Death as a Penalty and the Fantasy of Instant Death

In this essay I take up the question of how death can be a penalty, given that each of us will eventually die. I argue that capital punishment in the United States rests on contradictory demands for painless death delivered humanely through pharmaceuticals and yet denies the accused the possibility of natural death. The death penalty must be at once humane and punishing. Analyzing what we mean by ‘botched’ executions, along with the language of the Supreme Court in upholding lethal injection as a humane application of the death penalty, I argue that the fantasy of instant death is at the heart of the tension between death as painless and death as penalty. In the end, I turn to Derrida’s Death Penalty Seminar Volume One, particularly his discussion of Kant’s defence of the capital punishment, and the pivotal role of time in his discussion. Finally, I suggest that the fantasies of instantaneous death and our technological mastery of it result in the fantasy of the ‘good’ punishing death.     

The moral status of wrongful life claims

A wrongful life action is a claim brought by a disabled child who asserts that but for a physician's negligence he or she would not have been born, thereby being spared the suffering of life. The action is inherently controversial because the alternative to an impaired life is non-existence. Lord Griffiths has described such claims as 'utterly offensive; there should be rejoicing that the hospital's mistake bestowed the gift of life upon the child.' This paper cuts through the rhetoric that the debate has generated and analyses whether there is a sound doctrinal basis for recognizing wrongful life actions.     

The Crime of Aggression before the House of Lords: Chronicle of a Death Foretold

In the days preceding the invasion of Iraq by the Coalitionforces, groups of individuals committed acts of civil disobediencein British military bases to hinder what they thought were unlawfulpreparations for an aggressive war. In R v. Jones et al., theHouse of Lords examined the question of whether individualscan rely upon the alleged prevention of crimes against peaceto justify otherwise unlawful actions under English law. TheLords ruled that the crime of aggression is a crime under customaryinternational law, yet not under English law. This followedfrom the principle that customary crimes cannot be incorporatedinto the English legal system without statutory enactment. Asa result, the appellants could not invoke the ‘Nurembergdefence’ to elude responsibility incurred under domesticlegislation.     

Pain as a fact and heuristic: how pain neuroimaging illuminates moral dimensions of law

In legal domains ranging from tort to torture, pain and its degree do important definitional work by delimiting boundaries of lawfulness and of entitlements. Yet, for all the work done by pain as a term in legal texts and practice, it has a confounding lack of external verifiability. Now, neuroimaging is rendering pain and myriad other subjective states at least partly ascertainable. This emerging ability to ascertain and quantify subjective states is prompting a "hedonic" or a "subjectivist" turn in legal scholarship, which has sparked a vigorous debate as to whether the quantification of subjective states might affect legal theory and practice. Subjectivists contend that much values-talk in law has been a necessary but poor substitute for quantitative determinations of subjective states--determinations that will be possible in the law's "experiential future." This Article argues the converse: that pain discourse in law frequently is a heuristic for values. Drawing on interviews and laboratory visits with neuroimaging researchers, this Article shows current and in-principle limitations of pain quantification through neuroimaging. It then presents case studies on torture-murder, torture, the death penalty, and abortion to show the largely heuristic role of pain discourse in law. Introducing the theory of "embodied morality," the Article describes how moral conceptions of rights and duties are informed by human physicality and constrained by the limits of empathic identification. Pain neuroimaging helps reveal this dual factual and heuristic nature of pain in the law, and thus itself points to the translational work required for neuroimaging to influence, much less transform, legal practice and doctrine.