隐私权:刑事程序基本权

隐私权是宪法权利,亦是刑事程序基本权.隐私权作为刑事程序调整的重要范围,保护着个人对刑法执行至关重要的有罪或者无罪信息的私有,以及对不让政府插手的个人信息的享有.加强刑事领域的隐私权保护,意味着要在政府的规范需要和个人隐私权益上达成大量开放式的司法平衡,对政府操纵背景条件的能力进行有限限制.漠视隐私权的刑事程序比我们想象的更具有事实性的恶果,其对事实结果的影响可能导致一些不良趋势.为此,应关注作为宪法权利的隐私权在刑事诉讼中的属性、价值及作用,加大对我国刑事程序中隐私权的保护.     

Families and future children: the role of rights and interests in determining ethical policy for regulating families

"Rights" and "interests" are key ethical concepts in the debate on the regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology. This article examines some of the ways in which these terms have been used in the debate, concentrating on their application to the situation of the potential children resulting from the technology. The article argues that, while there have been many misuses of these terms by the parties to the often acrimonious debate, nevertheless ethical regulation depends on maintaining the concepts as of central importance, but at the same time clarifying their use.     

Social rights,child rights,discrimination and devolution: untangling the web

Abstract

This article examines judicial reviews of two areas of social security policy and practice in the UK – the household benefit cap and the restriction of bereavement benefits to bereaved spouses and civil partners. While each case ostensibly concerned discrimination against claimants, in practice much of the legal argument centred on the impact on claimants’ children. The judiciary is revealed to be deeply divided on the lawfulness of the acknowledged discrimination. The article considers what lessons can be drawn about the relative weight that ought to be afforded to claimants’ property rights, the best interests of affected children, anti-discrimination provisions and the state’s stated policy imperatives of cost control and administrative convenience. Insights are also sought into whether devolutionary differences can be identified between the approaches of courts in London and Belfast.     

Abortion: Models of responsibility

My focus within the topic of abortion is on several models that are used to support the position that a woman has a responsibility to sustain the fetus she carries because she brought about its existence. I consider the following models: a creator, strict liability, fault, and a contract. Although each of these models has been used by opponents of abortion to support the position that women should accept the consequences of engaging in sexual intercourse, I argue that none of the models is adequate.This paper grew out of research begun during the 1979 Summer Seminar of the National Endowment for the Humanities led by Richard Wasserstrom. He and other participants in the Seminar contributed to my thinking then and commented later on drafts of this paper. Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the Society for Women in Philosophy and to colloquia at California State University, Los Angeles, and the University of California, Santa Cruz. I appreciate the good suggestions made during these discussions. I also want to thank Sharon Bishop, Donald Burrill, E. M. Curley, Barbara Herman, and Miles Morgan for their helpful comments.