Personal vote‐seeking in flexible list systems: How electoral incentives shape Belgian MPs' bill initiation behaviour

It is well known that different types of electoral systems create different incentives to cultivate a personal vote and that there may be variation in intra‐party competition within an electoral system. This article demonstrates that flexible list systems – where voters can choose to cast a vote for the list as ordered by the party or express preference votes for candidates – create another type of variation in personal vote‐seeking incentives within the system. This variation arises because the flexibility of party‐in‐a‐district lists results from voters' actual inclination to use preference votes and the formal weight of preference votes in changing the original list order. Hypotheses are tested which are linked to this logic for the case of Belgium, where party‐in‐a‐district constituencies vary in their use of preference votes and the electoral reform of 2001 adds interesting institutional variation in the formal impact of preference votes on intra‐party seat allocation. Since formal rules grant Belgian MPs considerable leeway in terms of bill initiation, personal vote‐seeking strategies are inferred by examining the use of legislative activity as signalling tool in the period between 1999 and 2007. The results establish that personal vote‐seeking incentives vary with the extent to which voters use preference votes and that this variable interacts with the weight of preference votes as defined by institutional rules. In addition, the article confirms the effect of intra‐party competition on personal vote‐seeking incentives and illustrates that such incentives can underlie the initiation of private members bills in a European parliamentary system.     

Tacit co-operation in three-alternative non-cooperative voting games: A new model of sophisticated behaviour under the plurality procedure

Two models, one due to Farquharson and the other to Niemi-Frank, attempt to account for sophisticated voting behaviour when the voters' preference orderings are common knowledge and communication among Voters is impossible. Having subjected these two models to experimental testing, we have found them lacking. Hence, we propose a new model of sophisticated voting for 3-alternative n-person non-cooperative games under the plurality procedure, which can be extended to other voting procedures and more than three alternatives.The model assumes that voters whose first preference is (one of) the Condorcet winner(s) will (tacitly) co-ordinate their strategies and vote for their first preference, and specifies the conditions under which voters whose second preference is (one of) the Condorcet winner(s) will vote for their second (rather than their first) preference. Consequently, our model predicts that: (i) if there is a single Condorcet winner he or she will be elected; (ii) if there is more than one Condorcet winner the final outcome will be a tie between them; and (iii) when there are cyclical majorities with a single maximin alternative, this alternative will be elected.     

A comparison of cumulative voting and generalized plurality voting

In market based societies consumers are able to express the intensity of their preference for an object by paying more for it. However, under some voting systems, consumers are unable to express the intensity of their preference for a candidate due to the constraint of the “one person, one vote” principle. Cumulative voting maintains the equality of the “one person, one vote” principle by allotting each voter the same number of votes, while also allowing for expression of intensity of candidate preference. This paper provides an experimental analysis of voter behavior under different voting systems.     

Human capital,committee power and legislative outcomes

This paper presents a model in which legislators use informational asymmetries to engage in rent-seeking behavior. Previous work in the informational and distributive traditions could not explain deviations from the median preference without reference to “committee power”. Integration of these forces demonstrated that legislative outcomes need not correspond to the median preference regardless of the extent to which committee power is present in a legislature. While deviations from the median preference are consistent with committee power, recent empirical evidence suggests that observed deviations in Congress are in fact caused by human capital differentials rather than committee power.     

Feminist consciousness and candidate preference among American women, 1972–1988

Recent research has suggested that women with a feminist consciousness differ from nonfeminists in their attitudes and values. This paper investigates the impact of feminist consciousness on candidate preference and vote choice in presidential elections from 1972 to 1988. In those elections in which candidates took divergent positions on feminist issues, feminism was a significant predictor of candidate preference after controls for demographic variables, political attitudes, and partisanship. In elections in which the candidates took similar positions, however, feminism did not affect candidate preference. The 1980 election was the exception: in that election, feminists cast relucantant ballots for Carter, while rating John Anderson higher.     

Distrust in Government Leaders,Demand for Leadership Change,and Preference for Popular Elections in Rural China

This paper examines the relationship between distrust in incumbent government leaders and demand for systemic changes in rural China. It finds that individuals who distrust government leaders’ commitment to the public interest have both stronger demand for leadership change and stronger preference for popular elections. It argues that distrust in government leaders may have enhanced the demand for leadership change, which in turn may have reinforced the preference for elections. It further argues that distrust in incumbent leaders has in effect induced a demand for systemic changes, as introducing popular election of government leaders would require a major constitutional amendment. The paper suggests that two distinctive mechanisms may be at work in determining whether distrust in current government authorities induces preference for systemic changes. Whether citizens can engineer leadership change through existing channels influences the generation of idealistic wishes for a better political system. Perceived availability of better and viable alternatives affects whether idealistic wishes become a practical preference.     

Preference votes without preference? Institutional effects on preference voting: an experiment

A classical question of political science is to what extent electoral systems influence voting behaviour. Yet, many of these studies examine how different electoral systems affect the election results in terms of vote distribution across parties. Instead, we investigate how electoral rules affect intra party preference voting. Given the importance of the debate on the personalization of politics, insight into how electoral rules shape intra-party choice is a valuable contribution to the literature. In our study, we focus on the effect of two specific rules: the option to cast a list vote and on a single versus multiple preference votes. The results of experiments conducted in Belgium and the Netherlands show that electoral rules indeed influence voting behaviour with regard to intra party preference voting, although differences exist between the Netherlands and Belgium. Moreover, we find that the option to cast a list vote equally affects votes for the first candidate on the list, as well as lower positioned candidates. This suggests that preference votes might be less preferential than has often been assumed.     

The structured value referendum: Eliciting preferences for environmental policy alternatives

This article introduces a voting-based method for eliciting public preferences, referred to as a structured value referendum (SVR). The process for developing and implementing an SVR is viewed as a version of public sector decision analysis, in which problem-structuring activities are crucial, and preference is elicited on a large scale by voters selecting among specified alternatives. The present study discusses the steps involved in developing an SVR, drawing on the problem-structuring approaches of decision analysis. Next, the advantages offered by SVR are discussed and compared to standard preference elicitation techniques or conventional referendums. A rationale for the use of SVR as an approach to preference elicitation is provided. Political judgments that differentiate SVR from other elicitation approaches are considered; the nature of the preference judgments and the required level of measurement are discussed. Concluding sections of the study discuss the implementation of an SVR for a regional government in British Columbia, in which 34,000 people voted to select among wastewater treatment alternatives for managing a potential environmental risk.     

Voting for government coalitions in Ireland under single transferable vote

This paper addresses the issue of whether voters indicate a preference for a government rather than, or in addition to a preference for a party, when they cast a ballot under the system of the single transferable vote (STV). It thus contributes to the existing literature on strategic coalition voting by examining whether coalition preferences matter where electors are given the option to rank the parties in order of preference. The question then becomes: does this ranking reflect or signal a coalition preference? Using survey data from two Irish elections, this paper finds that whereas first preferences are closely aligned with coalition choices, Irish voters do not systematically use second preferences to express a view on their preferred coalition formation.     

Is electoral intraparty competition more intense in urban areas?

This article investigates whether intraparty competition at the election stage – measured by the distribution of preference votes over candidates running under the same party label – is more intense in urban areas. Earlier research on preferential-list PR systems shows that urban voters are less inclined to cast preference votes. Yet we do not know how these differences at the individual voter level translate to the degree of intraparty competition at the aggregate list level. We hypothesize that urban areas provide a more open electoral market and lead to lower levels of vote concentration on party lists. We leverage a novel dataset on preference voting in three Belgian elections by aggregating 461,049 preference vote scores for candidates-in-cantons to a dataset of intraparty competition scores for 3214 lists-in-cantons. The hierarchical models show that intra-party competition is impacted by the interactive effects of both the urban character of electoral competition and the presence of prominent office-holders. While rural contexts lead to greater vote concentration in presence of a larger number of office-holders, urban contexts often result in lower vote concentration. Our study provides novel insights into the contextual determinants of intraparty competition and personalization.     

Chasing an elusive concept: Ideological identifications and candidate choice

This research examines the manner in which ideological identifications covary with candidate choice. Ideological ID is not purely an independent variable for evaluating candidates; evaluations of the candidates affect both individual identification and candidate placements. Prospective voters try to create a consistent cognitive system of candidate preference, ideological ID, and ideological placement of their candidate. Results demonstrate that candidate preference has a strong effect on less salient attitudes.     

Similarity in husbands and wives party family preference in the Netherlands

Using insights from theories on marital homogamy and political behaviour, this research examines the tendency of husbands and wives to vote for the same party family. It disentangles the extent to which similarity in party family preference can be explained by (1) partners choosing one another because of their shared socio-economic position and (2) partners influencing one another. For this purpose, we conducted probit regression models with instrumental variables using data from the 2000 and 2003 Dutch Family Survey. Using instrumental variables to analyze endogenous relationships, we found that Dutch partners tend to support parties belonging to the same party family (left, confessional or right). There is some support for the idea that similarity in preference for a leftist and confessional party is – at least partly – a by-product of ‘self-selection’, i.e. the preference for a partner who is similar in socio-economic characteristics to oneself. As regards rightist voting, there does not seem to be an effect of similarity in socio-economic characteristics. Similarity in preference for a rightist party rather seems to be uniquely the result of mutual influence.     

Why preferences and institutions change: A systematic process analysis of credit rating in Germany

This article argues that a within‐case analysis of the causes and patterns of the institutionalisation of rating in the German financial system offers fresh insights into change in the major socioeconomic institutions of advanced capitalism. Using the method of systematic process analysis, the article explores the expansion of credit rating in the German banking system from three perspectives: historical (power), sociological (diffusion) and behavioural institutionalism (prospect theory). It demonstrates that the proliferation of credit rating resulted from a change of preference on the part of large banks. With Germany as a least likely case for successfully implementing rating, the study's main lesson is that institutional analysis may benefit from incorporating behavioural institutionalism into the analysis of preference change because this cites economic motivations as causes of preference shifts and institutional changes.     

公共支出效率评价——带非自主决定输入的两阶段数据包络模型

公共支出的效率评价是政府进行有效公共支出管理的基础,正确评价公共支出效率也是各国政府需要研究和解决的问题.经济学是通过比较公共支出前后的社会福利变化来衡量公共支出效率的,然而,社会福利是由公共支出与私人支出共同决定的,而且公共支出的增加是有机会成本的.因此,我们不能通过忽略私人支出,而单独分析公共支出对社会福利的影响的方式来衡量公共支出的效率.同时,各种原因共同导致政府通过公共支出提供的公共产品组合往往与社会公众的实际需求不一致.本文尝试在分析公共支出的效率时,把私人支出也纳入分析的范畴,同时提出了一种方法--带非自主决定输入的两阶段数据包络模型,试图解决在政府与公众偏好不一致情况下的公共支出的效率评价问题,并按照中国的数据进行了实证检验.     

The Politics of Beauty: The Effects of Partisan Bias on Physical Attractiveness

Does politics cause people to be perceived as more or less attractive? As a type of social identity, party identifiers often exhibit in-group bias, positively evaluating members of their own party and, especially under conditions of competition, negatively evaluating out-party members. The current experiment tests whether political in-party and out-party status affects perceptions of the physical attractiveness of target persons. In a nationally representative internet sample of U.S. adults during the 2012 presidential election, we presented participants with photos of individuals and varied information about their presidential candidate preference. Results indicate that partisans, regardless of gender, rate target individuals as less attractive if they hold a dissimilar candidate preference. Female partisans, however, were more likely to rate target persons as more physically attractive when they held a similar candidate preference whereas no such effect was found for male partisans.     

Vote-earning strategies in flexible list systems: Seats at the price of unity

In theory, flexible list systems are a compromise between closed-list and open-list proportional representation. A party's list of candidates can be reordered by voters if the number of votes cast for an individual candidate exceeds some quota. Because these barriers to reordering are rarely overcome, these systems are often characterized as basically closed-list systems. Paradoxically, in many cases, candidates are increasingly earning individual-level preference votes. Using data from Slovakia, we show that incumbents cultivate personal reputations because parties reward preference vote earning candidates with better pre-election list positions in the future. Ironically, the party's vote-earning strategy comes at a price, as incumbents use voting against the party on the chamber floor to generate the reputations that garner preference votes.     

Civic Duty and Voter Turnout

We argue that two different sets of considerations shape the decision to vote or abstain in an election–ethical and non-ethical. First the citizen may vote out of a sense of duty. Failing that, she may vote because she has strong preferences about the outcome of the election. Abstention occurs when neither duty nor a sufficiently strong preference is present. The implication is that while duty and preference each have strong positive effects on turnout, they also have a negative interaction effect, since the impact of preference is much weaker among those with a sense of duty. We present a wide array of empirical evidence that systematically supports our claim that the turnout decision is importantly shaped by this causal heterogeneity. Thus a turnout model misses something fundamental if it does not take into account the effect of civic duty.

     

Forecasts and Preferences in the 1992 General Election

Little attention has been paid to the influence of expectations for victory on the formation of general election preferences in U.S. presidential races. There is good reason to believe, however, that under certain conditions citizens' forecasts of who will win the fall election may influence their preference and their vote. We model preferences during the course of the fall 1992 campaign as a function of two kinds of expectations. First we attempt to identify a component of expectations that is independent of political projection. We discover that expectations based only on information about the race play a prominent role in preference formation early in the fall but decline later as the cost of information drops. Similar results obtain when we include projection in the model of expectations. We conclude that general elections may have some of the same dynamic properties that are observable in primaries. Since early momentum in the fall campaign may influence subsequent preference formation, we contend that leads in early polls are valuable.     

Voting on public spending: Differences between public employees,transfer recipients,and private workers

Politicians who support higher public spending in the hope of gaining the support of transfer recipients, such as the aged, the unemployed, and those on welfare, have no reason to believe that the strategy will succeed; according to the evidence reviewed here, transfer recipients do not vote much differently on such issues from other voters. State and local employees have shown a clear preference for higher public spending, but their numbers are limited and the relative strength of their preference weak, so that their impact on voting outcomes has been only marginal.     

The vulnerability of point-voting schemes to preference variation and strategic manipulation

This essay measures and analyzes for a special class of point-voting schemes (the Borda method, plurality rule and the unrestricted point-voting scheme) sensitivity to preference variation (a simple change in the socially winning alternative resulting from alteration of a single voter's preferences) and vulnerability to individual strategic manipulation (a change in the winning alternative that benefits the voter whose preferences are altered). Assuming that society (n voters with linear preference orders on a finite set of m alternatives) satisfies the impartial-culture assumption, that is, each randomly selected voter is equally likely to hold any one of the randomly picked possible preference orders on the alternatives, we demonstrate:

1. for a given rule and a fixed number of voters, the sensitivity to individual preference variation and the vulnerability to individual strategic manipulation are greater, the larger the total number of alternatives.
2. For a given rule and a fixed number of alternatives, the vulnerability to individual strategic manipulation, in general, is not greater the smaller the total number of voters. Such a relationship does hold, however, if n is sufficiently large.
3. For any given combination of number of voters and number of alternatives, the unrestricted point-voting scheme is more sensitive to preference variation than the Borda method, which, in turn, is more exposed to such variation relative to the plurality rule. A similar conclusion does not hold with respect to vulnerability to individual strategic manipulation, unless the number of voters is sufficiently small.