The Case Against Balanced Budgets

A proposal by the Fahey government in late 1994 to amend the NSW state Constitution so as to require 'balanced' budgets is one of a number of signs which suggest that the simple notion that total government expenditure should not exceed total tax revenue has gained real influence in Australia, particularly at the state level. This article explains why fiscal responsibility does not require overall budget balance. A balanced budget requirement of this type is not appropriate even if one were to make allowances for recession-induced ('cyclical') deficits, and to seek to ban only 'structural' deficits. The reason for this is there are inherent irregularities in capital expenditure, and only through varying debt levels is it possible to reconcile reasonable stability of tax levels with stable levels of provision of public services (including services from public capital infrastructure).     

Budget institutions and taxation

While a number of different studies have explored the effects of budgetary procedures and the centralization of the budget process on government debt, deficits and spending, few of them have explored whether such fiscal institutions matter for public revenue. This article argues that centralizing the budget process raises the levels of taxation by limiting the ability of individual government officials to veto tax increases in line with common-pool-problem arguments regarding public finances. Using detailed data on budgetary procedures from 15 EU countries, the empirical analysis shows that greater centralization of the budget process increases taxation as a share of GDP and that both the type of budget centralization and level of government fractionalization matter for the size of this effect. The results suggest that further centralizing the budget process limits government debt and deficits by increasing public revenues as well as constraining public spending.     

The Flypaper Effect: Evidence from India

The flypaper effect refers to the phenomenon whereby expenditure stimulus from unconditional grants exceeds that from an equivalent increase in income. The flypaper effect has been described as "money sticks where it hits." The present study empirically tests the flypaper effect for the Indian economy. The study also tests the asymmetry hypothesis that looks at the impact of retrenchment in grants. Results obtained in the present study show the flypaper effect to be vindicated. We find that both capital and revenue expenditures receive a greater stimulus from grants than would an increase in income. Results show that in the prereform period both revenue and capital expenditures are maintained during periods of grant cuts. However, in the postreform period it is only expenditures on revenue accounts that are maintained in periods of grant reduction. We also find that during periods of grant reduction, state governments maintain their expenditure programs by raising their own tax revenue. This suggests that grants from the center have had a disincentive effect and could be a reason that state governments have not exploited their tax potential to the fullest. By bringing to the fore the disincentive effect of grants we wish to emphasize the urgency of taking a closer look at restructuring and redesigning our system of intergovernmental transfers.     

Performance measures in tax administration: Chile as a case study

The article proposes a set of tax administration performance measures and contrasts them with measures actually used by the Chilean tax administration agency. The goals assumed for the tax administration agency (TA) are to maximize tax revenue collection and provide quality services to taxpayers. Ideal performance measures (PMs) would measure the deviation of actual outcome from a best‐practice standard, given the value of all variables affecting organisation performance that are outside management control. The key challenge is to build and calculate these best‐practice outcomes. In Chile the PM in use, for the first goal, is the ratio of actual to potential tax revenue collection. This PM does adjust revenue collection for variations in the tax structure and rate, but it fails to control other variables that affect performance such as the TA budget and per capita income. The PM in use, for the second goal, is taxpayer satisfaction measured through sample surveys. This seems the appropriate PM, as quality of taxpayer services depends directly on the TA efforts to improve them. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Tax Expenditure Budgets, Budget Policy, and Tax Policy: Confusion in the States

A tax expenditure budget should contribute to efficient and effective public decisions by quantifying the division in the tax structure between provisions that represent revenue policy (distribute the cost of government according to the legislated tax base) and parts that represent budget policy (substitute for direct spending). For this transparency to have the desired impact, however, the tax expenditure budget process and the direct expenditure process must be properly integrated and the tax expenditure budget must make an accurate division between the parts of the tax structure. A review of the 33 states with tax expenditure systems shows many weaknesses in application of the concept and poor linkage to the direct spending budget system. Their most significant flaw is in dividing the tax structure into normal and preference elements; states need greater attention to defining their basic tax structure if they are to have a meaningful tax expenditure budget.     

On the political economy of national tax revenue forecasts: evidence from OECD countries

Sustainable budgets are important quality signals for the electorate. Politicians might thus have an incentive to influence tax revenue forecasts, which are widely regarded as a key element of national budget plans. Looking at the time period from 1996 to 2012, we systematically analyze whether national tax revenue forecasts in 18 OECD countries are biased due to political manipulation. Drawing on theories from the field of political economy, we test three hypotheses using panel estimation techniques. We find support for partisan politics. Left-wing governments seem to produce more optimistic, or less pessimistic, tax revenue forecasts than do right-wing ones. Contrary to the theoretical prediction based on the “common pool” problem, we find that more fragmented governments and parliaments tend to produce more pessimistic, or less optimistic, tax revenue forecasts. We find no empirical evidence that political business cycles play a role in tax revenue forecasts.     

Tax Expenditure Reporting: The Utilization of an Innovation

Central to this article is the question, “Are tax expenditure reports used?” State legislators serving on tax committees in ten states were surveyed regarding their use and their perceptions of others' use of tax expenditure report information. Responses indicate (1) strong acceptance and broad use of report information; (2) purposes and policy stages of use characteristic of technical information use; and (3) use focused predominantly on resource acquisition (revenue) policy rather than resource allocation (budget) policy. Thus it appears that tax expenditure reporting does not operate to secure budgetary control over tax expenditures, and consequently tax expenditures continue largely to escape budget scrutiny.     

The Politics of Forecast Bias: Forecaster Effect and Other Effects in New York City Revenue Forecasting

This paper examines the impact of forecasters, horizons, revenue categories, and forecast timing in relation to decision making on forecast bias or accuracy. The significant findings are: for the most part forecasters tend to report forecasts that are similar rather than competitive. Forecast bias (underforecasting) increases over longer horizons; consequently claims of structural budget deficit are suspect, as an assertion of structural deficit requires that a reliable forecast of revenue shows continuous shortfall compared with a reliable forecast of expenditures. There is an overforecasting bias in property tax, possibly reflecting demand for services. There is an underforecasting forecast bias in two revenue categories, all other taxes and federal categorical grants, resulting in a net total underforecasting bias for the city's revenue. There appears to be a period effect (forecasts in June are substantially biased), but this effect requires further study. The study suggests further examination of the bias associated with revenue categories, time within the budget cycle, and forecast horizon.     

Budget Deficits in the States: Connecticut

Like many states, the State of Connecticut has recently faced substantial budget problems. This article is one of several that explore budget deficits in the states. We explore the reasons, extent, and current solutions to the budget deficits in Connecticut. Connecticut's fiscal circumstances include very poor accounting practices; dueling revenue estimates; large amounts of debt (both bonded and for post-employment benefits); a structurally strong legislature and governor; a governor and legislative majority of different political parties and fiscal philosophies; and a legislature with the ability to override gubernatorial vetoes. The combination of these ingredients has led to a highly partisan and contentious approach to budget discussions amid some of the largest budget deficits the state has ever experienced.     

Economic Considerations and Reagan's New Federalism Swap Proposals

Upon coming to office, President Ronald Reagan proposed a numberof programs collectively referred to as the New Federalism.These programs were designed to alleviate some of the problemswhich the president saw as plaguing the intergovernmental systemand to accomplish Reagan's goal of decentralizing authority.One of the most highly publicized and debated— indeed,probably the most controversial—aspect of the President'sNew Federalism package was the "Big Swap" plan. Both versionsof this plan, however, were bad deals for the states and theircommunities, and it would appear that several interrelated economicconcerns played a role in the opposition of many state and localofficials to these proposals. To demonstrate just how bad theseproposals were, the article documents the effect that inflationand recession had had on the fiscal health of state and localgovernments, and the projected impact that these plans wouldhave had on state and local revenue and tax systems.     

Surviving a Revenue Collapse: Shortfall and Recovery in California

Substantial revenue shortfalls have to be reckoned with, no matter what their cause or what the cost. California found itself in such a situation late in the 1987–88 fiscal year. On April 22, 1988,' it ascertained that tax receipts were falling behind forecasted revenues. This led to the prediction of a $1 billion shortfall for California in 1987–88 and again in 1988–89. The article reviews the causes of the shortfall and describes the actions taken by the governor and the legislature to balance the budget.     

The Politics and economics of revenue growth: A cross–national analysis

Despite considerable interest in comparative fiscal policy in general, and the high salience of tax policy and tax reform in the industrialized democracies, there are relatively few cross–national studies of the economic and political correlates of revenues over time. We undertake a cross–national time series study of revenue growth in fourteen OECD countries between 1958 and 1990.We test a number of political and economic hypotheses about revenue change, including political business cycle, 'fiscal illusion', elasticity, and ideological theories. For the 1958—1990 period, we find that all countries, regardless of revenue structure, experience higher real revenue growth as a result of inflation, but that revenue growth is more responsive to unemployment in countries that rely more on direct taxes compared to countries with less direct–tax reliance. We find that this effect is most pronounced in the post–1972 period. We also find that revenue tends to increase in the years following elections, consistent with the idea that governments try to minimize the political fallout from tax increases by separating them as much as possible from election campaign periods; this effect, too, is most pronounced in the post–1972 period. We find no support for 'fiscal illusion' and ideological theories of revenue growth.     

The politics and economics of revenue growth: A cross-national analysis

Abstract Despite considerable interest in comparative fiscal policy in general, and the high salience of tax policy and tax reform in the industrialized democracies, there are relatively few cross–national studies of the economic and political correlates of revenues over time. We undertake a cross–national time series study of revenue growth in fourteen OECD countries between 1958 and 1990.We test a number of political and economic hypotheses about revenue change, including political business cycle, 'fiscal illusion', elasticity, and ideological theories. For the 1958—1990 period, we find that all countries, regardless of revenue structure, experience higher real revenue growth as a result of inflation, but that revenue growth is more responsive to unemployment in countries that rely more on direct taxes compared to countries with less direct–tax reliance. We find that this effect is most pronounced in the post–1972 period. We also find that revenue tends to increase in the years following elections, consistent with the idea that governments try to minimize the political fallout from tax increases by separating them as much as possible from election campaign periods; this effect, too, is most pronounced in the post–1972 period. We find no support for 'fiscal illusion' and ideological theories of revenue growth.     

Dueling Revenue Caps and Municipal Bond Yields: The Case of Houston,Texas

Two competing revenue cap proposals, one from a citizen's group and the other proposed by the mayor, were on the November 2004, election ballot of the City of Houston, Texas. Both propositions passed, yet the citizen's group had to sue to have their initiative enforced. This study examines the effect on Houston bond yields of the series of events (from June 2004 through March 2006) surrounding these dueling revenue cap propositions. The empirical findings suggest that the budget‐related events can have a significant effect on yields demanded by investors in the secondary market for outstanding uninsured tax‐exempt general obligation debt.     

Revisiting the Income Tax Effects of Legalizing Same‐Sex Marriages

In this paper we estimate the impacts on income tax collections of legalizing same‐sex marriage. We utilize new individual‐level data sources to estimate the federal income tax consequences of legalizing same‐sex marriages. These data sources also allow us to estimate the impact of legalization on state income tax collections. We find that 23 states would realize a net fiscal benefit from legalization, while 21 states would experience a decline in revenue. The potential (annual) changes in state tax revenue range from negative $29 million in California to positive $16 million in New York. At the federal level, our estimates suggest an overall reduction in revenues, ranging from a potential loss of $187 million to $580 million. Overall, we find that the federal and state impacts are quite modest. We also find that our estimates are only marginally affected by alternative assumptions about how many same‐sex couples will choose to marry and which partner will claim any children for tax deduction purposes.     

A User's Guide to State Revenue Forecasting

One of the most difficult tasks in preparing a state budget is forecasting available revenues. An overly optimistic forecast may subsequently require unpopular budget cuts, tax increases, or both. A pessimistic forecast may trigger a political controversy over the size of the budget surplus, or may encourage additional spending that cannot be sustained in the future. Forecasters have always informally shared their experience with each other. Only in recent years, however have scholars begun to document those experiences.
A forecast user is an elected official, program manager, reporter or private citizen involved in the budget process who uses a forecast prepared by someone else as a basis for making or influencing policy decisions about state taxes and spending levels. __ While the objectives of these forecast users may vary depending on their role in the budget process, they all share one need in common: a sound forecast which provides them with the information they need to participate in the budget process. The first part of this article briefly reviews the status of revenue forecasting in the states. The second part reviews five specific forecasting issues. The third section, discusses limits of revenue forecasting. The concluding section is a summary and checklist of good revenue forecasting practices.     

Grant Levels and Debt Issuance: Is There a Relationship? Is There Symmetry?

Although previous work on fiscal federalism and grants has focused on the effects of grants on expenditures, no published research examines the impact of decreasing grants on state financing. This research addresses how decreasing levels of federal grant money to states affect states' long-term debt issuance, and whether the relationship is symmetric for increasing and decreasing grants. The model is tested with time series, cross-sectional data from 1984 to 1999. The results show that grants affect debt issuance, the effect is asymmetric, and direction of the effect differs for different types of debt issuance.     

Budget Deficits in the States: Massachusetts

Massachusetts entered the current recession carrying a structural deficit counterbalanced by a healthy, $2.1 billion stabilization fund, equal to 10 percent of total tax revenue. Like most states, Massachusetts only dimly realized the depth of the current recession in October 2008 when revenue collections began to slip and welfare caseloads began to increase. By May of 2009, a total FY2009 budget gap of $4 billion had been identified, the combined effect of plummeting revenues and increased costs for welfare and medical assistance. The Commonwealth closed the FY2009 budget gap through a combination of budget cuts, stabilization fund transfers, and federal stimulus funds. The Commonwealth faced an even larger $4.8 billion budget gap in FY2010. With the stabilization fund severely depleted, the FY2010 budget gap was closed primarily by budget cuts, federal stimulus money, and a sales and use tax increase. Because of the Commonwealth's reliance on one-time money to close current budget gaps, a significant budget gap of at least $2.8 billion for FY2011 was identified soon after passage of the budget. In this paper we discuss the political and historic context in which the budget gaps occurred, outline the causes of the budget gaps, and evaluate the strategies employed to close them.     

The Hard Road to Fiscal Responsibility

The paper describes the current fiscal problems of the United States showing that without significant changes in revenue and spending policies, the country is headed for a sovereign debt crisis similar to that afflicting countries in Southern Europe. Numerous committees and commissions have offered policy options that would stabilize the debt–GDP ratio in the long run. The proposals of the President's National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform and the Bipartisan Policy Center's Deficit Reduction Task Force are described in detail. Elected politicians have not been enthusiastic about the work of these bodies. Only the House has passed a budget that would stabilize the debt and that proposal is analyzed as is the president's response. The paper goes on to describe the Budget Control Act that was passed after the debt limit debate in the summer of 2011.     

How to think about the U.S. budget challenge

The long‐term budget prospects of the United States are grim. Projected spending greatly exceeds projected revenue over the next few decades. Projected growth of health care spending accounts for more than all of the anticipated gap. Without action to narrow the gap, accumulating deficits will drive up the ratio of debt to GDP. Interest payments will rise correspondingly. At some point, domestic and foreign holders of U.S. debt will come to doubt the capacity of the government to service this debt. At that point, they will demand sharply higher interest rates. The combination of increasing debt and rising interest rates will cause debt service costs to explode. What follows would be some combination of collapsing investment, declining production, debt default, and inflation—in brief, a calamitous mess. That such a mess will occur is certain if budget deficits as large as those currently anticipated are realized. Precisely when is impossible to forecast accurately.