Membership and its Privileges: the WTO, Civil Society, and the Amicus Brief Controversy

Abstract: In a series of rulings, beginning with the notorious Shrimp/Turtle dispute, the high court of the WTO, the so‐called Appellate Body, has ruled that it, as well as the panels of first instance, may, on a discretionary basis, accept and consider amicus curiae briefs from, inter alia, non‐governmental organisations and private individuals. This has been highly controversial and subject to wide and intense criticism by trade diplomats who are the political representatives of WTO Member states in Geneva; the officials have reacted with anger and hostility to the notion that governments are not exclusive gatekeepers of access to the WTO dispute settlement tribunals. This article shows that the decision that amicus briefs are admissible at the discretion of the adjudicator has a sound basis in the legal framework for WTO dispute settlement, as well as conforming to trends in the practice of international courts and tribunals more generally. The article examines various ‘due process’ issues concerning the modalities for acceptance and consideration of amicus briefs and how they have been so far dealt with by the Appellate Body, as well as how they are handled in certain proposals for reform of the legal framework of WTO dispute settlement, the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).     

Catch Me if You Can: An Analysis of "Measures Taken to Comply" under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding

The objective of the compliance procedure is to ensure promptcompliance with the Dispute Settlement Body's (DSB) recommendationsand rulings through an expeditious procedure. In their assignment,the compliance panels are faced with competing considerationsof, on the one hand, ensuring Members the right of a "reasonableperiod of time" for implementing the DSB's recommendations andrulings and, on the other, ensuring prompt compliance. Compliancepanels have to pay due respect to the fact that an Article 21.5proceeding is not a new proceeding, which limits the scope ofwhich claims may be raised in those proceedings and restrictsthe determination of which measures are "measures taken to comply".In order to achieve those overall aims, compliance panels andthe Appellate Body have accepted that claims other than thoseraised in the original proceedings may be presented in complianceproceedings. Due process principles form an integral part ofthe Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). The delicate taskof the panels and Appellate Body is to determine which claims,not raised in the original proceedings, are admissible in anArticle 21.5 proceeding. Compliance panels and the AppellateBody have established several limitations in order to limitthe ambit of potential claims and measures that may fall withinan expeditious Article 21.5 proceeding. However, the embracedapproach to determining which new claims, not raised in theoriginal proceedings, are to be considered in Article 21.5 proceedingsand which measures fall within the realm of measures taken tocomply bears the common characteristics of being subject toan extensive interpretation of Article 21.5 of the DSU.     

The European Community and the Member States in the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO: United or Divided?

Opinion 1/94 of the European Court of Justice determined the competence of the European Community and the Member States to conclude and implement WTO Agreements. Whilst the European Community enjoys exclusive competence to implement the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, it shares joint competence with the Member States in respect of the General Agreement on Trade in Services and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. However, the Court’s recognition of a division of competences between the Community and the Member States in WTO agreements has given rise to many fears that such a division would greatly complicate Community and Member State participation in WTO Agreements, would create many problems for them in doing so and, as a result, would greatly impede their successful participation in the WTO. Given the benefit of a number of years’ experience in the WTO, this paper focuses on the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the WTO and addresses the extent to which the division of competences between the Community and the Member States has affected their participation in the DSU. Primarily, it aims to examine the extent to which the provisions of the DSU affect Community and Member State participation in dispute settlement within the WTO. It then analyses the duty of co-operation imposed on the Community and on Member States by the Court of Justice in Opinion 1/94 in the implementation of the WTO Agreements and the degree to which this duty influences their pursuit of dispute settlement. Finally, the paper examines the manner in which Community and Member State dispute settlement proceedings have evolved in practice, the extent to which the division of powers has penetrated dispute settlement proceedings and the manner in which the Community, the Member States and other WTO members have addressed it. In essence, the paper attempts both to highlight some of the more obvious consequences and effects that the internal division of powers between the Community and the Member States has for their participation in the DSU and to suggest some ways in which these consequences may be manipulated for their mutual and successful settlement of disputes.     

King Cotton, Developing Countries and the 'Peace Clause': The WTO's US Cotton Subsidies Decision

Although the World Trade Organization (WTO) is a powerful vehiclefor promoting economic development, the Uruguay Round has beenperceived by developing country WTO members as an unequal bargain.Especially with respect to agriculture, the Uruguay Round yieldedonly limited concessions. In September 2003, Doha Round effortsstalled at Cancún when developing countries coalescedto oppose a proposal that insufficiently liberalized trade inagriculture. In March 2005, the Dispute Settlement Body adopteda panel decision upholding Brazil’s legal challenge ofUS subsidies to cotton producers. The US Cotton Subsidies decisionrepresents a dramatic victory for Brazil and other developingcountry WTO members. The timing of the decision, coincidingwith ongoing Doha Round agriculture negotiations, ensures thatit will influence any outcome of the Round. This article examinesthe US Cotton Subsidies decision, describes the subsidy programsat issue in the dispute, reviews applicable WTO rules, and outlinesthe major findings of the panel and Appellate Body. The articleconcludes that Brazil’s victory in US Cotton Subsidiesmay represent a broader shift within the WTO away from a systemdominated by the US and EC toward a system that increasinglyis influenced by emerging market economies.     

国际人权保护:WTO争端解决机制所面临的新问题及其对策

从一定角度看,人类社会的贸易活动必然体现和反映一定的社会冲突,其中包含了道德、伦理、政治、社会及法律层面的冲突。这一冲突主要体现在贸易规则本身之间的冲突,以及相伴而生的人权保护问题。WTO争端解决机制在解决国际贸易争端过程中,不可避免地会涉及国际贸易中的人权冲突、人权保护问题,而这对我国如何应对“贸易与人权的冲突”亦将产生深远的影响。     

诚信原则在WTO争端解决机制中的适用评析

诚信原则作为各国民法中最重要的原则,已经成为国际法中的一般法律原则,越来越频繁地应用在WTO争端解决中。由于诚信原则存在明显的不确定性,难以在实践中适用,专家组和上诉机构在诸多案例中对诚信原则的含义及其解释法律和弥补法律漏洞的司法职能进行了确认,并成功地解决了不少争端。遗憾的是,上诉机构的司法限制制约了专家组的有益探索,过分谨慎。当前国际国内经济与法律的发展为专家组和上诉机构进行更大胆的探索准备了良好的条件,WTO争端解决机制应充分发挥诚信原则的司法职能,确立成员方诚信履行WTO实体法律的独立的义务,这将有利于弥补WTO的相关法律漏洞,迅速有效地解决争端。     

WTO体制内国内法的可诉性问题

在一般国际法理论与实践中,国内法本身可以单独构成国际争端解决程序的诉因。WTO体制内国内法可诉的法律依据是GATT1994第23条、DSU第3.8条以及《WTO协定》第16.4条。在WTO争端解决实践中,专家组和上诉机构的裁决呈现出一个重要的趋势:在美国“301条款”案前,遵循GATT1947时期专家组所确立的“裁量性立法与强制性立法之区分”的习惯性做法;在美国“301条款”案后,不再严格遵循这一习惯性做法。WTO体制内国内法之可诉性问题目前尚没有一个统一、明确的答案。     

WTO争端解决程序中的举证责任

世界贸易组织的相关协议对争端解决程序中的举证责任几乎没有规定,相关举证责任规则是由处理争端的专家组和上诉机构发展起来的。在世界贸易组织争端解决程序中,谁主张谁举证是举证责任规则的基本要求,其标准是初步证明(证据)标准,这种标准实质上是一种推定技巧,而非终局的证明标准。提供充分的证据并说服专家组是举证责任的内在要求。不同诉因、不同条款可能影响争端方举证责任的分配。争端方是否满足了举证责任的要求,由专家组最终评估、认定,专家组在这方面享有相当大的裁量权。     

WTO争端解决中的案例法方法

判例法这一用语在不同的语境下具有不同的含义。判例法是普通法法律制度中的一种传统,该传统是经由长期的司法实践形成的,而非来自于立法的强制性要求。严格意义上,判例法的突出特点是遵循先例,案件相同裁决相同。在一般意义上,判例法具有指导作用。在WTO争端解决中,无论是上诉机构的观点,还是上诉机构和专家组的实际做法,都体现出明显的案例法的指导作用的特点。与普通法制度不同的是,WTO的案例都是依据WTO规则的解释形成的,并非独立于WTO协定的法律渊源。     

WTO争端解决机制中报复措施的缺陷及革新路径探析

世界贸易组织(以下简称WTO)争端解决机制中的报复措施被认为是解决成员方之间贸易争端的最后手段。尽管它比GATT相关规定有了不少改进之处,但其文本规定上的不足和本身所固有的功能性缺陷仍使得它备受批评和争议。国内外学界对此提出了各种改进建议,有必要对这些建议的合理性和可行性进行深入分析,在此基础上,结合我国的国情探讨我国应持有的立场和对策。     

Treaty Interpretation and the WTO Appellate Body Report in US - Gambling: A Critique

‘Before the game begins players should agree on a dictionaryto use in case of a challenge.’ (from the Official Rulesof SCRABBLE®)

Treaty interpretation in WTO law continues to represent a topicof highly theoretical and practical importance. The Panel’sand the Appellate Body’s reports in the recent US –Gambling dispute have critically turned on ascertaining themeaning of the United States’ GATS Schedule and ArticleXVI GATS on the basis of the public international law rulesof treaty interpretation as codified in the Vienna Conventionon the Law of Treaties. The paper’s principal aim is toreview the interpretative approach followed in particular bythe Appellate Body in reaching its decision in US – Gambling.Its main argument is that, although the Appellate Body appearsto be trying to emancipate itself from a rigorous textual approach,it has not yet embraced a holistic approach to treaty interpretation,one in which the treaty interpreter looks thoroughly at allthe relevant elements of the general rule on treaty interpretationpursuant to Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention.     

WTO争端胜诉方"申请授权报复"的程序问题研究——"世贸组织争端解决规则与程序的谅解"第21.5条和第22.6条之间的顺序问题

WTO争端解决机制(Dispute Settlement Mechanism)是乌拉圭回合谈判的一个重要成果,而WTO争端解决机制比起GATT时代的争端解决程序的优越性主要在于它对执行裁决的监督上。体现在"WTO争端解决程序与规则的谅解"(DSU)中,就在于第21条"履行措施的合法性审查"和第22条"申请授权报复"的规定。这两条规定在WTO司法实践中已经成为WTO法执行的砥柱规则,使多边贸易体系解决纠纷的法律体系功能更为强大。但是,WTO的立法和任何立法一样,在具有前瞻性、预测性的同时,不可避免地具有一些滞后性,甚至在立法的当时受各种利益因素的制约,在立法上留有一些空白。针对DSU第21条和第22条规定的内在冲突,从分析WTO以往发生的案例入手,综合WTO专家小组对此问题的解释,结合各国提出的建议,对此问题进行论述。     

WTO与中国行政诉讼原告资格

世界贸易组织(WTO)规则是一个庞大的国际行政法体系,其中的许多内容将对我国行政诉讼原告资格制度的发 展产生重大影响。WTO司法最终理念所确立的"不利影响标准"对我国现行的"合法权益标准"提出了更高的要 求;WTO法制统一原则要求行政相对人有资格对更多的行使行政管理职权的行政行为提请司法审查;WTO争端 解决机制则进一步扩大了行政相对人合法权益的保护范围。     

WTO专家组和上诉机构举证责任分配标准的合理性分析

WTO专家组和上诉机构为了完成其迅速而有效地解决争端的义务,在DSU没有对举证责任分配规则做出任何规定的情形下,在判例中基本采用了谁主张谁举证的原则,同时,也发展了一些举证责任分配规则和标准。遗憾的是,专家组和上诉机构的实践表明,他们并没有严格遵守其形成的相关举证责任分配规则,其形成的相关标准也缺乏合理性:传统的谁主张谁举证原则由于忽视了实质公平,在WTO审理实践中容易被滥用;例外规定与排除规定之间存在区别的分析多此一举;重要性等级标准缺乏合理性及例外规定作为举证责任分配的标准既没有法律依据,其合理性也受到质疑。这必然削弱了WTO争端解决机制的权威性,因此,对WTO专家组和上诉机构所形成的举证责任分配规则和标准实行必要的改革,已成为当务之急。     

非WTO法在WTO争端解决中的适用

在分析WTO专家组和上诉机构具有充分的理由适用非WTO法的基础上,结合DSB解决争端的实践,认为非WTO法在WTO争端解决程序中具有广泛的效力。非WTO法不仅可以使专家组中止管辖权,甚至在更多的情况下使专家组拒绝管辖,而且非WTO法能有效的证明某些违反WTO规则的做法具有正当性。     

非WTO法在WTO争端解决中的适用

WTO专家组和上诉机构具有充分的理由适用非WTO法,DSB解决争端的实践表明非WTO法在WTO争端解决程序中具有广泛的效力。非WTO法不仅可以使专家组中止管辖权,甚至在更多的情况下使专家组拒绝管辖,而且非WTO法能有效地证明某些违反WTO规则的做法具有正当性。     

WTO贸易报复机制的实施——以利益集团理论为视角

WTO争端解决机制中的贸易报复机制是WTO最具特色、最具创造性的部分,该机制以法律手段保障裁决或建议的执行,其主要目的是"促使违反义务的成员方遵守WTO义务",国内利益集团有动力促成这一目标的实现。国内利益集团通过向政府或政府机构提出他们的利益要求从而影响国家贸易政策的制定;通过对政府施加政治压力从而达到实施报复措施的目的,进而促成败诉方尽快全面地履行WTO争端解决机构的裁决,纠正或取消其违规措施以符合WTO的规定。     

设立投资仲裁上诉机制的路径选择

目前,各国就投资仲裁上诉机制改革提交给联合国国际贸易法委员会第三工作组的建议主要有两种模式,分别是设立多边投资法院上诉机制和设立常设多边上诉机制。相对于多边投资法院,常设多边上诉机制更具有正当性与可行性。常设多边上诉机制对仲裁裁决一致性、可预测性和正确性的保障依托于具体规则的建立。一方面,上诉机制的审查范围应涵盖法律适用和事实认定错误以及程序性错误,以确保全面实现上诉机制的纠错功能;另一方面,应将事实认定上的错误限于“明显错误”,以提高仲裁效率。虽然遵循先例尚未成为国际仲裁实践的一般性原则,不能要求常设多边上诉机构在仲裁裁决中遵循既往裁决以提高裁决的一致性、连贯性和可预测性,但是WTO司法实践中发展形成的事实上的遵循先例也可以被常设多边上诉机制所借鉴。     

论WTO透明度原则在争端解决中的适用

透明度原则是WTO法律制度当中的基本原则之一,对于监督各成员方遵守WTO 法律框架,进而推进自由贸易发挥着重要作用。该原则在争端解决中的适用经历了先冷后热的过程,凸显出透明度原则应对非关税壁垒的优越性。在适用过程中,争端解决机构确立透明度原则适用对象和透明度标准,认为透明度原则适用于对成员方的国内部门法的整体审查,认为透明度原则应当能够保护贸易者的预期。在此基础上,在众多的案件中总结出争端解决机构的一贯立场以期能够对未来的透明度案件产生借鉴意义。     

A turning point of non-market economy: on the individual duty treatment of the wto in the fasteners anti-dumping case between european communities and china

For a long time, Chinese export enterprises were afflicted by the vague WTO rules of non-market economy under anti-dumping investigations. On 15 July 2011, the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) of the WTO published the report of the Appellate Body on the dispute called “European Communities — Definitive Anti-dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China” (DS397). In this article, it is to reason four questions, i.e., (i) the scope of article 9(5) of the Basic Anti-dumping Regulation of the European Union; (ii) whether sampling as described in the second sentence of article 6.10 constitutes the only exception to the principle laid down in the first sentence; (iii) whether a state may be seen as a producer unless individual exporters can demonstrate their independence from the state; (iv) interpretation of the word “impracticable” under articles 9.2 and 6.10, the DSB finally concluded that the EU acted inconsistently with articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the Anti-dumping Agreement with respect to article 9(5) of the Basic AD Regulation of EU, which refused to give each known NME exporter or producer individual duty treatment. To some extent, this case might clarify the NME issue in the WTO, change the defective situation, and be considered as a milestone for the promotion of justice under a free and rule-oriented multilateral trade system.