Reelection and Legislative Power: Surprising Results from Brazil

A diverse and growing literature ties legislative professionalization and power to career paths. In particular, higher rates of reelection and longer legislative careers should produce more professional, competent, and high‐quality legislatures. Legislators have more incentives to strengthen their own institution when they intend to remain there for a long career. Using data from the most recent constitutional convention in Brazil, we show that legislators with greater prospects for long careers were actually less likely to support strengthening the legislative branch. We explain this as part of a local equilibrium where career legislators’ short‐term need for pork trumped their long‐term interest in a stronger institution.     

Party Strategies,Constituency Links,and Legislative Speech

This article examines how parties organize legislative speech. Electoral incentives and legislative institutions affect speech participation. When electoral systems create personal vote‐seeking incentives, parties are less concerned with screening speeches and more supportive of members seeking to garner name recognition. But in many countries, legislative rules and norms constrain opportunities for individual position taking during the lawmaking debates. We argue that parties resolve this dilemma by organizing speech participation into nonlegislative speeches and lawmaking debates. In each instance, different types of legislators are more likely to speak. We examine the case of Chile and test the implications of our theory with data on congressional speeches.     

State‐Level Institutional Effects on Legislative Coalition Unity in Brazil

How do subnational factors affect the proclivity of legislators from the same party or coalition to vote together? We estimate the effects of two institutional forces operating at the state level—intralist electoral competition and alliance with governors—on voting unity among coalition cohorts to the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. Larger cohorts, in which the imperative for legislators to distinguish themselves from the group is stronger, are less unified than smaller cohorts. We find no net effect of alliance with governors on cohort voting unity. Governors are not dominant brokers of legislative coalitions, a result suggesting that the net gubernatorial effect is contingent on factors that shape governors' influence relative to that of national‐level legislative actors.     

Legislative Effectiveness and Legislative Careers

We studied an underutilized source of data on legislative effectiveness and exploited its panel structure to uncover several interesting patterns. We found that effectiveness rises sharply with tenure, at least for the first few terms, even when we control for legislators' institutional positions, party affiliation, and other factors. Effectiveness never declines with tenure, even out to nine terms. The increase in effectiveness is not simply due to electoral attrition and selective retirement, but to learning‐by‐doing. We also found evidence that a significant amount of “positive sorting” occurs in the legislature, with highly talented legislators moving more quickly into positions of responsibility and power. Finally, effectiveness has a positive impact on incumbents' electoral success and on the probability of legislators moving to higher office. These findings have important implications for arguments about term limits, the incumbency advantage, and seniority rule.     

我国传染病防治领域公民权利保护的立法进展与思考

2003年以来,我国传染病防治领域公民权利保护的法制建设取得了较大进展,生命权、健康权的维护不断强化,人身自由权的限制及其生活保障更加人性化,财产权的政府处置权力与补偿义务逐渐对等化,知情权的运用逐步制度化、个体化,受救助权的实现形式日益多元化,隐私权的规定越来越具体化,不受歧视权的保护范围适度细化。但是,为了进一步完善传染病防治领域的公民权利保护,建议：加快公民权利保护均等化的立法步伐,关注公民权利保护的法律法规可操作性,提高公民维护自身权利的法律意识,汲取国外依法保护公民权利的有益经验。     

立法权去中心化与立法模式转变

立法权本应属于人民全体,只是交由代议机关行使,但是立法权的所有与行使的分离使其有被滥用的可能,由此导致立法权在行使时出现趋中心化:立法权绝对化、非理性化、将立法权而不是公民作为立法过程的核心。因此,应着力实现立法权的去中心化,实现立法权行使范围和方式的变革。立法模式应该实现由单一政府立法到政府立法与社会立法相结合的转变,更多地发挥公众、社会团体和专家的实质性作用。     

危险驾驶罪的立法理念与立法完善探讨

刑法修正案（八）首次将＂醉驾＂、＂飙车＂行为以危险驾驶罪入刑。鉴于民众甚至司法人员对该罪的认识上和操作中均存在不少亟待澄清和回应的问题,诸如该罪立法理念上与刑法谦抑性是否存在着矛盾和冲突？如何认识和处理该罪中＂罪过倒挂＂问题？如何理解和适用该罪的追诉时效问题？如何看待和处理该罪的行为方式过窄的问题？通过对以上诸问题进行阐释进而提出了完善相关立法的构想及其路径。     

Delegation and Authority: Authoritarian Liberalism Today

In light of the reforms undertaken for the sake of the Euro, the article revisits the concept authoritarian liberalism that was introduced in 1933 by the German public law scholar Hermann Heller. This notion seeks to capture the liaison between the ‘strong state’ and economic liberalism. The article suggests that this notion can be fruitfully used to designate the new governance of economic and monetary union. It argues, particularly, that it makes sense to speak of an authoritarian style of governance even if the latter does not wear vestiges of outright repression. Two different faces of authoritarian liberalism can be distinguished: one that looks more towards authoritarianism and another one that views authoritarian rule as a managerial strategy that is good for the economy. The article then speculates whether the EU has been, indeed, successful because it shifts between the two. Disturbingly, there may be something deeply as well as more accidentally authoritarian about European integration.     

Committees and Legislative Strengthening: The Growing Influence of Committees in Ukraine's Legislative Process

The Ukrainian legislature is in the process of transforming from a ‘rubber stamp’ institution of the Soviet type into an ‘institution that matters’ in a new democratic state. The practice of democratic institution building in the post-Soviet countries presents multiple examples of powerful executives who gained dominance in legislative processes. What path has Ukraine taken and what can explain its specific characteristics? This article charts the growth of committees here as a marker of legislative institutionalisation in Ukraine. The study finds that Ukrainian legislative committees defy prevalent regional trends and, contrary to expectations, have asserted independent roles. It then discusses factors that may account for this unique regional development – the role of a dual executive structure and the Ukraine party system.     

论经济特区立法权和立法体制的完善

<立法法>的颁布实施为解决现存问题提供了一些法律依据,同时又出现一些新的问题,急需在理论上加以探讨和澄清,才能完善经济特区的立法权和立法体制.     

论刑法立法解释权与立法权和司法权的纠葛

刑法立法解释权的产生和发展,导致这一权力同立法权和司法(解释)权产生了冲突,使得刑法解释权力体制产生了新变化。现实中,刑法立法解释权同立法权之间产生了混淆,进而因为这一权力的混淆,类推性立法解释的溯及既往造成了对被告人权利的侵犯。同时,由于解释对象和方式的混同,刑法立法解释权又同司法解释权发生运用的重合,深刻地影响了最高人民法院、最高人民检察院的刑事司法解释权的格局。     

专家在立法听证中的角色和作用

立法听证是一种提高立法公正,促进立法民主的制度;同时也是搜集信息、发现事实的制度设计。专家在立法听证中应扮演重要角色,发挥重要作用:第一,作为利害关系人的委托代理人,他们是利害关系人和立法者之间的桥梁;第二,作为利害关系人的专家证人,他们可以使自然公正原则切实发挥作用;第三,作为专家陈述人,他们可以弥补立法者立法知识和信息的不足,促进立法科学,可以提高公众对立法的认同,这有利于法律的实施。当然,专家参与立法听证也有其消极作用,应有一定的限度。     

Delegation of Regulatory Powers in a Mixed Polity

It is a common place of academic and political discourse that the EC/EU, being neither a parliamentary democracy nor a separation‐of‐powers system, must be a sui generis polity. Tocqueville reminds us that the pool of original and historically tested constitutional models is fairly limited. But however limited, it contains more than the two systems of rule found among today's democratic nation states. During the three centuries preceding the rise of monarchical absolutism in Europe, the prevalent constitutional arrangement was ‘mixed government’—a system characterised by the presence in the legislature of the territorial rulers and of the ‘estates’ representing the main social and political interests in the polity. This paper argues that this model is applicable to the EC, as shown by the isomorphism of the central tenets of the mixed polity and the three basic Community principles: institutional balance, institutional autonomy and loyal cooperation among European institutions and Member States. The model is then applied to gain a better understanding of the delegation problem. As is well known, a crucial normative obstacle to the delegation of regulatory powers to independent European agencies is the principle of institutional balance. By way of contrast, separation‐of‐powers has not prevented the US Congress from delegating extensive rule‐making powers to independent commissions and agencies. Comparison with the philosophy of mixed government explains this difference. The same philosophy suggests the direction of regulatory reform. The growing complexity of EC policy making should be matched by greater functional differentiation, and in particular by the explicit acknowledgement of an autonomous ‘regulatory estate’. At a time when the Commission aspires to become the sole European executive, as in a parliamentary system, it is particularly important to stress the importance of separating the regulatory function from general executive power. The notion of a regulatory estate is meant to emphasise this need.     

Legislative Transparency and Credit Risk

Open governance requirements are designed to improve accountability, which implies that transparent governments are more trustworthy stewards of their publicly invested power. However, transparency may also reduce institutional effectiveness and inhibit political compromise, diminishing the capacity to manage resources responsibly. We assess empirical support for these competing perspectives in the context of American state legislatures, many of which have become exempt from state sunshine laws in recent decades. We leverage variation in the timing of these legislative exemptions to identify the effect of removing transparency in a crucial governing institution on investors’ risk perceptions of states’ general obligation bonds. Our analysis of these data during the period 1995–2010 suggests that removing legislative transparency reduces state credit risk. We conclude that while openness in government may be normatively desirable, shielding legislative proceedings from public view may actually be better for states’ debt repayment capacity, improving their overall fiscal health.     

Genetic Exceptionalism and Legislative Pragmatism

Genetic-specific nondiscrimination laws have been enacted in most states, but the laws are ineffective and increase the stigma of genetic conditions. Whether these laws are better than no new legislation depends on their consequences and a recognition of their limitations.     

Electoral Institutions and Legislative Particularism

How do electoral institutions affect legislative behavior? Though a large body of theoretical scholarship posits a negative relationship between multimember districting and the provision of particularistic goods, empirical scholarship has found little evidence in support of this expectation. Using data on the provision of US post offices from 1876 to 1896, a period during which many states elected congressional representatives from at‐large districts, and a differences‐in‐differences approach, I find that counties represented by at‐large representatives received approximately 8% fewer post offices. The results have important implications for studying how electoral institutions affect incentives for legislative behavior.