to the British dimension of this question is the role that Canada and Canadian overseas investment played in the extension of Britain's economic power and influence in the wider world.     

Visa Diplomacy

The consular element of national diplomatic power plays an essential, but often overlooked role in international relations. This is unfortunate, since the process of globalization places increasing importance on so-called “low politics”—trade, commerce, tourism, migration—all traditional consular areas of interest. This study examines the visa component of consular diplomacy as an integral device in the conduct of international relations. The simple visa serves an important purpose in international relations and is a well-used, but little studied, instrument of foreign policy in today's system of sovereign states.

In this article, “visa diplomacy” is defined as the use of visa issuance or denial at an individual, group, and interstate level, to influence another state's policies. Although possessing limitations, visa diplomacy is an available signaling and retorsion instrument which makes it a viable policy option in the arena of international affairs. At the operative level, it links an individual or group to its sovereign country and respective national policies. Denial or issuance at the individual or group level can have outcomes on overall interstate interactions as illustrated in the cases selected for this study. The conclusion assesses where the use of visa diplomacy seems most effective in international relations.     

A territorial history of the international system

This article charts the evolution of the international system from the post‐Napoleonic wars to the present, with special reference to growth in the number and configuration of states as well as changes in territorial sovereignty involving those states. Growth and change in the international system was found to occur largely in the 20th century. In that time, war plays a major role in precipitating the growth of the international system, although war is less significant in changes in territorial sovereignty. Finally, it was noted that major powers were involved in one half of the territorial changes. Implications for the future of the international system are discussed.     

China's Naval Rise and the South China Sea: An Operational Assessment

Over the last fifteen years, the steady rise of China's naval capabilities has received a level of attention unmatched since the Soviet navy's expansion following the Cuban Missile Crisis. Yet much of that attention has focused on what that rise has meant for Taiwan's security or a possible contest with the United States.¹ But Beijing's seaward territorial concerns also reach far into the South China Sea. And it is there that the military balance has most swiftly swung in China's favor as a result of its modernization program. This article will examine not only how the military balance has shifted, but also what Southeast Asian countries, particularly Vietnam and the Philippines, could do to best preserve their territorial interests in response to that shift.     

Wilsonian Pragmatism? Woodrow Wilson, Japanese Immigration, and the Paris Peace Conference

“He [Wilson] was more than just an idealist: he was the personification of the heritage of idealism of the American people. He brought spiritual concepts to the peace table. He was a born crusader.”

Herbert Hoover ¹

The issue of the Japanese plea for race equality at the Paris Peace Conference is generally seen as a secondary issue for American delegates. Most accounts see Wilson as being bullied into rejecting the proposal by the Dominion delegates — most notably Australia's Billy Hughes. Analyzing his views on race and its intricate connection with immigration and examining his own and his advisers response to political allies and opponents at home and in Paris over these issues, this piece will argue that Wilson responded as much to domestic pressures as external forces in his eventual compromise with the Japanese in Paris.