Self-Defense,Punishment and Forfeiture

Abstract

According to the self-defense view, the moral justification of punishment is derived from the moral justification of an earlier threat of punishment for an offense. According to the forfeiture view, criminals can justly be punished because they have forfeited certain rights in virtue of their crimes. The paper defends three theses about these two views. (1) The self-defense view is false because the right to threaten retaliation is not independent of the right to carry out that threat. (2) A more plausible account of the right to threaten says instead that the right to retaliate is primary to the right to threaten, and that the former right in turn arises because aggressors forfeit the right not to suffer retaliation. (3) The “fair warning thesis,” according to which just punishment must be preceded by a threat, is less plausible than first appearances suggest and is therefore no serious obstacle to the view of threats described above.     

Proportionality and Its Discontents

Law and Philosophy - In this paper, I defend a deflationary account of proportionality, which suggests that proportionality does not explain anything valuable about a system of punishment....     

Knowledge Problems and Proportionality

The proportionality standard demands a meaningful link between the severity of crimes and the punishments received for them. This article investigates the compatibility between this philosophical demand and the practical means most commonly associated with criminal justice provision: governmental decision making. In so far as criminal justice systems require the coordination of real human and physical resources, certain forms of knowledge and incentives are required to calculate, produce, and distribute outputs proportionately. Whereas markets rely upon pricing mechanisms to generate and coordinate information and incentives across diverse stages of complex production processes, governmental decision making often lacks a calculation mechanism comparable to market prices through which knowledge about societal needs and demands can be conveyed and may thus inevitably result in some forms of punitive disparity.     

论假想防卫过当

假想防卫过当的场合,根据行为人对过当事实有无认识,可以区分为故意犯和过失犯。由于行为人在对假想侵害进行反击时有防卫过当的认识,因此,其责任的追究,只能在其主观认识即防卫过当的认识限度内进行,否则,有违反责任原则的嫌疑。只是在以防卫过当的规定处罚假想防卫过当时,必须注意其与通常只能作为过失犯定罪量刑而不能"减免处罚"的假想防卫之间的衡平。     

Can Self-Defense Justify Punishment?

This piece is a review essay on Victor Tadros’s The Ends of Harm. Tadros rejects retributive desert but believes punishment can be justified instrumentally without succumbing to the problems of thoroughgoing consequentialism and endorsing using people as means. He believes he can achieve these results through extension of the right of self-defense. I argue that Tadros fails in this endeavor: he has a defective account of the means principle; his rejection of desert leads to gross mismatches of punishment and culpability; and he cannot account for punishment of inchoate crimes.     

正当防卫还是防卫过当

一、主要案情　　犯罪嫌疑人庞某在北京市从事个体贩卖生意。有从事同类生意者向某 ,因生意竞争而与犯罪嫌疑人发生矛盾 ,遂纠集其侄及同乡王某、邓某 ,意欲强行阻止庞某继续从事同类生意。 1 999年 5月 2 2日 5时 30分许 ,向某等四人前往北京市朝阳区某乡某村二号路北路东侧附近截住庞某。至 6时许 ,庞某之弟骑车送货路经此处 ,向某等四人即截住庞某之弟 ,将其揪下车后 ,按在地上即用拳脚并持棍殴打。其间 ,在其弟之后送货的庞某恰好赶到 ,见状后即从路边修车摊上抄起一打气筒 ,向正在围欧其弟的四人抡去 ,打中邓某头部 ,致其颅脑损伤 ,经…     

The Presumption of Proportionality

This article challenges the assumption that the burden of demonstrating that a limitation of a fundamental right is proportionate rests on the public authority seeking to justify the limitation. After considering the operation of burdens and presumptions in European human rights case‐law it notes the difficulties British domestic courts have had in rigorously applying proportionality tests. It suggests that the concerns which lead judges to weaken the requirement of proportionality would be better met by recognising that certain circumstances give rise to a presumption of proportionality, where the burden of demonstrating disproportionality rests on the right‐holder. Five categories of case in which this applies are proposed, and one which has recently been judicially accepted is rejected. Clarifying the types of case in which a presumption of proportionality applies is a preferable strategy to blurring the standards of justification to be met by those seeking to limit the enjoyment of rights.¹     

Punishment and Proportionality: Part 2

This article is a companion to an article by the same author in issue 33.3 of Criminal Justice Ethics on the question of the standard by which the severity of punishment is determined to be proportional to the seriousness of the crime for which it is inflicted. Its chief argument is that basing the determination on what the offender deserves to suffer is morally problematic because it conflicts with principles of humanity that call for our taking the good of human beings as our end. By contrast, it is also argued, basing the determination on promoting public safety or preserving civil order is not similarly problematic because punishment inflicted to serve either of these ends is compatible with principles of humanity. The article concludes with a comment on how the harsh sentencing laws enacted in the United States in the past 40 years should be seen as a product of the former mode of determining punishment and not the latter.     

Prisons,Proportionality and Recent Penal History

A leading aim of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 was to install the principle of proportionality as the primary rationale for sentencing and to bring about a reduction in the use of imprisonment.  In the decade that followed the prison population in England and Wales rose steeply.  This article examines the reasons for the rising use of prison, in order to assess whether proportionality (or ‘just deserts’) was tried and failed.  It argues that in practice the proportionality principle was overwhelmed by other influences, and that deterrence and incapacitation were the main drivers of the increasing use of imprisonment.  The article goes on to argue that proportionality theories have within them the resources to produce penal moderation, notably the ‘drowning out’ argument, the human rights argument, and decrementalism.  The article concludes by rejecting the claim that proportionality theories are likely in practice to result in escalating punishment.     

Self-Defense, Punishing Unjust Combatants and Justice in War

Some contemporary Just War theorists, like Jeff McMahan, have recently built upon an individual right of self-defense to articulate moral rules of war that are at odds with commonly accepted views. For instance, they argue that in principle combatants who fight on the unjust side ought to be liable to punishment on that basis alone. Also, they reject the conclusion that combatants fighting on both sides are morally equal. In this paper, I argue that these theorists overextend their self-defense analysis when it comes to the punishment of unjust combatants, and I show how in an important sense just and unjust combatants are morally equal. I contend that the individualistic and quid pro quo perspective of the self-defense analysis fails to consider properly how the international community, morally speaking, ought to treat combatants, and I set forth four elements of justice applicable to war, which, together, support the conclusion that in principle the international community should not take on the activity of punishing combatants solely for fighting on the unjust side.     

Strict Liability and the Paradoxes of Proportionality

This essay explores the case against strict liability offenses as part of the more general debate about proportional punishment. This debate takes on a very different look in light of a formal result derived by the authors elsewhere, that is briefly summarized and whose implications are pursued here. Traditional objections that consequentialists have mounted against the deontologists’/retributivists’ defense of proportionality fall by the wayside, but a new threat to the proportionality requirement replaces it: the ease with which any such requirement can be circumvented.     

基、序、等──刑罚的相应性的蕴涵

本文对刑罚的相应性原则的蕴涵作了系统的探讨。作者认为,基的相应、序的相应与平等性是相应性的不可或缺的三项基本要求,基的相应性是刑量与罪量在绝对意义上的相应．序的相应是罪量与刑量在相对意义上的相应,平等性是相同的罪量应受的刑量应该一致,三者共同制约着立法上法定刑的确定与司法上判定刑的裁定。     

Proportionality in the Liability to Compensate

Law and Philosophy - There is widely thought to be a proportionality constraint on harming others in self-defense, such that an act of defensive force can be impermissible because the harm...     

寻找WTO法中的比例原则

虽然国内外学者公认非歧视、透明度及自由化原则是WTO法的基本原则,但对WTO法基本原则的范围及其适用并没有达成一致,而这其中一个最大的争议就是欧洲大陆学者所主张的比例原则是否是WTO法的原则。美国政府及学者对此一般都持反对态度。中国学者研究这一涉及国际法基本理论问题的人还比较少,通过寻找WTO法律文本中体现比例原则的规定和WTO争端解决机构裁决中对这些规定的应用和分析,证明比例原则在WTO法中确实存在,它不但可以在平衡不同的政策目标,削减贸易壁垒及限制贸易报复水平方面起重要作用,而且作为一个工具性原则能起到其它原则起不到的作用。比例原则应该成为约束成员方政府行为及指导WTO法发展的基本原则。     

Proportionality, Territorial Occupation, and Enabled Terrorism

Some collateral harms affecting enemy civilians during a war are agentially mediated – for example, the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 sparked an insurgency which killed thousands of Iraqi civilians. I call these ‘collaterally enabled harms.’ Intuitively, we ought to discount the weight that these harms receive in the ‘costs’ column of our ad bellum proportionality calculation. But I argue that an occupying military force with de facto political authority has a special obligation to provide minimal protection to the civilian population. As a result, when an occupying military force collaterally enables a harm affecting the civilian population, the weight that the harm ought to receive in the ad bellum proportionality calculation is unaffected by the fact that the harm is agentially mediated – it ought to be weighed at least as heavily as those harms that the occupying force collaterally commits directly. As a result, satisfying the ad bellum proportionality constraint in wars of territorial occupation is more difficult than it has been thought.