CARTER, REAGAN, AND THE QUEST FOR LEADERSHIP

Books reviewed in this article.
Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., and David deF. Whitman, The President as Policymaker: Jimmy Carter and Welfare Reform
Anthony King (Ed.), Both Ends of the Avenue: The Presidency, the Executive Branch, and Congress in the 1980s
Fred I. Creenstein (Ed.), The Reagan Presidency: An Early Assessment     

RESEARCH, EVALUATION, AND POLICY ANALYSIS: HEURISTICS FOR DISCIPLINED INQUIRY

Terminology like "evaluation research" and "policy analysis research" poses a fundamental conflict in talking about what constitutes legitimate inquiry activities. Using the two-part definition of disciplined inquiry developed by Cronbach and Suppes (1969). it is possible to characterize research, evaluation and policy analysis as three separate and distinct forms of disciplined inquiry. As distinct forms, each has its own unique definition, purpose(s), products, intended outcomes or effects, and audiences. Further, under the definitions proposed, emergent inquiry paradigms have as much utility as older, conventional models.     

ON CHANGE: OR, THERE IS NO MAGIC SIZE FOR AN INCREMENT

Abstract In this article we identify instrumentalism in budgetary processes with regularity in the annual change in the appropriation, and non-instrumentalism with irregularity in the annual appropriation change. This definition focuses interest on structural changes in the underlying budget processes. These changes may be isolated using a combination of statistical and more conventional techniques. Other meanings of incremental, we argue, are appropriate to different objectives in studying budgeting. We attempt to clarify the confusion surrounding the meaning of incremental and to answer some of the critics of our previous work.     

SYNTHESIZING POLITICS, RATIONALITY AND ADVOCACY: ENERGY POLICY ANALYSIS FOR MINORITY GROUPS

This paper explores the interaction between three primary activities (political influence, scientific analysis, and advocacy) in the practice of policy analysis. After arguing that successful practice depends on the ability of policy analysts to synthesize those three activities, the paper describes and critiques one analytical team's recent efforts to define the impacts of federal energy policy and programs on minority groups. It reports that the analytical team failed to maintain critical distance from its client and to communicate effectively with its lay constituency; acting as a "client advocate," the team unintentionally but systematically distorted knowledge concerning minorities and energy. The paper concludes by urging analysts to recognize that they have three distinct audiences (clients, technical peers, and lay constituencies) and that successful analysis depends on communicating honestly and openly with each of them.     

THE CORVAIR, THE PINTO AND CORPORATE BEHAVIOR: IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATORY REFORM

Top corporate management responds to what is socially desirable when the costs and economic benefits provide the incentive to do so. Even when changing directions to match what is thought to be socially desirable would produce long-term profit maximization, some firms may stay with what is socially undesirable for what is perceived as a greater short-term profit maximization. Halpern suggests that such short-term profit decisions made by General Motors with the Corvair, and by Ford with the Pinto, backfired. A key problem is seen as the time lag between corporate misdeeds and the final judgment of courts or the government.     

MOVING INTO THE NEW AID APPROACH,DILEMMAS FOR NGOs: THE BELGIAN CASE

Under the new aid approach, nongovernmental development organizations (NGOs) are expected to move from “delivery” (service delivery projects) to “leverage” (lobbying and advocacy). In line with this international tendency, the Belgian government has signed a pact with the NGO sector in which a move away from delivery and toward leverage is being proposed. Given that Belgian NGOs are heavily dependent on government funding and strongly oriented toward the “delivery” model, this pact implies that a number of NGOs will have to undergo organizational changes. This article shows that there is a major cleavage in the NGO landscape in Belgium. Some organizations clearly favor the leverage, whereas others prefer the delivery roles. Those that are more dependent on government funding tend to incline toward the leverage orientation. The attitudinal orientation toward the leverage model however does not imply that organizations are effectively willing and able to change. A number of identity and legitimacy concerns are perceived by NGOs to be important sources of organizational inertia. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.