“全盘西化”祖于吴虞论

处理中西化关系的“全盘西化”模式,在20世纪的中国影响深远。此一模式的始祖是“四川省只手打孔家店的老英雄”吴虞,而不是学界常说的胡适。理由有二：吴虞是明确摧毁“中体西用”之“体”的第一人;吴虞是明确使用“西式”武器摧毁此“体”的第一人。     

“亚细亚生产方式”概念历史演变的考察之二

马充思、恩格斯作中的“亚细亚生产方式”概念是一个历史性概念,在他们的社会形态理论形成的四个不同时期,即1853年以前的时期、19世纪50年代中后期、以《资本论》为代表的时期、摩尔根《古代社会》一书发表以后的时期,涵义并不相同。在《北京行政学院学报》2001年第4期,笔已对第一时期的思想作了考察,现在考察第二时期的思想。本认为,马克思这一时期的思想与第一时期已有较大区别,他不再把“亚细亚生产方式”看作不能放在社会发展序列中的任何一个阶段的特殊的社会形态,而把它看作人类历史的第一阶段。这个阶段不是我们现在所说的原始社会,它仅仅指原始社会的最后阶段,是原始社会向奴隶社会转变的过渡阶段。     

INFORMING WILDERNESS POLICY: THE DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF WILDERNESS CONSERVATION1

Abstract: Over the last two decades wilderness conservation has resurfaced to become one of the most contentious issues currently on the public agenda. The "politics" of wilderness preservation has been extensively reported in the media, but academic analysis has been on a superficial level and usually by the supporters of "conservation". This analysis has not proved particularly helpful for policy practitioners in this field.     

The Politics of Administrative Reforms in Asia: Paradigms and Legacies, Paths and Diversities

Many Asian governments have embarked on administrative reforms of one kind or another, engaging in rhetoric that resonates with the global paradigms of "new public management" and "good governance." This article seeks to understand Asian administrative reforms against the background of international influence, policy diffusion, domestic politics, institutional dynamics, and administrative traditions and legacies. It is impossible to capture the whole range of national reform types within any neat and tidy Asian paradigm, but some common strands of national reform paths in the region can still be traced. Different problems and failures are found to be addressed by Asian reforms, reflecting diverse motives and resulting in varied outcomes. The "old" public administration regime has largely coexisted with the "new" public management approaches and tools.     

Constraining Federalism: Formalizing Expectations about Redistributive Policies in Decentralized Systems

Whether states keep welfare benefits low in order to preventin-migration of benefit-seeking individuals is one of the greatquestions in the study of federalism. Assessing this questionis challenging, however, because it is difficult to specifyexactly what constitutes evidence that states inhibit theirspending for this reason. This article develops a model whichprovides a micro-founded framework for thinking about the issue.The model suggests that competition on redistributive programsdoes not induce "racing" among states, but does constrain spendingto be less than what the states would spend if migration werenot a concern. The model also provides specific guidance forthe form of this downward pressure.     

Japanese voluntary environmental agreements: Bargaining power and reciprocity as contributors to effectiveness

Theoretical and empirical research on voluntarism has focused primarily on U.S. and European examples, but has generally failed to consider the Japanese system of voluntary environmental agreements. Nevertheless, Japanese VEAs are one of the worlds oldest experiments in voluntary policy; careful analysis of the characteristics and contexts may improve understanding about the critical factors associated with effective voluntary policy. This paper reviews the extant literature on voluntarism focusing specifically on the bargaining context within which agreements are negotiated. It details three factors that contribute to the effectiveness of voluntary policy generally: regulatory bargaining power, non-regulatory bargaining power and reciprocity. The paper then provides a brief but detailed analysis of the development of voluntary agreements in Japan. Comparisons with voluntary policies in the U.S. and Europe are included. Findings indicate similarities and some significant differences between the Japanese system and other national systems of voluntary policy. Conclusions discuss implications for theory and policy.     

Deliberation,Democratic Decision-Making and Internal Political Efficacy

Empirical research into the possible positive consequences of deliberation increasingly reveals that there is a complex relationship between deliberation and its effects on citizens. In this experimental study I examine the relationship between internal political efficacy and one type of deliberation: deliberative decision-making. I also test whether different structures of decision-making mediate between deliberation and internal political efficacy. The data suggest that deliberative decision-making had no direct effect on a global measure of internal political efficacy. Participants in face-to-face deliberative decision-making, though, had higher scores on a situation-specific measure of internal political efficacy than participants who only voted. The structures of decision-making had no effect on either measure of internal political efficacy. These results support claims that deliberation will not necessarily lead to direct, positive effects on citizens internal political efficacy, but they also highlight the likelihood that face-to-face deliberation can lead citizens to feel more competent in their deliberative abilities.     

Crossing the River by Touching Stones: A Comparative Study of Administrative Reforms in China and the United States

To compare administrative reform in one of the world's most ancient civilizations and in one of the world's "youngest countries" produces some surprises. Administrative reforms in both countries are similar, but occur at different periods of history. Mengzhong Zhang of the University of Maryland at College Park discovers that some of China's recent reform efforts resemble historic efforts in the United States up to half a century ago. Other components of administrative reform in China reflect contemporary practices in the United States. This phenomenon reflects convergence, rather than divergence.     

Managing Value Conflict in Public Policy

Policy issues are often characterized by conflicting values. Conventionally, students of public policy have conceptualized government's response to value conflicts as a matter of "balancing" competing goals, or striking trade-offs among values. In this paper we argue that this way of managing value conflicts represents only one possibility from a larger and more varied repertoire of strategies that draw from more complex models of practical reasoning. Policy actors do sometimes try to strike a "balance" among conflicting values, but they often avail themselves of other strategies as well: they cycle between values by emphasizing one value and then the other; they assign responsibilities for each value to different institutional structures; or they gather and consult a taxonomy of specific cases where similar conflicts arose. We argue that each of these strategies can be rational in some institutional contexts, and that conclusion challenges the view that policy values must always be treated as commensurable for rational policy choices to be made. Government responds to value conflict in ways that are more varied and changing than existing views of public policy imply.     

利玛窦儒学观的困境与张力

从记载文本来看,利玛窦从自身对宗教的体会出发,曾经把儒家列为中国的三种宗教之一。随着利玛窦本人对儒家认识的进一步加深,同时为了更好地在中国传教,利玛窦做出了儒家非宗教的判断,这种判断在西方社会中产生了重要影响,虽然当时并没有在中国国内引起较大的关注,但是从一个较长范围来说,仍然具有学术史的意义。利玛窦敏锐地认识到儒学发展的阶段性,肯定"先儒",批判"后儒",但是没有看到中国儒学发展的连续系,也没有看到中国儒学发展断裂性与连续性之间的关系,体现了利玛窦儒学观的内在张力。     

A Rawlsian Argument Against the Duty of Civility

In this article, I show that the assumptions underpinning John Rawls's so-called "duty of civility" ought to lead one not to affirm the duty but to reject it. I will begin by setting out in its essentials the content and rationale of the "duty of civility," which lies at the heart of Rawls's ideal of public reason. Secondly, I will argue that the very premises allegedly underpinning the duty of civility—namely, the values of reciprocity and political autonomy, and the burdens of judgment—in fact rule it out. Thirdly, I will suggest that if my argument against the duty of civility is correct, then one recent attempt to salvage political liberalism and reasonableness from the charge of incoherence fails. Finally, I draw some challenging lessons from our discussion for political liberalism and the liberal tradition as a whole.     

The Erosion of Party Politics in Britain

This article looks at the erosion of democratic practice enacted by "New" Labour in Britain under the leadership of Tony Blair. Building on the internal reforms of the 1980s, the process of Labour Party "modernization" has created an exclusive, top-down managerial style of leadership. This type of party leadership and management has far-reaching implications for British politics more generally, not least the role of political parties. The current crisis of the Conservatives and the destruction of representative democracy within the Labour Party pose serious questions regarding the medium-term future of parties as voluntary membership organizations. These changes are placed in the context of a possible longer-term transformation of British political structures in order to exchange the long-established administration of the Conservative Party for a new type of governmental machinery. The aim is not a new "traditional" party of government, but a partyless formation built around a dominant central presidential figure and his office—a change which necessitates abolishing the Labour Party and social democracy as they currently exist. It is argued that this anticipated remedy to a protracted crisis of the British state accords closely to the requirements of neoliberal economic management, while drawing upon developments in the wider global environment. However, if this is to succeed, Blair's "modernizing" tendency needs to be able to articulate a coherent ideology that strikes a popular chord. Thus far, Blair's managerial approach to politics may have scored a few points against the old party ideologies, but it has also undermined attempts to promote an alternative ideology—even one of a "partyless" nature.     

SOCIAL ADMINISTRATION IN AUSTRALIA: THE NEED FOR A PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION

There appear to be two current, opposing misconceptions concerning the nature of social administration. On the one hand there is the belief that it constitutes "no special or definite study but a part of that general mass of things which every earnest young man or woman should know" and, on the other hand, it is "often assumed without question to be concerned with administrative practice"¹.
The domain of the subject of "social administration" is the social service industry in all its parts, its relationship with the industrial and commercial world, and its relationship with primary groups such as families, friends, and neighbours².
Narrowly defined, social administration is the study of the development structure and practices of the social services. Broadly defined, it is an attempt to apply the social sciences — including philosophy — to the analysis and solution of a changing range of social problems³.     

Promise and peril

The size of the federal budget tells only one part of the tale of government's presence in the market economy. The enormous amounts of non-tax dollars government requires to be spent on regulation – estimated at $647 billion per year – powerfully argue for some sort of regulatory scorekeeping. Regulatory costs are equivalent to over one-third of the level of government spending. A regulatory budget can be an effective tool both for spurring reform and monitoring regulatory activity.At bottom, today's rulemaking process is plagued by the fact that agency bureaucrats are not accountable to voters. And Congress – though responsible for the underlying statutes that usually propel those unanswerable agencies – nevertheless can conveniently blame agencies for regulatory excesses. Indeed, Americans live under a regime of Regulation Without Representation.A regulatory budget could promote greater accountability by limiting the regulatory costs agencies could impose on the private sector. Congress could either specify a limit on compliance costs for each newly enacted law or reauthorization of existing law, or Congress could enact a more ambitious full-scale budget paralleling the fiscal budget, a riskier approach. A comprehensive budget would require Congress to divide to a total budget among agencies. Agencies' responsibility would be to rank hazards serially, from most to least severe, and address them within their budget constraint. In either version of a regulatory budget, any agency desiring to exceed its budget would need to seek congressional approval.Regulatory costs imposed on the private sector by federal agencies can never be precisely measured, and a budget cannot achieve absolute precision. Nonetheless, a regulatory budget is a valuable tool. The real innovation of regulatory budgeting is its potential to impose the consequences of regulatory decisionmaking on agencies rather than on the regulated parties alone. Agencies that today rarely admit a rule provides negligible benefit would be forced to compete for the right to regulate. While agencies would be free to regulate as unwisely as they do now, the consequences could be transfer of the squandered budgetary allocation to a rival agency that saves more lives.Budgeting could fundamentally change incentives. Under a budget, adopting a costly, but marginally beneficial, regulation will suddenly be irrational. Congress would weigh an agency's claimed benefits against alternative means of protecting public health and safety, giving agencies incentives to compete and expose one another's bogus benefits. Budgeting could encourage greater recognition of the fact that some risks are far more remote than those we undertake daily. In the long run, a regulatory budget would force agencies to compete with one another on the most important bottom line of all: that their least-effective rules save more lives per dollar spent (or correct some alleged market imperfection better) than those of other agencies.There are clear benefits to regulatory budgeting, but there are also pitfalls. For instance, under a budget, agencies have incentives to underestimate compliance costs while regulated parties have the opposite incentive. Self-correcting techniques that may force opposing cost calculations to converge are only at the thought- experiment stage. However, limitations on the delegation of regulatory power and enhancing congressional accountability can help.Certain principles and antecedents can help ensure that a regulatory budgeting effort succeeds. Explicitly recognizing that an agency's basic impulse is to overstate the benefits of its activities, a budget would relieve agencies of benefit calculation responsibilities altogether. Agencies would concentrate on properly assessing only the costs of their initiatives. Since an agency must try to maximize benefits within its budget constraint or risk losing its budget allocation, it would be rational for agencies to monitor benefits, but Congress need not require it.Other ways to promote the success of a budget are to: establish an incremental rather than total budget; collect and summarize annual report card data on the numbers of regulations in each agency; establish a regulatory cost freeze; implement a Regulatory Reduction Commission; employ separate budgets for economic and environmental/social regulation; and control indirect costs by limiting the regulatory methods that most often generate them.A regulatory budget is not a magic device alone capable of reducing the current $647 billion regulatory burden. Yet a cautious one deserve consideration. Having good information is an aid in grappling with the regulatory state just as compiling the federal fiscal budget is indispensable to any effort to plan and control government spending.     

Framing and Deliberation: How Citizens' Conversations Limit Elite Influence

Public opinion research demonstrates that citizens' opinions depend on elite rhetoric and interpersonal conversations. Yet, we continue to have little idea about how these two forces interact with one another. In this article, we address this issue by experimentally examining how interpersonal conversations affect (prior) elite framing effects. We find that conversations that include only common perspectives have no effect on elite framing, but conversations that include conflicting perspectives eliminate elite framing effects. We also introduce a new individual level moderator of framing effects—called "need to evaluate"—and we show that framing effects, in general, tend to be short-lived phenomena. In the end, we clarify when elites can and cannot use framing to influence public opinion and how interpersonal conversations affect this process .     

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT VIEWED FROM SYDNEY

This conference on "Public Administration in Co-operative Federalism", fittingly convened by the Royal Institute of Public Administration, is a most timely one. It is tangible evidence that co-operative federalism is not only possible but, in many areas, positively flourishes, and it provides an opportunity for those of us with state or federal responsibilities in public administration to state our problems fairly and frankly and seek ways of extending co-operation to secure future prosperity for Australia.     

Ideology and the construction of nationality: The Canadian elections of 1993

Canada is one nation, but it is in many ways two communities, one Francophone and the other Anglophone. We employ a formal model of ideology and analyze how nationality is constructed in people's minds. The magnitude of the changes in expressed preferences in terms of ideology depends on the salience of the new issue, the extent to which it confirms with the existing ideological cleavage, and the difference between the perceived status quo on the new dimension and the voter's most preferred alternative. Using data from the 1993 Canadian National Election Study, we consider the relative importance of different policy dimensions in explaining voting decisions among educated Canadians. The issue of Quebec sovereignty, alone, is shown to have significant power for predicting vote choice. A plausible explanation, confirmed here by regression analysis, is that Quebec sovereignty stands for other issues in voters' conception of Canadian politics.     

Do Participants and Observers Assess Intentions Differently During Bargaining and Conflict?

Political actors in conflict settings are often uncertain about their counterparts' intentions. This article explores the psychology of how intentions are assessed using a novel experimental design that randomly assigns subjects to one of three roles—"proposer,""recipient," or "observer." Recipients and observers are given identical noisy information about proposers' actions, and make postplay assessments of proposers' intentions that are rewarded based on accuracy. A first experiment explores a context of ambiguity, while a second experiment explores a context of uncertainty . The results suggest that actors' perceptions can sometimes be directly affected by the set of strategic alternatives they possess. When signals about proposer behavior appear "negative," recipients' assessments of proposers' intentions are more negative than observers' assessments if recipients have the ability to respond to the proposer's action—but not if recipients lack this ability. The ability to respond to proposer behavior appears to cause recipients to make more negative inferences about the proposer than circumstances warrant. Interestingly, recipients' and observers' assessments are indistinguishable when signals about proposer behavior instead appear "positive."     

Measuring party strategies on the territorial dimension: a method based on content analysis

This article proposes an innovative coding scheme for the content analysis of party manifestos, one designed to estimate party strategies on the territorial dimension and based on a solid theoretical framework. It builds on existing scholarly efforts on party positioning, while adding further theoretical and methodological insights. The proposed coding scheme first conceives of party strategies as the combination of three tools, namely the manipulation of salience and positioning and the framing of policy preferences. Second, it points out the importance of distinguishing between purposely vague and ‘blurred' positioning and ‘contradictory' but clear and nuanced positioning.

The functioning of this content analysis framework is illustrated through its application to Italian party manifestos issued between 1963 and 2013. Their analysis provides an overview of the substantive research questions that can be addressed with this coding scheme. This article also illustrates the potential of the instrument, which can be extended to policy dimensions other than the territorial one.