New populist parties in Western Europe

This article addresses the electoral success of far right political parties in West European party systems and suggests that there is a new type of party ‐ the New Populist. Differentiating between neo‐fascism and the New Populism is instructive in two senses. First, it reveals that the current wave of comparative electoral success is more associated with the New Populism than neo‐fascism. Second, it demonstrates that there are certain parallels between the New Politics and the New Populism thereby suggesting that changes in the contemporary far right may well be telling indicators of changes in West European societies that are deeper set than a simple resurgence of racist and anti‐immigrant sentiment.     

Gendering the vote for populist radical-right parties

ABSTRACT

Why do more men than women vote for populist radical-right (PRR) parties? And do more men than women still vote for the PRR? Can attitudes regarding gender and gender equality explain these differences (if they exist)? These are the questions that Spierings and Zaslove explore in this article. They begin with an analysis of men's and women's voting patterns for PRR parties in seven countries, comparing these results with voting for mainstream (left-wing and right-wing) parties. They then examine the relationship between attitudes and votes for the populist radical right, focusing on economic redistribution, immigration, trust in the European Union, law and order, environmental protection, personal freedom and development, support for gender equality, and homosexuality. They conclude that more men than women do indeed support PRR parties, as many studies have previously demonstrated. However, the difference is often overemphasized in the literature, in part since it is examined in isolation and not compared with voting for (centre-right) mainstream parties. Moreover, the most important reasons that voters support PRR parties seem to be the same for men and for women; both vote for the populist radical right because of their opposition to immigration. In general, there are no consistent cross-country patterns regarding gender attitudes explaining differences between men and women. There are some recurring country-specific findings though. Most notably: first, among women, economic positions seem to matter less; and economically more left-wing (and those with anti-immigrant attitudes) women also vote for the PRR in Belgium, France, Norway and Switzerland; and, second, those who hold authoritarian or nativist views in combination with a strong belief that gays and lesbians should be able to ‘live their lives as they choose’ are disproportionately much more likely to vote for PRR parties in Sweden and Norway. Despite these findings, Spierings and Zaslove argue that the so-called ‘gender gap’ is often overemphasized. In other words, it appears that populist radical-right parties, with respect to sex and gender, are in many ways simply a more radical version of centre-right parties.     

Political parties and corruption in Portugal

Portugal is often considered an example of successful democratic consolidation. Yet it has not been exempt from corruption scandals. By the mid‐1990s, transparency and the moralisation of political life had come to dominate parliamentary debates and reforms. The illegality surrounding party life must be seen against the background of dominant ethical standards in society. Voters appear tolerant of the unethical behaviour of political leaders, while parties are gradually becoming less responsive to their electorate. Representation and delegation rely more on tacit consent than on voice, thus encouraging complacency over corruption.     

The vulnerable populist right parties: No economic realignment fuelling their electoral success

Abstract.  The two occupational groups most likely to vote for populist right parties in Western Europe in the 1990s also disagree the most over issues relating to the economic dimension of politics. The two groups were: blue-collar workers – who support extensive state intervention in the economy – and owners of small businesses – who are against such state intervention. Proponents of economic realignment theories have held that both groups voted for the populist right because their economic preferences became aligned in recent decades. This article analyzes more detailed comparative data than has previously been available in the two cases held to be most propitious for the realignment hypotheses – France and Denmark – and finds strong evidence against them. The key mechanism for bringing together voters who disagree on state intervention in the economy is the populist right's appeal on issues cross-cutting the economic dimension, and these voters' willingness to grant such issues pre-eminence over economic ones. As a result, it is argued, populist right parties in Western Europe are limited by or vulnerable to the salience of the economic dimension.     

Mainstreaming populist discourse: the race-conscious legacy of neo-populist parties in Australia and Italy

Curran examines the political legacy of far-right neo-populist parties in Australia and Italy. She argues that assessments of their ‘success’ need to extend beyond the electoral decline or organizational implosion of the parties themselves. An important measure of their impact is the influence they have exerted on mainstream political discourse and styles of communication. That they have been successful in having such an impact is well illustrated in the politically expedient adoption of race-conscious, anti-immigration and anti-asylum policies in Australia and Italy. Curran examines the influence of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation party and Umberto Bossi’s Lega Nord (Northern League) on the mainstreaming of populist discourse in these two countries. She focuses on some of the populist themes and styles embraced by the Australian political leader John Howard and his Italian counterpart Silvio Berlusconi, and she concludes that, regardless of their political fragility or outright demise, these far-right neo-populist parties have been successful in injecting populist themes and prejudices into the mainstream political discourse in their respective countries.     

Failed expectations: Quality of government and support for populist parties in Europe

This article addresses an issue previously neglected in the research on support for populist parties: How do perceptions of the local quality of government (QoG) and local service delivery affect voters’ propensity to vote for a populist party? It argues that personal experience with poor QoG makes voters more likely to support populist parties. The argument highlights the interplay between supply and demand factors in explaining populist support and discusses why populist parties have been particularly successful in certain regions in Europe. A unique dataset from the Quality of Government Institute that surveys citizens’ perception of QoG in their area is used to estimate both individual‐ and regional‐level models of the link between perceived local QoG and populist support in Europe. The empirical results show a strong and robust association between within‐country variation in QoG and support for populist parties.     

The rise of right-wing populist Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands: A discursive opportunity approach

This article seeks to explain the dramatic rise of Pim Fortuyn's right-wing populist party during the campaign for the parliamentary elections in the Netherlands in 2002. Fortuyn succeeded in attracting by far the most media attention of all political actors and his new party won 17 per cent of the votes. This article analyses how this new populist party managed to mobilise so much attention and support so suddenly and so rapidly. It uses the notion of 'discursive opportunities' and argues that the public reactions to Pim Fortuyn and his party played a decisive role in his ability to further diffuse his claims in the public sphere and achieve support among the Dutch electorate. The predictions of the effects of discursive opportunities are empirically investigated with longitudinal data from newspapers and opinion polls. To study the dynamics of competition over voter support and over space in the public debate during the election campaign, an ARIMA time-series model is used as well as a negative binomial regression with lagged variables to account for the time-series structure of the data. It is found that discursive opportunities have significantly affected the degree to which Fortuyn was successful both in the competition for voter support, and regarding his ability to express his claims in the media. Combining these two results, a dynamic feedback process is identified that can explain why a stable political situation suddenly spiralled out of equilibrium. Visibility and supportive reactions of others positively affected the opinion polls. Consonance significantly increased Fortuyn's claim-making; dissonance undermined it. Furthermore, electoral support and negative claims on the issue of immigration and integration in the media by others enhanced Fortuyn's ability to further diffuse his viewpoints and to become the main political opinion-maker during the turbulent election campaign of 2002.     

The rise and fall of support for political parties: a dynamic analysis

The dynamics of political systems are explained by writers in the Schumpetarian tradition in terms of such things as moods, tastes, animal spirits, fashions and irrational impulses. This paper takes the idea of a non-rational choice explanation seriously and explores some of its implications. It develops a model of how voters might behave if their actions were not rational. It shows that, under certain broad conditions, a system made up of voters that act on impulse produces cycles in party support. The analysis also raises some questions about time and continuity in the analysis partys support. I also suggest an empirical test of the theory.     

腐败的发生机理及腐败风险的预警

腐败的本质是权力的滥用和异化,腐败的发生具有其内在机理。权力是腐败发生的根本性基础,制度或体制的缺陷是腐败发生的客观条件,腐败动机和成分分析是腐败发生的决定性因素。预防腐败的重点是能够发现腐败的苗头、把握腐败的发展趋势。因此,构建腐败风险预警机制就十分必要,腐败风险防范机制、发现机制和警示机制构成了腐败风险预警机制的基本结构。结合教育、制度、监督等反腐败途径,以预防腐败为工作重点,依据腐败行为的发生过程,科学设定腐败风险预警机制的运行程序,保证预防腐败行为的发生和蔓延。     

The role of intermediaries in corruption

The aim of the article is to examine a briber initiated corrupt transaction and the role of intermediaries in such a transaction, using a game theoretical model. Clients applying the intermediaries do so to be able to get rid of high red tape applied by the officers. They prefer using intermediary instead of offering a bribe to the officers directly since they do not know which officers are corrupt (accepts a bribe offer) and how much bribe should be given to the corrupt officers. In our model, the client wants to offer a bribe to get rid of red tape, however, she hesitates due to the possibility of offering a bribe to an honest public officer and as a result getting a penalty. Client also hesitates due to the possibility of offering an amount of bribe lower than the reservation price of the corrupt officer; thus being rejected. Intermediaries, knowing which officers are corrupt and the reservation prices of those corrupt officers, decrease the risk of offering a bribe. Two cases; one with intermediary, the other without, in such a scenario is examined and the results of the two are compared.     

The place of parties in contemporary democracies

The electoral system has often been considered an important determinant of the political stability that the Federal Republic of Germany has enjoyed in the half-century of its existence, so that it has been often indicated as a 'model' for electoral reforms in other democracies. The analysis of the political impact of the German electoral system after 1949 shows that such impact was different in the different phases of evolution of the party system. In the 1950s, the German party system was characterised by a higher level of fractionalisation, which the electoral system contributed progressively to reduce. That phase was followed by 30 years of concentration and defractionalisation of the vote. In the last decade, the post-reunification party system presents again higher electoral fractionalisation, which the electoral system has partially reduced in the vote-seats translation. In the current political contingency it is doubtful, however, that the electoral system by itself can contain fragmentation on a durable basis.     

The role of memory in populist discourse: the case of the Italian Second Republic

Cento Bull's paper takes as its starting point Ernesto Laclau's and Chantal Mouffe's conceptualization of populism as counter-hegemonic, and argues, with reference to the Italian case, that populism not only takes the form of a rejection of the establishment and political elites, but also entails a construction of ‘the people’ that requires, as well as the development of empty signifiers as shown by Laclau, also the deployment of common myths based on a collective memory of an imagined past. Cento Bull therefore argues, in line with Ritchie Savage, that the role of memory in populist discourse has been underestimated. Specifically, many populist movements and leaders engage in a fundamental redefinition of who constitutes ‘the people’ accompanied by mistrust and demonization of the Other, which is predicated upon (and justified with recourse to) a reimagining of the nation's and/or democracy's ‘founding moment’. Furthermore, many populist movements make use of a political rhetoric revolving around the ‘anti-subversive impulse’ and aimed at instilling fear and a sense of being under threat.     

The determinants of cross-border corruption

Public Choice - We reconsider the question of what determines corruption at the cross-national level, using new methods and data: observations of occurrences of cross-national...     

The nation under threat: secularist,racial and populist nativism in the Netherlands

ABSTRACT

Right-wing discourses and issues of belonging and collective identity in Europe’s political and public spheres are often analysed in terms of Islamophobia, racism and populism. While acknowledging the value of these concepts, Ke?i? and Duyvendak argue that these discourses can be better understood through the logic of nativism. Their article opens with a conceptual clarification of nativism, which they define as an intense opposition to an internal minority that is seen as a threat to the nation due to its ‘foreignness’. This is followed by the analysis of nativism’s three subtypes: secularist nativism, problematizing particularly Islam and Muslims; racial nativism, problematizing black minorities; and populist nativism, problematizing ‘native’ elites. The authors show that the logic of nativism offers the advantages of both analytical precision and scope. The article focuses on the Dutch case as a specific illustration of a broader European trend.     

Challenges to established parties: The effects of party system features on the electoral fortunes of anti-political-establishment parties

Abstract. The rise of parties that challenge the political establishment has recently sparked the interest of political scientists. Scholars have identified several factors that lie behind the success of such anti-political-establishment parties. Most empirical studies, however, have concentrated their attention either on the importance of electoral system features or on the effects of socioeconomic conditions. This article focuses instead on the role that party system factors play in the electoral success of these parties. Using three data sets from studies conducted in three different time periods it tests two seemingly contradictory hypotheses. On the one hand, the claim that where the established parties have converged toward centrist positions and thus fail to present voters with an identity that is noticeably different from their established competitors, the electorate will be more susceptible to the markedly different policies put forward by anti-political-establishment parties. On the other hand, there is the argument that these parties profit more from increasing polarization and the subsequent enlargement of the political space than from a convergence toward the median. The results of the analyses show that anti-political-establishment parties generally profit from a close positioning of the establishment parties on the left-right scale. However, there is no consistent support for the notion that party system polarization by itself is associated with an increase in the support for parties that challenge the political establishment.     

The policy consequences of political corruption

Controversies abound over whether political corruption handicaps the disadvantaged, facilitates government action, or simply inflates government costs. Multivariate analysis using data from the American states supports none of the hypotheses. Rather, corruption appears to have virtually no policy impact, either directly or in interaction with party competition.