Research on the dilemma and improvement of legal regulation for unfair competition related to corporate data in China

Corporate data disputes have been rising rapidly in recent years in China. Courts typically apply the trade secret clause, the Internet clause, and the general clause under the Anti-Unfair Competition Law of PRC to the disputes. However, there are some limitations and problems, including the limited scope of the trade secret clause, the difficulty in interpretation of the Internet clause, and short of sufficient demonstration of the general clause, all leading to the lack of clear rules and guidelines for solving corporate data competition issue. The property nature of corporate data and the business operators’ factual control of the data necessarily require standard legal protection. Corporate data is not the property right, but the property interest protected under the Anti-Unfair Competition Law. For further legal positioning of the corporate data, the paper refers to the trade secret clause’s legislative principles. The paper also learns from the United States and Japan that both information misappropriation rule and newly established ‘shared data with limited access’ provision protect corporate data under their anti-unfair competition law. The paper concludes by providing judicial and legislative suggestions to pave the way for corporate data protection in China. At the judicial level, Chinese courts should clarify the specific application conditions of the general clause. At the legislative level, enacting new legislation ‘data clause’ into the Anti-Unfair Competition Law is necessary to regulate unfair competition behaviors related to corporate data.     

Human-centered legal tech: integrating design in legal education

As the legal profession begins in earnest to deploy digital technology in service and information delivery, greater numbers of law schools are including technology instruction in their curricula. The prospect of more lawyers with digital expertise, while a welcome development, amplifies a parallel imperative that new technology tools be designed to be responsive to evolving human needs. This paper argues that coupling technology instruction with training in human-centered design approaches offers legal educators a means of preparing lawyers not only able to generate novel technology solutions, but able to fundamentally improve legal institutions and programs through those results. The use of design pedagogies within legal education also provides educators and students with the opportunity to reimagine the law as a creative pursuit by exploring structured methods like empathy via observation, prototyping, and the embrace of failure, with learning outcomes that hold the potential to transform how lawyers approach their role. This paper concludes by detailing the insights the NuLawLab has gained in the application of design methodologies in the creation of digital legal resources, and the modifications we are adopting to the approach to produce better results for the legal sector.     

Cost-shifting: the discount dilemma

Cost-shifting, the practice by hospitals of raising their prices to make up for reimbursement shortfalls from payers that do not pay full charges, is an important and controversial issue. Concerns about cost-shifting, particularly its effects on payment equity and cost escalation, have led many insurers, business groups, and legislators to advocate rate-setting regulation for hospitals. This article seeks to clarify the definition of cost-shifting, and quantifies its magnitude in Minneapolis/St. Paul. We believe that cost-shifting is the consequential result of the failure of both public and private payers to structure payment policies that reward cost-effective hospitals, and we outline a market-oriented alternative to rate-setting to address the discount dilemma caused by cost-shifting.     

Elmer's case: A legal positivist replies to Dworkin

Conclusion I have argued that Legal Positivism can accommodate the existence oftheoretical disagreements in law and that Ronald Dworkin is wrongto claim otherwise. As far as Legal Positivists are concerned, evenjudges who differ over both the truth of propositions of law and thegrounds or sources of law can have a legal duty to resolve their dis-agreements on the basis of legal arguments. The duty exists whenconventional legal practice creates it. Moreover, all Anglo-Americanlegal systems impose the duty on judges because all such systemscontain legal practices of the right sort: practices creating expectationsthat cases will be decided on the law even when they raise doubtsabout the content or proper formulation of a rule of recognition.Thus, Elmer's Case poses no threat to Legal Positivism. To the con-trary, it reveals the richness of that theory as few other cases can.Only if Elmer's Case is detached from the context of Anglo-American adjudication can it be said to undermine Legal Positivism.But then no theory of positive law could withstand its challenge.A draft of this essay was presented at a political theory workshop at the University of Chicago. I am grateful for comments received from Russell Hardin, Leo Katz, Steven Fletcher and Thomas Christiano on that occasion. I also thank Steven Walt and Jules Coleman, two of the better dressed philosophers I know.