Why Tolerate Conscience?

In Why Tolerate Religion?, Brian Leiter argues against the special legal status of religion, claiming that religion should not be the only ground for exemptions to the law and that this form of protection should be, in principle, available for the claims of secular conscience as well. However, in the last chapter of his book, he objects to a universal regime of exemptions for both religious and secular claims of conscience, highlighting the practical and moral flaws associated with it. We believe that Leiter identifies a genuine and important contemporary legal and philosophical problem. We find much to admire in his reasoning. However, we raise questions about two claims that are crucial for his argument. The first claim is that it is not religion as such, but conscience that deserves toleration and respect. The second claim is that respect for religion and conscience demands ‘principled toleration’ but does not entail stronger policies of legal exemptions. Against the first claim, we argue that Leiter does not successfully distinguish religious belief from secular conscience and morality; and he does not explain why secular conscience (which shares many of religious conscience’s epistemic features) deserves respect. Against the second claim, we argue that the most promising theories of legal exemptions are not classical theories of liberal toleration.     

Conscientious objection in reproductive health care: Analysis of Pichon and Sajous v. France

This article explores the issue of conscientious objection invoked by health professionals in the reproductive and sexual health care context and its impact on women's ability to access health services. The right to exercise conscientious objection has been recognized by many international and European scholars as being derived from the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. It is not, however, an absolute right. When the exercise of conscientious objection conflicts with other human rights and fundamental freedoms, a balance must be struck between the right to conscientious objection and other affected rights such as the right to respect for private life, the right to equality and non-discrimination, and the right to receive and impart information. Particularly in the reproductive health care context, states that allow health professionals to exercise conscientious objection must accommodate this in such a way that its exercise does not compromise women's access to health services. This article analyses the European Court of Human Rights' decision on admissibility in Pichon and Sajous v. France (2001) and argues that a balancing approach should be applied in cases of conscientious objection in the sexual and reproductive health care context.     

Accommodating Religion and Shifting Burdens

With some qualifications, this article endorses Brian Leiter’s argument that religious accommodation should not shift burdens from believers to non-believers. It argues that religious believers should take responsibility for their beliefs and for meeting the demands of their beliefs. It then examines the implications of that argument for British law on indirect discrimination (disparate impact) as it relates to religion or belief: burden-shifting from believers to employers and providers of goods and services should be deemed acceptable only insofar as the burden incurred by the employer or provider is ‘insignificant’. Legal exemptions should satisfy a similar test. Why should there be religious accommodation at all, even if it entails no significant burden-shifting? The author agrees with Leiter in finding the most plausible answer in the claims of conscience rather than in general theories of equality or features special to religion. Those claims can reasonably be made in respect of liberty of conscience but also when conscience is merely disadvantaged.     

Nozick’s Reply to the Anarchist

Central to Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia is a defense of the legitimacy of the minimal state’s use of coercion against anarchist objections. Individuals acting within their natural rights can establish the state without committing wrongdoing against those who disagree. Nozick attempts to show that even with a natural executive right, individuals need not actually consent to incur political obligations. Nozick’s argument relies on an account of compensation to remedy the infringement of the non-consenters’ procedural rights. Compensation, however, cannot remedy the infringement, for either it is superfluous to Nozick’s account of procedural rights, or it is made to play a role inconsistent with Nozick’s liberal voluntarist commitments. Nevertheless, Nozick’s account of procedural rights contains clues for how to solve the problem. Since procedural rights are incompatible with a natural executive right, Nozickeans can argue that only the state can enforce individuals’ rights without wronging anyone, thus refuting the anarchist.     

Civic Conscience,Selective Conscientious Objection and Lack of Choice

Most democratic states tolerate, to various extents, conscientious objection. The same states tend not to tolerate acts of civil disobedience and what they perceive as selective conscientious objection. In this paper it is claimed that the dichotomy between civil disobedience and conscientious objection is often misguided; that the existence of a “civic conscience” makes it impossible to differentiate between conscientious objection and civil disobedience; and that there is no such thing as “selective” conscientious objection—or that classifying an objection as “selective” has no significant moral or practical implications. These claims are supported by a preliminary, more general argument according to which conscientious objection is and should be tolerated because the objector lacks the ability to choose his conscience and to decide whether to act upon it. The lack‐of‐choice argument, it is claimed, applies equally to all types of conscientious objection, including those that are mistakenly called “selective” objection. It also applies to one type of civil disobedience. As a result, if a state is willing to tolerate non‐selective conscientious objection, it may and at times must also tolerate selective conscientious objection and (one type of) civil disobedience and to a similar degree (all other things being equal).     

Religiosity and stress for police officers

Much of the research which has been conducted to date regarding stress and police officers has focused on identifying the presence of stress, associating stress with specific stressors, and comparing levels of stress between police officers and members of other professions. This project focused on the influence of one potential mediator of stress—religious activity. Data were collected from a population of law enforcement officers from a medium sized city and from a comparison group of firefighters from the same city. The data indicate that religiosity has two factors (1) traditional beliefs and activities and (2) religious satisfaction and perceived influence of religion on subject’s everyday lives. The second factor was found to be negatively related to stress for police officers. As religious satisfaction and perceived influence increase, stress increases.     

Relationship Religiosity,Adult Attachment Styles,and Courtship Violence Experienced by Females

This study assesses the association between adult attachment styles, religiosity, and courtship violence as experienced by females. The sample was composed of 299, 18 to 24-year-old females attending junior level Human Development and Family Studies courses at a midwestern state university. Statistical analyses evaluated interactional effects and mean-level differences for both victimization and perpetration of courtship violence. Additionally, structural equation models were generated. Results indicate significant relationships between adult attachment styles and religiosity on reports of victimization from intimate partners. In general, the results suggest that females with low religiosity and insecure attachment styles report experiencing more courtship violence than females reporting high religiosity and secure attachment styles. The analyses also provide support for a multidimensional conceptualization of religiosity. Indicators of `relationship' religiosity were more strongly linked to lower reports of courtship violence than personal and private relationship measures. The findings suggest that future studies evaluating the effects of religiosity on courtship violence should include measures of `relationship’ religiosity.     

Making Room for Hate Crime Legislation in Liberal Societies

There is a divide within political and legal theory concerning the justification of hate-crime legislation in liberal states. Opponents of Hate-Crime Legislation have recently argued that enhanced punishment for hate-motivated crimes cannot be justified within political liberal states. More specifically, Heidi Hurd argues that criminal sanction which target character dispositions unfairly target individuals for characteristics not readily under their control. She further argues that a ‘character’ based approach in criminal law is necessarily illiberal and violates the state’s commitment to political neutrality. In the current paper, I attempt to show the difficulties and absurdity that follows from Hurd’s characterization of hate- rimes. I aim to show that punishment for undesirable character traits is consistent with western conceptions of criminal law. Upon doing so, I then go on to construct a positive argument for the justifiability of punishing for character traits as well as for the enhanced punishment associated with hate-motivated crimes.     

‘Seeing’ is believing: Positivist terrology, peacemaking criminology, and the northern ireland peace process

In this essay, the authors seek to draw upon the understanding and critique of positivism within criminological discourse in order to offer one analysis of the British governments’ approach to the Northern Ireland peace process. They argue that this approach has been hampered not just by the political reliance of the John Major government on Ulser Unionist support at Westminster but by a political and ideological approach to the peace process, informed by positivist terrorology, which has lead to an inability to ‘see’ the potential for peace. Offering a brief analysis of one of its leading academic proponents, the authors argue that such a paradigm posits a view of the liberal democratic state as axiomatically legitimate. Politically-motivated violence within such a state is seen as a purely criminal attack upon it, fundamentally inexplicable in terms other than the deviancy of its perpetrators. Thus in this view, politically-motivated violence is only combatable through purely instrumental, technical, and scientific means. By way of contrast to this paradigm, the authors offer an alternative vision, based on the epistemologies of critical and peacemaking criminology which, they argue, offers much greater potential for the prospects of peace in Northern Ireland and similar political conflicts elsewhere. NIACRO     

Reply to Five Critics of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Why Tolerate Religion?</Emphasis>

This is my contribution to a symposium on my book Why Tolerate Religion? (Princeton, 2013), in which I respond to essays by François Boucher (Montreal) and Cécile Laborde (University College London), Frederick Schauer (Virginia), Corey Brettschneider (Brown), and Peter Jones (Newcastle). I clarify and revise my view of the sense in which some religious beliefs are “insulated from reasons and evidence” in response to the criticisms of Boucher and Laborde (2015), but take issue with other aspects of their critique. I defend most of my original argument against utilitarian and egalitarian objections from, respectively, Schauer and Brettschneider. I also discuss and defend the “No Exemptions” approach to conscientious objection to neutral laws of general applicability against a variety of objections, arguing, in particular, that my view is probably not very different from that of Jones.     

Freedom of Conscience and Observance of the Laws on Religious Denominations

Freedom of conscience is one of the most important democratic institutions in the Soviet state. The basic content of that institution lies in the citizen's right not to profess any religion or to profess any religion whatever; the freedom to perform religious rites to the degree that this does not involve disturbance of public order and does not infringe upon the personal rights, honor and dignity of citizens; and the freedom to carry on antireligious propaganda in ways that do not offend the religious sentiments of believers.     

Torture: A Modicum of Recognition

Torture has reappeared in liberal democracies in the guise of anti-terrorism strategies. The acceptance of its use and the fascination with the images and documents that indicate the pain and suffering of the tortured point to more than a belief in the need for torture to counter terrorist threats. This fascination implies an enjoyment on the part of the liberal subject who is looking on while the other subject is being beaten. In this article I consider the liberal subject’s acceptance of and fascination with the scene of torture. I argue that the scene of torture, as imagined by the subject looking on, provides a formula for the relief of anxiety in the liberal subject who does not know if s/he will be subject to torture at any time. To consider this scene I analyze Donald Rumsfeld’s annotation to the ‘Action Memo’ which sanctioned torture and, through the work of Freud, Lacan and Santner, I explore the position of contemporary sovereigns in their function as providing transcendental signification for the subject seeking recognition and relief in the sovereign’s gaze.     

Charles Sanders Peirce, A Mastermind of (Legal) Arguments

In this article, we try to trace the relationship between semiotics and theory of legal reasoning using Peirce’s idea that all reasoning must be necessarily in signs: every act of reasoning/argumentation is a sign process, leading to “the growth of knowledge. The broad scope and universal character of Peirce’s sign theory of reasoning allows us to look for new conciliatory paradigms, which must be presented in terms of possible synthesis between the traditional approaches to argumentation. These traditional approaches are strongly affected by either the dialectical (logical) perspective or the rhetorical perspective on argumentation, while Peirce’s approach tends to reconcile the rhetorical and methodological aspects of reasoning. This reconcilation is best illustrated by Peircean analysis of argument’s logical and rhetorical structure; while the diagrammatic (iconic) analysis of arguments is performed in the system of Existential Graphs (which is Peirce’s major methodological system, designed for the expressions of propositions in point of their relational structure). Obviously, Peirce’s original division of argument parts offered only the characterisation of the sign activity (involved in the process of reasoning), and thus left much to be desired in terms of practical explication.     

What is Tort Law For? Part 1. The Place of Corrective Justice

In this paper I discuss the proposal that the law of torts exists to do justice, more specifically corrective justice, between the parties to a tort case. My aims include clarifying the proposal and defending it against some objections (as well as saving it from some defences that it could do without). Gradually the paper turns to a discussion of the rationale for doing corrective justice. I defend what I call the ‘continuity thesis’ according to which at least part of the rationale for doing corrective justice is to mitigate one’s wrongs, including one’s torts. I try to show how much of the law of torts this thesis helps to explain, but also what it leaves unexplained. In the process I show (what I will discuss in a later companion paper) that ‘corrective justice’ cannot be a complete answer to the question of what tort law is for.     

The Liberal Value of Privacy

This paper presents an argument for the value of privacy that is based on a purely negative concept of freedom only. I show that privacy invasions may decrease a person’s negative freedom as well as a person’s knowledge about the negative freedom she possesses. I argue that not only invasions that lead to actual interference, but also invasions that lead to potential interference (many cases of identity theft) constitute actual harm to the invadee’s liberty interests, and I critically examine the courts’ reliance on a principle of ‘no harm, no foul’ in recent data breach cases. Using a number of insights from the psychology of human belief, I also show that the liberal claim for protection of privacy is strengthened by the observation that often the privacy invader cannot be held responsible for the influence on the invadee’s negative freedom.     

Racial targeting and social control: looking behind the police

The experience, common among minority ethnic populations, that they are racially targeted has typically been laid at the door of the police whose coercive practices and whose ‘institutionally racist’ culture have been blamed for this state of affairs. While police practice remains an issue, it is my contention that by focusing on police practice alone critical commentators can loose sight of the extent to which racial targeting is an outcome of the regimes of control integral to the wider governance of crime in the neo liberal state. By examining the implications of anti-terror legislation, by attending to the way centres of consumption in the entrepreneurial city are regulated and by looking at how problems of serial exclusion experienced by migrant populations in Britain’s poorest areas are managed, this paper examines how perceptions of racial targeting will continue to be reproduced independently of getting the police to change their practices.     

Justice and Public Opinion from a Comparative Perspective

Toril Aalberg’s book links a wide array of issues and perspectives that conventionally are kept apart. She combines normative theory with empirical justice research, takes a longitudinal as well as a cross-national perspective, and she discusses her results against the background of the socio-structural and institutional context. The book provides a detailed picture of the attitudinal landscape and is a rich source of comparative data on social justice attitudes. The exceptionally wide variety of approaches that are used represents an asset of this analysis and addresses the need for an encompassing view on the issue of justice. At the same time, when recapitulating the results, it becomes evident that this strategy also entails dangers: Aalberg’s approach requires a more comprehensive conceptual framework that allows a coherent interpretation of her findings. It is argued that normative institutionalism would offer a suitable frame of interpretation for the subject and design employed.     

Rethinking Power and Law: Foucault’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Society must be Defended</Emphasis>

Michel Foucault provides a radical challenge to the liberal approach to power and law, which is echoed by Jacques Derrida. Important differences exist between the analyses of Foucault and Derrida which should not be overlooked. This essay proceeds on the basis of an awareness of these differences, yet it at the same time attempts to bring these thinkers closer together, with reference specifically to the thinking of Freud. It is often said that Foucault does not offer an alternative to that which he criticises or that his analyses do not provide for a way in which to escape from the effects of power. By specifically focusing on Foucault’s reliance on the notion of ‘play’ in Society must be defended, it is submitted that an ‘escape’ is in fact provided for. The deconstructive reading of Foucault which is presented here attempts to ensure that Foucault does not remain trapped within metaphysics.     

Decriminalisation of abortion performed by qualified health practitioners under the Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic)

In 2008, the Victorian Parliament enacted the Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) and amended the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) to decriminalise terminations of pregnancy while making it a criminal offence for unqualified persons to carry out such procedures. The reform legislation has imposed a civil regulatory regime on the management of abortions, and has stipulated particular statutory duties of care for registered qualified health care practitioners who have conscientious objections to terminations of pregnancy. The background to, and the structure of, this novel statutory regime is examined, with a focus on conscientious objection clauses and liability in the tort of negligence and the tort of breach of statutory duty.