Globale Besteuerung und Demokratische Legitimität

The democratic state has been offering the conditions for legitimately levying taxes. Tax revenues have been securing the sovereign’s ability to act, policy aims pursued through taxation have been the outcome of a democratic process and the coercion backed institutions levying taxes have enjoyed the status of democratic legitimacy. But a twofold dynamic challenges this status quo. States are under pressure to address problems to which global taxation offers the most promising response. And phenomena like capital mobility impose constraints on the state’s ability to effectively use the policy instrument of taxation. Under what institutional arrangements could taxation be maintained as a justifiable instrument? And what should future institutional arrangements of public finance look like?     

Sind wir im Krieg? Über Terrorismus, Partisanen und die neuen Formen des Krieges

Ohne Zusammenfassung Dieser Essay beruht auf Vortr?gen, die ich auf Einladung von Wilhelm Heitmeyer am 24. Oktober in der Universit?t Bielefeld und im Rahmen einer von Gerd-Joachim Glae?ner organisierten Ringvorlesung am 20. November in der Humboldt-Universit?t Berlin gehalten habe.     

Zwischen Kultur, Rationalität und Neo-Pluralismus: Neuerscheinungen zum politischen System Japans

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Koalitionsbildungen zwischen Ämter- und Politikmotivation. Konstruktion einer interdependenten Nutzenfunktion

While newer coalition theories take into account that parties are both office and policy motivated, one problem remains unsolved: the fact that offices (ministries) and policies are inseparably connected with each other. In this essay, we solve this problem by constructing a utility function which considers the interdependency of office distributions and policy outputs. This utility function — which can be used as a basis for further coalition theories — is able to capture the interdependencies also in empirical applications, as we illustrate for the example of the coalition building process after the Bundestag elections of 2002.     

Europäisierung und innerstaatlicher Wandel. Zentralisierung und Entparlamentarisierung?

A number of studies suggest that European integration impacts upon the domestic institutions of the member states by changing the distribution of resources among domestic actors. This paper argues that resource dependency needs to be embedded in an institutionalist understanding of Europeanisation in order to explain when and how Europe affects the domestic institutions of the member states. First, domestic institutions determine the distribution of resources among the domestic actors in a given member-state. Second, the compatibility of European and domestic institutions determines the degree to which Europeanisation changes this distribution of resources and hence the degree of pressure for institutional adaptation. Third, the domestic institutional culture determines the dominant strategies of actors by which they respond to such a redistribution of resources facilitating or prohibiting institutional adaptation. This argument is empirically tested by comparing the impact of Europeanisation on the territorial institutions of the five most decentralized member states, with special reference to Germany and Spain as representatives of opposite institutional cultures. The study shows that the regions succeeded in balancing the territorial centralization caused by Europeanization. However, the compensation of regional losses of competencies through the intrastate participation of the regions in the formulation and representation of the national bargaining position in European affairs reinforces executive dominance in European decision-making contributing to the tendencies of deparlamentarization in the member states.     

Staatskapazität und Verwaltungsreformen in hybriden und autoritären Regimen – am Beispiel der Steuerverwaltung in postsowjetischen Ländern

In order to enlarge state capacity, authoritarian regimes have undertaken considerable efforts to (re-)construct and modernize their administrations. Combining various research strands, this literature review links basic findings of research on authoritarian and hybrid regimes to those on administrative reforms in post-soviet countries. As tax administrations are essential for increasing state capacity, a particular focus is laid on these reforms. Drawing on the cases of Russia, Ukraine, and Kazachstan, the article reveals that stable, hegemonic authoritarian regimes seem to succeed better in increasing administrative efficiency and capability. While professionalizing their civil services, however, tax administrations can still be used to repress opponents. Hybrid regimes which are shaped by frequent government turnovers, by contrast, seem to avoid longsome efficiency-oriented reforms of their administrations.     

Einigkeit, zwei kompatible Therapieansätze und etlicher Streit. Antwort auf Christian Welzel

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Moderat bevorzugt, extrem gewählt. Zum Zusammenhang von Präferenz und Wahlentscheidung in räumlichen Modellen sachfragenorientierten Wählens

This article demonstrates, on the basis of survey data from the 2005 German national election, that voters often systematically choose more extreme parties than warranted by their own preferences. Estimation of Grofman’s (1985) spatial discounting model reveals that party preference and vote decision follow different utility functions. Preferences turn out to be purely proximity driven, i. e. voters prefer parties with positions close to their own. Moving from preference to the vote of the top-ranked alternative, a devaluation of party positions and a significant shift in voter utility towards more extreme parties is observed. These results show that voter behaviour may change, even though voter preferences remain unchanged. Results also suggest that the remarkable success of FDP and Linke in the 2005 election is more likely due to shifting behaviour by moderate voters rather than to sweeping changes in the German electorate’s preferences toward welfare policy.     

Netzwerkstruktur, Handlungslogik und politische Räume: Institutionenwandel in europäischen und nordamerikanischen Grenzregionen

This paper is a contribution to the debate on political order and governance in a “debordered world” beyond the “Westphalian system”. It is based on empirical information about the development and change of political institutions in cross-border regions in Europe and North America in the 20th century. First, it is shown that the nation state is loosing its gate keeper role at the end of the century and that various sub-national actors institutionalise independent cross-border links or participate on an equal footing. Therefore, the pattern of interaction is changing from formal hierarchies to networks. Nevertheless, if we define hierarchies and networks as modes of governance, we cannot conform such a change since the mode of interaction has not changed over the years. There does not exist and never has existed any other mode of interaction as “negotiated agreement”. What has changed is the institutional logic for finding such a cross-border agreement. Whereas older institutions were designed to find a common solution by using a technocratic-deductive logic, younger institutions use a symbolic-inductive logic (mainly in Europe). In North America they are based either on a rationalistic-evolutionary logic (at the US-Mexican border) or on a discursive-constructivist logic (in the Pacific Northwest). Also in respect to the much proposed tendency towards “deterritorialization” of political orders we find strong differences between the continents: Whereas in Europe even the younger institutions are based on “spaces of place”, in North America the more recent institutions are much more oriented towards “spaces of flows”.     

Begrenzte Rationalität und regulatives Lernen in der EG: die Liberalisierung der Elektrizitätsversorgung

The article analyses the liberalization of the EC electricity supply industry. Confronting the intergovernmental approach, the case study is based on the premise that the member state executives act within the limits of a bounded rationality and do therefore not always represent clear and fixed interests in EU negotiations. Taking the examples of France and Germany, it shows that the national positions and preferences may change greatly during the course of the decision making process. While the French positional changes may be reasonably well explained by the intergovernmental approach, the German preference changes are attributed to effects of the EC institutions and negotiations. Institutional principles, policy-concepts and fairness criteria guide member state orientations and behavior and hinder the pursuit of unilateral advantages. Incremental negotiation techniques within the Council induce learning processes and cause reassessments of the domestic situations. Furthermore, the EC decisions may cause behavioral changes which clearly surpass their regulatory content even if they contain extensive flexibilisation mechanisms.