Volatility in Electoral Support for United Russia: Cross-Regional Variations in Putin’s Electoral Authoritarian Regime

Abstract

Grounded in the main theoretical approaches to the study of electoral volatility, this article examines cross-regional variations in the levels of volatility for United Russia (UR) in Duma elections over the period 2003–2016, which are juxtaposed with the level of volatility for the Kremlin’s candidates in presidential elections. The main finding is that ‘regime type’ or, more precisely, ‘authoritarianism’ is the key explanatory variable. Stronger authoritarian rulers are able to control regional elites and ensure the best results for UR by exerting administrative pressure on voters. This reduces the level of volatility in support for UR. At the same time, economic and institutional explanations have a partial significance. Here, Duma elections differ from presidential elections, which demonstrate a much lower degree of volatility; in addition, economic factors appear insignificant.     

Legitimising Victories: Electoral Authoritarian Control in Russia’s Gubernatorial Elections

We explore the evolution of the Kremlin’s election control strategy in response to the reintroduction of gubernatorial elections in 2012. Our analysis focuses on the evolution of four tools used to engineer electoral competition: auxiliary institutions, subnational punishment regimes, ballot construction, and turnout manipulation. We argue that election managers deploy these mechanisms to maximise victories for state-sponsored candidates while minimising the possibility for post-election protest. The analysis demonstrates that electoral manipulation presents conflicting incentives for the Kremlin and its regional officials. It also shows the critical role that Russia’s systemic opposition plays in the electoral management system and regime stability.     

Plus ça change: Electoral law reform and the 2008 Romanian parliamentary elections

Romania reformed the law governing its parliamentary elections between 2004 and 2008, shifting from a complex proportional representation system based on county-level party lists to a complex uninominal system in which each district for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate elects one representative. The change in law emerged after more than a year of heated political controversies, including partisan and personal animosity between President Basescu and Prime Minister Tariceanu, a failed attempt at impeachment, a deadlocked special electoral commission, a failed popular referendum, an unfavorable constitutional court ruling, and a confusing final accord brokered under deadline. Qualitative comparison of the 2004 and 2008 laws reveals that the heralded reform merely added an additional layer of calculation to the previous electoral system. Quantitative analysis using counterfactual estimation reveals that the new law had absolutely zero effect on the partisan outcome. In the conclusion, we explore the implications of these findings for Romanian politics and the politics of electoral reform more generally.     

The Influence of Direct Democracy on Political Interest,Electoral Turnout and Other Forms of Citizens’ Participation in Swiss Municipalities

Based on the data of a survey conducted among Swiss municipalities, this article inquires into the relationship between different institutional settings of local democracy and the amount of political interest of citizens as well as electoral participation and new forms of citizen participation like participatory planning or local agenda 21. The study identifies six distinct settings of local democracy in Switzerland, ranging from pure direct democracy to representative democracy. The analysis shows that the institutional setting of local democracy has no impact on the political interest of the citizens. It also reveals that instruments of direct democracy do not significantly weaken representative democracy as far as electoral participation is concerned. New forms of citizen participation are predominantly used alongside with means of direct democracy.     

Principal–Agent Dynamics and Electoral Manipulation: Local Risks,Patronage and Tactical Variation in Russian Elections, 2003–2012

Abstract

Why are some elections manipulated more severely than others, and why do the techniques used to manipulate them vary over time and space? This article addresses these related questions by showing that patronage resources—not incumbent popularity—make manipulation appealing to frontline agents, while local political conditions can make manipulation personally risky for them. Agents can mitigate these risks by adopting more dispersed forms of manipulation like vote-buying, rather than more centralised falsification. These hypotheses are tested using forensic analysis of electoral data from more than 90,000 precincts per election across Russia’s 83 regions, from 2003 to 2012.     

Electoral discourse analysis of state foreign policy development: exploring the party politicization of the Commonwealth in UK Westminster elections 1945–2010

This paper focuses on the policy discourse of the Commonwealth in Wales, UK general election manifestos 1945–2010. It reveals party politicization in the immediate post-war period underpinned by contrasts in policy framing and a Left–Right cleavage spanning a range of issues including immigration and development. A significant post-1970 decline in salience is shown to be accompanied by a shift from substantive to symbolic policy-making and cross-party convergence around residual policy frames whereby the Commonwealth is used to evoke past influence and a normative vision of international governance. This has wider significance for the present electoral discourse approach provides a transferable methodology to inform understanding of party dynamics and policy framing in the formative stage of international relations policy-making.