如何刻画法律推理中的事实与规范

法律推理过程包含着权力与利益、应然与实然、确定性与妥当性、客观解释与主观解释等矛盾,法律推理促动法律规范由普遍规则到个案规则适用,法律推理涉及法律事实认定、法律规范识别、法律价值追寻,涉及推理主体关于知识论与实践理性的思考,法律推理的重心由立法领域到司法领域、由法律本体论到方法论、由法律移植到制度理性整合、由宏观论证到微观分析的转向。法律推理呈现内部逻辑强制与外部言说理性互动的特征,已经由法律文本所体现的规范层面转向法律施行的实践层面,形成事实与价值、事实与规范的交互流转。     

Deontic Logic as Logic of Legal Norms: Two Main Sources of Problems

Abstract .
The paper offers a critical survey of two main sorts of problems hindering the possibility of conceiving deontic logic as a suitable account of the logical behaviour of (sentences expressing) legal norms. The notion of "legal norm" is viewed as the main source of the first sort of problems: (a) the typological variety of legal norms requires an account both of the differing logical behaviour of (sentences expressing) differing legal norms, and of the relations which might hold amon them; (b) the ontologic, semantic, and epistemic features of legal norms shed doubt on the very attempt to figure out a logical analysis of (sentences expressing) legal norms. The notion of "systemic legal validity" is viewed as the main source of the second sort of problems: Deontic logic does not provide suitable logical tools to account for legal phenomena like enactment, derogation, and conflicts between legal norms which rely on systemic legal validity.     

The Challenge of Universal Norms: Securing Effective Defence Rights Across Different Jurisdictions and Legal Cultures

This article considers the contribution of comparative empirical research in shaping best practice norms for custodial legal advice, and helping to address challenges in their implementation. It traces the role of ECtHR decisions and EU Directives in developing transnational norms to strengthen suspects’ right to legal assistance. Recognizing how these norms are translated into the national context, it considers the value of comparative empirical and socio‐legal research in helping to develop legislative and training measures; how roles and responsibilities are shared out in different legal systems and traditions; and practical arrangements that facilitate or inhibit the effectiveness of custodial legal advice in practice. There is a tension between framing transnational norms that are sufficiently universal to attract support, without being so broad as to lack any transformational force, and sufficiently detailed to ensure respect for core protections without imposing legal requirements too rigid and difficult to be absorbed into diverse processes of criminal justice.     

Normative Systems,Permission and Deontic Logic*

Abstract. The authors concentrate on the analysis of the concept of permission. After a general account of differing concepts of permission both with regard to different legal theories and to different legal ideologies, they argue in favour of a “radical” imperativism which leaves no place for permissive norms. Thus, in contrast with the logic of normative language (LNL) purported by Alchourrón and Bulygin, the authors figure out a system of deontic logic - supplemented by devices of the possible world semantics - according to which a normative system (N) is conceived as a set of logical consequences of a certain finite set of basic obligations and no room is left either for the concept of weak permission or for the concept of strong permission. Finally the authors raise some criticisms concerning the view maintained by Alchourron and Bulygin on strong permission.*     

法学方法论研究的语用学转向(上)———法学方法论研究范式的批判性检审

传统的法学方法论范式，被学界概括和界定为归类（或包摄和涵摄）、推论、等置和评价——这四种范式。但归类或包摄和涵摄均可再归属于形式主义的推论范式，于是传统四范式最少可化归为推论、等置和评价——这三范式；其中的等置范式试图借助于具有实践理性的类推法、比较法和归纳法，实现法律事实与法律规范关系的等置或者对称性，但其重心依然倚重于逻辑理性；而评价范式不仅离开了“客观化”的逻辑框架，而且也因脱离价值评价的主体及其特定语境，而成为无法实施的一厢情愿。最后认定，唯有具有主体间性（交往理性）、综观性、动态性的语用范式，才可以克服和超越传统三范式的缺陷，经由交往理性而实现逻辑理性和实践理性的统一，从而最终实现法律事实与法律规范关系的对称性。     

Metamorphosis in Hans Kelsen's Legal Philosophy

Two major questions stem from the fundamental shift in Hans Kelsen's legal philosophy that takes place in 1960 and the years thereafter: first, the scope of the shift and, second, its explanation. On the first question, I argue that the shift is not limited to Kelsen's rejection of the applicability of logic to legal norms. Rather, it reaches to his rejection of the entire Kantian edifice of his earlier work. On the second question, I argue that the explanation for the shift has a conceptual dimension as well as a historico‐biographical dimension. That is, I argue that Kelsen's rejection of the principle of non‐contradiction vis‐à‐vis legal norms reaches to the Kantian edifice in that the principle was presupposed in Kelsen's earlier work and appears, expressis verbis, in his ‘Kantian filter’. And I argue that certain historico‐biographical data are germane, including, quite possibly, the earlier revolution in Kelsen's thought, that of 1939–40.     

Realism about the Nature of Law

Legal realism comes in two main versions, namely American legal realism and Scandinavian legal realism. In this article, I shall be concerned with the Scandinavian realists, who were naturalists and non‐cognitivists, and who maintained that conceptual analysis (in a fairly broad sense) is a central task of legal philosophers, and that such analysis must proceed in a naturalist, anti‐metaphysical spirit. Specifically, I want to consider the commitment to ontological naturalism and non‐cognitivism on the part of the Scandinavians and its implications for their view of the nature of law. I argue (i) that the Scandinavians differ from legal positivists in that they reject the idea that there are legal relations, that is, legal entities and properties, and to varying degrees defend the view that law is a matter of human behavior rather than legal norms, and (ii) that they do not and cannot accept the idea that there is a ‘world of the ought’ in Kelsen's sense. I also argue, more specifically, (iii) that the objection to non‐naturalist theories raised by the Scandinavians—that there is and can be no connection between the higher realm of norms and values (the ‘world of the ought’) and the world of time and space—is convincing, and (iv) that Kelsen's introduction of a so‐called modally indifferent substrate does nothing to undermine this objection. In addition, I argue (v) that the Scandinavians can account for the existence of legal relations that do not presuppose the existence of morally binding legal norms by embracing conventionalism about the existence of the sources of law, while pointing out that in doing so they would also be abandoning their legal realism for legal positivism. Finally, I argue (vi) that the implications for legal scholarship of the realist emphasis on human behavior instead of legal norms is not well explained by the realists and appear to amount to little more than a preference for teleological interpretation of legal norms.     

规范之中的逻辑

法律能否或如何运用逻辑来对事实进行把握是一个永恒的话题。推理、推定和拟制的运用即是从不同程度上对逻辑在静态的规范意义上运用的清晰的反映。其具体表现形式在推理中表现为事实分类,在推定中为事实性规则的确立,在拟制中则是规则的变动。在这些具体的运用活动中,规则虽然始终保持着一种名义上的规范性,但其内容却已有了很大程度的不同。     

法学方法论研究的语用学转向( 下)——法学方法论研究的语用模式及其新开展

随着哲学的语用学转向,哲学与法学的内在交融与互动,法哲学、法学方法论、法律语言学、法律逻辑的研究也随之发生了“语用学的转向”,这种转向的标志就是法律语用学和“规范语用学”的诞生与日新月异的发展,进而为我们理解和诠释法律的本质、类型、功能、适用机理、适用效力及其行动之有效性,提供了前所未有的分析方法、知识范式和建构模式,从而使法哲学、法学方法论（尤其是狭义的法律方法论）实现了——由事实世界向规范世界的转变,由主客二分到主体间性的行为互动,由面向单向度的工具理性转向实践理性,再由面向单一主体的实践理性转向多主体之间的沟通理性,由静态的逻辑分析转向动态的语境分析或情境构作,由困固于语形、语义分析转向以法律言语行为主体及其相关语境为出发点的语用建构和实践.     

经济法“国家干预”法律机制的探讨

为应对席卷全球的金融危机,世界各国政府对市场经济采取了各式各样的干预手段,使国家干预成为当今最热门的话题,其重要性勿庸质疑。经济法作为国家干预市场经济的法律规范,应具有其固有的法律价值和规范模式。文章通过对经济法语境下＂国家干预＂内涵的分析,从经济法律规范的逻辑设计和规范结构剖析经济法对＂国家干预＂的规范模式。     

初论民间规范对法律方法的可能贡献

民间规范作为一种实际存在的“制度事实”,对法律方法有着什么样的意义?基于此种问题意识,对民间法可能对法律方法的贡献的研究,应该是有益的。由于司法活动中的法律方法多样,这里只对法律方法之于法律渊源、价值(利益)衡量、判例和判例法形成方式、法律论证的可能贡献做出了简要的描述。可以肯定,民间规范对其他法律方法也一样会有可能作用。对此,笔者将在后续研究中逐步探讨。     

Defeating the Inference from General to Particular Norms*

Abstract. The author argues that in order to maintain, with the later Kelsen, that particular norms are not deducible from general norms, it is unnecessary to deny (1) that norms are propositional, (2) that norms have truth value, (3) that there are normative facts, or (4) that norms fall within the compass of logic. It is claimed that general norms, like many generalizations in science, are not, typically, unrestricted universal generalizations, but generalizations of a different kind, which have sometimes been called normic generalizations. Normic generalizations may have truth value and describe facts; and there is no obvious reason for thinking that they fall outside the compass of logic. Yet they do not deductively imply the instances which fall under them. Exceptions to a generalization of this sort need not constitute falsifying instances; in some cases, at least, they serve rather to qualify the scope or power of the generalization. The logic of such generalizations is thus not deductive. Granting that general norms are typically of this kind, we may accept Kelsen's conclusion about the non-deducibility of particular from general norms without accepting the grounds upon which he accounted for this fact.     

A Formal Model of Legal Argumentation

Abstract . The paper gives a formal reconstruction of some fundamental patterns of legal reasoning, intended to reconcile symbolic logic and argumentation theory. Legal norms are represented as unidirectional inference rules which can be combined into arguments. The value of each argument (its qualification as justified, defensible, or defeated) is determined by the importance of the rules it contains. Applicability arguments, intended to contest or support the applicability of norms, preference arguments, purporting to establish preference relations among norms, and interpretative arguments are also formalised. All those argument types are connected in a unitary model, which relates legal reasoning to the indeterminacy of legal systems, intended as the possibility to develop incompatible defensible arguments. The model is applied to permissive norms and normative hierarchies, and is implemented in a Prolog program.     

违约金的类型构造

违约金规则以任意性规范为主,其中既包含一个法定模范类型,也允许当事人另作约定形成意定类型.这一规范逻辑决定了违约金类型构造的必要性.当前主流学说的构造方案符合该规范逻辑,理论出发点亦卓具贡献,但囿于标准单一且未重视类型要素在利益衡量上的强度差异,在司法实践中仍不乏疑义.考察德国法上区分违约金和损害赔偿概括计算条款的判例、学说与立法演进,可提炼更为丰富的类型要素并作强度分析,形成违约金的类型谱系.以之为背景定位中国法的法定模范类型和各种意定类型,就能全面厘清各类型的规范适用问题.不同类型承载了不同的自治意思,通过类型构造把握各种类型,可以确保规范适用时尽可能地尊重私法自治.     

The Structure of Conflicts of Fundamental Legal Rights

In recent years, the most widespread doctrine about the conflicts between fundamental (usually constitutional) legal rights could be summarized in the following three main theses: (1) The elements in conflict are legal principles, as opposed to legal rules; (2) Those conflicts are not consequences of the existence of inconsistencies or antinomies between the norms involved, but rather depend on the empirical circumstances of the case. In other words, the norms are logically consistent and the conflicts are not determinable a priori or in abstracto, but only in concreto; and (3) The classical criteria for solving conflicts between norms, such as lex superior, lex posterior and lex specialis, are not suitable to solve conflicts among fundamental legal rights. Indeed, they require a specific method known as ‘weighing and balancing’. Although all three theses could be (and indeed have been) regarded as problematic, in this paper I address mainly the second one. I try to show that there is room for a tertium genus between antinomies (deontic inconsistencies) and conflicts caused by strict empirical circumstances that I call ‘contextual antinomies’. There are situations in which the norms involved are not inconsistent but the conflict arises for logical reasons. My thesis is that many conflicts between fundamental legal rights fall in this category. I offer, in an appendix, a proposal of formalization of this kind of conflict and the elements involved in it.     

Legal obligation as a duty of deference

An enduring question in political and legal philosophy concerns whether we have a general moral obligation to follow the law. In this paper, I argue that Philip Soper’s intuitively appealing effort to give new life to the idea of legal obligation by characterising it as a duty of deference is ultimately unpersuasive. Soper claims that people who understand what a legal system is and admit that it is valuable must recognise that they would be morally inconsistent to deny that they owe deference to state norms. However, if the duty of deference stemmed from people’s decision to regard the law as valuable as Soper argues, then people who do not admit the value of the state would have no duty as such to defer to its norms. And, more importantly, people who admit the value of the state would have a duty not to defer to particular norms, namely those norms which violate the values that ground their preference for a state. This critique of Soper operates within his parameters by accepting his claim that moral consistency generates reasons to act. Even on those terms, Soper’s defence of legal obligation as a duty of deference is unpersuasive. I wish to thank John Tasioulas, Joseph Raz, Bill Edmundson, Adam Cureton, the editors and referees of Law and Philosophy, and the participants of the Society for Applied Philosophy 25th anniversary conference, July 2005, St Anne’s College, Oxford.     

指导性案例跨类型适用的限度与进路

司法实践中指导性案例跨类型适用的现象具有广泛性、频发性、多样性、热点集中性等特征。基于对上述现象的实证分析和反思,类型化思维和法律方法的运用是指导性案例跨类型适用的理论依据,满足案例指导制度运行多元化需求则是其现实动因。指导性案例的跨类型适用如果严重背离“类案类判”的基本理念,就易滋生隐患和风险。完善指导性案例的跨类型适用应分别从案例生成和案例适用的角度出发。一方面,通过丰富指导性案例的数量和类型、改进指导性案例的裁判要点从源头上减少指导性案例的跨类型适用概率;另一方面,通过完善指导性案例与待解决案件的相似性判断以及法律适用的“公约化”来规范指导性案例跨类型适用的裁判路径。