The impact of constitutional structures and collective and competitive veto points on income inequality in industrialized democracies

Abstract This paper presents the first systematic, empirical examination of the impact of constitutional structures on income inequality among eighteen OECD countries. Our pooled time series/cross–sectional panel analysis (n = 18, t = 2) reveals that consensual political institutions are systematically related to lower income inequalities while the reverse is true for majoritarian political institutions. We also make a crucial distinction between 'collective' and 'competitive' veto points. Our multiple regression results provide strong evidence that collective veto points depress income inequalities while competitive veto points tend to widen the inequality of incomes. Thus, some institutional veto points have constraining effects on policy while others have 'enabling' effects.     

Barriers to prosperity: the harmful impact of entry regulations on income inequality

Public Choice - Entry regulations, including fees, permits and licenses, can make it prohibitively difficult for low-income individuals to establish footholds in many industries, even at the...     

Being unequal and seeing inequality: Explaining the political significance of social inequality in new market democracies

Market economies inevitably generate social inequalities, of which the new democracies of Central and East European (CEE) societies have seen dramatic – though widely diverging – levels of growth. Do CEE citizens believe that inequality is excessive and, if so, why? And what is the connection between perceptions of social inequality and citizens' views of new markets and democracy? These questions are addressed using new data from mass surveys conducted in 2007 in 12 post‐communist CEE states. Surprisingly weak links are found between social inequality perceptions and national‐level measures of inequality as well economic, social and political conditions. Perceptions of social inequality are mainly driven by individual‐level assessments of market and democratic performance, but not by market or democratic ideals.     

Racial and gender income inequality in the American states

The purpose of this article is to uncover the political factors associated with greater income parity for black men, black women, and white women relative to white men in the American states. Variables are constructed for federal, state, and local government employment, state electoral competition, federal procurement, black state legislators, and women state legislators along with a number of socioeconomic factors. It is discovered that the political variables carry less weight than the socioeconomic ones. These findings raise questions about the future prospects for increased earnings parity for minorities and women as previous federal efforts to eliminate racial and gender discrimination appear to have been weakened and state political factors have little relationship with greater income equality.     

Partisan politics and public finance: Changes in public spending in the industrialized democracies, 1955–1989

This paper evaluates the role that partisan politics plays in altering public spending levels. The analysis covers over three decades of data on the developments of the public sectors in 16 OECD countries. The results of the analysis lend firm support to the partisan politics model. Of special note is the distinction between the electorate' and the government' ideological preferences and the dominant role that the former plays. The results also suggest, contrary to conventional wisdom, that partisan political influences have not been eliminated with the tightening of linkages to the international economy.     

Sectoral reallocation, distributional coalitions and the welfare state as determinants of economic growth rates in industrialized democracies

Abstract. This paper investigates three propositions about economic growth. It rejects the proposition that differences in the size of the agricultural sector or in opportunities to reallocate resources from this sector to other sectors of the economy significantly contribute to the explanation of differential growth rates among industrialized democracies. It supports Olson's proposition that long lasting democracies suffer from an accumulation of distributional coalitions whose rent-seeking activities retard economic growth. It also supports the proposition that the welfare state contributes to economic decline. Technically, this paper applies cross-sectional and pooled regression analyses of growth rates on employment in agriculture as a percentage of civilian employment, age of democracy, and social security transfers as a percentage of GDP. Data refer to the 1960–82 period and 19 nations.     

Electoral turnout and income redistribution by the state: A cross-national analysis of the developed democracies

Abstract.  This article explores the sources of variation in state redistribution across 13 developed democracies over the period 1979–2000, drawing upon data from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, the Luxembourg Income Study and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. The discussion begins with the median voter hypothesis, which predicts that the extent of state redistribution in a country will be positively related to the degree of pre-government inequality. In seeking to extend the median voter approach, the article takes into account two additional variables: the level of electoral turnout and the degree to which turnout is skewed by income. The analysis confirms that pre-government inequality is indeed positively related to state redistribution. However, the predictive power of the median voter approach is significantly improved when account is taken of the level of electoral turnout and the extent to which the turnout rate reflects an income skew – variables that are themselves related. The link between turnout and redistribution is especially strong for social transfers as opposed to taxes, and for the lower and middle, as opposed to the upper, part of the income spectrum.     

To have or not to have: Effects of economic inequality on turnout in European democracies

The effect of economic inequality on turnout has received considerable interest recently. Some studies suggest that inequality depresses turnout, others that the relationship is either the other way around or simply non-existent. Employing a large dataset with some 80,000 respondents from 30 European democracies, we show that great care is required when exploring inequality and turnout. On average, there is indeed a negative/positive effect of being below/above the median income in a country – but it is conditioned by inequality (measured as the Gini coefficient) and national wealth (measured as GDP per capita). Moreover, the two country-level factors interact in surprising ways. Based on our results we warn against claims of mono-causal relationships between the economic situation of voters and turnout.     

The impact of compulsory voting on inequality and the quality of the vote

Abstract

Democratic elections imply that the electorate holds incumbents accountable for past performance, and that voters select the party that is closest to their own political preferences. Previous research shows that both elements require political sophistication. A number of countries throughout the world have a system of compulsory voting, and this legal obligation boosts levels of voter turnout. Under such rules, citizens with low levels of sophistication in particular are thought to turn out to vote in higher numbers. Is it the case that the quality of the vote is reduced when these less sophisticated voters are compelled to vote? This article investigates this claim by examining the effect of compulsory voting on accountability and proximity voting. The results show that compulsory voting reduces stratification based on knowledge and level of education, and proximity voting, but it does not have an effect on economic accountability. The article concludes with some suggestions on how systems of compulsory voting might mitigate the strength of political sophistication in determining the quality of the vote decision process.     

The impact of source of income laws on voucher utilization

Vouchers are lauded both for being the most efficient way of delivering housing assistance to needy households and for the potential to allow poor households to access better neighborhoods. The success of vouchers is of course predicated on recipients being able to successfully use a voucher. For a number of reasons, including discrimination by landlords on the basis of source of income (i.e. a voucher), voucher recipients frequently cannot find apartments to lease. Using a difference-in-differences approach the research reported here examines how Source of Income anti-discrimination laws affect the utilization of housing vouchers.

The findings indicate that utilization rates are higher among Local Housing Authorities in jurisdictions with Source of Income anti-discrimination laws. These findings suggest such laws can be an effective tool for increasing the rate at which vouchers are successfully utilized. In a time of scarce resources for affordable housing this is an important policy tool that should not be over looked.     

The impact of governance on education inequality: Evidence from Bangladesh

Bangladesh has made remarkable progress in increasing education access in the last 20 years. However, substantial inequalities in educational attainment remain even though equity in education is a central government objective. The article argues that weaknesses in education sector governance are crucial to understanding these persistent inequalities. At the level of the budget, anti‐poor biases in allocation decisions are shown to be the result of the budget's role in political management and the lack of effective accountability mechanisms. The spearhead of government attempts to address education inequality at the primary level has been the conditional cash transfer programme for poor children. The article shows that the programme has failed to target the poor and suggests that this has been due to the weaknesses and contradictions in the governance of the programme. Strengthening the links between policy and implementation through improvements in the governance of the sector are crucial if inequality is to be addressed and national education goals achieved. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Post‐ministerial occupation in advanced industrial democracies: Ambition,individual resources and institutional opportunity structures

The post‐office occupation of former cabinet members remains basically unexplored in both single‐case and comparative studies. Is being a minister just a career tout court, or does serving in executive office facilitate movement to other positions? This article sheds new light on this question by advancing the theoretical development and empirical understanding of the various types of post‐ministerial occupation. The analysis takes into account ex‐ministers’ ambition, political capital resources and the institutional opportunity structures that might well affect both ambition and individual resources. Additionally, given that access to executive office is profoundly gendered, the article addresses the central question of whether post‐ministerial occupations similarly present differential patterns for women and men. The empirical results of a cross‐national comparison of 23 advanced industrial democracies show that, for most departing ministers, serving in executive office is indeed a stepping stone to other positions. Post‐office trajectories are not only shaped by ex‐ministers’ political capital resources such as seniority, party office, policy expertise and type of portfolio held while in cabinet, but also by different institutional factors that present country‐specific combinations. Specifically, systemic variables shape the relevance of political capital resources and affect how ambition is constructed and towards which goals. Strong gendered post‐office patterns are not found, although some intriguing gender differences are observed.     

The use and effect of political propaganda in democracies

This paper examines the influence of political propaganda on voters and analyses the behavior of the interest groups in the face of the influence being exercised. By propaganda semitruths are distributed among the electorate. The decision taken by a voter results from his basic opinion and from the parts of information he receives. The analysis shows that the greater the likelihood of a certain decision being reached by a fully informed electorate, the more probable it is that the same decision will be reached by a rationally uninformed electorate. The pecuniary interest of an interest group is, however, also positively correlated with the probability that the electorate reaches a decision which is agreeable to that interest group. It has finally become apparent that the results of the approach concur well with empirical studies.     

The impact of parties,economic growth,and public sector expansion: A comparison of long-term dynamics in the Scandinavian and Anglo-American democracies

Abstract. This paper discusses (1) the extent to which the partisan composition of government affects economic policies and macroeconomic outcomes, and (2) the interrelationship between public spending, taxation and economic growth. These two issues are connected. Since target variables and instruments affect each other reciprocally, the specification of the partisan model should encompass both a reaction function and an outcome function. A pooled vector autoregressive model suggests that during the last century left–wing governments in the United States, Britain and Canada have reinforced the growth of both public spending and GNP. Only public sector expansion is affected by partisanship in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. In the Anglo–American countries changes in spending occur before changes in economic growth in terms of a lagged crowding out effect. Spending and revenues appear to affect each other reciprocally. By contrast, public sector expansion in Scandinavia stimulates growth, while taxation leads spending.     

International migration and liberal democracies: the challenge of integration

Migration theories that build on economic incentives and social network effects will generally predict much more international migration than we observe. We have to 'bring the state back in' to explain why so few potential migrations lead to actual flows, and why these flows are highly selective. Immigration policies have been strongly shaped by particular nation-building projects but the increasing diversity of origins in contemporary migrations has also challenged and transformed perceptions of national identity at the receiving end. Bauböck discusses the need for studying integration regimes from a comparative and normative perspective. He examines characteristic features of four regimes - the United States, Canada, Israel and the European Union - and defends a conception of integration that embraces the ambiguities of the term: it should be understood as referring to the inclusion of newcomers as well as to the internal cohesion of the societies and political communities that are transformed by immigration. These two meanings are combined in a third one of integration as federation: the process of forming larger political unions from distinct societies. Particularly in the context of the European Union integration policies for immigrants should live up to the same democratic principles that are invoked for the political integration of the EU. This suggests a European agenda for harmonizing the legal status of third country residents and their access to citizenship. Bringing the state back in makes us also aware that the transnational communities of migrants are no substitute for access, status and rights within territorially bounded polities. Instead of portraying migrants as harbingers of the end of the nation-state, we should rather think how to transform nation-states so that increasingly mobile populations can still share in political authority, a bounded territory and a common historical horizon. This perspective of integration is 'transnational' rather than 'postnational'. A transnational perspective does not envisage the dissolution of nation-states, but emphasizes instead that societies and cultures increasingly overlap both in space and time.     

Parties and institutions: empirical evidence on veto players and the growth of government

Does the effective number of veto players in a political system explain the rate of government growth? Panel data analyses are conducted in order to test several measures of veto players against each other, and these results are compared with similar analyses of government fractionalization. The analyses indicate that veto players and especially government fractionalization exert a constraining effect on changes in the size of government, but also that the effect is not consistent over time: neither veto players in general nor fractionalization of government in particular exerted any constraining effect during the decades of rapid government growth due to welfare state creation and expansion in the 1960s and 1970s. The strength of government fractionalization vis-a-vis the veto player measures in explaining changes in the size of government suggest that the constellation of partisan veto players within coalition governments matters, while the effect of institutional veto players remains uncertain.     

On the theory and practice of party formation and adaptation in new democracies

Abstract.  In addressing issues of party development in contemporary democracies, many of the recent discussions confuse notions of party formation with those of party adaptation. The contention of this article is that the conceptual confusion of these two distinct processes undermines our understanding of party development, which is of particular importance in the context of the more recently established democracies. Moreover, in order to contribute to theory building on political parties more generally, it is necessary to differentiate between the two. This article offers some theoretical contours for the study of party formation and development, and empirically evaluates the patterns of organizational development in some of the newer democracies in Southern and East-Central Europe. The analysis shows that the external context of party formation has encouraged these parties to adopt an organizational style largely resembling their contemporary counterparts in the older democracies. However, despite the resemblance between party organizations in the older liberal democracies and the newly established ones, the paths of party development are best understood as processes sui generis . The historical uniqueness of parties emerging as strong movements of society, as opposed to agents of the state, is a path that is unlikely to be repeated in contemporary polities which democratize in a different institutional context.