Corporations and the Presumption of Innocence

Corporate behaviour is often regulated through the criminal law by means of reverse onus offences. Such offences are alleged to involve violations of the Presumption of Innocence. Such allegations almost always assume natural persons as defendants. The arguments supporting reverse onus offences are typically instrumental, to do with the importance of the social goals promoted and the ease of proof. The Presumption of Innocence is taken to be an autonomy right of natural persons and so not subject to being sidelined for reasons of law enforcement expediency. Corporations, however, are not natural persons: they have no autonomy right not to be treated as means. It may well be, then, that reverse onus offences are justified in the case of corporate defendants. I argue that the Presumption is not violated by such offences in the case of corporate defendants. I develop a broad concept of the criminal justice system as an allocative system, and argue that reverse onus offences properly allocate the burden of proof for corporations. Specifically, I argue that the normative demand for legal innocence is sufficiently met by the availability of a due diligence defence; that the responsibility of corporations when prohibited harms occur is properly a form of outcome-responsibility; and that taking into account issues of reciprocity, legitimacy and power reverse onus offences justly allocate the burden of proof in the case of corporate defendants.     

论无罪推定

推定是认定事实的特殊方法,它有三大要素构成。法国《人权宣言》第9条规定:"任何人在其未被宣告为犯罪以前应被推定为无罪"。这一推定并不具有推定的构成要件,且既不能发生法律效力,也不能执行,故为虚假推定。中国社科院林欣研究员认为:这个原则"应该译为‘无罪假定’"。法国《人权宣言》第9条的规定如果是无罪假定是可以成立的,也具有一定的价值。需要澄清几个问题:一是现代法治国家并没有普遍确立无罪推定原则;二是无罪推定并不能构成扼制刑讯逼供和保障人权的理由和根据;三是真正的无罪推定是指,不能证实有罪,应推定为无罪。     

The Ideal of the Presumption of Innocence

This article clarifies and further defends the view that the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, protected by Article 6(2) of the European Convention of Human Rights has implications for the substantive law. It is shown that a ‘purely procedural’ conception of the presumption of innocence has absurd implications for the nature of the right. Objections to the moderate substantive view defended are considered, including the acceptability of male prohibits offences, the difficulty of ascertaining intentions of legislatures and the proper role of prosecutorial discretion.     

The Prosecutor and the Presumption of Innocence

In what ways is the conduct of prosecutors constrained by the presumption of innocence? To address this question, I first develop an account of the presumption in the trial context, according to which it is a vital element in a moral assurance procedure for the justified infliction of legal punishment. Jurors must presume the factual innocence of defendants at the outset of trials and then be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by the government’s evidence before they convict defendants. Prosecutors’ responsibilities to promote the integrity of this moral assurance procedure are then divided into pre-trial, during-trial, and post-trial phases. Since most charge adjudication is effected through plea bargaining, the ways in which plea procedures must be modified to conform to this moral assurance procedure, and thus honor the presumption of innocence, are also discussed.     

Preventive Justice and the Presumption of Innocence

When the state aims to prevent responsible and dangerous actors from harming its citizens, it must choose between criminal law and other preventive techniques. The state, however, appears to be caught in a Catch-22: using the criminal law raises concerns about whether early inchoate conduct is properly the target of punishment, whereas using the civil law raises concerns that the state is circumventing the procedural protections available to criminal defendants. Andrew Ashworth has levied the most serious charge against civil preventive regimes, arguing that they evade the presumption of innocence. After sketching out a substantive justification for a civil, preventive regime, I ask what Ashworth’s challenge consists in. It seems that there is broad disagreement over the meaning and requirements of the presumption of innocence. I thus survey the myriad possibilities and extract two claims that have potential bearing on preventive regimes. One claim is that of substantive priority—the criminal law comes first when assessing blame. This is the claim at the root of objections to pretrial detention based on consideration of the crime charged. The second strand of argument is one of procedural symmetry. This is the concern that with respect to citizen/state relations, certain procedures are required, including, for example, proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to the offense or defense. Having extracted these claims, I then assess their applicability with respect to the preventive regime defended. I first conclude that the criminal law must share blame and censure with other fora, and thus, the criminal law only has substantive priority when criminal proceedings have been instituted. I then survey whether procedural symmetry is required, specifically assessing whether the preventive regime I defend requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. My tentative conclusion is that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is warranted.     

Ambiguous exchanges and the police

This article analyses exchange relationships involving public police agencies and external institutions. It specifies three general forms of exchange (Coercion, Sale and Gift), then observes that, in practice, the three may not be mutually exclusive. It identifies ambiguities that may exist within exchange relationships, and discusses the implications of these for three important aspects of police performance: efficiency or value for money; equity in the distribution of police services; and the legitimacy of the police organisation. The article concludes that managing ambiguity in exchange relations has become a challenge of 21st century policing, and that police are well advised to have elaborate guidelines in place to govern their exchange relations.     

Innocence Commissions: Due Process Remedies and Protection for the Innocent

Currently the American criminal justice system has no institutional mechanism to evaluate the conviction of an innocent person. An innocence commission would fill this gap. The commission would automatically review any acknowledged case of wrongful conviction, whether the conviction was reversed on post-conviction DNA tests, or through development of new evidence of innocence. Upon review of these cases, the commission would recommend remedies to prevent such miscarriages of justice from happening again. This paper commences with a review of the primary areas of wrongful conviction, followed by recommendations made with respect to the substantive components constituting innocence commissions. To empirically demonstrate the fiscal soundness of creating an innocence commission, data was gathered pertaining to the state of Arizona. Statements from criminal justice professionals and politicians in support of innocence commissions conclude our discussion.     

刑事申诉筛选机制比较研究

刑事申诉筛选机制负责受理申诉,并对申诉进行审查、调查和评估,之后将符合法定条件的申诉输出到再审系统.世界上主要有三种申诉筛选模式:司法机关型、独立机构型和民间团体型.我国现行申诉筛选机制没有很好地起到筛选优质冤假错案的作用,因此,应设立一个独立的申诉案件复查委员会来统一受理、审查和筛选申诉案件.     

The Presumption of Innocence in the Trial Setting

The starting frame with which jurors begin trials and the approach which they should take toward the presentation of evidence by the prosecution and defense are distinguished. A robust interpretation of the starting frame, according to which jurors should begin trials by presuming the material innocence of defendants, is defended. Alternative starting frames which are less defendant‐friendly are shown to cohere less well with the notion that criminal trials should constitute stern tests of the government's case against those it has charged with crimes. The intuitive case for the robust presumption of innocence is supplemented with empirical evidence concerning the psychology of belief formation and preservation. Various objections to the proposed starting frame are addressed.     

Deferred Prosecution Agreements and the Presumption of Innocence

A deferred prosecution agreement, or DPA, allows a corporation, instead of proceeding to trial on a criminal charge, to settle matters with the state by acknowledging the facts on which any charge would be based, pay a reduced fine, and agree to change the way they conduct business. Critics of DPAs have suggested that, because the defendant corporation must pay a fine and submit to structural reform without having been found guilty at trial, DPAs violate the Presumption of Innocence. This paper argues that they do not. The paper appeals to the role of civic trust in a liberal political community. The obligations a corporation assumes in a DPA can be framed as a reasonable retributive response to a breach by that corporation of the community’s laws, and an appropriate reassurance by that corporation to the community that such breaches will not reoccur. This framing is sufficient to deny that DPAs violate the Presumption of Innocence.     

Innocence Lost: A Problem for Punishment as Duty

Constrained instrumentalist theories of punishment – those that seek to justify punishment by its good effects, but limit its scope – are an attractive alternative to pure retributivism or utilitarianism. One way in which we may be able to limit the scope of instrumental punishment is by justifying punishment through the concept of duty. This strategy is most clearly pursued in Victor Tadros’ influential ‘Duty View’ of punishment. In this paper, I show that the Duty View as it stands cannot find any moral distinction between the permissible punishment of the guilty and the permissible punishment of the innocent in extreme circumstances, therefore undermining one the key pillars of its intuitive appeal. I canvass several ways to respond to this problem, arguing that a rights (or claims) forfeiture theory which employs the distinction between rights forfeiture and rights infringement (or claims forfeiture and infringement) is the best solution.     

The Presumption of Innocence and the Human Rights Act

There has recently been a proliferation of case law dealing with potential inroads into the presumption of innocence in the criminal law of England and Wales, in the light of article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights. This article is concerned with the nature of the presumption of innocence. It considers two central issues. The first is how the courts should address the question of when the presumption of innocence is interfered with. The second is the extent to which interference with the presumption of innocence may be justified on the grounds of proportionality. It is argued that the courts have not developed the appropriate concepts and principles properly to address these questions.     

論「無罪推定」原則的歷史發展

「無罪推定」的法律概念源起於古希臘及古羅馬,作爲法律原則,它最早由法國的教會法法學家提出,再由義大利的刑法學家完善它的理論。作爲成文法,則最早出現於1789年的法國《人權和公民權利宣言》,現已是多個國際公約確認的基本人權,香港的《基本法》也有相關原則。中國的《刑事訴訟法》也提出未依法判決不得確定有罪及罪疑從無的原則。坦白從寬,抗拒從嚴。自古以來,不論中外,嫌     

论律师的职业秘密

一、律师职业秘密与律师职业秘密特权所谓律师的职业秘密,是指律师因其职务活动中所知悉的与其委托人有关且为其委托人不愿透露的事项。律师的职业秘密具有以下特征:1、律师职业秘密的主体是律师。这里的律师包括律师、曾经担任过律师的人、实习律师、律师助理等知悉秘密的人员     

Loss of Innocence in Common Law Presumptions

This review article of Stumer (The presumption of innocence: evidential and human rights perspectives. Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2010) explores the concept, normative foundations and institutional implications of the presumption of innocence in English law. Through critical engagement with Stumer’s methodological assumptions and normative arguments, it highlights the narrowness of common lawyers’ traditional conceptions of the presumption of innocence. Picking up the threads of previous work, it also contributes to on-going debates about the legitimacy of reverse onus clauses and their compatibility with European human rights law and general principles of criminal jurisprudence.     

无罪推定原则研究

无罪推定原则作为刑事诉讼中的一个重要原则 ,对于确保被告人在审判中受到公平对待、参与法庭判决制作和保障人权具有重要意义。其思想在我国古代已有体现 ,但真正现代意义的无罪推定原则是近代资产阶级大革命胜利的成果。我国现行法律还没有确立完全意义的无罪推定 ,但吸收了其合理内核。在正确理解无罪推定原则时 ,我们应注意该原则与实事求是、沉默权、传统法律观念和配套法律制度等问题的关系     

无罪推定原则在证据法中的体现

无罪推定是基于人生来无罪、也无犯罪基因这一常态而作出的一种假定。刑事诉讼程序是以证据为依据的动态逻辑证明过程并以证据为核心构件,因而,无罪推定原则在证据法中也具有重要意义。它在证据法中主要体现为以下具体规则：证据裁判主义、非法证据材料排除规则、无罪推定原则支配下的刑事诉讼证明与无罪推定原则下的证明责任。