The median voter model in public choice theory

The changing perception by public choice theorists about the relevance of the median voter model is a result of excessive extrapolation of the conclusions of theoretical models to the real world. Early in the 1970s the median voter model was often accepted as implying that the output produced in the public sector was what was most preferred by the median voter. This claim is excessive because the median voter model is only a model of demand aggregation under majority rule and has little to say about the supply side of the public sector. In the late 1970s many scholars identified several circumstances under which the model would not apply in theory, but these critiques of the model were often viewed as reasons to abandon the median voter model altogether. The model went from having excessive claims that made the model appear to be more powerful than it really is to excessive claims that made the model appear to be less powerful than it really is. These latter claims were often in response to the earlier claims rather than to the model, appropriately applied.Pointing out that the model might not be valid under some circumstances in no way implies that the model is never valid. In fact, this paper has reviewed strong arguments, both empirical and theoretical, suggesting that the median voter model is a good approximation of demand aggregation in the public sector for many issues. One paper will not change the opinions of public choice theorists on the median voter model. But the argument given here is that there is a large amount of theoretical and empirical evidence supporting the median voter model as a good foundation for the development of the theory of public sector demand. Once the overly ambitious claims that have been made for the model are set aside, the median voter model is in a good position to provide a base for the development of a theory of political structure that is analogous to the theory of market structure in economics.     

The public choice of educational choice

The very small literature explaining (i) how citizens have voted in two California voucher referenda, (ii) how legislators have voted on voucher bills in the State of Florida and the US Congress, and (iii) the variation across states in charter school provisions is summarized. New empirical evidence documenting the cross-state variation in the success of voucher referenda and voucher bills is examined. Voucher bill characteristics and state characteristics play important roles. Voucher bills have been passed only in the more conservative Republican states, and almost all of the successful voucher programs have been targeted at large, struggling school districts.     

Toward a public choice theory of monopoly regulation

This paper benefited from valuable comments when presented at the Sixth Annual Conference of the Rutgers University Advanced Workshop in Public Utility Economics and Regulation at Bolton Landing, New York in May 1987.     

The theory of economic regulation and public choice and the determinants of public sector bargaining legislation

In this study we used the theory of economic regulation and public choice to derive a model to explain the pattern of public sector bargaining laws among the states. We find this type of legislation is influenced by the following demand factors: (1) the extent of public sector union membership, which represents the interest group hypothesis, has a positive influence on pro-union legislation; (2) the extent of employer opposition to unions, as measured by unfair labor practice charges against employers in representation elections, has a negative effect on bargaining laws; (3) two taste variables — the salaries of public employees and the percent of nonwhite employment in the state — have a positive influence on these laws. A result which will be surprising to many people is that the extent of private sector union membership has no significant influence on the passage of public sector bargaining legislation.Our empirical analysis indicates that supply factors are also important in explaining the pattern of public employee bargaining laws across the state. We find that states are more likely to enact pro-union legislation under the following conditions: (1) constituents appear to hold pro-labor views as represented by their Congressmen's voting record; (2) neighboring states have passed mandatory bargaining laws; and (3) when competition is greater among the political parties.     

The endogenous public choice theorist

Public choice theory has effectively explored defects in collective action and political processes. However, little attention has been given to the fact that any recommendations as to how to improve the situation can only be realized on the basis of precisely those defective institutions. What turns up here can be identified as a problem of self-reference. Normative contributions by Buchanan and Hayek may serve as an example. In order to clear up the seemingly paradoxical situation, “endogenization” of the public choice theorist within an extended theory is suggested. A straight-forward extension is briefly outlined.     

Rational choice theory,public policy and the liberal state

Liberalism requires a high order of responsible behaviour from its citizens in order to be sustainable. Yet when the modern liberal state makes policy, it is the stereotyped economic man, driven by self-interest and influenced only by carrots and sticks, who occupies center stage. This regulatory approach to public policy can be shown theoretically to give rise to a paradox — the greater the need for regulation, the less likely, because of compliance problems, it is to succeed. It is contended that an alternative approach which explicitly focuses on a broader behavioral understanding of citizens' attitudes and motivations provides a rationale for the use of a much wider range of policy instruments than does the regulatory framework, and is also more in keeping with those values necessary to the sustainability of the liberal state.     

A public choice theory of the Great Contraction: Further evidence

We benefitted from comments by John Johnson and Lloyd Blenman. M. Bala Subrahmanyam, Steven Moore, and Thomas Lewis provided valuable research assistance. Any remaining errors are our own.     

The unfinished business of public choice

Over the past fifty years, the public choice research program has generated important insights into collective decision-making processes, especially as they operate within the political institutions of Europe and North America. Despite a half-century of progress, a great deal of unfinished business remains on the public choice research agenda. In the course of assessing the current state of the literature, as represented in the contributions to this special issue of Public Choice, this essay identifies some of the unanswered questions.     

公共选择理论视角下提高公民科学素质的对策

根据布坎南的公共选择理论,各种特殊利益之间的"缔约"在公众中进行集体选择中起着关键的作用,而并非公众所认为的"根据公共利益进行选择"的结果。无论是企业行为还是各种公共选择,其结果均来自各个利益主体的相互较量和博弈。提高公民科学素质工程无论对于国家实力提升、社会均衡发展还是公民个体都是一个无法回避的公共选择,然而在具体政策的制定与措施的实施方面,仍缺少相应的理论依据。基于公共选择理论,从政府支持、科普组织以及主体参与等三方面进行分析和探讨。     

The place of political science in public choice

This study examines the effects of alternative executive veto structures in a model of the budgetary process. For the model examined it is shown that the outcome of the budgetary process must be contained in the Pareto set if the executive has either no veto authority or the authority to exercise an all-or-nothing veto. When the executive has item veto authority, however, the outcome need not be contained in the Pareto set.     

Moral public choice

Public Choice should now integrate systematically considerations of ethics and justice for two kinds of reasons. First, moral principles can be implemented by self-centered individual who, however, care for others' judgments, and these others can thus have these principles implemented at no cost to themselves. Furthermore, direct moral motivations may be less negligible than it was assumed, and at any rate it may be time to focus on them. Second, the theory of justice has reached an integrated, rational maturity which makes it suitable for this purpose (whereas the “Social Choice” approach is plagued by serious problems of meaning).