Why Do Institutions Matter? An Audience–Cost Theory of Institutional Commitment

Institutions constrain political choices and thus commit the future path of policy. Well–designed institutions square the circle of generating commitment that is both credible and flexible. This article develops an audience–cost theory of flexible commitment that addresses some vexing questions. Where does institutional commitment come from? Why is institutional commitment feasible when policy commitment is not? How can an institution achieve credible and flexible commitment without flexibility undermining credibility by opening the back door to defections? How does partial commitment work, or how is it possible for defections to occur in an equilibrium with credible commitment? Why do policy–makers sometimes respect institutional constraints and other times defect on institutional commitments? Why are some defections punished severely, while others are instantly forgiven and forgotten?     

Dangerous Disconnect: Voter Backlash,Elite Misperception,and the Costs of Violence as an Electoral Tactic

Political Behavior - Why do politicians use violence as an electoral tactic, and how does it affect voting behavior? Theories of election-related violence focus on the electoral benefits such...     

Comment on Donald R. Haurin and Hazel A. Morrow‐Jones's “the impact of Real Estate Market knowledge on tenure choice: A comparison of black and white households”

Abstract

Haurin and Morrow‐Jones analyze a sample of survey respondents from Columbus, OH, and find that additional knowledge about real estate markets increases the likelihood of homeownership. They conclude that differences in real estate knowledge contribute importantly to explaining some of the racial gap in homeownership rates; this finding leads to their conclusion that the racial gap can be addressed through public policy interventions, including financial counseling programs.

Their research broadly addresses three questions: Why does the racial gap in homeownership exist? Why does it persist? What can be done to reduce it? We compare their findings with those of other researchers and conclude that improved financial literacy may well be an important tool for reducing the gap, but that the causes for its existence and persistence are complex and that improving financial literacy alone may not be sufficient to have a significant and lasting impact.     

Educational Attainment and Social Norms of Voting

Political Behavior - Why does the likelihood of voting increase with education in the US? Prominent theories attribute education’s effect to human capital, which affords individuals resources...     

Religion,Sectarianism, and Democracy: Theory and Evidence from Lebanon

Political Behavior - Why does religion sometimes increase support for democracy and sometimes do just the opposite? Using data from an original survey conducted in Lebanon, I present and test a...     

Why strategic intelligence analysis has limited influence on American foreign policy

Why does strategic intelligence analysis have limited influence on American foreign policy? Intelligence analysis is frequently disregarded, this paper contends, because it is a duplicated step in the decision-making process and supplements but does not supplant policy assessment. Many intelligence analyses will confirm policy assessments and be redundant or – if the assessments are different – policy-makers will choose their own interpretations over those of intelligence analysts. The findings of this paper provide scholars with important insights into the limits of intelligence analysis in the foreign policy process as well as recommendations for increasing its positive impact on policy.     

Deliberation and Forgiveness in the Public Sphere

A common objection to the argument for deliberative democracy is that it cannot provide mechanisms for achieving its ideal of all-inclusiveness. This does, however, not in itself refute the deliberative ideal. In a reading of Hannah Arendt and Jacques Derrida’s writings on forgiveness, we argue that forgiving involves a renegotiation of our enemies and of ourselves. Hereby a renegotiation of the seemingly unbridgeable understandings of who our enemies are can be achieved. Forgiving involves a realisation that we have something in common with our foes. This opens the question: Why did our paths separate? We become puzzled and start to search for reasons. This does not mean that we have to accept ways of life that we detest. But it does mean that we need to be able to articulate counter arguments. Hereby limitations of prevailing understandings of who to include in deliberative processes can be overcome.     

Industrial conflict as a source of technical innovation: three cases

This article is concerned with the history and theory of technical change. The central problems in this area involve explaining not simply the general propensity of the capitalist economy to technical development, but also the impulses to specific lines of technical advance: why, for example, are some production processes subject to innovation while others are not? Why does the urgency with which possible innovations are examined differ between processes? There are a wide range of possible explanations here. This article explores one of them: it argues that industrial conflict can generate or focus technical change in production processes which are prone to such conflict. This relationship is demonstrated concretely by reference to three textile process innovations in the nineteenth-century British economy.     

March divided,fight united? Trade union cohesion and government appeal for concertation

Why does the government appeal for concertation? Starting from the principal?agent framework and delegation theory, the article argues that the government is more willing to share decision-making power with trade unions when the policy preferences endorsed by the unions are closer to those of the cabinet. Furthermore, it maintains that government propensity to negotiate with trade unions increases as the heterogeneity of union policy preferences grows because the cabinet can exploit its agenda-setting power to divide the union front. The article tests these two hypotheses through a longitudinal analysis of the Italian case (1946–2014). In detail, it takes advantage of two original datasets built through content analysis that provide unique in-depth information on the policy preferences of parties and cabinets and measures the policy positions of the main Italian trade unions, thus allowing assessment of their reciprocal heterogeneity. The results confirm the expectations.     

Middle class: Friends or foes to Beijing’s new leadership

This paper addresses the following questions: What are the key elements of the middle class? What do they really want? To what extent can the middle class serve as an agent for democratic change? Why is the Party trying to co-opt the middle class? Is the middle class a willing partner with the state or an autonomous force in opposition to the state? The paper concludes that at present, the new middle class as a whole does not pose any significant threat to current regime. It quietly endorses the leadership in Beijing. Nevertheless, in the long run, the middle class will have a significant impact upon the socio-political structure in China.     

Religious Participation and Economic Conservatism

Why do some individuals engage in more religious activity than others? And how does this religious activity influence their economic attitudes? We present a formal model in which individuals derive utility from both secular and religious sources. Our model, which incorporates both demand‐side and supply‐side explanations of religion, is unusual in that it endogenizes both an individual's religious participation and her preferences over economic policy. Using data on over 70 countries from the pooled World Values Survey, we find that religious participation declines with societal development, an individual's ability to produce secular goods, and state regulations on religion, but that it increases with inequality. We also find that religious participation increases economic conservatism among the poor but decreases it among the rich. Our analysis has important insights for the debate about secularization theory and challenges conventional wisdom regarding the relationship between religious participation and economic conservatism.     

District level competition in Mexico’s chamber of deputies: an embedded analysis

Why does Mexico’s mixed legislative system diverge from Duverger’s Law? Rather than rehash cultural and historical explanations, we suggest two institutional factors – a fused ballot and compulsory voting laws – may explain this divergence. Cross-national evidence controlling for these factors suggests Mexico is not an outlier and that the fused ballot encourages multiparty district competition. The results also suggest ways reforms could bring competition closer toward Duvergerian expectations.     

Political economy of crime and punishment under Stalin

Why do dictatorships favor harsher punishments than democracies? We use a rational choice approach to explain the stylized facts of Stalin’s dictatorship—preference for harsh sanctions, higher incarceration rates, greater use of capital punishment, low tolerance for theft of state property and workplace violations. They are shown to be explained by the preferences of a rational dictator, who does not internalize the social and private cost of punishment.     

Slavery: a dual-equilibrium model with some historical examples

What sustains slavery, and why at critical junctures—the fall of the Roman Empire, the early modern expansion of plantation agriculture, the later phases of the industrial revolution, the totalitarian regimes of the 1930s—has it often expanded or contracted so rapidly? Why have elites sometimes been united, but sometimes violently divided, over the choice between free and servile labor? Why has slavery usually been ended by legal prohibition rather than voluntary abandonment? An extremely simple dual-equilibrium picture can illuminate how, when, and with whose support slavery is introduced or abolished. Internal divisions over slavery are likely to be most intense as a society approaches either of these “tipping points.” The most striking example, explored fleetingly here, is the US Civil War.     

Are the rich too rich to be expropriated?: Economic power and the feasibility of constitutional limits to redistribution

Public Choice - Why is it that, in democracies, the poor do not expropriate the rich even though they outnumber them? In this paper we analyze the commonly held belief that the rich escape...     

Voters,dictators, and peons: expressive voting and pivotality

Why do the poor vote against redistribution? We examine one explanation experimentally, namely that individuals gain direct expressive utility from voting in accordance with their ideology and understand that they are unlikely to be pivotal; hence, their expressive utility, even if arbitrarily small, determines their voting behavior. In contrast with a basic prediction of this model, we find that the probability of being pivotal does not affect the impact of monetary interest on whether a subject votes for redistribution.     

Not again! Public perception,regulation, and nanotechnology

It is often argued that immediate government action regarding nanotechnology is needed to ensure that public opinion does not mistakenly view nanotechnology as dangerous, to restore public trust in government, and to increase the legitimacy of government action through increased public participation. This article questions whether governments can achieve these goals. As the world lurches toward regulation of nanotechnology, we should ask Why the rush? Can anticipatory action, perceived as the government doing something, fulfill the competing hopes to “restore trust,”“pave the way” for nanotechnology, “increase awareness,” and “satisfy democratic notions of accountability”? Or is government action more likely to increase existing divisions over nanotechnology's future?     

How American Core Values Influence Public Policy: Lessons From Federal Aid to Small Business, 1953–1993

Why does the federal government provide aid for small business? This article contends that American core values are one of the sources of small business aid. Rather than taking the values/policy congruence approach of the national values school, it demonstrates a mechanism through which core values have influenced small business aid and through which core values likely influence other policies. The focus is on the processes of policy problem definition. While a role for core values in problem definition processes has been noted previously, core values have neither been a center of attention, nor have the various paths of values influence been linked. Analysis of the problems defined in the legislative histories of 39 systemically selected small business aid enactments, 1953–1993, shows avenues of values influence that have been under-appreciated or not appreciated at all.     

Human Rights and Modern Liberalism: a Critique

The idea of human rights has become one of the central moral notions of both the theory and practice of international politics. While its foundation and future in the practice of politics looks bright, it is an idea that still causes great trouble at the theoretical level. What are human rights? Why do we have them? To what should we attribute the authority of their moral claims? The theorist Michael Freeman has suggested one theory that by addressing such questions may serve as a foundation for human rights. His theory, however, ends by begging the questions it set out to answer.     

Tutors and Pupils: International Organizations, Central European Elites, and Western Models

In the past decade, political elites in Central and Eastern Europe have often sought to imitate Western organizational and institutional models, while organizations like the EU and NATO have often acted as “institutional tutors” in the region. Using evidence from Hungary and the Czech Republic, this paper demonstrates why imitating Western structures has been both administratively expedient and useful in building political coalitions. It also stresses that the short‐term benefits of doing so are followed by longer‐term costs. The paper answers four questions: How have certain models been held up to CEE elites? Why might some such models be targets for elites to imitate? How does such imitation occur? And what results from imitation? Contrary to expectations that institutional modeling would be merely technocratic and used only yearly in the transformation, the paper's threefold heuristic of templates, thresholds, and adjustments shows that the process is both politically contentious and sustained.