民法总则设置商法规范的限度及其理论解释

如何建构民商法二元结构的统一私法体系,主要存在“民法典＋单行商事法”与 “民法典＋商法通则＋单行商事法”两种范式主张。其中前者力主“在民商合一体例下制定民法典总则”,这一立法设想可行与否,涉及到民法总则设置商法规范的限度及其模式等问题。无论从构建统一私法体系的形式理性立场,抑或从商事立法体系化的现实主义立场,“民法典＋单行商事法”范式都难称最优,“在民商合一体例下制定民法典总则”的范式应受质疑,民法总则制定应该果决放弃民商合一的理想化追求,剥离难以承载的提供商法规范之重任,循“民法典＋商法通则＋单行商事法”范式构建统一私法体系,藉由实现商事立法的体系化,是符合中国民商事立法现实的理性立法选择。     

融贯民商:职务代理的构造逻辑与规范表达  ——《民法总则》第170条释评

职务代理是一项传统的商事代理制度。职务代理权源于被代理人的意定授权，但其范围和类型受到法律规定的限制，被代理人承受职务代理行为的效果是法律规定的结果。我国《民法总则》第170条系以民商合一理念为指导，首次在民法典总则编中明确规定了职务代理规范。在制度功能上，该规范有助于统一司法裁判。但基于职务代理制度的商事属性，该条第1款的适用范围需被限缩，与职务代理有关的商事登记制度还需完善，职务代理权类型还需细化。同时，该条第2款是职务代理制度的特殊规范，适用时应注意它与表见代理和普通无权代理的区分。未来可在《商法通则》中通过建构统一的商事登记规范和对职务代理权的类型化处理，完善职务代理制度。     

浅析《商事通则》的构建

民法典的制定正在紧锣密鼓的进行中,大陆法系先民后商的立法惯例,使理论界不得不认真审视商法在私法中的地位。以现有的条件来看,制定一部大包大揽的民法典,或者出台一部与民法典并驾齐驱的商法典都有许多不可逾越的障碍,因此《商事通则》加单行商事法律的立法模式成为了商事立法的最佳路径选择。     

析商事通则与民法一般规则的关系——商事通则立法的可行性悖议

目前制定商事通则的呼声颇高，但从商法与民法的关系、我国的立法传统和立法技术等方面看，制定商事通则的可行性、必要性值得检讨；否定商事通则的立法主张绝不意味着商法不重要，其重要性与独立性无必然联系。坚持民商合一，商事规范以单行法的形式存在是我国商事立法的最佳模式选择。     

论我国商事立法模式的选择——商事通则的制定

在我国实行完全意义上的民商合一与民商分立,制定民商法典或单独的商法典,这都是不切实际的想法;本文从商法的历史演进及世界各国商事立法模式的发展,系统阐述商法不能法典化的理由;进而提出只有在制定民法典的同时制定一部总纲性的《商事通则》用以规范基本的商事法律关系,才是立足现实和着眼未来的最佳立法模式选择。     

民法典的编纂与商事立法

民法与商法的固有联系决定了商事立法在民法典编纂中的特殊地位，为完善市场经济法律体系而编纂民法典的立法定位突显了商事立法的重大使命。民商合一既无必要也无可能，民商分立也并不可取，民商立法体例的理性选择应该是民法法典化与商法单行法并行的折中体例，此属真正本土化的中国创制。商法通则的制定不仅有充分的法理基础与现实根据，还将使商法的中国特色表现得更为鲜明、超越民商合一与民商分立模式的两难选择、并与我国民商立法以解决问题为导向的指导思想和现实格局高度契合。     

我国应实行实质商法主义的民商分立——兼论我国的商事立法模式

我国法学界对于如何处理民法与商法的关系、如何处理或建构我国商事立法模式存在着较大的争议和分歧。论文通过对四种不同形态的商事立法模式的阐释 ,对我国商事立法模式抉择的争议进行了评析 ,主张我国应实行以《商法通则》为统率的实质商法主义的民商分立。     

析德日法商法总则的异同及对我国商事立法的启示

德国、日本、法国为典型的大陆法系国家,在民商立法模式上均采民商分立,即在民法典之外制定商法典,分别调整民商事关系.目前我国商事领域缺乏具有统率性、一般性的商事通则,本文希冀通过分析三者商法典总则内容存在的共性与差别,探究其利弊,以期为我国日后确定《商事通则》内容提供借鉴.     

我国制定《商事通则》之反对——兼谈我国商事立法方向

制定一部《商事通则》是近年来商法学者热议的商事立法的新思路,许多商法学者对此进行了宏观层面的构想。但是单独制定商事基本法的必要性存在疑问。一旦制定"内容服从形式"的《商事通则》,从长远来看也会为带来系列不良影响。在民、商事社会关系日益混同的社会背景下,"民商合一"是发展趋势。在私法统一的框架下,制定一部现代意义的民法典,此外配合完善商事单行法,才能从根本上解决商事法律的空白、冲突等现实问题。     

论商事习惯的法源位阶

《民法典》第10条、第11条究竟确立了怎样的商法渊源体系,是“商法规范—民法规范—商事习惯”抑或“商法规范—商事习惯—民法规范”？两种观点分歧在于商事习惯与民法规范的位阶安排,背后原因是对商法之于民法的实质性独立程度有不同认知。“民法规范先于商事习惯”的位阶安排系片面理解与孤立适用“成文法优于不成文法”规则,不恰当地切割商事领域习惯法与制定法,实质损害了商法的独立性。依我国形式私法一元制、实质私法二元制的私法体系,民商法的内在体系不同,商事习惯相较于民事制定法更能够实现对商事关系的妥当调整,由此而确立的“商事习惯先于民法规范”位阶更能维护商法的实质独立性,避免商事审判的“任意向民法逃逸”,更可规模性地避免“有法误用”现象发生。“商法规范—商事习惯—民法规范”三位阶商法渊源体系之确立,有立法论与解释论两条选择路径。     

Risk,Precaution, Responsibility,and Equal Concern

Systemic risks are risks produced through interconnected non‐wrongful actions of individuals, in the sense that an individual's action is a negligible cause of the risk. Due to scale effects of interaction, their consequences can be serious but they are also difficult to predict and assess via a risk assessment. Since we can have good reason to engage in the interconnected activities giving rise to systemic risk, we incur a concurrent collective responsibility to ensure that the risks are fairly distributed and well regulated. James argues that fairness in this context requires taking reasonably available precautions ensuring for each risk‐bearer a favourable ratio of expected benefits over expected losses. In sections 2 and 3 we argue that such a conception of fairness applies but only on the condition that the systemic risks created are irreversible risks and that the general background conditions of justice are imperfectly fair. When risks are reversible, compensatory justice can correct for unfairness in risk imposition. Where risks are irreversible, compensatory justice necessarily fails, giving rise to a collective responsibility to regulate fairly ex ante. Additionally, where background conditions of justice are fully fair and the systemic risk is well understood, risk bearers can be said to have consented to the systemic risk. If they are not fair, we argue that the primary political obligation should lie in fixing the fairness of the backgrounds of justice. A related reason for addressing the general background conditions of fairness is that James’ account of fairness in systemic risk imposition encounters a baseline problem. If expected risks and benefits are calculated again an unfair historic background condition, systemic risk imposition would not be fully fair. Section 4 shows why differences in evidentiary uncertainty as to probability and levels of harm and effective responses require a normatively appropriate response in the form of additional precautions. We show that the evidentiary standards set for risk‐based cost‐benefit analysis have a connection with deontology because they express a postulate of equal treatment in formal terms. Systemic risks can have different possible degrees of epistemological certainty due to factors of social and natural origin, such as more available research funding or higher degrees of complexity for some systemic risks but not others. These differences have to be mitigated by taking even greater precautions in difficult‐to‐research systemic risks.     

Rape,burglary, and opportunity

Following on the recent development of opportunity theory in criminology, we apply an opportunity approach to rape. Although rape is commonly viewed as a street crime, a substantial proportion of rape occurs inside homes following an unlawful entry of the residence. Drawing on this observation, we argue that rape and burglary, because they share a common locus in the home, should exhibit similar opportunity structures. That is, characteristics that place particular types of homes and householders at greater risk of burglary should also place (female) residents at greater risk of rape. An analysis of UCR rates and censusderived opportunity variables for 155 SMSAs in 1980 supports this position. We conclude that home-intrusion rape (rape following an unlawful entry of the home) is a violent crime with the opportunity structure of a property crime.     

Autonomy, justice, and disability

In this Article, Professor Carlos A. Ball explores the philosophical foundations for the types of rights and benefits that our society currently provides to individuals with disabilities. The concept of autonomy places on society a moral obligation to assist individuals with disabilities when their basic human functional capabilities are impaired. The exercise of this obligation entails assisting individuals with crossing a minimum threshold of functional capabilities below which it is not possible to lead autonomous lives. In making this argument, Professor Ball responds to libertarian critics who contend that notions of freedom or liberty proscribe an activist role for government in this arena. He explains how even a libertarian state redistributes wealth in order to provide for some incapacities. Professor Ball also disputes the idea that the meeting of the needs of the disabled is enough to provide moral justification for the rights and benefits provided to individuals with disabilities. The problem with the concept of needs, Professor Ball argues, is that it fails to account sufficiently for the human good of personal autonomy.