U.S. interest groups prefer emission trading: A new perspective

Public Choice - If there is to be environmental regulation, what kind of regulation would the main interest groups then prefer? This political distortion must be taken into account when designing...     

The idea of the legal regulation of war and its origin

The subject matter of the analysis in this paper is jus in bello and the very possibility of its existence. On the face of it, the concept that in the event of the outbreak of hostilities, the use of force against one＇s opponent should be somehow regulated and limited, which is stranger, and its origin is more difficult to explain, than the concept that human societies should live together in peace or that wars should only be begun on some ethical or legally acceptable grounds. It is likely that limits on the use of force, or at least pressures to keep it within a ritualized framework, are property of human beings that enabled our ancestors to live together as social animals. Something similar would have been applied for groups of such beings. Even though the tendency to regulate the use of force in war has existed in the earliest times, this is not a simple task and sets against this effort there are a number of factors that encourage the freest use of violent methods and weapons： The war is a serious business and the desire to win at all costs is very strong, the logic of war leads the combatants to employ all the forces that can be freed from elsewhere and make use of all available advantages and means, a combat is an emotional mater not only rational, etc. Against these forces, the factors that work in favor of the legal regulation of the use of force are： The existence of at least a basic common identity, a situation in which war does not have the characteristics of total war, ear of reprisals by the enemy, the principle of proportion of force used to the objectives, the existence of an approximately comparable moral code and warrior code of honor on both sides, and the need to legitimize war. The extent to which a given war will abide by legal regulation of the use of force depends on the result of the balance of the opposing factors listed above.     

Risking Regulation,Regulating Risk: Lessons from the Transatlantic Biotech Dispute

Debates over the future of new technologies frequently implicate governmental policies and regulation, the purpose of which has traditionally been to mitigate the dangers of new technologies through promotion of conditions of safe use. It is increasingly recognized, however, that regulation is predicated on a particular conception of the nature of risk which may or may not correspond to the views and beliefs held by society. Here I explore three broadly related questions in the context of the debates around agricultural biotechnology. First, what are the implications of varying conceptions of risk for regulatory policy in the United States and in the European Union? Second, what are the implications of differing conceptions of risk and resulting regulatory policy for agricultural trade relations between the two giants of international trade? And finally, what lessons might we draw from contemporary disputes over agricultural biotechnology?     

The British Regulatory State under the Coalition Government: Volatile Stability Continued

What have been the effects of coalition government on the British regulatory state? This article argues that the politics of regulation have been largely about a continuation of existing patterns, namely volatile stability rather than more far‐reaching change. The British regulatory state continues to be defined by boundary conflicts between the world of ‘politics’ and ‘regulation’, by conflicting calls for centralisation and decentralised autonomy, and by tensions between the wish to ‘reduce’ regulation and the realisation of inherent complexities.     

American standards: definition and differentiation through nonprofit regulation

Nongovernmental organizations are deeply enmeshed in global governance, as promoters and, increasingly, subjects of regulation. Focusing on the proliferation of self-regulatory initiatives, this article asks: Why do NGOs adopt governance initiatives? Do their subsequent regulatory experiences match their expectations? It investigates these questions through the analysis of InterAction, the American international NGO alliance, and its PVO Standards. Based on interviews with NGO leaders, it emphasizes collective meaning over material benefit: American NGOs constitute themselves as American NGOs through standards, with which they underscore their professionalism and market orientation. These gains do not accrue equally, however, with large, central organizations perceived to benefit most from regulation.     

Process choice

Regulation scholars have long searched for the best tools to use to achieve public policy goals, generating an extensive body of research on what has become known as instrument choice. By contrast, analysis of options for structuring how officials make regulatory decisions – process choice – remains in relative infancy. Notwithstanding the emphasis legal scholars and political economists have placed on administrative procedures, surprisingly little research has investigated why regulators choose among different process options or what value they and the public receive from different choices. In their book, Regulation by Litigation, Andrew Morriss, Bruce Yandle, and Andrew Dorchak make a significant contribution by empirically and normatively examining regulators' choices between notice‐and‐comment rulemaking, negotiated rulemaking, and what they call “regulation by litigation.” This review article considers three central questions about regulation by litigation. First, how if at all does regulation by litigation differ from other uses of litigation to achieve policy goals? Second, why do regulators choose litigation over other process options? Third, is regulation by litigation as bad as Morriss, Yandle, and Dorchak say it is? By addressing these conceptual, empirical, and normative questions, this review article not only reveals the specific strengths and limitations of the book, Regulation by Litigation, but also highlights more general opportunities and challenges for future research on process choice.     

Industry size and regulation: Evidence from US states

Public Choice - What explains variation in the extent of regulation across US states and industries? We examine cross-sectional variation in state government regulations facing 81 three-digit North...     

Environmental Protection Versus Economic Development: A False Trade‐Off?

Is a trade‐off between the social benefits of regulation and the economic benefits of development inevitable? We argue that environmental regulation may deter economic growth in some contexts, however, in other contexts the benefits of regulation may be obtained with little or no economic loss. We develop an explanation of the economic impacts of state environmental policy based on a model of public influence on private resource allocation decisions. In this model, we assume utility‐maximizing firms will make investment choices based upon the projected profits on their investments and their willingness to accept the risk associated with the investments. We assert that state policies and administrative institutions influence perceptions of risk by increasing or decreasing uncertainty over future environmental policy and influence return on investments at particular locations by affecting firm‐level production costs. Our results confirm that certain administrative arrangements for environmental regulation may enhance, rather than impede, economic development.     

The consequences of midnight regulations and other surges in regulatory activity

Is the midnight regulations phenomenon real and what are its consequences? This paper finds that when an administration??s time is almost up, submissions of economically significant regulations nearly double. Such surges in regulatory activity decrease the duration of regulatory review at the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), likely because of political pressure to quickly approve new rules. Specifically, one additional economically significant regulation submitted to OIRA decreases the mean review time for all regulations by about two thirds of a day. If OIRA review improves regulation quality, then regulatory surges that decrease review time could hinder such improvement.     

The Empirical Analysis of Merger Remedies＇ Influence on Prices in Russia

One of the most important instruments of antitrust regulation in Russia becomes behavioral merger remedies. At the same time, price requirements account for an essential part of such remedies. The issuance of remedies is expected to restrict price increase and, simultaneously, protect consumers from the welfare decrease. On the other hand, however, price remedies may produce a negative effect at the price level. This article explores how behavioral merger remedies of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation affect the price level. The main assumption implies that issuance of price remedies by antimonopoly authority may cause downward price rigidity as a result of ratchet effect or tacit collusion. The article includes analysis of 11 mergers with behavioral remedies during the period of 2006-2010 and price dynamics for 14 products. In the course of the research the hypothesis that the issuance of price remedies brought about downward price rigidity was not confirmed.     

Not again! Public perception,regulation, and nanotechnology

It is often argued that immediate government action regarding nanotechnology is needed to ensure that public opinion does not mistakenly view nanotechnology as dangerous, to restore public trust in government, and to increase the legitimacy of government action through increased public participation. This article questions whether governments can achieve these goals. As the world lurches toward regulation of nanotechnology, we should ask Why the rush? Can anticipatory action, perceived as the government doing something, fulfill the competing hopes to “restore trust,”“pave the way” for nanotechnology, “increase awareness,” and “satisfy democratic notions of accountability”? Or is government action more likely to increase existing divisions over nanotechnology's future?     

Does regulation kill jobs?: The limits of quantification

This essay reviews a new edited volume entitled Does Regulation Kill Jobs? It concludes that this book brings much needed data and realism to the debate about jobs and the environment, showing that government regulation generally has minor impacts on employment. This essay focuses much of its attention on the suggestion, discussed by several of the contributors to this book, that cost–benefit analysis should include a dollar value representing an estimate of the value of employment changes a proposed regulation might cause. It discusses concerns about double counting, ex ante estimates of employment impacts, monetization of the value of employment impacts, and potentially misleading asymmetric analysis.     

Production goes global,compliance stays local: Private regulation in the global electronics industry

Poor working conditions in global supply chains have led to private initiatives that seek to regulate labor practices in developing countries. But how effective are these regulatory programs? We investigate the effects of transnational private regulation by studying Hewlett‐Packard's (HP) supplier responsibility program. Using analysis of factory audits, interviews with buyer and supplier management, and field research at production facilities across seven countries, we find that national context – not repeated audits, capability building, or supply chain power – is the key predictor of workplace compliance. Quantitative analysis shows that factories in China are markedly less compliant than those in countries with stronger civil society and regulatory institutions. Comparative field research then illustrates how these local institutions complement transnational private regulation. Although these findings imply limits to private regulation in institutionally poor settings, they also highlight opportunities for productive linkages between transnational actors and local state and society.     

How can we better align private security with the public interest? Towards a civilizing model of regulation

How can we better align private security with the public interest? This question has met with two answers in the literature on private security regulation, one seeking to cleanse the market of deviant sellers, the other to communalize the market through the empowerment of buyers. Both models of regulation are premised upon a limited neoclassical economic conception of how market transactions map onto the public interest. This article makes the case for a new model of regulation, one that seeks to civilize the market. Drawing upon the insights of economic sociology, our model regards the market for security as a moral economy in which commodity and non‐commodity values jostle and collide. On this basis, we propose a regulatory architecture where buyers and sellers are cast not only as economic actors but also as moral actors, revealing new avenues through which to encompass private security within the democratic promise of security.     

Religious market structure and democratic performance: Clientelism

Is there a connection between government intervention in religious competition and partisan clientelism in democratic systems? Drawing on the economics of religion, we argue that alongside commonly examined population-level religious processes (religious diversity), state-level religious processes (government regulation of competition in the religious market) affect institutional performance in electoral democracies. Linking comparative indicators of religion-state relations with measures of partisan clientelism, statistical analysis suggests that uncompetitive religious markets, such as those where a dominant religion is sponsored by the state, create incentives, infrastructures and opportunities that favour clientelism. The study emphasises the importance of light-touch regulation of religion not merely as a normative principle narrowly related to religious freedom, but also as a potential remedy that can enhance the quality of political institutions.     

Partisanship,Ministers, and Biotechnology Policy

Research in public policy and political economy has provided many insights in the evolution of public resistance against genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in the last two decades. But how does the partisan composition of a government, its programmatic orientation and the allocation of cabinet offices affect policy making in this specific area? We argue that the regulation of GMOs is determined by the ideological orientation of governments and the presence of parties with a specific ideological background in the cabinet. In addition, we hypothesize that the parties' control over relevant cabinet posts matter for GMO regulation. We test our hypotheses by using an innovative dataset that contains information on biotechnology regulation outputs of European governments in the time period from 1996 until 2013, the partisan composition and policy‐area specific positions of governments, and the party affiliation of key cabinet actors. The results show that the presence of a Christian democratic party in a cabinet increases the chances of a ban on biotech crops, in particular if it controls the Ministry of the Environment.     

The regulatory style of environmental governance in China: the case of EIA regulation in Shanghai*

The body of literature that examines how institutional contexts affect environmental governance in advanced industrial countries finds that style of environmental regulation is country‐specific. In the pluralist form of democracy like the United States, environmental policy formulation involves bargaining and compromises among interest groups and regulation enforcement through relatively formal and legalistic means. In the corporatist form of democracy like Sweden and Great Britain, in contrast, environmental policies are more accommodating to divergent societal interests and tend to be less formal in their enforcement. These variations in regulatory style have been attributed to differences in basic constitutional structures, regime types and cultures. How do institutional contexts affect the style of environmental regulation in China, which is both a non‐democratic and developing country? This article examines China's regulatory style by focusing on environmental impact assessment (EIA) regulation in Shanghai. The Shanghai EIA system is analyzed in terms of policy ideology, policy content, regulatory process, public participation and policy consequences. It is shown that China's being a single‐party regime with a ‘rule of persons’ tradition has heavily shaped its environmental governance. Based on Shanghai experience, China's style can be characterized as formal in requirement, agency‐dominated in the regulatory process, legalistic in enforcement, and informal politics as the substance of regulation. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Politics of ‘Third Country Equivalence’ in Post-Crisis Financial Services Regulation in the European Union

After the global financial crisis, the European Union has adopted a new regulatory approach towards foreign countries by making use of equivalence rules in finance. Why? This paper argues that it is the EU’s attempt to restore financial stability in its territory and maintain the competitiveness of its financial industry. However, this ‘old’ dilemma between stability and competition in financial regulation is further complicated in a regional jurisdiction, such as the EU, because different regulatory paradigms play off in the dilemma.     

Devolution and Innovation: The Adoption of State Environmental Policy Innovations by Administrative Agencies

Do states act as laboratories for reform? Are state administrative agencies likely to adopt policy innovations? This study analyzes the adoption of environmental policy innovations by state administrative agencies in the area of hazardous waste regulation. Four explanations are developed to explain the factors that affect innovation adoption: the severity of the problem, the importance of institutional factors, the role played by interest groups, and contextual factors. Institutional factors, such as state wealth and administrative professionalism, are important determinants of innovation adoption. State agencies are also likely to adopt innovations to deal with problems created by hazardous waste contamination. In addition, state environmental managers are not directly influenced by interest groups, and the inclusion of all stakeholders is likely to lead to greater support for new policy initiatives. Implications for practitioners are drawn based on the study's findings.