International,national or local? Explaining the substance of democracy promotion: the case of Eastern European democracy promotion

The EU is one of the most prominent democracy promoters in the world today. It has played an especially important role in the democratization of its Eastern European member states. Given the acknowledged success and legitimacy of EU democracy promotion in these countries, it could be expected that when they themselves began promoting democracy, they would borrow from the EU's democracy promotion model. Yet this paper finds that the EU's model has not played a defining role for the substantive priorities of the Eastern European democracy promoters. They have instead borrowed from their own democratization models practices that they understand to fit the needs of recipients. This article not only adds to the literature on the Europeanization of member state policies but also contributes both empirically and theoretically to the literature on the foreign policy of democracy promotion. The article theorizes the factors shaping the substance of democracy promotion—how important international ‘best practices’ are and how they interact and compete with donor-level domestic models and recipient democratization needs. Also, this study sheds light on the activities of little-studied regional democracy promoters—the Eastern European members of the EU.     

Normative power and organized hypocrisy: European Union member states' arms export to Libya

The 2011 Libyan civil war prompted a reassessment of the normative foundation of the EU's conventional arms export control regime as armaments manufactured in Europe were used by Gaddafi's forces during the war. The EU's foreign policy identity is based, partly, upon a common approach to arms export involving respect for common criteria for export licences. Yet, prior to the civil war, considerable amounts of military equipment had been exported by member states to Libya, notwithstanding grounds for restraint on the basis of several of the criteria. This article traces member states' arms export to Libya during 2005–2010 to explore whether member states favoured restraint or export promotion. It concludes that although aware of the risks of exporting, in a competitive market for military goods, member states sought commercial advantage over restraint, and comprehensively violated export control principles. This casts doubts on assertions of the EU acting as a “normative power”.     

Necessary Illusions: Misperception,Cooperation, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

A significant and growing body of literature related to security regimes focuses on the importance of either common knowledge or common norms to the success of efforts to limit military competition. This paper challenges this central pillar of the arms control literature. Security regimes, in particular arms control regimes, are not necessarily the product of common knowledge, norms, or shared identities. Rather, actors can and sometimes do cooperate because they do not fully understand one another and lack information. In these cases, examples of what I will refer to as “imagined intersubjectivity”—the mistaken belief that two actors share information, norms, and identities when in fact each has an idiosyncratic understanding—the lack of information is crucial for international cooperation. I analyze the record of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty negotiations. Through process-tracing, I will argue that three crucial moments in the negotiation process were premised on a misunderstanding of the position of the other party. The implications for cooperation without intersubjectivity are then explored.     

Enforcing consensus? The hidden bias in EU democracy promotion in Central and Eastern Europe

Democracy is a primary export norm of the European Union (EU). It has also played a key role in the conditionalities that have governed the accession processes of new member states in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The EU has often been accused of offering little guidance regarding the specifics of desirable democracy models and the means of their consolidation. But are these accusations justified? In the first part of this article a detailed examination of European Commission opinions and reports reveals that it has consistently promoted a specific model of democracy in future member states. It shows a strong bias in favour of Lijphart's model of consensus democracy, which is indiscriminately advocated for prospective member states. The second part of the article draws attention to the serious obstacles which exist in the region to the realization of this model. We question the wisdom of the Commission's one-size-fits-all democratic model given these obstacles and the real-life diversity of political contexts in the region.     

Issue linkage across international organizations: Does European countries’ temporary membership in the UN Security Council increase their receipts from the EU budget?

What explains the outcome of interstate negotiations in international organizations (IOs)? While existing research highlights member states’ power, preference intensity, and the IO’s institutional design, this paper introduces an additional source of bargaining power in IOs: Through issue linkage members of an IO leverage privileged positions in other IOs to obtain more favorable bargaining outcomes. Specifically, European Union members are more successful in bargaining over the EU budget while they hold a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Inside the UNSC EU members can promote security interests of other European countries, and they can use their influence to secure side-payments from the EU budget. The study tests this argument by investigating new EU budget data, and it shows that EU members obtain 1.7 billion Euro in additional net receipts during a two-year UNSC term, on average. Thus, bargaining processes in the EU and the UN are intricately linked.     

Rethinking small arms control in Africa: it is time to set an armed violence reduction agenda

Policy-makers and practitioners concerned with small arms control have traditionally focused narrowly on ‘supply-side’ forms of regulation and containment. Concerned that excessive arms availability might destabilise fragile and post-war countries, they typically advance a host of activities such as weapons embargoes, export and import controls, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes and weapons collection schemes. These initiatives often achieve fewer dividends than expected. This article argues for a broader conceptualisation of ‘availability’ that accounts for both supply and demand dimensions. Availability would thus extend from arms production and diverse forms of weapons circulation to the manifold factors shaping acquisition and the multiple ways arms are used and misused. A broad spectrum treatment directly acknowledges the many faces of armed violence and allows for more sophisticated diagnosis, treatment and cure. This article considers how a host of ‘second generation’ armed violence prevention and reduction activities might enhance efforts to promote security in the aftermath of Africa's wars.     

‘We care about you,but …’: the politics of EU trade policy and development

The European Union (EU) is one of the most important markets for developing countries, and trade policy has long been one of its most important instruments for promoting development. There is, however, a paradox at the heart of the relationship between the EU's trade policy and development. On the one hand the EU's trade as development policy has undergone a paradigm shift, the objective shifting from supporting the former colonies of the EU's member states to addressing poverty and with a greater emphasis on reciprocal liberalization. On the other hand, the EU's conventional trade policy initiatives—particularly its market access objectives in the Doha Round and in commercially motivated bilateral trade agreements—have adverse consequences for developing countries, as does its tendency to adopt stringent product regulations. We argue that this paradox is explained by differences in how much traction the emphasis on the development implications of trade has had in the EU's various trade policy subsystems.     

THE EU CODE OF CONDUCT ON ARMS EXPORTS—ENHANCING THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF ARMS EXPORT POLICIES?

Agreed within the institutional framework of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU Code of Conduct for Arms Exports is the most comprehensive regional arms export control regime to date. Adding a European dimension to a policy area traditionally limited to national decision-making raises the question, whether the much debated democratic deficit of the EU applies to the area of arms exports. This article argues that, although the original 1998 document provides for neither public transparency nor parliamentary scrutiny, the Code has effectively led to increased transparency of arms export policies and an enhanced role for parliament.     

The breakdown of the EU’s strategic partnership with Russia: from strategic patience towards a strategic failure

This article investigates the evolution of the European Union (EU)–Russia relationship to understand whether Russia’s violations of Ukraine’s territorial integrity in 2014 destroyed the EU–Russia strategic partnership. It uncovers fundamental differences in three key sectors—security, trade and energy—and regarding the broader design of their contractual relationship. Despite the appearance to the contrary, their relationship was never a well-functioning ‘partnership of choice’. Structural asymmetries contradictory approaches to and fundamentally different understandings of the role and utility of their relationship affected the EU–Russia relationship from the very beginning. The widening gaps were not addressed nor were the differences of the two actors acknowledged, let alone overcome. The confrontation over Ukraine was therefore not the cause but rather a symptom of deeply rooted problems. The blame for talking past each other and engaging in a marriage of convenience, rather than a real partnership, falls on both the EU and the Russian leadership.     

The impact of EU-Enlargement on relations between Europe and East Asia

On 1 May 2004 the European Union’s biggest Enlargement ever materialised when ten countries joined the EU. The new member states—Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia—brought 75 million new citizens into the Union which now comprises a population of 455 million. In spite of the historical importance of EU enlargement, it seems to have raised relatively little interest beyond Europe. This paper tries to narrow the research gap by discussing the most significant implications of EU enlargement for Europe–Asia relations in the areas of general inter-regional (political) links, trade and investment.     

Networked Cooperation: How the European Union Mobilizes Peacekeeping Forces to Project Power Abroad

Abstract

How does the European Union (EU) recruit troops and police to serve in EU peacekeeping missions? This article suggests that pivotal EU member states and EU officials make strategic use of the social and institutional networks within which they are embedded to bargain reluctant states into providing these forces. These networks offer information on deployment preferences, facilitate side-payments and issue-linkages, and provide for credible commitments. EU operations are consequently not necessarily dependent on intra-EU preference convergence—as is often suggested in the existing literature. Rather, EU force recruitment hinges on highly proactive EU actors, which use social and institutional ties to negotiate fellow states into serving in an EU missions.     

A test of European Union post-accession influence: comparing reactions to political instability in Romania

The positive role of the European Union (EU) in the democratization process in post-communist countries has been amply documented. The pre-accession conditionality was to a large extent the tool used to enhance adoption of norms, and implementation of policy. In this context, it is less clear what happens after countries join the EU and conditionality is no longer an option. This article seeks to provide an answer by analysing how the EU can influence democratic governance after accession of a new member state. In particular, it focuses on the reactions of EU actors in two institutional conflicts (the 2007 and 2012 presidential impeachment referendums) in Romania. The main findings indicate how EU leverage on domestic politics remains possible, though the effectiveness of involvement, monitoring and evaluation of respect for democratic principles depends on a complex interaction of international and domestic actors.     

EU–China relations in financial governance: cooperation,convergence or competition?

The global financial crisis (GFC) and subsequent Eurozone sovereign debt crisis (ESDC) have made reform of the global financial governance regime a priority for governments around the world. Prior to the crisis, neoliberal policies agreed between the European Union and the USA created a financial governance regime based on the principle of free operation of the market through the norms of market self-regulation, equal access to the market, and stability via institutional supervision. How will global financial governance look like after these crises? And what role can the EU and China play in shaping this regime? This article argues that as a result of the GFC and the ESDC, stability is becoming a second principle of global financial governance, along with the free operation of the market. Meanwhile, European and Chinese views regarding the norms, rules, and decision-making procedures designed to implement those principles do not differ as much as they used to. Thanks to interactions at the bilateral and multilateral levels, the EU and China now have knowledge regarding how the other understands the role and characteristics that financial governance should have. This is leading to convergence in some areas and cooperation in others. Concurrently, there are also areas of competition. Analysing all of these is essential to understand how global financial governance might evolve, given the central role that the EU and China now play in this regime.     

How can perception help us to understand the dynamic between EU member states? The state of the art

The paper reviews literature on perception within the international relations and the European Union (EU) studies in order to find out whether and how this concept can help us shed some light on the mutual relations between the EU member states. It examines the utilisation of perception as an analytical tool within the international relations where it was predominantly included into the foreign policy analysis approaches (image and role theory). Moreover, it was used for examining the views of the EU by other actors at not only bilateral but also multilateral level. Most studies analysed the perception of Asian countries, however, other areas, including Africa, were studied. Perception was utilised also at the EU level, when it was used for scrutinising different EU policies (foreign and security policies, enlargement), examining preference formation and influence of member states or investigating elite and public support for the European integration. The results show that perception is a valuable concept that can help us to analyse mutual relations between the EU member states in the enlarged and changed EU in several ways.     

The Paradox of Weakness in European Trade Policy: Contestation and Resilience in CETA and TTIP Negotiations

Over the last decade, trade negotiations with Canada and the United States met with considerable resistance from non-governmental organisations (NGO). Moreover, the negotiation mandates given to the European Commission were so broad as to include topics falling under so-called mixed competence of the EU and the member states, necessitating not only ratification by the EU Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, but also member states’ parliaments. At some point, these two factors almost seemed to paralyze the EU as a trade negotiator. In the end, however, the EU concluded an agreement with Canada, renegotiated its agreement with Mexico (while also concluding agreements with Singapore and Japan amongst others), while negotiations with the US were suspended. Three factors can account for this puzzling combination of apparent incapacity and blockage and surprising resilience of EU trade policymaking. First, the NGO contestation campaigns did not muster pan‐European but rather only varying degrees of support. Second, in addition to scrutiny by the European Parliament, consensus decision-making in the Council fosters accommodation of the demands of all member states. This leads to a low degree of negotiating autonomy on the part of the European Commission, yet large bargaining power for the European Union, as long as the other side wants agreement. Finally, a recent ruling by the Court of the EU facilitated the decoupling of agreements on portfolio investment and investment arbitration (one of the most difficult hurdles), from all other matters of trade and regulatory cooperation, making it easier to reach agreement.     

Analysis: (Big) business as usual. Sustainable development,NGOs and UK arms export policy

The UK government claims to exercise a responsible arms export policy and to be committed to considering sustainable development concerns in arms export licensing. Yet in December 2001, it granted BAe Systems a licence for the sale of a £28 million air-traffic-control system to Tanzania, one of the world's poorest countries. This export failed the conditions of UK export guidelines in three major ways. This article explores why the government ignored its commitments, arguing that the relationship between Labour and the arms industry lies at the heart of UK export policy. A critical analysis of the development agenda shows that the issue is not simply to get the government to stick to its declared commitments, difficult as this is, as the neo-liberal development agenda promoted by the Labour government is itself fundamentally flawed. Assessing the effectiveness of NGO activity on UK arms export issues thus requires an interrogation of their vision of sustainable development as well as their critique of government actions.     

The EU–India strategic partnership: neither very strategic,nor much of a partnership

While formally labelled as ‘strategic’, the European Union (EU)–India partnership is more often than not described as ‘lukewarm’ and ‘reluctant’. Thus, by process-tracing the EU–India relationship, this article reveals the significance of 1999 as a crucial point that has urged both Brussels and New Delhi to significantly alter both their outlook on global life and on each other. The bilateral relationship will be shown to be a story of two actors aspiring to global prominence, who—to their mutual frustration—find themselves consigned and constrained to play a leading role only in their respective neighbourhoods. The bilateral relationship seems only to reinforce this marginalization in global affairs, as neither of the strategic partners considers the other significant enough to develop meaningful relations with them.     

EU-oriented bilateralism: evaluating the role of member state embassies in the European Union

The European Union (EU) constitutes an evolving diplomatic milieu characterized by high levels of interconnectedness among the politico-administrative apparatuses of member states. The article assesses whether the continued presence of member state bilateral embassies in the EU is residual and largely emptied of function, or whether they are adapting their role to new requirements in the EU policy environment. An analytical framework is developed conceptualizing diplomatic representation around three variables—function, access and presence—and two scenarios of change dynamics in the structures of bilateral diplomacy in the EU are proposed. These are then utilized to evaluate empirical evidence gathered in embassies of six member states in London and Vienna. The findings reveal a process of gradual ‘re-gearing’ of embassy functions towards EU matters, shifting patterns of communication and access, and ‘domestication’ of diplomatic presence in terms of personnel and agenda. Overall, this amounts to a shift towards EU-oriented bilateralism.     

The External Dimension of EU Counter-Terrorism Relations: Competences,Interests, and Institutions

Some very significant policy developments indicate “supranationalisation processes” of EU external relations in counter-terrorism, even in its most significant relationship with the USA. This means that, increasingly, the USA is willing to work with Europe through its institutionalised forum—the European Union. Thus, the EU achieves certain recognition on the world stage in areas previously completely unsuspected—the “high politics” of counter-terrorism. This supranationalisation process proceeds in two stages. Firstly, the construction of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) pools a significant amount of national sovereignty at the level of the EU through the establishment of internal EU competences. As a side effect, however, it also constructs an institutionalised structure for external actors, such as the U.S., to deal with. Through dealing within this institutional setting, member states' interests become defined in such a way that increasingly they construct a “European” interest related to counter-terrorism.     

Are European Union sanctions “targeted”?

The emergence of targeted sanctions in the mid-1990s was due to the humanitarian impact of embargoes, which were deemed unacceptable and compelled senders to shift to measures designed to affect only wrongdoers. Twenty years on, the present paper considers the extent to which autonomous sanctions are designed to affect those individuals and elites responsible for the behaviour the EU aims to condemn. How faithful has the EU remained to this concept in its sanctions policy? The enquiry scrutinizes diverse practices in three established sanctions strands of the EU, development aid suspensions, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) sanctions and Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) withdrawals. It shows that it has been more faithfully implemented in some strands of EU sanctions than in others. Specifically in the flagship CFSP sanctions practice, the due process motivated court challenges of its blacklists have led the EU to modify selection criteria in a way that renders them potentially less targeted.