The fairness of discounting: A majority rule approach

A model of majority rule is developed in which each of a finite number of generations votes on a redistribution of income between itself and the other generations. In voting, each generation expresses tastes for its own income and for the distribution of income across generations. The model is then used to derive the conditions under which discounting is justified — namely those conditions for which the majority rule exhibits a positive marginal rate of time preference. It is demonstrated that when each generation is wealthier than those preceding it, the parameters representing the taste for income equality must be relatively high for the majority rule to exhibit a positive marginal rate of time preference.     

Richard Musgrave,public finance,and public choice

Review Article

Richard Musgrave, public finance, and public choice     

Voting methods, problems of majority rule, and demand-revealing procedures

Gordon Tullock made fundamental conceptual contributions to the understanding of collective choices. Tullock balanced an optimism about the capacity of political choices to facilitate gains from exchange with a pessimism about the negative externalities attending having majorities control power and dictate choices for all. Tullock’s work on both sides of this divide is surveyed, examining both the problems of voting procedures, and the promise of the demand-revealing process he helped invent, in guiding the choice of political institutions.     

General fund financing versus earmarked taxes: An alternative model of budgetary choice in a democracy

This paper presents an alternative model of budgetary choices in a direct democracy. Our model is not only more consistent with the underlying assumptions of consumer theory, but also is easier to apply to the study of problems such as the impact of lump-sum subsidies, changes in the costs of production, and so forth, on the equilibrium levels of collective variables.The model appears to account for the hitherto inexplicable perverse results that plague many of the general fund financing models discussed in the literature to date.     

The public finance of healthy behavior

Lifestyle can often affect the likelihood an individual will have a future illness. Subsidies often mitigate the consequences of poor lifestyle choices. In this paper we explore tax-subsidy policies that lower the consequences of incurring ill health. We find that a funding mechanism consistent with current US policy lowers the investment in healthy lifestyles by both the wealthy, who pay taxes, and the poor, who receive subsidies. We also explore alternative policy interventions such as investing in research to lessen the impact or probability of the disease.     

An experimental study of the efficiency of unanimity rule and majority rule

Scholars traditionally claim that unanimity rule is more capable of producing Pareto optimal outcomes than majority rule. Dougherty and Edward (Public Choice 151(3):655–678, 2012) make the opposite claim assuming proposals are either random, sincere, or strategic. We test these competing hypotheses in a two-dimensional framework using laboratory experiments. Our primary results suggest: (1) majority rule enters the Pareto set more quickly than unanimity rule, (2) majority rule leaves the Pareto set at the same rate as unanimity rule, and (3) majority rule is more likely to select a Pareto optimal outcome than unanimity rule at the end of the game.     

The majority vote rule and runoff primaries in the United States

The major parties in the United States use primary elections to select party candidates for general elections. While most employ a simple plurality vote rule for this purpose, some states, primarily southern, employ a majority rule that requires a runoff between the top two vote recipients if no candidate receives a majority in the initial primary. Data on primaries for state Governor and U.S. Senator from 1980 to 2002 are used to examine contemporary concerns about runoffs. Included in the findings are (1) the problem that majority runoffs address – candidates being selected based on low levels of voter support is not a frequent outcome under the plurality rule; (2) the vast majority of selections is based on a majority of votes in a primary, regardless of whether a simple plurality or majority is required; and (3) runoff primaries are necessary in roughly one-third of the contested primaries held in the majority vote context, and in about one-third of them the primary leader loses the runoff.     

The private and social value of information in majority decisions

The paper contrasts the value of information at the private level with the social value when all voters have access to information. A sequence of examples illustrates how the private and social value of information changes as the distribution of benefits and costs derived from a project varies across individuals and states of the world.     

Partisan politics and public finance: Changes in public spending in the industrialized democracies, 1955–1989

This paper evaluates the role that partisan politics plays in altering public spending levels. The analysis covers over three decades of data on the developments of the public sectors in 16 OECD countries. The results of the analysis lend firm support to the partisan politics model. Of special note is the distinction between the electorate' and the government' ideological preferences and the dominant role that the former plays. The results also suggest, contrary to conventional wisdom, that partisan political influences have not been eliminated with the tightening of linkages to the international economy.     

Innovative work behaviour in the public sector: The roles of task characteristics,social support,and proactivity

This study examines the roles of task characteristics, organisational social support, and individual proactivity on innovative work behaviour (IWB) in the public sector. Analysing empirical data from 154 employees from a government agency in Australia, we found that task characteristics, organisational social support, and proactive personality have a positive impact on IWB. Proactive personality is also found to be a moderator in the relationship between task characteristics and IWB. The findings suggest the need to design human resource practices that better identify proactive and innovative job applicants in the recruitment and selection process. Further, we highlight the requirement to organise and design work that recognises the need to develop social support to improve IWB. The implications of the study for further research on IWB are discussed.     

Committee choice and the core under supramajority rule: Results from simulation of majority choice in 2-dimensional space

While simple-majority choice by committees is generally unstable, supramajority rule has been demonstrated to yield nonempty sets of stable outcomes: outcomes in the core. This paper reports results of a computer simulation of majority choice by committees under supramajority rule. The object is to explore the transition from unstable to stable committee choice with increasing supramajority rules. The findings are that supramajority rule limits the instability of committee choice; that stable committee choice is no more predictable than unstable committee choice; and that an optimal supramajority rule can be specified which minimizes instability and maximizes the predictability of committee choice. In all of the results, simple-majority rule plays virtually no role.