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A hospital, while performing its major function of providing health care, is also viewed as a business. It needs capital from a wide variety of sources, many of which are government regulated. Over the past few years, federal expenditures for Medicare have increased dramatically, as has regulation of hospital revenue sources. Congress enacted the Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS) to curb hospital cost inflation. This Note examines historical trends in health care financing and analyzes the Medicare reimbursement system, with emphasis on PPS and its impact on hospital revenues. The Note suggests that hospitals, due to the effects of PPS, will be forced to reduce their levels of financial leverage and will have to look for corporate financial alternatives. PPS may signal a new era in hospital finance. Survival mandates an increased focus on efficient corporate, financial and managerial policies.  相似文献   

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As in many states around the country, health care costs in Massachusetts had risen to an unprecedented proportion of the state budget by the early 1980s. State health policymakers realized that dramatic changes were needed in the political process to break provider control over health policy decisions. This paper presents a case study of policy change in Massachusetts between 1982 and 1988. State officials formulated a strategy to mobilize corporate interests, which were already awakening to the problems of high health care costs, as a countervailing power to the political monopoly of provider interests. Once mobilized, business interests became organized politically and even became dominant at times, controlling both the policy agenda and its process. Ultimately, business came to be viewed as a permanent part of the coalitions and commissions that helped formulate state health policy. Although initially allied with provider interests, business eventually forged a stronger alliance with the state, an alliance that has the potential to force structural change in health care politics in Massachusetts for years to come. The paper raises questions about the consequences of such alliances between public and private power for both the content and the process of health policymaking at the state level.  相似文献   

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"Regulation by litigation" is a recently recognized trend in American legal governance that develops differently in each economic sector it affects. In health care, widespread litigation can be viewed as the product of three partial transformations: incomplete industrialization, incomplete consumerism, and incomplete social solidarity. One can argue that the public turns to the courts because other actors who might exercise judgment and authority to resolve problems appear unreliable. Because litigation has several features at odds with sound health policy--including its cost, its hindsight bias, and its adversarial character--it may be necessary to develop new discretionary institutions to address specific questions that regulators cannot or will not answer.  相似文献   

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When they have addressed highly controversial subjects, the bioethical commissions of the last decade have tended to avoid explaining the ethical justifications for their recommendations. This omission is consistent with the typical preference of policymakers for "muddling through," because it is often possible to reach agreement on specific decisions even when disagreeing sharply on principles. In bioethical policy, this omission of reasons has some special consequences. It allows commission members to ignore "slippery slope" arguments, which are based on the claim that the logic of justification adopted to address the current problem will ultimately lead us to great harms. Case-by-case decision-making--along with the omission of reasons for decisions--will tend to highlight the benefits of innovation, and downplay possible long-term effects that might be ethically upsetting.  相似文献   

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Two of the best-known economic models of hospital behavior are utilized to examine theoretically the issue of cross-subsidization of hospital costs between public and private-pay patients. It is shown that the existence of public/private hospital-charge differentials does not, in itself, demonstrate that public programs are subsidized by the private sector. This differential is to be expected, whether hospitals are considered to be monopolistic profit maximizers or controlled by physicians. While cost-based hospital reimbursement may be dynamically inefficient, it is shown to have certain static efficiency properties when hospitals provide services to both public and private patients.  相似文献   

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Existing accounts of the Clinton health reform efforts of the early 1990s neglect to examine how the change in big business reform interests during the short period between the late 1980s and 1994 might have altered the trajectory of compulsory health insurance legislation in Congress. This article explores evidence that big employers lost their early interest in reform because they believed their private remedies for bringing down health cost inflation were finally beginning to work. This had a discouraging effect on reform efforts. Historical analysis shows how hard times during the Great Depression also aligned big business interests with those of reformers seeking compulsory social insurance. Unlike the present case, however, the economic climate did not quickly improve, and the social insurance reform of the New Deal succeeded. The article speculates, therefore, that had employer health expenditures not flattened out, continuing and even growing big business support might have neutralized small business and other opposition that contributed heavily to the failure of reform. Thus in light of the Clinton administration's demonstrated willingness to compromise with business on details of its plan, some kind of major reform might have succeeded.  相似文献   

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