Military veterans and Social Security

There are 9.4 million military veterans receiving Social Security benefits, which means that almost one out of every four adult Social Security beneficiaries has served in the United States military. In addition, veterans and their families make up almost 40 percent of the adult Social Security beneficiary population. Policymakers are particularly interested in military veterans and their families and have provided them with benefits through several government programs, including Social Security credits, home loan guarantees, and compensation and pension payments through the Department of Veterans Affairs. It is therefore important to understand the economic and demographic characteristics of this population. Information in this article is based on data from the March 2004 Current Population Survey, a large, nationally representative survey of U.S. households. Veterans are overwhelmingly male compared with all adult Social Security beneficiaries who are more evenly split between males and females. Military veterans receiving Social Security are more likely to be married and to have finished high school compared with all adult Social Security beneficiaries, and they are less likely to be poor or near poor than the overall beneficiary population. Fourteen percent of veterans receiving Social Security benefits have income below 150 percent of poverty, while 25 percent of all adult Social Security beneficiaries are below this level. The higher economic status among veterans is also reflected in the relatively high Social Security benefits they receive. The number of military veterans receiving Social Security benefits will remain high over the next few decades, while their make-up and characteristics will change. In particular, the number of Vietnam War veterans who receive Social Security will increase in the coming decades, while the number of veterans from World War II and the Korean War will decline.     

Social Security cost-of-living adjustments and the Consumer Price Index

OASDI benefits are indexed for inflation to protect beneficiaries from the loss of purchasing power implied by inflation. In the absence of such indexing, the purchasing power of Social Security benefits would be eroded as rising prices raise the cost of living. By statute, cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) for Social Security benefits are calculated using the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W). Some argue that this index does not accurately reflect the inflation experienced by the elderly population and should be changed to an elderly-specific price index such as the Experimental Consumer Price Index for Americans 62 Years of Age and Older, often referred to as the Consumer Price Index for the Elderly (CPI-E). Others argue that the measure of inflation underlying the COLA is technically biased, causing it to overestimate changes in the cost of living. This argument implies that current COLAs tend to increase, rather than merely maintain, the purchasing power of benefits over time. Potential bias in the CPI as a cost-of-living index arises from a number of sources, including incomplete accounting for the ability of consumers to substitute goods or change purchasing outlets in response to relative price changes. The BLS has constructed a new index called the Chained Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (C-CPI-U) that better accounts for those consumer adjustments. Price indexes are not true cost-of-living indexes, but approximations of cost-of-living indexes (COLI). The Bureau of Labor Statistics (2006a) explains the difference between the two: As it pertains to the CPI, the COLI for the current month is based on the answer to the following question: "What is the cost, at this month ' market prices, of achieving the standard of living actually attained in the base period?" This cost is a hypothetical expenditure-the lowest expenditure level necessary at this month's prices to achieve the base-period's living standard.... Unfortunately, because the cost of achieving a living standard cannot be observed directly, in operational terms, a COLI can only be approximated. Although the CPI cannot be said to equal a cost-of-living index, the concept of the COLI provides the CPI's measurement objective and the standard by which we define any bias in the CPI. While all versions of the CPI only approximate the actual changes in the cost of living, the CPI-E has several additional technical limitations. First, the CPI-E may better account for the goods and services typically purchased by the elderly, but the expenditure weights for the elderly are the only difference between the CPI-E and CPI-W. These weights are based on a much smaller sample than the other two indices, making it less precise. Second, the CPI-E does not account for differences in retail outlets frequented by the aged population or the prices they pay. Finally, the purchasing population measured in the CPI-E is not necessarily identical to the Social Security beneficiary population, where more than one-fifth of OASDI beneficiaries are under age 62. Likewise, over one-fifth of persons aged 62 or older are not beneficiaries, but they are included in the CPI-E population. Finally, changes in the index used to calculate COLAs directly affect the amount of benefits paid, and as a result, projected solvency of the Social Security program. A switch to the CPI-E for the December 2006 COLA (received in January 2007) would have resulted in an average monthly benefit OASDI benefits are indexed for inflation to protect beneficiaries from the loss of purchasing power implied by inflation. In the absence of such indexing, the purchasing power of Social Security benefits would be eroded as rising prices raise the cost of living. By statute, cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) for Social Security benefits are calculated using the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W). Some argue that this index does not accurately reflect the inflation experienced by the elderly population and should be changed to an elderly-specific price index such as the Experimental Consumer Price Index for Americans 62 Years of Age and Older, often referred to as the Consumer Price Index for the Elderly (CPI-E). Others argue that the measure of inflation underlying the COLA is technically biased, causing it to overestimate changes in the cost of living. This argument implies that current COLAs tend to increase, rather than merely maintain, the purchasing power of benefits over time. Potential bias in the CPI as a cost-of-living index arises from a number of sources, including incomplete accounting for the ability of consumers to substitute goods or change purchasing outlets in response to relative price changes. The BLS has constructed a new index called the Chained Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (C-CPI-U) that better accounts for those consumer adjustments. Price indexes are not true cost-of-living indexes, but approximations of cost-of-living indexes (COLI). The Bureau of Labor Statistics (2006a) explains the difference between the two: As it pertains to the CPI, the COLI for the current month is based on the answer to the following question: "What is the cost, at this month ' market prices, of achieving the standard of living actually attained in the base period?" This cost is a hypothetical expenditure-the lowest expenditure level necessary at this month's prices to achieve the base-period's living standard.... Unfortunately, because the cost of achieving a living standard cannot be observed directly, in operational terms, a COLI can only be approximated. Although the CPI cannot be said to equal a cost-of-living index, the concept of the COLI provides the CPI's measurement objective and the standard by which we define any bias in the CPI. While all versions of the CPI only approximate the actual changes in the cost of living, the CPI-E has several additional technical limitations. First, the CPI-E may better account for the goods and services typically purchased by the elderly, but the expenditure weights for the elderly are the only difference between the CPI-E and CPI-W. These weights are based on a much smaller sample than the other two indices, making it less precise. Second, the CPI-E does not account for differences in retail outlets frequented by the aged population or the prices they pay. Finally, the purchasing population measured in the CPI-E is not necessarily identical to the Social Security beneficiary population, where more than one-fifth of OASDI beneficiaries are under age 62. Likewise, over one-fifth of persons aged 62 or older are not beneficiaries, but they are included in the CPI-E population. Finally, changes in the index used to calculate COLAs directly affect the amount of benefits paid, and as a result, projected solvency of the Social Security program. A switch to the CPI-E for the December 2006 COLA (received in January 2007) would have resulted in an average monthly benefit $0.90 higher than that received. If the December 2006 COLA had been adjusted by the Chained CPI-U instead, the average monthly benefit would have been $4.70 less than with current indexing. Any changes to the COLA that would cause faster growth in individual benefits would make the projected date of insolvency sooner, while slower growth would delay insolvency. Hobijn and Lagakos (2003) estimated that switching to the CPI-E for COLAs would move projected insolvency sooner by 3-5 years. A projection by SSA's Office of the Chief Actuary estimated that annual COLAs based on the Chained C-CPI-U beginning in 2006 would delay the date of OASDI insolvency by 4 years.     

Projections of economic well-being for Social Security beneficiaries in 2022 and 2062

Policymakers considering potential changes to the Social Security program need to be able to assess how such changes would affect the economic well-being of future retirees. The first step to understanding these effects is to determine the well-being of future retirees under the current Social Security system. To this end, this article projects the retiree populations aged 62 or older in 2022 and 2062 using the Social Security Administration's MINT (Modeling Income in the Near Term) model and assesses their well-being. Because no one measure can fully capture whether future retirees will have adequate resources to meet their needs, we employ several indicators to assess retirement prospects. In addition, because current-law Social Security promises cannot be financed from current-law taxes, we project an alternative 2062 baseline that adjusts Social Security benefits downward to reflect the amounts that current-law taxes can support. Our results illustrate the importance of using several measures when assessing the well-being of future Social Security beneficiaries. When using absolute measures, retirement well-being will improve for Social Security beneficiaries in 2062 compared with those in 2022. Median per capita income of Social Security beneficiaries is projected to increase by a third (in real terms) between 2022 and 2062, with a corresponding decline in projected poverty rates. In addition, median financial wealth will increase between 2022 and 2062. Relative measures of well-being, however, suggest a decline in well-being between Social Security beneficiaries in 2022 and those in 2062. The share of beneficiaries who have low income relative to their peers, measured as the share whose income-to-needs ratio is less than half of the median ratio, will increase over time. In addition, income replacement rates are projected to fall between 2022 and 2062, indicating a decline in how well-being during retirement compares with that during the working years. And although median financial wealth will increase between 2022 and 2062, it will actually fall relative to economy-wide average wages. Projected improvements over time would lessen, and declines would be exacerbated, if instead of assuming the payment of currently scheduled Social Security benefits we assumed that benefits would be reduced according to what is payable under current-law taxes. Regardless of which measure of well-being is used, certain groups fare worse than others, including beneficiaries who never married, nonwhites, beneficiaries without a high school degree, and those with fewer years of labor force experience and low lifetime earnings. These vulnerable groups are likely to be more dependent on Social Security benefits for their retirement income. As a result, they fare particularly poorly under the assumption that Social Security benefits are reduced to reflect what is payable under current-law taxes.     

Relationship between the retirement, disability, and unemployment insurance programs: the U.S. experience

This article was prepared initially for an international conference of social security program administrators and researchers. They examined the reasons for, and implications of, a recent trend in several European countries toward making it easier to qualify for retirement or disability benefits as a way of alleviating long-term unemployment. The article notes that the United States has not followed this trend. Instead, this country has continued to use temporary extensions of unemployment insurance benefits as a way to help the long-term unemployed during recessionary periods. Since the mid-1970's, the emphasis in retirement and disability insurance programs has been to strengthen the financial integrity of these programs rather than to expand eligibility. Described here are the progression of extended benefit provisions of unemployment insurance through the most recent recession, the historical development of early retirement features in the social security program, and the more recent attention that has been paid to the financing issues that have played a central role in legislation during the late 1970's and early 1980's. Unemployment experience and trends toward early retirement are examined, along with the role of public and private employee pension plans that supplement social security retirement benefits. Preliminary data from the Social Security Administration's New Beneficiary Survey show the prevalence of such pension coverage for recent retirees and the extent to which these pension benefits were claimed before normal retirement age.     

Using data for couples to project the distributional effects of changes in Social Security policy

Under Social Security program rules, the aged receive Social Security benefits either as retired workers, spouses, divorced spouses, or widow(er)s. Retired-worker benefits are paid to workers who have 40 quarters of coverage over their lives. Auxiliary benefits are paid to spouses, divorced spouses, and widow(er)s of retired workers. Spouse benefits are computed using the earnings history of the current spouse for individuals who are married when they apply for benefits. Divorced spouse and widow(er) benefits are computed using the earnings history of the ex-spouse or deceased spouse with the highest PIA. A large number of retired women are entitled to auxiliary benefits. Some women receive only auxiliary benefits, while the majority of women have their retired-worker benefit supplemented by auxiliary benefits. Because the level of Social Security benefits can reflect the relative lifetime earnings of both spouses, as a couple, using individual data to estimate Social Security benefits will tend to underestimate actual benefits, particularly for women. However, detailed data for couples are often difficult to obtain. There is currently no known single data source that includes both marital and earnings history information. As a result, many researchers resort to estimating Social Security benefits using individual data or aggregate data, such as the average earnings of men and women. The Social Security Administration's Office of Research, Evaluation, and Statistics, with substantial assistance from the Brookings Institution, the Urban Institute, and the RAND Corporation, is developing a model that overcomes this problem by using the marital and earnings histories of both marital partners to estimate Social Security benefits. The Modeling Income in the Near Term (MINT) model projects retirement income (Social Security benefits, pension income, asset income, and earnings of working beneficiaries) from 1997 through 2031 for current and future Social Security beneficiaries using a unique data source--the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)--matched to Social Security Administration records. Using MINT data, this article establishes the importance of using data for couples rather than individuals by examining the impact of changing Social Security benefits to reflect 40 years of lifetime earnings rather than the 35 years required under current law. We compare the effect of this policy change on married women by estimating their benefits with data for couples and with individual data. Results indicate that: Using individual data overestimates the projected reduction in retirement benefits brought about by the policy change and makes the effects on women look more severe than they actually are. Because older birth cohorts are more likely than younger cohorts to receive auxiliary benefits based on their husbands' average lifetime earnings, the bias created by using individual data is projected to be much larger for older cohorts than for younger cohorts. This article emphasizes the importance of using data for couples to estimate Social Security benefits, particularly for women. Although our focus is on married women, using data for couples is just as important for calculating the retirement benefits of divorced and widowed individuals. For individuals who are divorced or widowed at retirement, their Social Security benefits are based on their own earnings history, as well as the earnings histories of each of their previous spouses.     

Public attitudes toward Social Security

In the early years of the Social Security program, public support for old-age pensions was high but knowledge and understanding about benefits and taxes were low. Understanding has greatly increased, even though the program has expanded, and support for Social Security has remained high. Data from the surveys and polls examined in this article indicate that support for Social Security was strong even during the late 1970's and early 1980's, when a fiscal crisis generated a crisis of confidence in the public's perception of the system's ability to pay benefits in the future. The proportion of the American public declaring confidence in the program declined sharply from a large majority with confidence (63 percent) in 1975 to a minority with confidence (39 percent) in 1978. Following the restoration of program financing through the provisions in the 1983 amendments, the trend has reversed. By 1988, nearly one-half of the public expressed confidence in the future of the Social Security program. For the most part, other aspects of public opinion regarding Social Security have shown great stability over the years. The program is popular and has been well-supported. Support for the Government to spend more for Social Security has been consistently high, as has support for benefits to increase with inflation and for benefits to increase even if it means higher taxes. Many individuals rely on income from Social Security or expect to rely on it when they retire. It is clear that the public wants the program to continue. If participation were optional, about three-fourths of the population would stay in the program.     

Workers' compensation: 1984-88 benchmark revisions.

About 93.1 million workers were covered under workers' compensation laws in 1988--an increase of 11 percent from the 1984 total. Benefit amounts totaled $30.7 billion--an increase of about 56 percent since 1984. Of the total payments made under the workers' compensation program, $17.6 billion went to disabled workers, $1.6 billion to their survivors, and $11.5 billion for medical care. The Social Security Administration (SSA) is interested in measuring economic security in the United States, and workers' compensation plays a large role in that measurement. This article represents one part of our overall effort to determine the roles the various income-maintenance programs play in helping citizens of the United States achieve economic security. The figures presented here provide readers with an opportunity to review workers' compensation program operations during much of the 1980's. Workers' compensation is also important to SSA because that program is directly related to the Social Security Disability Insurance program. Since 1965, Social Security disability benefits have been subject to reduction if the beneficiary also receives workers' compensation and the combined benefits exceed 80 percent of previous earnings. In addition, SSA has been directly involved in providing income maintenance for disability from work-related diseases since 1969 when the Federal Black Lung benefits program was established.     

Income of retirement-aged persons in the United States

This article reviews the composition and level of retirement income in the United States and how this has changed over time, focusing on two overlapping but distinct groups--the entire population aged 65 or older, and recent retirees. Changes in the composition of income of the aged over the past 20-30 years, including greatly expanded Social Security and pension coverage and an increasing number of persons with retirement savings, have improved the economic status of the aged not only in comparison with the aged in earlier years, but also in comparison with younger adults who derive most of their income from earnings. New retired workers are better off than the total aged population in several respects. The younger cohorts now in the labor force will spend more of their working lives in the more favorable conditions now present than was true of past new beneficiaries or the aged as a whole. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to expect that today's workers will enjoy more and larger pensions and increased income from savings to supplement their Social Security benefits when they retire.     

Income and assets of Social Security beneficiaries by type of benefit

The SIPP data have provided a first look at the relative economic status of various types of Social Security beneficiaries. They have shown that the different types of Social Security beneficiaries face very different economic circumstances. Retired workers and wife beneficiaries have the highest family incomes adjusted for family size. Aged widows and minor children have the lowest family incomes, with high proportions of poor or near poor. And disabled workers are in between, but also have high proportions of poor or near poor. Retired-worker and wife beneficiary households also have considerably more asset holdings than disabled-worker or widow beneficiary households. Beneficiaries with high family incomes are very likely to live with relatives and to rely heavily on the relatives' income. The high-income families tend to have non-means-tested sources of family income other than Social Security amounting to substantial proportions of their total income and to have high asset holdings. Conversely, beneficiaries with low family incomes are very likely to live alone or with nonrelatives, to rely heavily on Social Security and means-tested benefits, and to have low asset holdings. A majority of ever-poor beneficiaries (with the exception of widow beneficiaries) are poor in only some months of a year. This situation is not consistent with the stereotype of beneficiaries living on fixed incomes. But the change in poverty status is often due to a change in the income of other family members rather than of the beneficiary. And in some cases, a change in poverty status occurs with little or no change in income as the cost of living rises.     

The U.S. study of work incapacity and reintegration

In many countries, including the United States, the number of persons being awarded long-term or permanent disability benefits has risen dramatically in recent years. Government agencies, advocates for the disabled, and others are looking for ways to help persons with disabilities return to the labor force. The Work Incapacity and Reintegration (WIR) Study was developed to address that issue. The United States and five other countries--Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Israel, and the Netherlands--have participated in a cross-national study of work incapacity under the auspices of the International Social Security Association. The study had two objectives: to examine the factors that influence the pattern of work resumption among persons disabled by a back condition and to identify the medical and nonmedical interventions that are most effective in helping such persons reenter the labor force. Samples for the U.S. national study were drawn from four cohorts: Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) beneficiaries, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) beneficiaries, and recipients of temporary disability insurance (TDI) benefits from the states of California and New Jersey. Only the TDI recipients were included in the comparative study. This article discusses the study design and methodology and summarizes the findings of the U.S. national study. Findings from the U.S. study show significant differences between the two cohorts in terms of work resumption and other characteristics. The proportions of respondents from the TDI cohorts who were working at the third and final study contact ranged from 53 percent to 65 percent, compared with less than 5 percent of the DI and SSI respondents. Respondents from the DI and SSI cohorts were on average about 10 years older than the TDI respondents, were less well educated, and reported more physical demands in their usual work. They also reported lower levels of functional capacity, higher levels of pain, and a much greater tendency to have other chronic illnesses. The types of medical treatments provided were remarkably uniform across cohorts and, within cohorts, between those who did and did not resume working. Thus, no medical intervention was identified that showed a significantly higher success rate in terms of facilitating a return to work. However, changes made in the work environment by the employer were an important factor in work reintegration; about 80 percent of respondents who resumed working did so with the help of workplace accommodations. In addition, since respondents with fewer physical demands in their job were more likely to return to work, there appears to be some potential for job retraining as a means of promoting a return to work. The Social Security Administration should consider these findings in developing strategies to help disabled workers reenter the labor force.     

Early retirees under Social Security: health status and economic resources

Some proposals to change the Social Security program to ensure long-run solvency would reduce or eliminate benefits for early retirees. This article documents the health and financial resources of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) beneficiaries aged 62-64. It identifies a substantial minority of early retirees who might be economically vulnerable if either the early eligibility age or normal retirement age was raised. Attention is directed at the extent to which poor health limits work in this age group and the extent to which curtailment of early OASI benefits might lead to increases in the Disability Insurance (DI) program rolls. Using a set of comprehensive health measures, we estimate that over 20 percent of OASI beneficiaries aged 62-64 have health problems that substantially impair their ability to work. This finding implies that in this age range, as many severely disabled persons receive OASI benefits as disability benefits. In fact, 12 percent of early beneficiaries would meet a more stringent criterion for being classified "disabled"--SSA's medical standard for disability benefits. The evidence therefore indicates that OASI functions as a substantial, albeit unofficial, disability program for early retirees. Compared with those who have no health problems or are less severely impaired, early OASI beneficiaries who meet the medical criteria for disability benefits are more likely to be living alone and more likely to be poor or "near poor." The great majority of the group--almost 80 percent--are women. Analysis of their earnings histories suggests that most of these beneficiaries do not satisfy the insured-status requirements for Disability Insurance benefits. The article considers the different roles of the OASI program and the DI program for health-impaired individuals aged 62-64. Disability modelers sometimes overlook an important aspect of program administration. Under customary screening procedures implemented in Social Security field offices, applicants for early OASI benefits who appear to be severely impaired simultaneously apply for DI benefits if they are disability insured. If they are found eligible for DI benefits, those applicants become DI beneficiaries. The implication is that raising the earliest entitlement age would have little impact on the DI rolls. Unless there are changes in eligibility criteria, the DI program would not serve as a safety net for many of the most severely disabled early retirees.     

Physically demanding occupations, health, and work after retirement: findings from the New Beneficiary Survey

This article uses data on a recent cohort of Social Security retired-worker beneficiaries to examine the predictors of work after initial receipt of benefits. It focuses on two factors: an analysis of the effects of ill health and of employment in a physically demanding occupation in the year preceding receipt of benefits. Based on responses received during the Social Security Administration's New Beneficiary Survey, the employment of men in a physically demanding occupation is associated with a lower probability of work in retirement; the existence of a work-limiting health condition also lowers their probability of work. Full-time, full-year workers in 1979 who had changed jobs in the years just preceding the receipt of Social Security benefits were more likely to work after they became beneficiaries. It may be that workers anticipate constraints on their ability to continue working on a job and reduce the effect of those constraints through earlier job changes. The finding that the work effort of women beneficiaries is not affected by previous employment in occupations identified as physically demanding may signify the failure of customary physical demand indices to measure stress on those jobs in which women are most likely to be employed.     

Improving return-to-work strategies in the United States disability programs, with analysis of program practices in Germany and Sweden

The General Accounting Office (GAO) has made recommendations for improving the disability programs by citing practices that have been successful in Germany, Sweden, and the private sector. This issue is important in the United States because the number of disability beneficiaries is growing rapidly, program costs are increasing proportionately, and few disability recipients are leaving the disability rolls to resume work activity. GAO points out that the estimated lifetime savings for removing an additional 1 percent of the disabled beneficiaries from the rolls of the Disability Insurance (DI) and the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs each year will ultimately reach $3.0 billion. GAO cites three specific practices as showing the most promise for returning the disabled to work. They are (1) intervening as soon as possible after a disabling event to promote and facilitate return to work, (2) identifying and providing necessary return-to-work assistance and managing cases to achieve return-to-work goals, and (3) structuring cash and health benefits to encourage people with disabilities to return to work. This article examines these suggestions to improve the rate of rehabilitation of disabled workers using research by experts on return-to-work practices in Germany, Sweden, and the United States. Experts caution that any consideration of borrowing practices from other countries needs to take into account the unique economic, social, and political elements in each country. Although other countries appear to be very successful in their rehabilitation programs, practices that are successful in one country may not necessarily work well in another. Countries have different definitions of disability and payment structures. The existence of temporary and partial awards in Germany and Sweden may ensure a number of easily rehabilitated individuals, while the U.S. vocational rehabilitation (VR) agencies have been mandated to focus on only the most severely disabled individuals. Public expenditures for vocational rehabilitation, work for the disabled, and disability benefits are much higher as a percentage of gross domestic product in Germany and Sweden than they are in the United States. Compared with the United States, Germany spent twice as much for VR, and Sweden spent 2.6 times more. Impediments to GAO's suggestions include divergent goals of the Social Security program and VR agencies, lack of availability of VR services, the timing of VR referral (which is significantly later than the onset of the disability), and little incentive for return to work built into the payment structure. The Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 is currently being considered by a Congressional conference committee. The bill would establish a Ticket to Work and Self-Sufficiency program and would require or authorize the Social Security Administration to demonstrate and evaluate different ways of encouraging return to work. In designing these demonstrations, early intervention after a potentially disabling illness or injury is an approach that merits serious attention.     

Social Security's special minimum benefit

Social Security's special minimum primary insurance amount (PIA) provision was enacted in 1972 to increase the adequacy of benefits for regular long-term, low-earning covered workers and their dependents or survivors. At the time, Social Security also had a regular minimum benefit provision for persons with low lifetime average earnings and their families. Concerns were rising that the low lifetime average earnings of many regular minimum beneficiaries resulted from sporadic attachment to the covered workforce rather than from low wages. The special minimum benefit was seen as a way to reward regular, low-earning workers without providing the windfalls that would have resulted from raising the regular minimum benefit to a much higher level. The regular minimum benefit was subsequently eliminated for workers reaching age 62, becoming disabled, or dying after 1981. Under current law, the special minimum benefit will phase out over time, although it is not clear from the legislative history that this was Congress's explicit intent. The phaseout results from two factors: (1) special minimum benefits are paid only if they are higher than benefits payable under the regular PIA formula, and (2) the value of the regular PIA formula, which is indexed to wages before benefit eligibility, has increased faster than that of the special minimum PIA, which is indexed to inflation. Under the Social Security Trustees' 2000 intermediate assumptions, the special minimum benefit will cease to be payable to retired workers attaining eligibility in 2013 and later. Their benefits will always be larger under the regular benefit formula. As policymakers consider Social Security solvency initiatives--particularly proposals that would reduce benefits or introduce investment risk--interest may increase in restoring some type of special minimum benefit as a targeted protection for long-term low earners. Two of the three reform proposals offered by the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security would modify and strengthen the current-law special minimum benefit. Interest in the special minimum benefit may also increase because of labor force participation and marital trends that suggest that enhancing workers' benefits may be a more effective means of reducing older women's poverty rates than enhancing spousal or widow's benefits. By understanding the Social Security program's experience with the special minimum benefit, policymakers will be able to better anticipate the effectiveness of other initiatives to enhance benefits for long-term low earners. This article presents the most recent and comprehensive information available about the special minimum benefit in order to help policymakers make informed decisions about the provision's future. Highlights of the current special minimum benefit include the following: Very few persons receive the special minimum benefit. As of December 2001, about 134,000 workers and their dependents and survivors were entitled to a benefit based on the special minimum. Of those, only about 79,000 received a higher total benefit because of the special minimum; the other 55,000 were dually entitled. (In effect, when persons are eligible for more than one type of benefit--that is, they are dually eligible--the highest benefit payable determines total benefits. If the special minimum benefit is not the highest benefit payable, it does not increase total benefits paid.) As of February 2000, retired workers who were special minimum beneficiaries with unreduced benefits and were not dually entitled were receiving, on average, a monthly benefit of $510 per month. That amount is approximately $2,000 less than the annual poverty threshold for an aged individual. Special minimum benefits provide small increases in total benefits. For special minimum beneficiaries who were not dually entitled as of December 2001, the average special minimum monthly PIA was just $39 higher than the regular PIA. Most special minimum beneficiaries are female retired workers. About 90 percent of special minimum beneficiaries are retired workers, and 77 percent of those retired workers are women. The special minimum benefit has never provided poverty-level benefits. Maximum payable special minimum benefits (unreduced for early retirement) equal 85 percent of the poverty level for aged persons, down from 96 percent at the provision's inception. Major public policy considerations raised by this analysis include the following: Social Security benefits alone do not protect all long-term low earners from poverty. Low earners with 30 years of earnings equal to the annual full-time minimum wage who retired in selected years from 1982 to 2000 received benefits that were 3.9 percent to 20.1 percent below the poverty threshold, depending on the year they retired. For 40-year earners, the range was 3.9 percent to 15.3 percent below poverty. Furthermore, in 1993, 29.2 percent of retired-worker beneficiaries who were poor had 30 or more years of coverage. The size of the universe of persistently low earners with significant attachment to the covered workforce is unknown. Available research that examines two 28-month periods suggests that only 4 percent to 6 percent of full-time, full-period earners had below-minimum wages for more than 12 consecutive months. Targeting enhanced benefits only toward long-term, regular workers who are low earners is difficult under the current Social Security program. All else being equal, if total wage-indexed lifetime covered earnings are the same for both a full-career low earner and for a high earner who has worked only occasionally, then their Social Security benefits will be identical. Social Security has no information on number of hours worked, hourly wages, or other information that could distinguish between two such persons.     

Benefit adequacy among elderly Social Security retired-worker beneficiaries and the SSI federal benefit rate

Both target effectiveness and administrative simplicity are desirable properties in the design of minimum benefit packages for public retirement programs. The federal benefit rate (FBR) of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program has been proposed by some analysts as a potentially attractive basis of establishing a new minimum benefit for Social Security on both of these grounds. This type of proposal is related to a broader array of minimum benefit proposals that would establish a Social Security benefit floor based on the poverty rate. In contrast to Social Security, the SSI program is means tested, including both an income and asset screen and also a categorical eligibility screen (the requirement to qualify as aged or disabled). The SSI FBR provides an inflation-adjusted, guaranteed income floor for aged and disabled people with low assets. The FBR has been perceived by proponents as a minimal measure of Social Security benefit adequacy because it represents a subpoverty income level for a family of one or two depending on marital status. For this same reason it has been seen as a target-effective tool of designing a minimum Social Security benefit. An FBR-based minimum benefit has also been viewed as administratively simple to implement; the benefit can be calculated from Social Security administrative records using a completely automated electronic process. Therefore-in contrast to the SSI program itself-an FBR-based minimum benefit would incur virtually no ongoing administrative costs, would not require a separate application for a means-tested program, and would avoid the perception of welfare stigma. While these ideas have been discussed in the literature and among policymakers in the United States over the years, and similar proposals have been considered or implemented in several foreign countries, there have been no previous analyses measuring the size of the potentially affected beneficiary population. Nor has there been any systematic assessment of the FBR as a measure of benefit adequacy or the tradeoffs between potential target effectiveness and administrative simplicity. Based on a series of simulations, we assess the FBR as a potential foundation for minimum Social Security benefits and we examine the tradeoffs between administrative simplicity and target effectiveness using microdata from the 1996 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Our empirical analysis is limited to Social Security retired-worker beneficiaries aged 65 or older. We start with the assessment of the FBR as a measure of benefit adequacy. We are particularly concerned about two types of error: (1) incorrectly identifying some Social Security beneficiaries as "economically vulnerable," and (2) incorrectly identifying others as "not economically vulnerable." Operationally we measure economic vulnerability by two alternative standards. One of our measures considers beneficiaries with family income below the official poverty threshold as vulnerable. Our second measure is more restrictive; it uses a family income threshold equal to 75 percent of the official poverty threshold. We find that a substantial minority of retired workers have Social Security benefits below the FBR. The results also show that the FBR-based measure of Social Security benefit adequacy is very imprecise in terms of identifying economically vulnerable people. We estimate that the vast majority of beneficiaries with Social Security benefits below the FBR are not economically vulnerable. Conversely, an FBR-level Social Security benefit threshold fails to identify some beneficiaries who are economically vulnerable. Thus an FBR-level minimum benefit would be poorly targeted in terms of both types of errors we are concerned about. An FBR-level minimum benefit would provide minimum Social Security benefits to many people who are clearly not poor. Conversely, an FBR-level minimum benefit would not provide any income relief to some who are poor. The administrative simplicity behind these screening errors also results in additional program cost that may be perceived as substantial. We estimate that an FBR-level minimum benefit would increase aggregate program cost for retired workers aged 65 or older by roughly 2 percent. There are two fundamental reasons for these findings. First, the concept of an FBR-level minimum benefit looks at the individual or married couple in artificial isolation; however, the family is the main consumption unit in our society. The income of an unmarried partner or family members other than a married spouse is ignored. Second, individuals and couples may also have income from sources other than Social Security or SSI, which is also ignored by a simple FBR-based minimum benefit concept. The substantial empirical magnitude of measurement error arising from these conceptual simplifications naturally leads to the assessment of the tradeoff between target effectiveness and administrative simplicity. To facilitate this analysis, we simulate the potential effect of alternative screening methods designed to increase target effectiveness; while reducing program cost, such alternatives also may increase administrative complexity. For example, considering the combined Social Security benefit of a married couple (rather than looking at the husband and wife in isolation) might substantially increase target effectiveness with a relatively small increase in administrative complexity. Adding a family income screen might increase administrative complexity to a greater degree, but also would increase target effectiveness dramatically. The results also suggest that at some point adding new screens-such as a comprehensive asset test-may drastically increase administrative complexity with diminishing returns in terms of increased target effectiveness and reduced program cost. Whether a broad-based minimum benefit concept that is not tied to previous work experience is perceived by policymakers as desirable or not may depend on several factors not addressed in this article. However, to the extent that this type of minimum benefit design is regarded as potentially desirable, the tradeoffs between administrative simplicity and target effectiveness need to be considered.     

The widow(er)'s limit provision of Social Security

Widow benefits have been a part of the Social Security program since the 1939 amendments to the Social Security Act (widower benefits were added later). For many years, the Social Security law called for paying a widow(er) a fraction of the deceased worker's primary insurance amount (PIA). However, the worker--while alive--may have received the full PIA as his or her retirement benefit. Over time, arguments were made that a widow(er) should be treated as generously as his or her spouse was. The 1972 amendments to the Social Security Act allowed for a widow(er) to receive a full PIA, subject to actuarial reductions if the widow(er) benefit was claimed before the normal retirement age (NRA) and subject to a new provision of the law commonly referred to as the widow(er)'s limit. Generally, the widow(er)'s limit specifies that if a worker received reduced retirement benefits (because the worker claimed benefits before the NRA), then the worker's widow(er) cannot receive a monthly benefit equal to the full PIA. Rather, the widow(er)'s benefit is generally limited to the amount the worker would receive if he or she was still alive. The limit provision appears to be motivated by the overall intent of the 1972 Congress to pay a benefit to a widow(er) that was comparable with what the worker received. A number of changes to the limit provision have been discussed. This article looks at the following options: Abolishing the limit, Raising the limit by requiring that it never be set below the average PIA among all retired-worker beneficiaries. Adjusting the limit for some widow(er)s--that is, only persons who are widowed before the NRA (the ARLA option), Making a simpler adjustment to the limit by abolishing it for persons who are widowed before age 62 (the SARLA option), and A proposal by Robert J. Myers that would make modest adjustments to the limit for cases in which the worker died before the NRA. The most fundamental change--abolishing the limit--would increase benefits for about 2.8 million widow(er)s and would cost about $3.1 billion a year. Most of the additional government expenditures would not go to the poor and the near poor. Another change would be more successful in aiding low-income widow(er)s: requiring that the limit amount never be set below the average PIA among all retired-worker beneficiaries. About 58 percent of the government expenditures from that option would be received by the poor and the near poor. Overall, 1.2 million widow(er)s would be helped, and the cost would be about $816 million a year. Although the limit provision is consistent with the overall intent of the 1972 Congress, it can have effects that may have been unintended and that some policymakers might consider unusual. Persons who delay receipt of Social Security benefits usually receive higher monthly benefit amounts, but a widow(er) who faces a limit cannot increase his or her monthly benefit through delayed receipt of benefits. Thus, many persons who are widowed before the NRA face strong incentives to claim benefits early. That is somewhat unusual because the actuarial adjustments under Social Security are approximately fair, so there are no cost savings to the Social Security program from "forcing" a widow(er) to claim early benefits as opposed to allowing him or her to delay receipt of benefits in exchange for a higher monthly amount. And many widow(er)s would be better off if they could use the Social Security program to, in effect, save (that is, delay receipt of benefits in exchange for a higher amount later). This article analyzes two other options that would provide widow(er)s with additional filing options under Social Security. The ARLA option would ultimately help about 229,000 widow(er)s, and the cost would be small (about $69 million a year). The SARLA option would help about 117,000 widow(er)s, and the cost would be about $41 million a year. Robert J. Myers, a former Chief Actuary of Social Security, has offered a proposal that would provide relief from the widow(er)'s limit in cases in which the worker dies shortly after retirement. That proposal would help about 115,000 widow(er)s, and the cost would be low (about $57 million a year).     

Economic security, 1935-85

The economic well-being of both working and retired persons has improved significantly since the Social Security Act was passed in 1935. More people are employed now than at any time since then, despite declining employment among the aged and more years of school attendance among the young. The ratio of non-workers to workers--a broad measure of dependency--is lower now than at any time since the 1930's. Social security has grown and matured to become a strong foundation of retirement income, and other work-related employee benefits have grown in tandem with social security. Employer contributions for social insurance and related employee benefits have grown from being about a 1-percent supplement to aggregate wages and salaries in 1929 to nearly 20 percent today. Social security and Medicare account for just over a fourth of employer contributions, while other public and private retirement systems represent just over another fourth. The balance of benefits for active workers includes group health and life insurance, unemployment insurance, workers' compensation, temporary disability insurance, and related benefits. Pay for holidays, vacations, and sick leave is estimated to have increased from less than 1 percent of aggregate pay in 1929 to about 10 percent today. The improved economic status of the aged has been documented by a series of surveys beginning in 1941-42 and carried out from time to time until 1972 and biennially since 1976. The earlier surveys were supplemented with estimates from record data and tables from the Bureau of the Census. The income of the aged as a whole has grown by about 75 percent over the past 2 decades after taking inflation into account. The income of the aged as a whole grew faster than that of the nonaged in the 1970's and early 1980's when real social security benefits increased faster than inflation and wages lagged behind it. New beneficiaries in 1982 were in better health and were more likely to retire because they wanted to than was true of their counterparts in the early 1940's. Not only have benefits continued to be the main component of income of the aged as total incomes have grown, but also benefits have become much larger in relation to average earnings than used to be the case. Retired workers are much more likely now than in the early 1940's to have other pensions or income from assets to supplement benefits.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Expanding access to health care for Social Security Disability Insurance beneficiaries: early findings from the accelerated benefits demonstration

Most Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) beneficiaries must complete a 5-month waiting period before they become entitled to DI cash benefits and an additional 24-month waiting period before Medicare benefits begin. The Accelerated Benefits (AB) demonstration is a randomized experiment designed to test the effects of providing newly entitled DI beneficiaries who do not have health insurance with a generous health benefits package during the Medicare waiting period. This article presents early findings on the prevalence of health insurance coverage among newly entitled beneficiaries and the characteristics of those without health insurance. It also examines the effects of AB on health care utilization, the extent to which AB reduces unmet medical needs, and the costs of providing the AB health benefits package.     

Reducing women's poverty by shifting social security benefits from retired couples to widows

This article examines proposals to transfer Social Security benefits from married couples to surviving widows in terms of effects on poverty rates, trust fund expenditures, and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) expenditures. Because widows are much more likely to be living in poverty than older married women, it makes sense to consider Social Security benefits in a lifetime framework and transfer some benefits from the time both the husband and wife are alive to the time when there is only one survivor, usually the wife. Because of expected life span and age differences of marital partners, a $1 reduction of the couple's benefit can finance a $1.45 increase in the widow's benefit. The 1990 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) matched to the Social Security Administration's benefit records are the basis for the estimates.