Public–Private Partnerships in Urban Regeneration: Democratic Legitimacy and its Relation with Performance and Trust

Public-private entities set up specifically to manage and implement urban regeneration projects have been observed across several nations. In these urban regeneration partnerships, public and private partners often work together to improve languishing neighbourhoods. One of the core ideas driving the establishment of these partnerships is that, in order to more effectively tackle the challenging regeneration process, these organisations should function at arm's length from the political institutions that oversee them.

A specific question concerning these partnerships is how representative mechanisms work and how the partnership process is linked to traditional representative bodies or in other ways is connected to principles of democratic legitimacy. This paper explores the so-called democratic legitimacy of urban regeneration companies, as a form of public–private partnership, in more detail. It makes a distinction between three types of democratic legitimacy: accountability, voice, and due deliberation. Using material from a survey among managers of urban regeneration companies (URCs) in The Netherlands, this paper examines the impact of these three forms of democratic legitimacy on outcomes and trust of these URCs.

The results show a fairly strong correlation between some criteria of democratic legitimacy, especially due deliberation on the one hand and performance and trust on the other hand.     

The democratizing impact of governance networks: From pluralization,via democratic anchorage,to interactive political leadership

Initially, governance networks were intended as tools for making public governance more effective. Yet, scholars have argued that governance networks also have the potential to democratize public governance. This article provides an overview of theoretical arguments pertaining to the democratizing impact of governance networks. It claims that the initial celebration of the pluralization of public governance and the subsequent call for a democratic anchorage of governance networks should give way to a new concern for how governance networks can strengthen and democratize political leadership. Tying political leadership to networked processes of collaborative governance fosters ‘interactive political leadership’. The article presents theoretical arguments in support of interactive political leadership, and provides an illustrative case study of a recent attempt to strengthen political leadership through the systematic involvement of elected politicians in local governance networks. The article concludes by reflecting on how interactive political leadership could transform our thinking about democracy.     

Governance Structures and Political Processes in a Public System: Lessons from Quebec

Debates about the form and nature of changes in the management of public systems have for some time now been articulated under the theme of governance. All definitions of governance are related to the problems of securing convergence among a diversity of actors and organizations, of redistributing power in an organizational or social field characterized by a high level of heterogeneity and of gaining sufficient legitimacy to act in the name of the collectivity. This paper concentrates on the dynamics involved in the emergence of new governing capabilities in public systems. More precisely we study the implementation of regionalization policies in the health care field (in this case of Canada) conceived as one major attempt to renew the governance structures in a large public system. Our study draws on the comparative analysis of empirical regulation in three health regions as contrasted with three ideal type models of governance in regionalized systems. The first model is inspired by an economic approach to organizational behaviour and focuses on mandate‐giving, execution and control. The second model is based on a political interpretation of behaviours and focuses on negotiation processes between actors. Finally, the third model is based on the theory of deliberation as well as the institutional school of policy analysis and focuses on direct public participation in public affairs. Evidence for this article is primarily derived from interviews with key informants and documentary analysis. Our analysis shows that none of the three models is sufficient in itself to grant regional structures the authority and legitimacy they need to create added value in terms of regulation that could ensure their survival. Regional Boards are thus forced by environmental constraints to conceive and implement original mixes of these models. The two predominant logics in regional action are inspired by the first two models although the last one also has an influence. Overall, our study also suggests that the implementation of new sources of governing authorities in a public system is rather fragile because of dependence on existing institutions. Clearly, the attempt to modify the dynamics of governance in a given system must be conceived as a political exercise and not just as a technical problem consisting of the rational adjustment of policy instruments.     

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL RATIONALITIES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WATER FRAMEWORK DIRECTIVE IN THE NETHERLANDS

Multi‐level governance, network governance, and, more recently, experimentalist governance are important analytical frameworks through which to understand democratic governance in the EU. However, these analytical frameworks carry normative assumptions that build on functionalist roots and undervalue political dynamics. This can result in a lack of understanding of the challenges that democratic governance faces in practice. This article proposes the analysis of democratic governance from the perspective of multiple political rationalities to correct such assumptions. It analyses the implementation of the Water Framework Directive in the Netherlands as a paradigmatic case study by showing how governmental, instrumental, and deliberative rationalities are at work in each of the governance elements that it introduces. The article concludes by discussing the implications of a perspective of multiple political rationalities for the understanding and promotion of democratic governance in practice.     

MAKING GOVERNANCE NETWORKS EFFECTIVE AND DEMOCRATIC THROUGH METAGOVERNANCE

In response to the growing discrepancy between the steadily rising steering ambitions and the increasing fragmentation of social and political life, governance networks are mushrooming. Governance through the formation of networks composed of public and private actors might help solve wicked problems and enhance democratic participation in public policy-making, but it may also create conflicts and deadlocks and make public governance less transparent and accountable. In order to ensure that governance networks contribute to an effective and democratic governing of society, careful metagovernance by politicians, public managers and other relevant actors is necessary. In this paper, we discuss how to assess the effective performance and democratic quality of governance networks. We also describe how different metagovernance tools can be used in the pursuit of effective and democratic network governance. Finally, we argue that public metagovernors must develop their strategic and collaborative competences in order to become able to metagovern governance networks.     

A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Korean and Japanese Clientelism

Clientele networks are differently structured across nations, depending on the political institutional setup and the configuration of political and social forces. The political institutional setup, which is cross-nationally different, determines where clientele networks are formed, how extensive they are and how long they can persist. The configuration of political and social forces, which varies over time, defines who takes the lead in clientele networks and how effective they are for producing policy effects. A comparison of Korean and Japanese clientelism suggests that the Korean case represents a form of national-level, defensive, non-cumulative and high political-risk clientelism, while the Japanese case illustrates a form of local-level, cumulative and low political-risk clientelism. Korean clientelism is not a copy of the Japanese variant. Based on this analysis, the author suggests that not every social organisation is functional for democratic governance. He also points out that the gradual process of disintegrating clientele networks is on the move.     

DEMOCRATIC SUBJECTIVITIES IN NETWORK GOVERNANCE: A Q METHODOLOGY STUDY OF ENGLISH AND DUTCH PUBLIC MANAGERS

Network forms of governance enable public managers to exercise considerable agency in shaping the institutions through which government interacts with citizens, civil society organizations and business. These network institutions configure democratic legitimacy and accountability in various ways, but little is known about how managers‐as‐designers think about democracy. This Q methodology study identifies five democratic subjectivities. Pragmatists have little concern for democracy. Realists regard networks as one of a number of arenas in which the politics is played out. Adaptors identify the potential for greater inclusiveness. Progressive Optimists think that network governance will fill the gap between the theory and practice of representative democracy, while Radical Optimists focus on its potential for enabling direct dialogue. Institutional design alone is not sufficient to enhance the democratic possibilities of governance networks. The choice of public manager is also salient. Adaptors or, preferably, Progressive or Radical Optimists should be selected for this role.     

How do interest groups legitimate their policy advocacy? Reconsidering linkage and internal democracy in times of digital disruption

The ongoing embrace of interest groups as agents capable of addressing democratic deficits in governing institutions is in large part because they are assumed to contribute democratic legitimacy to policy processes. Nonetheless, they face the challenge of legitimating their policy advocacy in democratic terms, clarifying what makes them legitimate partners in governance. In this article we suggest that digital innovations have disrupted the established mechanisms of legitimation. While the impact of this disruption is most easily demonstrated in the rise of a small number of ‘digital natives’, we argue that the most substantive impact has been on more conventional groups, which typically follow legitimation logics of either representation or solidarity. While several legacy groups are experimenting with new legitimation approaches, the opportunities provided by technology seem to offer more organizational benefits to groups employing the logic of solidarity, and appear less compatible with the more traditional logic of representation.     

China's Labyrinth: The Rise of Monitory Democracy

The new element in governance is social media. Inexorably, its fertile networks of shared information shift power from authorities to citizens and amateurs, including to the “unknown” experts in the “dorm rooms and edges of society” who drive innovation. Tweets may bust trust and undermine authority, but can social media also be a tool for building consensus through deliberation and negotiation among interests? When it comes to governance, is crowd‐sourcing any better than populism at generating collective intelligence instead of disruptive “dumb mobs?” Can networks aid the self‐administration of society, or does that take institutions with governing authority? In this section, leading Silicon Valley entrepreneurs, technologists and network theorists from Google, Microsoft and the MIT Media Lab join with political scientist Francis Fukuyama and top thinkers from Asia to address these issues.     

The Right to Connect and Internet Censorship

The new element in governance is social media. Inexorably, its fertile networks of shared information shift power from authorities to citizens and amateurs, including to the “unknown” experts in the “dorm rooms and edges of society” who drive innovation. Tweets may bust trust and undermine authority, but can social media also be a tool for building consensus through deliberation and negotiation among interests? When it comes to governance, is crowd‐sourcing any better than populism at generating collective intelligence instead of disruptive “dumb mobs?” Can networks aid the self‐administration of society, or does that take institutions with governing authority? In this section, leading Silicon Valley entrepreneurs, technologists and network theorists from Google, Microsoft and the MIT Media Lab join with political scientist Francis Fukuyama and top thinkers from Asia to address these issues.     

Democracy and the Smart Mob

The new element in governance is social media. Inexorably, its fertile networks of shared information shift power from authorities to citizens and amateurs, including to the “unknown” experts in the “dorm rooms and edges of society” who drive innovation. Tweets may bust trust and undermine authority, but can social media also be a tool for building consensus through deliberation and negotiation among interests? When it comes to governance, is crowd‐sourcing any better than populism at generating collective intelligence instead of disruptive “dumb mobs?” Can networks aid the self‐administration of society, or does that take institutions with governing authority? In this section, leading Silicon Valley entrepreneurs, technologists and network theorists from Google, Microsoft and the MIT Media Lab join with political scientist Francis Fukuyama and top thinkers from Asia to address these issues.     

Yin and Yang: Sina Weibo and the Chinese State

The new element in governance is social media. Inexorably, its fertile networks of shared information shift power from authorities to citizens and amateurs, including to the “unknown” experts in the “dorm rooms and edges of society” who drive innovation. Tweets may bust trust and undermine authority, but can social media also be a tool for building consensus through deliberation and negotiation among interests? When it comes to governance, is crowd‐sourcing any better than populism at generating collective intelligence instead of disruptive “dumb mobs?” Can networks aid the self‐administration of society, or does that take institutions with governing authority? In this section, leading Silicon Valley entrepreneurs, technologists and network theorists from Google, Microsoft and the MIT Media Lab join with political scientist Francis Fukuyama and top thinkers from Asia to address these issues.     

SELF‐SERVICE SOCIETY: PARTICIPATIVE POLITICS AND NEW FORMS OF GOVERNANCE

The purpose of this paper is to identify ‘participative politics' and what is here called ‘self‐service politics' as distinct political themes in many advanced democracies, in order to investigate their main elements and chart their interrelationships. These two themes are examined from the viewpoint of politicization and depoliticization tendencies. Participative politics consists of three main forms, defined as active citizenship, citizen networks and co‐production. Self‐service politics, in turn, connects each of these forms to a larger political transformation by pitting themes of activating politics, social governance and accountability against them. The paper investigates what bearing participative politics, and self‐service politics as its inevitable attendant, have on the sphere of democratic deliberation.     

Civil Society’s Claims to Political Representation in Brazil

Civil society is laying claim to political representation in contemporary democracies, destabilizing long-standing ideas about democratic legitimacy. The participatory governance structures that have emerged alongside classic institutions of representative democracy encompass not only direct citizen participation but also political representation by civil society actors. Using original data from São Paulo, Brazil, we show that most of civil society actors that work for the urban poor claim political representation of their “constituency.” Theirs is more often than not an “assumed representation,” we suggest, because our data show that most lack formal members and do not select leaders through elections. Civil society actors (in contrast to political parties and labor unions) lack historically settled and politically sanctioned mechanisms to authorize and hold accountable their representation. This new layer of political representatives therefore faces a historic challenge—constructing novel notions of democratic legitimacy that can support their forms of representation. We examine what new notions of representations are emerging and trace the historic roots of the most widespread and promising that focus on remedying inequality in access to the state.     

A political economy for social movements and revolution: popular media access,power and cultural hegemony

Abstract

One key marker of mass social movements transitioning to participatory democratic governance is popular media access. This essay argues that democratic media access by public constituencies becomes a site for constructing social revolution and simultaneously a manifest empirical measure of the extent of democratic participation in the production, distribution, and use of communication with new cultural possibilities. The participatory production practices (with citizens producing and hosting their own programs) and the democratic content (of oral histories, local issues, critiques of government and business, and everyday vernacular) reflect the hegemony of emerging ‘Bolivarian’ twenty-first century socialism expressed as popular participation in media production. Bolstered by constitutional changes and public funding, popular social movements of civil society, indigenous, women, and working class organizations have gained revolutionary ground by securing in practice the right of media production. Findings indicate that public and community media (that move beyond alternative sites of local expression and concerns) provide a startling revolutionary contrast to the commercial media operations in every nation. Popular media constructions suggest a new radically democratic cultural hegemony based on human solidarity with collective, participatory decision-making and cooperation offering real possibilities and experiences for increased equality and social justice.     

The circulation of public officials in a fragmented system: Urban governance networks in Paris

Fragmentation and specialization—two characteristics of governance—have increased the number and variety of actors involved in the governing process, which can influence policy outcomes and legitimacy. To date, studies on governance or policy networks usually focus on one policy field and one moment in time. In this article, we analyse the dynamic aspect, thus how governance networks change over time, and examine whether the fragmentation and specialization of the governance system is mirrored in the circulation of public officials. Our case is the urban governance system of the Paris region, which is characterized by high fragmentation along policy fields and territory. The data show that Paris is governed by three sub‐systems that largely correspond to the different territorial levels of governance, but also to different types of organizations. Generally, territorial fragmentation seems to be stronger than policy field fragmentation. This structure is quite stable across time.     

Why was democracy lost in Russia's regions? Lessons from Nizhnii Novgorod

The phenomenon of crony capitalism has been explored primarily with reference to its impact on economic growth. This study investigates the political implications of crony capitalism and, specifically, the interaction between political competition and crony capitalism. Based on a case study of a political trajectory in one of the regions of the Russian Federation, I argue that under crony capitalism political competition can undermine the legitimacy of state authorities and such democratic institution as the electoral mechanism. Played out in public during the electoral campaigns unrestricted political competition uncovers the predatory nature of crony elites engaged in struggle for power and wealth and increases public perceptions of corruption.     

Legitimacy‐Building in the Macau special administrative region: Colonial legacies and reform strategies

The retrocession of Macau to Mainland China's sovereignty since December 20, 1999 has initiated an unprecedented process of legitimacy‐building in the new Special Administrative Region. The Chief Executive, Edmund Ho, has implemented a multiplicity of reform strategies for the sake of consolidating his legitimacy. The twilight of the Portuguese colonial era was plagued by a rapid deterioration in law and order and the persistence in public maladministration, thus weakening the departing colonial regime's performance legitimacy seriously. As such, the political environment was conducive to Ho's herculean efforts at establishing his performance legitimacy. While the new Chief Executive's procedure legitimacy was enhanced by his election from an Election Committee composed of political elites, Ho's performance legitimacy has been buttressed by depoliticisation, economic development, civil service reforms, and new constitutional conventions. The abolition of the Municipal Councils in 2000 ran the risk of delegitimising the Ho regime. Yet, such delegitimisation was by no means serious given the relatively weak political opposition. Still, in the face of a more active and assertive citizenry, political reforms will have to be pondered and implemented by the post‐colonial regime in Macau. It will be necessary for the Macau government to utilise democratic reforms in a bid to preempt the increasingly vociferous demands for more participatory channels. The case of Macau corroborates the existence of a dialectical process of legitimisation, which has been strengthened mainly by depoliticisation and economic development, and delegitimisation, which is looming in the midst of a steadily growing political activeness on the part of the Macau people.     

Unveiling patterns of contestation over Better Regulation reforms in the European Union

Regulatory reforms labelled ‘Better Regulation’ are a prominent item on the political agendas of most advanced democracies and the European Union. Governments adopt Better Regulation measures to strengthen their democratic legitimacy and increase their regulatory and economic effectiveness. Notwithstanding their rhetorical appeal, their design and implementation are susceptible to high levels of political contestation. We therefore ask: are there systematic differences in stakeholders’ demands for what Better Regulation should achieve? What explains these differences? We argue that conflict over Better Regulation is rooted in what stakeholders prefer as a regulatory system of governance. Stakeholders demand reforms that lead to one of the following three scenarios: deregulation, technocratic or participatory policy‐making. We examine stakeholders’ demands expressed in the EU. We find that national authorities responsible for coordinating Better Regulation and cross‐sectoral business organizations support deregulatory and technocratic reforms. Business and public interest organizations are equally supportive of strengthening participatory policy‐making.