New populist parties in Western Europe

This article addresses the electoral success of far right political parties in West European party systems and suggests that there is a new type of party ‐ the New Populist. Differentiating between neo‐fascism and the New Populism is instructive in two senses. First, it reveals that the current wave of comparative electoral success is more associated with the New Populism than neo‐fascism. Second, it demonstrates that there are certain parallels between the New Politics and the New Populism thereby suggesting that changes in the contemporary far right may well be telling indicators of changes in West European societies that are deeper set than a simple resurgence of racist and anti‐immigrant sentiment.     

Gendering the vote for populist radical-right parties

ABSTRACT

Why do more men than women vote for populist radical-right (PRR) parties? And do more men than women still vote for the PRR? Can attitudes regarding gender and gender equality explain these differences (if they exist)? These are the questions that Spierings and Zaslove explore in this article. They begin with an analysis of men's and women's voting patterns for PRR parties in seven countries, comparing these results with voting for mainstream (left-wing and right-wing) parties. They then examine the relationship between attitudes and votes for the populist radical right, focusing on economic redistribution, immigration, trust in the European Union, law and order, environmental protection, personal freedom and development, support for gender equality, and homosexuality. They conclude that more men than women do indeed support PRR parties, as many studies have previously demonstrated. However, the difference is often overemphasized in the literature, in part since it is examined in isolation and not compared with voting for (centre-right) mainstream parties. Moreover, the most important reasons that voters support PRR parties seem to be the same for men and for women; both vote for the populist radical right because of their opposition to immigration. In general, there are no consistent cross-country patterns regarding gender attitudes explaining differences between men and women. There are some recurring country-specific findings though. Most notably: first, among women, economic positions seem to matter less; and economically more left-wing (and those with anti-immigrant attitudes) women also vote for the PRR in Belgium, France, Norway and Switzerland; and, second, those who hold authoritarian or nativist views in combination with a strong belief that gays and lesbians should be able to ‘live their lives as they choose’ are disproportionately much more likely to vote for PRR parties in Sweden and Norway. Despite these findings, Spierings and Zaslove argue that the so-called ‘gender gap’ is often overemphasized. In other words, it appears that populist radical-right parties, with respect to sex and gender, are in many ways simply a more radical version of centre-right parties.     

Political parties and corruption in Portugal

Portugal is often considered an example of successful democratic consolidation. Yet it has not been exempt from corruption scandals. By the mid‐1990s, transparency and the moralisation of political life had come to dominate parliamentary debates and reforms. The illegality surrounding party life must be seen against the background of dominant ethical standards in society. Voters appear tolerant of the unethical behaviour of political leaders, while parties are gradually becoming less responsive to their electorate. Representation and delegation rely more on tacit consent than on voice, thus encouraging complacency over corruption.     

Gender,populist attitudes,and voting: explaining the gender gap in voting for populist radical right and populist radical left parties

Empirical studies have demonstrated that compared to almost all other parties, populist radical right (PRR) parties draw more votes from men than from women. However, the two dominant explanations that are generally advanced to explain this disparity – gender differences regarding socio-economic position and lower perceptions regarding the threat of immigrants – cannot fully explain the difference. The article contends that it might actually be gender differences regarding the conceptualisation of society and politics – populist attitudes – that explain the gender gap. Thus, the gap may be due, in part, to differences in socialisation. The article analyses EES 2014 data on voting for the populist radical right and the populist radical left in nine European countries. Across countries, the gender gap in voting for the PRR is indeed partly explained by populist attitudes. For populist radical left parties, the results are less clear, suggesting that populism has different meanings to voters on the left and on the right.     

Don't call me a populist! The meaning of populism for western European parties and politicians

In recent years a common understanding of the core elements of populist communication has been achieved in academia. Yet, we know less about how the term populism is used by political parties themselves, despite widespread assumptions about the use of populism as a battle term to disqualify competitors. Based on a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of Twitter content from mainstream and populist actors in six western European countries, this study finds that populism is indeed used by mainstream parties in a pejorative way in order to label political competitors. Yet, not only populist but also mainstream competitors are labeled populist by the center parties linking a variety of different negative meanings to the term, which are often of a less demonizing nature not questioning the legitimacy of others. Populists in Italy and France refer to the term in a positive way, while Spanish and German populists rather reject the label.     

The vulnerable populist right parties: No economic realignment fuelling their electoral success

Abstract.  The two occupational groups most likely to vote for populist right parties in Western Europe in the 1990s also disagree the most over issues relating to the economic dimension of politics. The two groups were: blue-collar workers – who support extensive state intervention in the economy – and owners of small businesses – who are against such state intervention. Proponents of economic realignment theories have held that both groups voted for the populist right because their economic preferences became aligned in recent decades. This article analyzes more detailed comparative data than has previously been available in the two cases held to be most propitious for the realignment hypotheses – France and Denmark – and finds strong evidence against them. The key mechanism for bringing together voters who disagree on state intervention in the economy is the populist right's appeal on issues cross-cutting the economic dimension, and these voters' willingness to grant such issues pre-eminence over economic ones. As a result, it is argued, populist right parties in Western Europe are limited by or vulnerable to the salience of the economic dimension.     

Mainstreaming populist discourse: the race-conscious legacy of neo-populist parties in Australia and Italy

Curran examines the political legacy of far-right neo-populist parties in Australia and Italy. She argues that assessments of their ‘success’ need to extend beyond the electoral decline or organizational implosion of the parties themselves. An important measure of their impact is the influence they have exerted on mainstream political discourse and styles of communication. That they have been successful in having such an impact is well illustrated in the politically expedient adoption of race-conscious, anti-immigration and anti-asylum policies in Australia and Italy. Curran examines the influence of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation party and Umberto Bossi’s Lega Nord (Northern League) on the mainstreaming of populist discourse in these two countries. She focuses on some of the populist themes and styles embraced by the Australian political leader John Howard and his Italian counterpart Silvio Berlusconi, and she concludes that, regardless of their political fragility or outright demise, these far-right neo-populist parties have been successful in injecting populist themes and prejudices into the mainstream political discourse in their respective countries.     

Failed expectations: Quality of government and support for populist parties in Europe

This article addresses an issue previously neglected in the research on support for populist parties: How do perceptions of the local quality of government (QoG) and local service delivery affect voters’ propensity to vote for a populist party? It argues that personal experience with poor QoG makes voters more likely to support populist parties. The argument highlights the interplay between supply and demand factors in explaining populist support and discusses why populist parties have been particularly successful in certain regions in Europe. A unique dataset from the Quality of Government Institute that surveys citizens’ perception of QoG in their area is used to estimate both individual‐ and regional‐level models of the link between perceived local QoG and populist support in Europe. The empirical results show a strong and robust association between within‐country variation in QoG and support for populist parties.     

The rise of right-wing populist Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands: A discursive opportunity approach

This article seeks to explain the dramatic rise of Pim Fortuyn's right-wing populist party during the campaign for the parliamentary elections in the Netherlands in 2002. Fortuyn succeeded in attracting by far the most media attention of all political actors and his new party won 17 per cent of the votes. This article analyses how this new populist party managed to mobilise so much attention and support so suddenly and so rapidly. It uses the notion of 'discursive opportunities' and argues that the public reactions to Pim Fortuyn and his party played a decisive role in his ability to further diffuse his claims in the public sphere and achieve support among the Dutch electorate. The predictions of the effects of discursive opportunities are empirically investigated with longitudinal data from newspapers and opinion polls. To study the dynamics of competition over voter support and over space in the public debate during the election campaign, an ARIMA time-series model is used as well as a negative binomial regression with lagged variables to account for the time-series structure of the data. It is found that discursive opportunities have significantly affected the degree to which Fortuyn was successful both in the competition for voter support, and regarding his ability to express his claims in the media. Combining these two results, a dynamic feedback process is identified that can explain why a stable political situation suddenly spiralled out of equilibrium. Visibility and supportive reactions of others positively affected the opinion polls. Consonance significantly increased Fortuyn's claim-making; dissonance undermined it. Furthermore, electoral support and negative claims on the issue of immigration and integration in the media by others enhanced Fortuyn's ability to further diffuse his viewpoints and to become the main political opinion-maker during the turbulent election campaign of 2002.     

The appeal of nostalgia: the influence of societal pessimism on support for populist radical right parties

In the literature, explanations of support for populist radical right (PRR) parties usually focus on voters’ socio-structural grievances, political discontent or policy positions. This article suggests an additional and possibly overarching explanation: societal pessimism. The central argument is that the nostalgic character of PRR ideology resonates with societal pessimism among its voters. Using European Social Survey data from 2012, the study compares levels of societal pessimism among PRR, radical left, mainstream left and mainstream right (MR) voters in eight European countries. The results show that societal pessimism is distributed in a tilted U-curve, with the highest levels indeed observed among PRR voters, followed by radical left voters. Societal pessimism increases the chance of a PRR vote (compared to a MR vote) controlling for a range of established factors. Further analyses show that societal pessimism is the only attitude on which MR and PRR voters take opposite, extreme positions. Finally, there is tentative evidence that societal pessimism is channelled through various more specific ideological positions taken by PRR voters, such as opposition to immigration.     

The rise and fall of support for political parties: a dynamic analysis

The dynamics of political systems are explained by writers in the Schumpetarian tradition in terms of such things as moods, tastes, animal spirits, fashions and irrational impulses. This paper takes the idea of a non-rational choice explanation seriously and explores some of its implications. It develops a model of how voters might behave if their actions were not rational. It shows that, under certain broad conditions, a system made up of voters that act on impulse produces cycles in party support. The analysis also raises some questions about time and continuity in the analysis partys support. I also suggest an empirical test of the theory.     

Public campaign financing and the rise of radical-right parties

While public campaign financing is often thought of as a way to “level the playing field” of elections, I argue that such policies may have unintended second-order consequences. Namely, that increasing the degree to which public funding drives political campaigns disproportionately aids radical-right parties. This is a counter-intuitive result, as public financing of elections has recently become an important issue for those on the political left as a method to restore power to the majority. Rather, it seems to aid not only those on the right, but those on the political fringe. Through a cross-national analysis of 328 lower-house elections in 20 advanced democracies, I demonstrate that public financing serves to significantly increase vote-share of the radical-right.     

Strategies of mainstream parties towards their right-wing populist challengers: Denmark,Norway, Sweden and Finland in comparison

Although right-wing populist parties (RPPs) have established themselves in most European countries, the academic discourse on political strategies towards them has been slow to start. This article compares the strategic reactions of the mainstream parties in the Nordic countries. The main findings are threefold: (1) in Denmark, Norway and Finland there has been a gradual change from various disengage to engage strategies over time, while in Sweden there has always been a strong cordon sanitaire; (2) one key difference has been in the speed and extent of the strategy changes; and (3) the choice of strategies, which is a very complex process, can be traced back to a combination of factors at the individual, party and systemic levels. There is a need for more research into the impacts and effectiveness of the strategies, the timing of the choice of strategies and the potential learning effects of political parties.     

Framing blame: toward a better understanding of the effects of populist communication on populist party preferences

Although previous research has argued that the media play a crucial role in populism’s success, we know too little about how populist messages affect preferences for populist parties. To advance this knowledge, we conducted an experiment in which the core of populist rhetoric – constructing the people as innocent in-group opposed to the establishment as culprit out-group – was manipulated in news articles. The findings indicate that when political elites are blamed for a salient national problem, people are more likely to vote for a populist party and less likely to vote for the largest party in government. Populist vote intentions are indirectly affected via blame perceptions. These findings offer important insights into the media’s role in the electoral success of populism.     

腐败的发生机理及腐败风险的预警

腐败的本质是权力的滥用和异化,腐败的发生具有其内在机理。权力是腐败发生的根本性基础,制度或体制的缺陷是腐败发生的客观条件,腐败动机和成分分析是腐败发生的决定性因素。预防腐败的重点是能够发现腐败的苗头、把握腐败的发展趋势。因此,构建腐败风险预警机制就十分必要,腐败风险防范机制、发现机制和警示机制构成了腐败风险预警机制的基本结构。结合教育、制度、监督等反腐败途径,以预防腐败为工作重点,依据腐败行为的发生过程,科学设定腐败风险预警机制的运行程序,保证预防腐败行为的发生和蔓延。     

The comparative effectiveness of populist rhetoric in generating online engagement

Worldwide, voters are supporting populist candidates who promise to upend “politics as usual.” Despite all we know about populism, we still do not know how individuals respond to populist content during campaigns, particularly compared to other common content in liberal democracies. This paper adapts framing theory to an online electoral context to argue that populist campaign messages will generate more online engagement compared to three alternative conceptions of the relationship between the people and the elites: pluralism, technocracy, and neutral messages. The paper adapts Snow and Benford's seminal 1988 theory of resonance to studies of populist communication and assess whether populism resonates more with online social media users. An original dataset using the campaign Tweets of 22 national-level actors across five countries is used to test the theory: Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Italy, and Spain (N = 1777). The findings suggest that citizens on Twitter engage with populism more than its alternatives in certain contexts.