Why do corporations contribute to the Nature Conservancy?

Treating corporate contributions as purchases of valuable inputs, we hypothesize that firms for which genetic diversity, advertizing, and reputations of environmental responsibility are more valuable and firms for which the cost of contributing is less will be more likely contributors to the Nature Conservancy. These hypotheses are supported by logit estimations which find firms in industries where biological inputs are important, firms with high advertizing expenditures, firms in industries with high costs of meeting environmental regulations, and large firms are more likely to contribute and so become Corporate Associates of the Nature Conservancy.     

Citizenship—the real democratic deficit of the European union? 1

Given the pressures of globalisation, the nation state is limited in its control over public policy agendas, particularly in the field of social policy. The response of domestic governments to the heat of international competition has been to create more flexible, post‐welfare state economies. A significant consequence of this development is the removal of social rights and the acceleration of social exclusion. This gap which has opened up could be filled by the European Union, but it has so far failed to take a leading role in this regard.

So, as European citizens we should be concerned that the forces which operate to balance the harsher effects of the free market have been lost at the European, supranational level. There are three central reasons why this is the case: (1) the European Union consists of 15 member states with competing, historically rooted understandings of social protection and, therefore, social rights; (2) defining social rights is traditionally a state‐derived function and as such, the absence of an EU state means the absence of comprehensive citizen protection; (3) these two factors are magnified by the relative weakness of the supranational institutions and democratic deficit between the key EU institutions (weak vis‐à‐vis member state governments and with regard to the supremacy of the market).

The combination of these problems has meant that the European Union has not taken the primary role in providing the kind of social protection that we used to enjoy in the domestic context. The result of this is a situation in which the market is determining both the level and even the kind of rights that we are entitled to, thus we are citizens of a European market and not of a European state.

As a state‐derived function, and without a European state, social and citizen rights are being neglected. As a consequence, unless citizen protection is developed through an intergovernmental or supranational framework, it is difficult to see how governments can honour their responsibility to safeguard their people.     

Do Belgian parties undermine the democratic chain of delegation?

The Belgian party-archy violates the ideal-type chain of parliamentary delegation in many ways, insofar as political parties play a predominant role at each stage. They channel the delegation of power from voters to MPs, from Parliament to the cabinet, from the collective cabinet to individual ministers, and from ministers to their civil servants. Hence, they can be considered the effective principals in the polity, and many actors of the parliamentary chain of delegation, such as MPs, ministers, and civil servants have been reduced to mere party agents. The extreme fragmentation of the Belgian party system in combination with its increasing need for multilevel coordination have further enhanced the position of political parties in the Belgian polity. Yet, at the same time (since the early 1990s), Belgium has also witnessed a gradual decline in the informal system of partitocratic delegation and clientelistic excesses, thereby giving back part of their autonomy to some formal agents, such as the cabinet, top civil servants and some MPs. Still, one can wonder whether these corrections are sufficient to counter the strong outburst of public dissatisfaction with the way parties have run the country in past decades.     

How and when do presidents influence the duration of coalition bargaining in semi‐presidential systems?

How and when do presidents influence the government formation process in semi‐presidential systems? Presidents have both a formal role and vested interest in the formation of the cabinet, yet their influence has been overlooked in studies of the duration of government formation. In this article, it is argued that the president's influence over government formation can be explained by his or her perceived legitimacy to act in the bargaining process and their partisanship. In this first case, it is argued that the legitimacy to act derives from a president's constitutional powers and more powerful presidents simplify cabinet bargaining, leading to shorter government formation periods. In the second case, it is proposed that presidents and their parties have overlapping preferences. Therefore, when the president's party holds greater bargaining power in government formation negotiations, the bargaining process is less uncertain and less complex. Thus, government formation processes will be shorter. Using survival models and data from 26 European democracies, both propositions are confirmed by the analysis. The results enhance our understanding of the dynamics of cabinet bargaining processes and contribute to the wider study of semi‐presidentialism and executive‐legislative relations. One broader implication of these results is that the president's party affiliation is an important motivation for them as political actors; this contrasts with some previous studies which conceive of presidents as non‐partisan actors.     

Offices and policies – Why do oppositional parties form pre-electoral coalitions in competitive authoritarian regimes?

Although previous research has suggested that the opposition’s ability to form pre-electoral coalitions (PECs) in authoritarian elections is crucial for the electoral outcome, little has been written about why and when such coalitions are formed. The aim of this article is to fill this empirical and theoretical gap. A theory that combines oppositional parties’ office- and policy-gaining potential when creating such coalitions is proposed. The article utilizes a unique database of 111 competitive authoritarian elections and provides a representative sample of strategically chosen cases. It is shown that, coalitions are more likely when structural conditions favor oppositional victories and when oppositional parties have a distinctive policy agenda in relation to the incumbent government. These factors are shown to be more important than electoral institutions.     

The housing system of the former Soviet Union: Why do the soviets need housing markets?

Abstract

The administrative‐command system that had been in full force in the Soviet Union between 1927 and 1990 had its own logic and internal consistency. It is now common knowledge that this economic system has flaws that led to a deepening secular decline over the past three decades. Because of ideological reasons, and an inadequate economic understanding of the capacity of their system to be liberalized, many reformers sought a third way between central planning and markets. The consensus today is that there is no third way. Among the former Soviet republics, Russia has just embarked on market‐oriented reforms and is facing a difficult and unstable transition because central planning mechanisms have ceased to function, but markets are not yet in place. This transition is particularly problematic for housing, which is a very severely distorted economic sector.

The international evidence on market economies that has accumulated over the past 20 years shows that, when housing sector distortions exist, they are predominantly found on the supply side. In socialist economies, however, housing is part of the compensation provided by enterprises and other employers. As a result housing suffers from demand‐side distortions in addition to the supply‐side problems caused by the absence of land markets, vague property rights, and burdensome urban regulations. The housing sector is already so large and distorted in these highly urban economies that overall economic reforms cannot succeed without housing reforms. In addition to presenting an overview of Soviet housing, this paper provides comparative evidence indicating that, among all the distorted socialist housing systems, Russia's probably is the most impaired. The basic elements of a market‐oriented strategy to improve housing are briefly presented.     

Why do central states accept holding independence referendums? Analyzing the role of state peripheries

Why do central states accept holding independence referendums if they could lose a part of their territory during this process? Several variables have been proposed to explain this contradiction, but the most robust one has proved to be the competition-proximity model formulated by Qvortrup (2014). This paper challenges this theory by stressing the role of state peripheries. According to our approach, central governments are more likely to risk losing poor and isolated territories if they represent a cost for the host state. Drawing on an updated version of the contested sovereignty data set (1776–2019) by Mendez and Germann (2018), this paper demonstrates statistically that the “peripheriness” variables related to the economy and – especially – location are significant. Consequently, the competition-proximity model remains the best-fitted scheme for explaining central governments’ decision-making, but it can be amended slightly by taking into account the peripheral nature of separatist regions.     

Why do Historians Ignore Digital Analysis? Bring on the Luddites

This article argues that historians have failed to grasp the profound opportunities afforded by computational analysis. Despite the abundance of machine-readable data liberated by digitisation—alongside tools and exemplar studies—there has been no widespread embrace of text mining or revival of cliometrics. This ambivalence has arisen mainly through apathy and side-lining of computational analysis to a specialist methodological niche. The absence of justification is damaging to the intellectual vitality of the discipline and its capacity to face the dawning age of data science. The article calls for an urgent debate about the historian and the computer. More than anything else, this requires sceptics to come forward to meet the advocates to discuss how we face the future. British political history has a proud tradition of methodological innovation and there is no better subfield in which to begin a debate that has fundamental implications for the whole discipline.     

Why feed the hand that bites you? Perceptions of procedural fairness and system support in post‐communist democracies

There is widespread agreement that bad governance and corruption represent daunting threats to new democracies and developing countries. Nonetheless, mainstream research on system support and political legitimacy has to a large extent overlooked the crucial importance of public perceptions of procedural fairness for fostering public support and regime legitimacy. Taking its departure in the theory of procedural fairness, this article challenges the conventional wisdom of earlier research by arguing and demonstrating that public perceptions of procedural fairness and impartiality on behalf of the authorities are the most important determinants of system support in the post‐communist European Union Member States. The empirical analysis lends strong support to the fact that perceptions of fairness and the extent of corruption exercise a strong effect on public support for the performance of the political system and approval of regime principles.     

City-level analysis of the effect of political regimes on?public good provision

This paper uses U.S. city-level data on five public expenditure categories to test empirically whether the form of local government affects the amount of public good provision. This also serves as an empirical test of a theory of national politics that predicts higher provision of public good in parliamentary than in presidential regimes. The robust results indicate that: at the city level, the mayor-council form of government provides significantly more public good than the council-manager form of government for two of the public expenditure categories; and, at the national level, presidential regimes provide more public good than do parliamentary regimes.     

Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in?developed, established democracies?

This paper investigates the impact of elections on the level and composition of fiscal instruments using a sample of 19 high-income OECD democracies during the period 1972–1999. We find that elections shift public spending towards current expenditures at the cost of public investment. Although we find no evidence for an electoral cycle for government deficit and overall expenditures, we find a negative effect of elections on revenue attributed to a fall in direct taxation. Our results apply for predetermined electoral periods while endogenous elections seem to increase deficit and leave the composition of fiscal policy unaffected.     

Challenging the boundaries of democratic inclusion? Young people's attitudes about the distribution of voting rights

In theoretical debates about the quality of democratic rule, the core question concerns membership, and the adequate constitution of the demos: who is entitled to participate in choosing political representatives? This article enhances the predominantly normative debates on democratic inclusion and boundary making by taking an empirical perspective and analysing attitudes of 16–18-year-old teenagers regarding preconditions for the distribution of voting rights. Based on data stemming from 13 focus groups conducted in three Austrian cities in spring 2010, our findings show that principles related to both competence (autonomy, knowledge) and community (showing concern, being subjected to the law) matter when it comes to democratic boundary making. Furthermore, the study reveals that, in trying to explain the formation of juvenile attitudes about boundary issues, institutions are relevant when related to the conjunctive experiences manifested in the group-specific habitus: while young immigrants argue more inclusionarily than natives in terms of community-related preconditions, especially as far as the roles of language and citizenship are concerned, students argue more exclusionarily than apprentices when it comes to competence-related preconditions, especially civic education. Boundary making affects social groups independent of national origin or citizenship and can therefore be considered a permanent process beyond international migration.     

Optimists and skeptics: Why do people believe in the value of their single vote?

We investigate the origins of voters' beliefs about the value of their single vote. We construe such beliefs as a function of psychological predispositions and exposure to information about the competitiveness of the electoral race. We test this theoretical model using data from the 2008 Canadian federal election and a new survey question tapping voters' beliefs about whether their vote can make a difference. Our results show that sense of efficacy has a strong effect, efficacious voters being more prone to optimism. Competitiveness of the race also matters, but only among attentive voters.     

What is democratic reliability? Epistemic theories of democracy and the problem of reasonable disagreement

It has proven difficult to reconcile epistemic justifications of political authority, especially epistemic theories of democracy, with a basic liberal commitment to respecting reasonable value pluralism. The latter seems to imply that there can be no universally acceptable substantive outcome standard to evaluate the epistemic reliability of different political procedures. This paper shows that this objection rests on an implausible interpretation of political competence. In particular, the paper defends two claims: first, that epistemic theories of political authority are in fact compatible with a liberal commitment to respecting reasonable pluralism; but second, that if we take reasonable pluralism seriously, the standard of competence we should use is a pragmatic one. Good political decision procedures reliably fix practical problems of social coordination and adapt to new demands and developments; we need not demand that their decisions are all-things-considered just or optimal. This pragmatic account of political competence is compatible with reasonable pluralism, since on this basis we can comparatively evaluate political procedures without controversially asserting a single standard of ‘truth’ in politics. Hence, it is possible to give an epistemic account of political authority that works within a liberal theory of political justification.     

When do voters actually think “It’s the Economy”? Evidence from the 2008 presidential campaign

Studies linking election outcomes to economics frequently assume that the economy’s salience is constant. This study shows that the economy’s salience systematically fluctuates. The number of voters focused on economic issues shifted dramatically throughout the 2008 campaign as the recession worsened and this change occurred well before the financial markets collapsed in September 2008. However, even during the recession substantial numbers of individuals said their vote was based on non-economic issues and for these individuals there was no relationship between their assessment of the economy and their electoral choice. Consistent with extant theories of issue attention, citizens who were the hardest hit by the recession and those who had the most anxiety about suffering a financial dislocation in the future were most likely to consider economic performance electorally important while secure voters were less likely to be economic voters.     

Neglecting results? A critical view of the literature on organised interests in the European Union

Much research has been undertaken to cast light on to the role of interest groups in the European Union and elsewhere. However, only a few researchers have focused their energy on the practical effects of involvement—effects on the legal output of the political process. Thus, we have a good knowledge of interest groups as input factors, and we have a language to asses their weight in terms of input legitimacy. However, we do not understand their actual impact on the substance of legislation: does involvement make laws more efficient? This question seems especially relevant in the European Union as this organisation is often said to be much dependent on the effective and efficient functioning of its rules—its output legitimacy. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sexism predicts favorability of women in the 2020 democratic primary… and men?

Considerable research has examined the role of sexism and vote choice, especially within the context of the 2016 presidential election. These findings are clear, consistent, and unequivocal – sexism hurt Hillary Clinton at the ballot box. However, the 2020 presidential primary provides an opportunity to examine sexism's effects on candidate favorability among a broader range of candidates. Using data on candidate favorability from the 2019 VOTER survey, I find that sexism is unsurprisingly predictive of lower favorability of women running for the Democratic nomination. However, I also find that sexism influences support for men running for the nomination, in a way that is statistically indistinguishable from its effect on support for women. This effect persists even among only Democratic respondents.     

Moving beyond input legitimacy: When do democratic innovations affect policy making?

This article makes three key contributions to debates surrounding the effectiveness of democratic innovation, deliberation and participation in representative political systems. In the first instance, it argues that more attention should be paid to the role that participation actually plays in governance. The literature on democratic institutional design often neglects concern about the effects of innovative institutional designs on more traditional representative fora, at the expense of concerns about their internal procedures. Second, the article argues that despite limitations, replicable systematic comparison of the effects of institutional design is both necessary and possible even at the level of national governance. A comparative analysis of 31 cases of National Public Policy Conferences (NPPCs) in Brazil is presented. Finally, the article shows that popular deliberative assemblies that vary in their familiarity and their policy area of interest, and that organise their structure and sequence deliberation in different ways can be associated with differential effects on both option analysis and option selection stages of the policy process, respectively.     

Bilateralism or the median mandate? An examination of rival perspectives on democratic governance

Michael McDonald and Ian Budge have recently advanced an interpretation of democratic governance based on what they term the 'median mandate'. This perspective locates the key element of liberal democracy in a close correspondence between government policy and the policy preferences of the median voter on the left-right scale. The cross-national evidence they produce in favour of this interpretation is impressive, but it largely hinges on a method for measuring the median voter position in each election that relies on the positions of the various parties in the election and the vote shares they received. This article examines the validity of the median mandate hypothesis when median positions are measured more directly from public opinion surveys (particularly, the Eurobarometer and Comparative Study of Electoral Systems series). The findings show that choice between distinct alternatives, rather than conformity to the median, more accurately characterises governance in democratic systems.