财产权对人格权的积极索取与主动避让

财产权与人格权的关系历来是充满争议和左右徘徊的问题。传统理论认为人格权是内在于人且具有绝对的不可侵犯性,在与财产权冲突时优先。但并非所有人格要素都是内在于人,物质性人格权,尤其是身体权和生命权具有绝对优先性,财产权面临生命和身体冲突须主动作出自我牺牲性避让,甚至是以作为方式提供救助,而一些非物质性人格利益并不具有内在性和绝对不可侵性,财产权则可以对其实施积极索取,但在一定临界点,也必须立即停止积极索取行为,只是这种避让无须作出自我牺牲,无须作为。     

我国妇女农地权利法律制度运作的实证研究与完善路径

在我国,保护农村妇女土地权益具有重要意义,但调查研究表明,农村妇女土地权益频受侵害,土地承包经营权并未得到充分的保障。造成这种状况的主要原因:一是我国立法上对"男娶女嫁"婚嫁方式可能损害妇女土地权利的认识不足;二是法律、政策的相关规定互相矛盾;三是立法上对妇女权益法律保护的效果适得其反;四是法律规定过于原则,操作性不强;五是当村规民约侵害妇女土地承包权益时,缺乏有效的法律救济途径;为此,应当有效化解政策、法律之间的冲突,完善细化法律规则,在立法和执法过程中引入社会性别视角,加强对村规民约的法律审查,消除制度歧视。     

知识产权：自然权利亦或法定之权

就财产权的正当性而言,以洛克财产权劳动学说为代表的自然权利论和源于休谟并经边沁等人发扬光大的功利主义影响最为深远.两种理论看似难以调和的两极,实则从不同侧面揭示了财产权的正当性基础.在这个意义上,知识产权既是源于创造性活动的自然权利,又是国家基于功利原则授予的法定之权.     

Disability Rights Commission: From Civil Rights to Social Rights

This paper argues that, although originally conceived as part of the ‘civil rights’ agenda, the development of disability rights in Britain by the Disability Rights Commission (DRC) is better seen as a movement towards the realization of social, economic, and cultural rights, and so as reaffirmation of the indissolubility of human rights in the round. As such, that process of development represents a concrete exercise in the implementation of social rights by a statutory equality body and a significant step towards the conception of disability rights as universal participation, not just individual or minority group entitlement. The paper considers the distinctive features of that regulatory activity. It asks what sort of equality the DRC set out to achieve for disabled people and where, as a result, its work positioned it on the regulatory spectrum. From the particular experience of the DRC, the paper looks forward to considerations of general relevance to other such bodies, including the new Equality and Human Rights Commission.     

论作为财产权的水权

将水权客体——水资源的功能概括为生活功能、资源功能和环境功能,认为水权的财产权性质在水资源的不同功能区间中得到体现,其中水资源的生活功能对应的是作为宪法财产权的水权,水资源的资源功能对应的是作为民法财产权的水权,水资源的环境功能对应的是作为宪法财产权或共用财产权的水权。在此基础上,提出作为财产权的水权的实现机制及对我国水资源保护和利用的启示。     

Raz on Rights: Human Rights,Fundamental Rights,and Balancing

After clarifying the outlines of Raz's interest theory of rights and its relationship to aspects of the principles theory of rights, I consider how his recent observations on human rights manage to fit (or fail to fit) into the interest theory. I then address two questions. First, I elaborate on Raz's definition of morally fundamental rights, arguing that he is right in claiming that there are no such rights. I then show that the interest theory accommodates the notion that rights may take qualitative precedence over conflicting considerations—a question that has become increasingly relevant in light of recent writing on rights.     

论专利被许可使用权之债权属性

从《专利法》第11条的“未经许可”规定来看，将专利权视为消极排除权较将其视为积极使用权更为合理。一旦将专利权视为消极排除权，专利权人不能积极行使排除权，专利许可是专利权人容忍被许可人“进入”了其“排除”范围，被许可人仅取得了使用专利的行为资格。而且，专利被许可使用权是通过合同产生的，被许可使用权是一种合同债权。即使在目前大多将专利权视为积极使用权的情况下，专利被许可使用权只能是合同债权，不能成为类似于用益物权的权利，也不能被物权化。     

Are Procedural Rights Derivative Substantive Rights?

Law and Philosophy -     

论环境权的人权属性

对于环境权的属性问题一直是法学界争论的一个焦点 ,可谓众说纷纭 ,莫衷一是。从权利本原的角度入手 ,阐述目前我国研究权利特别是环境权的范式存在的误区 ,提出应从唯物主义的立场揭示环境权的自然权利属性。同时 ,对人权的历史发展中概念、性质、主体和内容的变化进行剖析 ,推断出环境权符合人权的构成要件 ,在精神实质与价值内涵上与人权存在固有的联系 ,是一项人类社会生存与发展不可或缺的基本人权。     

信息网络传播权的权利限制

信息网络传播权是著作权在网络中最重要的权能之一,是著作权人的权利在网络环境中的延伸和扩张.它是法律赋予著作权人控制自己的作品在网络上传播的专有权利,与网络文化的自由开放精神相冲突,对其进行限制成为必要,同时有必要从合理使用与法定许可两方面予以完善.     

Fundamental Rights

This essay aims at laying the foundations for a general theory offundamental rights. It starts out from a formal and structuraldefinition of the concept of `fundamental right', which is definedas a non-disposable, universal right. The author believes thatthis definition can be used as a starting point for the constructionof a theory of constitutional democracy based on four main theses.1) As fundamental rights are non-disposable and universal, theyare structurally different from patrimonial rights, which aredisposable and individual; 2) fundamental rights constitute thecontent of substantial democracy, i.e. the positive and negativelimits set on the power exercisable by the majority that comprisesformal democracy; 3) citizenship, which is still the precondition forholding many fundamental rights, is a regressive category becauseit is a source of inequality; 4) a distinction must be drawn betweenfundamental rights and the guarantees (duties and sanctions) put in place to protect them. Should a legal order make provision forfundamental rights but fail to accompany them with the necessaryauarantees, the result is a gap that the legislator and the legalinterpreter have a duty to bridge. The theory of constitutionaldemocracy thus elaborated constitutes a profound change in classical(Kelsenian) legal positivism, which is no longer suitable forpresenting the law of contemporary states governed by the rule oflaw, and calls for a more active, critical attitude towards law both by the judge and by legal science.     

Insatiable Rights

The essay criticises Ferrajoli's ideas about political democracyand the relationship between it and fundamental rights. Thedefinition of `substantial democracy' furnished by Ferrajoliis considered inopportune, because it claims to provide a semanticsolution to the normative problem of the limits of content ofdemocratic decisions. Ferrajoli is also criticised for equatingconstitutions with the social contract, with the result thatthe functioning of political democracy is tied to unanimousconsent and constitutions are treated as eternal. Finally, theauthor argues that treating the lack of guarantees of fundamentalrights in a legal order as a technical gap is tantamount toconceiving rights and their guarantees as something preordainedto positive law and subtracting them from the democraticlegislator's political decisions.