In Defense of Asbestos Tort Litigation: Rethinking Legal Process Analysis in a World of Uncertainty, Second Bests, and Shared Policy-Making Responsibility

A central question in American policy making is when should courts address complex policy issues, as opposed to defer to other forums? Legal process analysis offers a standard answer. It holds that judges should act when adjudication offers advantages over other modes of social ordering such as contracts, legislation, or agency rule making. From this vantage, the decision to use common law adjudication to address a sprawling public health crisis was a terrible mistake, as asbestos litigation has come to represent the very worst of mass tort litigation. This article questions this view, arguing that legal process analysis distorts the institutional choices underlying the American policy‐making process. Indeed, once one considers informational and political constraints, as well as how the branches of government can fruitfully share policy‐making functions, the asbestos litigation seems a reasonable and, in some ways, exemplary, use of judicial power.     

David Dyzenhaus and the Holy Grail

Abstract
In his book Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems David Dyzenhaus aims to provide a cogent refutation of legal positivism, and thus to settle a very old dispute in jurisprudence. His claim is that the consequences for practice and for morality if judges adopt positivist ideas in a wicked legal system are unacceptable. He discusses the South African legal system as a case in point. I argue that this claim is not secured. Dyzenhaus has three arguments for his view. The first is that positivism cannot account for legal principles, and legal principles are the key source of morally acceptable adjudication. I show that his argument does not go through for sophisticated positivist accounts of "principles" such as those of J. Raz and D. N. MacCormick. Dyzenhaus's second argument claims to find a pragmatic contradiction in positivism, between the belief in judicial discretion and the belief in a commitment to legislative sources as binding fact. I argue that there is no such commitment in a form that supports Dyzenhaus's theory. His final argument is that wicked legal systems are contrary to the very idea of law and legality. I argue that a strong doctrine of deference to legislative authority cannot be bad in itself: It can only be bad relative to a certain content to legislation. Thus Dyzenhaus's claim begs the question against positivism.     

Judging the Best Interests of the Child: Judges' Accounts of the Tender Years Doctrine

With dramatic changes in family life over the last several decades, child custody law has shifted from a maternal preference to a more egalitarian standard, the best interests of the child. Despite this change in the law, scholars have debated whether gender continues to play a role in the resolution of custody disputes. Drawing on feminist legal scholarship and sociolegal research on judges, I assess the current debates over gender and custody by examining the accounts of judges who frequently adjudicate custody cases. I conduct in-depth, face-to-face interviews with twenty-five trial court judges in Indiana and investigate judges' accounts about whether they continue to use the tender years doctrine in custody disputes, even though the custody statute is explicitly gender-neutral. Then, I assess several competing explanations of the variation across judges' accounts, including the judges' gender role attitudes, gender, age, and political party affiliation. In exploratory analyses, I also examine the contested custody rulings of a subset of nine judges to assess whether judges' accounts are congruent with their actual custody decisions. I discuss the implications of these findings in light of feminist legal scholarship as well as empirical research on child custody adjudication.     

商法的独立性与商事审判的独立化

商事审判独立化既是商法独立性的必然要求和主要标志,同时也是实现商法独立性的重要保障,没有商事审判的独立化就没有真正意义上的商法独立。实现商事审判独立化的关键首先在于确立独立的商事审判理念,这些理念主要包括重效率的审判理念、侧重动态保护和强调利益均衡的审判理念、尊重当事人意思自治的审判理念及促进商事交易效率与安全并重的理念等。在商事审判程序的具体设计上,应当在充分把握商事审判特殊性的基础上,建立独立的法官队伍并对法官的自由裁量权做出必要限制,注重法院司法能动性的发挥,确立商事惯例和商事判例作为法律渊源的地位和作用,注意发挥诉讼替代程序在商事纠纷争议解决中的作用,强化诚信原则在商事裁判中的独特作用,充分尊重国际惯例在商事审判中的作用。     

Elmer's case: A legal positivist replies to Dworkin

Conclusion I have argued that Legal Positivism can accommodate the existence oftheoretical disagreements in law and that Ronald Dworkin is wrongto claim otherwise. As far as Legal Positivists are concerned, evenjudges who differ over both the truth of propositions of law and thegrounds or sources of law can have a legal duty to resolve their dis-agreements on the basis of legal arguments. The duty exists whenconventional legal practice creates it. Moreover, all Anglo-Americanlegal systems impose the duty on judges because all such systemscontain legal practices of the right sort: practices creating expectationsthat cases will be decided on the law even when they raise doubtsabout the content or proper formulation of a rule of recognition.Thus, Elmer's Case poses no threat to Legal Positivism. To the con-trary, it reveals the richness of that theory as few other cases can.Only if Elmer's Case is detached from the context of Anglo-American adjudication can it be said to undermine Legal Positivism.But then no theory of positive law could withstand its challenge.A draft of this essay was presented at a political theory workshop at the University of Chicago. I am grateful for comments received from Russell Hardin, Leo Katz, Steven Fletcher and Thomas Christiano on that occasion. I also thank Steven Walt and Jules Coleman, two of the better dressed philosophers I know.     

Why Interpret?

Abstract. My article is about legal interpretation, but not about the question: how to interpret the law. Rather its aim is to make us consider seriously the question: Why is interpretation central to legal practices? After all not all normative practices assign interpretation such a central role. In this regard the law contrasts with morality. The reason for the contrast has to do with the status of sources in the law. There are no “moral sources” while legal sources are central to the law. Legal interpretation is primarily—I will suggest—the interpretation not of the law, but of its sources. To understand why interpretation is central to legal practices requires understanding the role of sources in the law: the reasons for having them, and hence also the ways in which they should be treated. I will show how reflections about these topics connect with some traditional jurisprudential puzzles, such as the relations between law and morality. Are there gaps in the law? Is the law or its interpretation objective or subjective?     

A Toolbox for European Judges

The forthcoming instrument on European contract law, be it in the shape of an optional code for cross‐border contracts or as an official toolbox for the European legislator, is likely to have a spill‐over effect on private law adjudication in Europe. Judges will have no great difficulty in finding model rules and definitions that might come in handy when dealing with gaps and ambiguities in European private law. However, the question is whether such a role as a toolbox for judges would be legitimate. I discuss three types of possible legitimation strategies: traditional methods of legal interpretation, the new European methods and merely political legitimation. It will often depend on the circumstances of the case at hand and the characteristics of the particular model rule or definition that is being borrowed what mode of legitimation will prove to be more convincing. However, generally speaking legitimation in terms of the ‘general principles of civil law’ that the CJEU has recently been developing seems a particularly promising strategy. On the other hand, it seems unlikely that European courts could come under a duty, following from the principle of sincere cooperation, to use the instrument as a toolbox.     

法律原则适用与程序制度保障——以民事法为中心的分析

法律原则因为没有明确、具体的事实构成要件和法律效果而无法像法律规则那样为当事人提供行为准则,为法官提供裁判根据。适用法律原则处理个案纠纷就是法官以自己所“造”之法进行司法裁判,其适用困境的实质在于,以立法机关制定的(成文)法律规则为中心运行的司法制度(尤其是司法程序)难以为法官行使自由裁量权提供有效的正当性论证。在实体法、法律适用技术的范围内,以构建适用条件、适用规则,完善适用方法等方式来破解此困境,作用极为有限。重构司法程序制度,使当事人、社会能够以恰当的方式参与到具体的裁判过程以制约法官的裁量权,或许是解决此难题的可能途径。     

二元规范理论下的法律原则检讨

当下法律原则理论的论争重心,已从"法律是什么"的概念分析,转向了司法实践中的原则裁判。自德沃金以来的"规则-原则"二元规范理论,对实际的司法裁判的解说力和作用力较为有限,也未能解决原则权衡这一关键性问题。"融贯性"命题和"籍由法政策权衡进行裁判"命题,是原则裁判理论的两大基石。但德沃金对融贯性命题的回答过于抽象,而阿列克希依比例原则和权重公式对权衡命题和原则理论的最新推进,却是一种不成功的自反性进化。这种自反性进化和理论反讽,表明作为一种"过度整合式"的裁判理论,原则裁判已然走到了穷途末路。     

刑事裁判中类推思维的作用及其运用——一种基于方法论意义的思考

我国刑法在确立罪刑法定原则的同时废除了类推制度,填补刑法漏洞意义上的类推适用被严格禁止。然而,作为一种司法判断的方法,类推思维依然在刑事裁判中发挥着重要作用,它是法官解明刑法规范含义、进行犯罪构成要件符合性判断、践行"相同案件相同处理"法治理念的有效方法。当然,在罪刑法定原则之下,刑事裁判中的类推思维应当受制于刑法规范目的和可能文义范围,确保类推结论没有超越刑法规定而违背罪刑法定。     

明清时期的“依法裁判”：一个伪问题？

明清时期的司法实践，既非简单的“法律裁决”，也非纯粹的“情理裁决”，而是由诸多原因导致了二者之间的紧张和融合，最终以“情法两尽”为目标和理想。通过辨析法律表达和解读司法案件可以发现，从类型角度来看，明清时期的司法属于“情法两尽”的裁决模式；就局部而言，司法官员在审理某些案件时，确实存在严格“依法裁决”的现象。据此，我们并不能将明清中国的“依法裁决”视作一个“伪问题”。     

法官受制定法约束的理论谱系及其评价--基于德国法学方法论视角的考察

自19世纪以来,法官受制定法的约束问题成为法学方法论研究的主要问题之一。概念法学的理论追求是将法官视为"涵摄机器";自由法学理论则强调法官具有造法的权力,将法官视为"法官王";纯粹法学理论提出了"可能框架"模式,法律规范只是为法官的裁判提供一个可能的框架范围。评价法学理论将"法官受制定法的约束"转变为"法官受价值约束"的"价值导向"模式;在20世纪末,法律论证理论提出了一种"理性商谈"模式,尝试解决这一     

Guilt Beyond Guilt: From Political Theory to Metaphysics with Herbert Morris

As it is presently conceptualised and applied in criminal law, moral guilt is bound by a narrow, legalistic framework that is rooted in a liberal political philosophy. In this paper, drawing on the work of Herbert Morris, I seek to open up and deepen the concept of moral guilt. I do this through the development of a four‐fold typology of guilt that charts Morris's journey from political theory to metaphysics that includes the following forms: moral‐legal guilt; moral‐psychological guilt; quantum guilt; and metaphysical guilt. In deepening our understanding of moral guilt, the typology compels us to consider alternative conceptions of guilt that would take into account a person who feels guilt not only towards others, but also towards themselves and the world. I argue that Morris's journey has important implications for how we think about the critical relationship between theory and law as well as restorative justice.     

论法官的裁判良心

近年来司法界已意识到司法裁决并非全由法律所决定,如果司法裁决并非全部客观,法官的职业行为就变得相关,法官审理具体案件时不仅仅依据的是事实与法律,还要结合自己的良心,要求法官在裁判中要尽量保持良心的客观性。因此,关注法官良心与法的关联性、法官良心的自由与中立及法官良心的社会尊重和养成,直接影响着法官裁判的公正及法院的社会公信力。     

An Acquittal for Epistemicism

Scott Soames argues that consideration of the practice of legal judgement gives us good reason to favor the partial-definition/context-sensitive theory of vagueness against epistemicism. Despite the fact that the value of power-delegation through vagueness is evidenced in practice, Soames says, epistemicism cannot account for it theoretically, while the partial-definition/context-sensitive theory is capable of it. In this paper, I examine the two possible arguments against epistemicism that can be extracted from Soames’s account: (1) an argument based on unknown obligations, and (2) an argument based on power-delegation through vagueness. The first argument tries to convince us that, as based on epistemicism, the law has already decided the borderline cases, so that judges have obligatory decisions even in such cases: therefore epistemicism is inconsistent with the discretion of judges in borderline cases. I show that even if we sympathize with Soames’s intuitions concerning the legal practice, the argument he offers is not conclusive since it is either invalid, unsound, or paradoxical. The second argument holds that only the gaps which the partial-definition/context-sensitive theory predicts give judges the possibility of lawmaking in borderline cases. However, by categorizing the vague laws as imperfect laws, the judges can claim the right of lawmaking without any need to refer to gaps in the law. By neutralizing these arguments, I argue that epistemicism is able to explain the phenomena just as well as the partial-definition/context-sensitive theory.     

Injustice in Robes: Iniquity and Judicial Accountability*

The paper addresses the question of judges' moral responsibility in an unjust society. How is the “moral” judge to reconcile his perception of justice with a malevolent law? Upon what grounds might judges, and perhaps other public officials, be held morally responsible for their acts or omissions? Does a positivist approach yield a more satisfactory resolution than a natural law or Dworkinian analysis? Could inclusive positivism offer any clues as to how this quandary might be judiciously resolved?     

Legal Positivism, Law's Normativity, and the Normative Force of Legal Justification

In this article, I distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of legal normativity, and argue that legal positivists can account for law's normativity in the strictly legal but not in the moral sense, while pointing out that normativity in the former sense is of little interest, at least to lawyers. I add, however, that while the moral conception of law's normativity is to be preferred to the strictly legal conception from the rather narrow viewpoint of the study of law's normativity, it is less attractive than the latter from the broader viewpoint of the study of the nature of law. I then distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of the normative force of legal justification, and argue that legal positivists may without contradiction embrace the moral conception, and that therefore the analysis of the normative force of legal justification need not be a problem for legal positivists. I conclude that, on the whole, we have reason to prefer legal positivism to natural law theory. I begin by introducing the subject of jurisprudence (section 1). I then introduce the natural law/legal positivism debate, suggesting that we ought to understand it as a debate about the proper way to explicate the concept of law (section 2). I proceed to argue that legal decision-making is a matter of applying legal norms to facts, and that syllogistic reasoning plays a prominent role in legal decision-making thus conceived (section 3). Having done that, I discuss law's normativity (section 4), the normative force of legal justification (section 5), and the relation between the former and the latter (section 6). I conclude with a critical comment on Joseph Raz' understanding of the question of law's normativity (appendix).     

Do Judges Have an Obligation to Enforce the Law?: Moral Responsibility and Judicial-Reasoning

Judicial obligation to enforce the law is typically regarded as both unproblematic and important: unproblematic because there is little reason to doubt that judges have a general, if prima facie, obligation to enforce law, and important because the obligation gives judges significant reason to limit their concern in adjudication to applying the law. I challenge both of these assumptions and argue that norms of political legitimacy, which may be extra-legal, are irretrievably at the basis of responsible judicial reasoning.     

法官应该是司法能动主义者——从李慧娟事件说起

李慧娟事件引发了学界不少的争论,引起了人们对于中国法官功能角色定位的思考。在比较法学以及价值层面上,法官应该成为一个能动主义者。为了避免在司法能动的过程中可能出现的弊端,应该通过"程序主义的司法能动范式"加以制约和保障。