Jesse Burkhead and the Multiple Uses of Federal Budgets: A Contemporary Perspective

The work of Jesse Burkhead continues to have great relevance today. Its germaneness could be taken as an indictment of how little progress has been made in federal budgeting in the past half century, but it also says a great deal about Burkhead's insights and the lasting legacy of his work. This article discusses some of Burkhead's ideas on the use of the federal budget and their pertinence to the budget issues of today, including the role of the federal government in the economy, budgetary relations between presidents and Congresses, and the role of performance information in budgeting.     

Exploring Regionalism in the Federal District Courts

This study explores regionalism in the appointment and decisionmakingpatterns of federal district judges. We begin with an examinationof the general appointment strategies of Ronald Reagan, JimmyCarter, and other recent presidents. The role of local constraintsin this process is emphasized. Next, the behavior of federaldistrict judges appointed by recent presidents is analyzed bycomparing levels of support for civil rights and civil libertiesclaims in cases decided during the 1977–1985 period. TheReagan appointees' support scores are compared with those ofjudges appointed by Carter and other recent Democratic and Republicanpresidents. Comparisons are made in the nation as a whole andalso across circuits and states. Our findings indicate thatthe Reagan appointees are less supportive of civil rights andliberties claims than judges named to the bench by Carter orother recent Democratic and Republican presidents.     

Federalism, the Bush Administration, and the Transformation of American Conservatism

Most recent Republican presidents have proposed signature federalisminitiatives intended to devolve power or sort out federal andstate functions. The Bush administration has not propoundedan explicit federalism policy of this sort, but its approachto federalism can be gleaned from analyzing presidential advocacyof legislation and constitutional amendments, fiscal policies,administrative actions, and judicial policies. What emergesfrom this analysis is an administration that has been surprisinglydismissive of federalism concerns and frequently an agent ofcentralization. In one sense, Bush is merely the latest in astring of presidents who have sacrificed federalism considerationsto specific policy goals when the two have come in conflict.However, the administration's behavior is somewhat surprising,given the president's background as a governor and the factthat he has been the first Republican president to enjoy Republicancontrol of Congress since 1954. Our explanation for the Bushapproach begins with the president's lack of any philosophicalcommitment to federalism and explores the changing status offederalism concerns within conservative ideology. Any explanationfor the Bush approach should account for this shifting politicaldynamic, which has seen Republicans in recent years become increasinglysupportive of exerting federal authority on behalf of theireconomic and social objectives, encouraging Democrats at timesto become more supportive of state authority.     

George W. Bush, the Party System, and American Federalism

George W. Bush's presidency presents two major puzzles. TheRepublican Party has traditionally stood for "limited government,"but Bush's principal legacy for federalism is centralizationof power in the federal government and the executive branch.Most modern presidents have neglected their partisan duties,but Bush has been a uniquely vigorous party leader. Here, weshow that Bush's puzzling lack of attention to federalism issuesis in large part the result of his efforts to strengthen theRepublican Party to cope with the political and electoral challengescharacteristic of the contemporary political context. We explainwhy the Bush administration's strategy for redressing the Republicanparty's shortcomings has presupposed the deprecation of federalism,and consider the implications of our argument for the developmentof federal arrangements.     

The President and Representative Bureaucracy: Rhetoric and Reality

Policy makers have long recognized the importance of achieving a representative federal bureaucracy, but the four most recent presidents have expressed divergent views about policies designed to achieve this goal. Meanwhile, there have been widespread perceptions among federal employees that the administrations' ideologies have had a direct impact on the opportunities of minorities, women, and white men for advancement. Using government-wide data from 1979 to 1996, this article examines whether such employment opportunities have varied in the manner suggested by these perceptions. We find little evidence of a correlation between the president's views on affirmative action and minority and female representation in the overall federal workforce. Moreover, the curtailment of promotion opportunities during the Reagan and Clinton administrations has affected all groups nearly equally. Potential presidential influence has been more notable in the representation of women and minorities in politically appointed and career senior executive jobs. We conclude that equal employment opportunity and affirmative action policies have remained basically intact during the 18-year period, but that recent court decisions, along with efforts to reduce the size of government, may slow progress toward achieving a representative bureaucracy.     

Helen Holt: A Centenarian's Reflections on a Lifetime of Public Service

Women have made great strides in the past 100 years. As the iconic cigarette commercial told us almost 50 years ago, “You've come a long way, baby!” Yet women are still underrepresented in the highest leadership ranks, including state and federal office. Before being asked to “lean in” or share valuable insights, a small group of very capable women were leaders long before those two words were seen in the same sentence. One such remarkable woman, Helen Holt, was a “servant‐leader” throughout her illustrious and inspiring career as a member of West Virginia's House of Delegates, then as secretary of state (1957–58), and later as a presidential appointee charged with developing the nation's nursing home system. Holt's work in state and federal government, her appointment by seven U.S. presidents to develop and implement the national nursing home program that is still in use today, and her leadership in civic and nonprofit organizations have made her an inspiration to countless women and men.     

Make It Rain? Retrospection and the Attentive Electorate in the Context of Natural Disasters

Are election outcomes driven by events beyond the control of politicians? Democratic accountability requires that voters make reasonable evaluations of incumbents. Although natural disasters are beyond human control, the response to these events is the responsibility of elected officials. In a county‐level analysis of gubernatorial and presidential elections from 1970 to 2006, we examine the effects of weather events and governmental responses. We find that electorates punish presidents and governors for severe weather damage. However, we find that these effects are dwarfed by the response of attentive electorates to the actions of their officials. When the president rejects a request by the governor for federal assistance, the president is punished and the governor is rewarded at the polls. The electorate is able to separate random events from governmental responses and attribute actions based on the defined roles of these two politicians.     

Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting

Almost all legislators are subordinate to party leadership within their assemblies. Institutional factors shape whether, and to what degree, legislators are also subject to pressure from other principals whose demands may conflict with those of party leaders. This article presents a set of hypotheses on the nature of competing pressures driven by formal political institutions and tests the hypotheses against a new dataset of legislative votes from across 19 different countries. Voting unity is lower where legislators are elected under rules that provide for intraparty competition than where party lists are closed, marginally lower in federal than unitary systems, and the effects on party unity of being in government differ in parliamentary versus presidential systems. In the former, governing parties are more unified than the opposition, win more, and suffer fewer losses due to disunity. In systems with elected presidents, governing parties experience no such boosts in floor unity, and their legislative losses are more apt to result from cross-voting.     

Congress and Administrative Policymaking: Identifying Congressional Veto Power

The ability of presidents to unilaterally shape administrative policymaking challenges a foundation of congressional power: Rarely can Congress statutorily veto administrative actions over presidential opposition. Consequently, Congress has turned to other means of influence, including the appropriations and oversight processes, although questions remain about the degree to which they have been effective. To investigate, I study a spatial model of administrative policymaking that assumes Congress can execute a legislative veto, as well as a baseline model in which congressional influence requires a coalition with the president. I compare the two models and develop empirical tests that exploit instances when their implications differ. Applying the tests to data on federal regulatory policymaking shows consistent evidence that Congress exerts veto power over administrative activity, even over those actions endorsed by the president. I conclude by discussing some broader implications, including the extent to which existing studies understate the constraints on presidential power.     

The relative effects of maturation,time period,and appointing president on district judges' policy choices: A cohort analysis

Using cohort analysis, this study addresses this primary question: What are the relative effects of appointing president, maturation, and time period on U.S. trial judges' voting behavior on civil rights and civil liberties cases? Specifically, we measure the relative impact of these variables on the liberalism of Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon appointees to the federal district courts. The data for the study are 4,553 opinions issued by these three presidents between 1969 and 1976 that were published in theFederal Supplement. In part, the study reveals that the effects of appointing-president cohorts are much stronger than the influence of maturation or time period. We also found that the Kennedy and Nixon cohorts have remained relatively stable over time and unaffected by maturation effects. The Johnson cohort, on the other hand, has become increasingly more liberal across time, particularly since the advent of the Burger Court.     

The Conditional Nature of Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion

How does public opinion affect presidential policymaking? We address this issue by testing a diverse set of hypotheses with data concerning a set of individual policies across time. In particular, the data revolve around presidential budgetary proposals on a set of major policy issues for which there are recurring surveys on citizens' preferences over spending. The analysis suggests that presidents are more responsive to mass opinion on issues that are familiar to citizens in their everyday lives. Also, for reelection‐seeking presidents, responsiveness is shown to depend upon two key political factors. First, presidents are more responsive to public opinion when the next election is imminent. Second, the effect of presidential popularity is nonmonotonic; presidents with average approval ratings are most likely to adopt policy positions congruent with public opinion, whereas presidents with approval ratings that are significantly above or below average have the greatest propensity to take unpopular positions.     

The influence of presidential heads of state on government formation in European democracies: Empirical evidence

Theories of coalition politics have paid little attention to the role of presidential heads of state in the government-formation process. This article investigates the influence of presidents on the two most important features of government-formation outcomes: the identity of the party of the prime minister and the party composition of the coalition. Substantial evidence is found that presidents in European democracies have managed to induce their preferred governments from the potential alternatives. The results also suggest that parliament-selected presidents and popularly elected presidents have different mechanisms of influence on these outcomes. The investigation sheds new light on the government-formation process in semi-presidential as well as in pure parliamentary systems.     

Experiential Learning and Presidential Management of the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy: Logic and Evidence from Agency Leadership Appointments

Presidents become increasingly effective at managing the bureaucracy because of the information and expertise that they acquire from on‐the‐job experience. In their appointment choices, this theory predicts that presidents become better at reducing information asymmetries incurred from the bureaucracy (Agent Selection Learning), improve the vertical balance of leadership agent traits between top supervisory positions and subordinates directly beneath them (Agent Monitoring Learning), and place a greater relative premium on loyalty in response to horizontal policy conflict between the White House and the Senate (Common Agency Learning). This logic obtains empirical support from the analysis of bureaucratic agent traits for Senate‐confirmed presidential appointees serving in leadership positions covering 39 U.S. federal government agencies from 1977 to 2009. Presidents’ appointment strategies reflect their increasing effectiveness at managing the bureaucracy, thus complementing their increasing reliance on administrative mechanisms to achieve policy objectives as their tenure in office rises.     

Which government officials leak unauthorized information to the press in Washington?

Every modern president of the United States has been bedeviled by unauthorized leaks of government information to the press. Who is responsible for such leaks? Presidents of the United States have accused civil servants of attempting to undermine them. However, journalists have suggested that the presidents' own political appointees leak more. Using interviews conducted in 2013 with both presidential political appointees and civil servants who worked in public affairs for the U.S. Treasury Department during the administrations of Presidents Barack Obama and George W. Bush, as well as interviews with reporters with whom the Treasury officials interacted frequently, this case study finds that political appointees and civil servants leak unauthorized information that does not serve the president's interests to the press with roughly the same frequency. The findings shed light on behavior that is typically shrouded in secrecy and call into question the effort by modern U.S. presidents to gain greater control of the federal government by hiring record numbers of political appointees. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rating the Chancellors and their Budgets

The annual budget presentation is one of the most important forms of public, partisan behaviour in a parliamentary democracy. As such, it should share many features with the addresses of US presidents, including their presumed efficacy. Yet public reactions to budget presentations have been studied only indirectly, and a link between these reactions and government standing has not been established. We use Gallup data over four decades to investigate how voters assess Chancellors of the Exchequer and their budgets. We find that voters' assessments are a product of the performance of the economy, the content of the budget, the media's reaction to the budget and political factors, and are not simply derivative of general feelings about the government in power or intended vote. While developed independently, evaluations of the Chancellor and the budget affect short-term voting intentions of the public. Thus, in unitary, parliamentary governments, as in federal and presidential systems, voters use more than one focal point (in a single party) to evaluate the government and its actions.     

Rethinking Loyalty and Competence in Presidential Appointments

Studies in presidential appointments, particularly principal-agent models, posit that presidents employ a top-down strategy to control the bureaucracy, one that promotes loyalty over competence. However, many studies have two critical limitations: (1) treating loyalty and competence as binary constructs and (2) focusing only on presidential nomination and Senate confirmation (PAS) appointments. In this article, the authors construct a continuous measure of loyalty and competence to determine how much loyalty or competence an appointee offers a president and examine other appointment tools—Senior Executive Service (SES), Schedule C, and presidential appointments—that allow presidents to influence different levels of the bureaucracy. Findings show that presidents are more likely to reward competence with their PAS and SES appointments. In addition, few appointees score high on both loyalty and competence, explaining why presidents generally must make a trade-off between loyalty and competence.     

Reining in the Bureaucrats: Democratic Transition and Administrative Procedural Reform in Korea

How do civilian presidents control their bureaucracies after taking over from an authoritarian regime? To answer this question, I develop a “reining in” theory of delegation. I argue that presidents who faces intrabranch conflict over policy issues and cannot appoint—and dismiss—freely will solve their delegation problems through administrative procedure acts (APAs) and related laws. While some scholars argue that APAs are tools for preserving the status quo, I find that APAs help presidents change policy. Building on the delegation literature from economics, my theory represents a more general argument than prior theories for why presidents support APAs. I test the theory through a case study of South Korea's first civilian government (post‐1961), under President Kim Young Sam. Kim initiated an APA to rein in a professionalized civil service that opposed his policy preferences. Strict procedural requirements designed to keep tabs on bureaucratic activities enhanced Kim's control over his bureaucracy.     

Presidents,Supreme Court justices,and racial equality cases: 1954–1984

This research assesses the policy success of presidents since Eisenhower in their appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court in racial equality cases from 1954–1984. The research examines presidential preferences in a much more detailed and sensitive manner than previous research. While past research has used presidential party as a measure of the policy preferences of presidents, we examine policy preferences in a very direct manner. Specifically, the preferences of presidents on racial equality issues are gauged by their public policy statements. These statements serve to tap the degree of liberalness, the level of attention, and the level of concern with judicial actions in racial equality matters. The results demonstrate that presidents have been much more successful in appointing like-minded justices than is suggested by the existing literature. In addition, it is shown that prior judicial experience is not related to presidential success. This is discussed in terms of the perennial debate over the political control of the Supreme Court and the congruence of Court policy making with majoritarian values.     

PRESIDENTIAL POLICY PREFERENCES AND SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENT SUCCESS

Presidential appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court are major constitutional events. Few studies assess whether this political process benefits presidents with appointment opportunities. This article estimates the policy success of presidents since Eisenhower in appointing favorable justices on the racial equality issues. Previous research uses the president's party affiliation as an indirect measure of presidential preferences. This research examines the president's policy stance more directly by using presidential public statements on racial equality issues. An issue specific measure of presidential preferences shows that presidents have been more successful in appointing like-minded justices than reliance on presidential party would suggest. Regression estimates of the justices aggregate voting record on racial equality cases are robust even in light of other controls. The implications for democratic theory and future research are discussed.     

Executive control of bureaucracy and presidential cabinet appointments in East Asian democracies

This article examines the role of cabinet appointments in controlling the bureaucracy in presidential democracies. I demonstrate how administrative challenges stemming from the structure of the bureaucracy shape presidential choice of ministers. Analyzing a sample of four East Asian cases from 1986 through 2013, I find that presidents are more likely to select ministers from the civil service as bureaucracies are more professionalized, controlling for several political factors. Further evidence from qualitative interviews and case studies suggests that, in professionalized systems equipped with a sizable pool of talent but lacking responsiveness, presidents tend to promote ideologically aligned senior civil servants. However, in politicized systems, where presidents easily obtain responsiveness but face a low level of competence, policy experts tend to be selected from outside the bureaucracy. My findings have important implications for the regulatory governance and state capacity of East Asia, demonstrating the value of balancing between responsiveness and competence.