Pulling the Strings: An Analysis of Informal Local Power Structures in Three Dutch Cities

Recent reform trends in local government ‘constitution’ have aimed at invigorating local democracy by strengthening local executive powers and making political leadership more visible through direct mayor elections. However, observers still tend to paint a gloomy picture of local democracy in contexts where reforms have been implemented. This article evaluates the notion of marginalised local democracy by adopting mandate theory. A data set on Norwegian mayors and deputy mayors provides evidence that mayors elected by the council are more confident in their own success regarding fulfilment of pre-election announcements than deputy mayors are. The mayoral advantage disappears if the mayor is directly elected. Regarding implementation of idiomatic party policy, political cohesion between the mayor and the deputy mayor (coalition or party conjunction) increases the confidence of both. Yet, cohesion does not increase confidence in fulfilling pre-election announcements, thus suggesting a rupture between issues emphasised in campaigns to local election and idiomatic party policy. While results are unfavourable to direct mayor elections, they do not otherwise support the gloomy picture of marginalised local democracy.     

Forming community councils East Kilbride

The principle of directly elected mayors forms a key part of the Labour government's strategy to modernise local democracy and strengthen accountability. First applied to London, the government has sought to extend the institution, allowing local referendums to determine whether the public favours the principle or not. This article examines the state of public opinion regarding elected mayors before reporting on the outcome of referendums held since the 2001 general election. We then consider the results of mayoral elections, specifically addressing issues of electoral participation, legitimation and partisan support. In conclusion, we consider whether its experience with both referendums and mayoral elections may have affected the government's enthusiasm for further expansion of this institution across the local government system.     

Exploring the limits of institutional change: The direct election of mayors in Western Europe

The process of local institutional reform that different Western European countries underwent starting in the 1990s converged towards the direct election of mayors in Italy, England, Austria and Germany. Using a comparative analysis of those countries and including in it Belgium and the Netherlands (where the introduction of directly elected mayors is planned) and Greece and Portugal (with a long tradition of it), the article examines why countries with such different municipal traditions have tended towards the same institutional solution. The answer runs through the text implicitly: the institutional tradition of each country appears to have a greater capacity for explaining the outcome of the reform rather than isomorphism in the introduction of the direct election of mayors.     

The impact of scale on management structures and processes

This paper advances the conjecture that the shift to a direct election of mayors in Israel, a most significant step towards recognising local authorities as political entities in their own right, has prevented further progress in the same direction. Hirschman's ‘getting stuck syndrome’ is used here to explore this paradox. Since a highly centralised system is not compatible with a ‘strong mayor system’, there developed an ingenious scheme — ’de facto decentralisation’ — a peculiar blend of formal ‘agency’ relationship, informal ‘partnership’ and ‘grey‐area’ autonomy. This scheme persists apparently because it is well suited to a world of ambiguous and conflicting imperatives.     

How do mayors get elected? The causal effects of pre-electoral coalitions on mayoral election outcomes in Indonesia

ABSTRACT

What determines the election of mayors? The extent to which pre-electoral coalitions (PECs) influence mayoral election outcomes has not yet been subject to empirical analysis, despite the question’s fundamental theoretical and practical relevance. This note uses regression discontinuity methods to identify the causal effects of PECs on mayoral election results in Indonesia. The study finds that candidates backed by PECs comprising political parties that control council seat shares exceeding first-round mayoral electoral vote thresholds are 14–18 percentage points more likely to win those elections than their counterparts supported by smaller-sized PECs. The analysis determines that PECs are especially helpful in getting non-incumbent candidates elected, although they have no apparent impact on incumbents’ electoral success. PECs can assist candidates in gaining office, therefore, but they are established under corrupt conditions. Ultimately, governance issues surrounding the formation and functioning of PECs impose significant constraints on the development of local democracy in Indonesia.     

Private administration of a public function: The news election service

The United States government has no elections office and does not attempt to administer congressional and presidential elections. The responsibility for the administration of elections and certification of winners in the United States national elections rests with the states. The states divide election administration responsibilities between state and local election officials, whose objective is an efficiently administered honest election, with the ballots correctly tabulated. The formal structure of election administration in the United States is not capable of providing tirely results of the presidential and congressional election. Similar structural difficulties in other policy areas often result in ad hoc operating agreements or informal cooperation among agencies at different levels of the federal system. In the case of election administration, however, the public officials have abdicated responsibility for election night aqgregation of the national Vote totals to a private organization, News Election Service, which is owned by five major news organizations. This private organization performs without a contract, without public compensation, and without supervision by public officials. It makes decisions concerning its duties according to its own criteria. The questions of responsibility and accountability have not arisen in part because of the private organization's performance record and in part because the responsibility was assumed gradually over a lengthy period without ever being evaluated as an item on the public agenda.     

New localism or fuzzy centralism: policymakers’ perceptions of public education and involvement in education

This research examines local authority involvement in education as a function of local policymakers’ perceptions of education as a public service – namely, whether public education is for the benefit of society as a whole, or for individual students and parents. Perceptions of education and involvement in education were assessed through 107 questionnaires returned by mayors and heads of local education departments in Israel. The results show that (1) local policymakers tend to perceive public education as a general public service, and (2) the relationship between this perception and involvement in education varies with the locality’s centre-periphery status. In peripheral localities, perceiving education as a general public service and an understanding of ‘society’ as the local community leads to greater involvement in education. In central localities, involvement rose with a more individualised perception. Implications of the findings are discussed in line with viewing education in the spirit of new localism.     

Efficiency over generosity? Evidence of electoral accountability from typhoon dayoff in Taiwan

ABSTRACT

Even though voters may irrationally blame the incumbent for natural disasters, democratic accountability can still hold if voters also reward the government for good responses. This article approaches the response-reward question by exploring the election impact of typhoon dayoff decisions in Taiwan. County mayors are responsible for deciding the dayoffs before a typhoon, so voters can easily and immediately observe the quality of the mayor's decision and fully attribute the outcome to him. Results combining 2005–2014 weather, election, and ten survey datasets show that a correct dayoff, which a dayoff was announced and the storm was tomorrow is harmfully strong, can significantly increase the incumbent's vote share. The effect is larger in the election year. Meanwhile, Taiwanese voters also slightly reward the incumbent for a bonus dayoff, which the storm is unexpectedly weak. Evidence also shows that mayors exploit the incumbent advantage by announcing more correct and bonus dayoffs.     

Why Do Non-partisans Challenge Parties in Local Politics? The (Extreme) Case of Poland

The article concentrates on recent successes of non-partisans (independents) in Polish local government. A majority of mayors and councillors remains unaffiliated with any party—in this respect Poland is an outlier among European countries. The article examines both the factors determining the cross-national variation in the level of local government partyness and those causing the differences between the municipalities. The analyses of local elections held in 2006 and 2010 demonstrate that non-partisans' successes are primarily due to the previous election results (the advantage of incumbency); a possible ‘partisan offensive’ to colonise new resources in local politics is sluggish.     

An Empirical Typology of Local Government Systems in Eastern Europe

The most widely used typologies of European local government systems are based on research conducted in the 1980s. The most popular are those of Page and Goldsmith (1987), distinguishing between Northern and Southern European systems, and Hesse and Sharpe (1991), distinguishing between Southern, Northern and Anglo-Saxon models. The rare attempts to include the Eastern part of the continent are far from comprehensive or satisfactory. They usually view the whole region as a distinct group, referring to its specific historical background and recent radical decentralisation (Bennett 1993, Heinelt and Hlepas 2006). Disappointingly, the same approach is presented in the most recent comprehensive analysis of European local government systems (Loughlin et al. 2010). This article tries to fill the gap produced by this simplification, by offering a comprehensive picture of the variation within the Eastern European region and suggesting a first attempt at a typology of around 20 countries of the region. The criteria for this typology refers to those used in earlier classifications of the Western European systems and include: (i) territorial organisation and tiers of elected local governments, (ii) scope of functions provided by local governments (functional decentralisation), (iii) financial autonomy, (iv) horizontal power relations within local government institutions (election systems and relationships between mayors and councils).     

The reformists: Kalahi and the performances of local government officials in Bohol,Philippines

To make sense of the gap between the theory and practice of community-driven development (CDD), development scholars and practitioners have proposed that the success of interventions is relative to the reform-mindedness of local government officials. This article sheds some light on the good governance performances of local government officials as part of the CDD programme Kalahi in the province of Bohol, Philippines. It highlights that locally, mayors who styled themselves as reformists enjoyed heightened power and electoral victories. In parallel, the province experienced a pattern of ‘growth with immiserisation’ and persistent political clientelism wrapped in a discourse of pro-poor development.     

Recasting Leadership Reform in Australian Local Government: A Typology from Political Theory

Changes to elected leadership in Australian local government have seen greater authority assigned to mayors in several jurisdictions. A Discussion Paper recently released under the auspices of the Australian Centre for Excellence in Local Government (ACELG) has recommended further reforms, arguing inter alia that mayors ought to enjoy a personal mandate and a stronger strategic role. This paper places these suggested reforms into context by developing a typology of local government leadership from political theory. We argue that this quadrilateral typology provides a critical portrait of recommendations for stronger leadership which, in this instance, have been transposed from two unitary systems of government (England and New Zealand) to the Australian federal system, without due consideration of the literature examining stronger mayoral roles. It is argued that caution should be exercised when redrafting legislation governing mayoral authority, a process presently underway in New South Wales (NSW).     

Elected Mayors: Leading Locally?

The directly elected executive mayor was introduced to England a decade ago. Drawing inspiration from European and American experience, the elected mayor appealed to both New Labour and Conservative commentators in offering a solution to perceived problems of local leadership. There was a shared view that governance of local areas was failing and that elected mayors were the answer. The first local referendums were held in 2001. Most have continued to reject the idea of the elected mayor. During 2012, the coalition government initiated 10 further mayoral referendums in England’s largest cities but only one, Bristol, opted for an elected mayor. Overall, there is no evidence of widespread public support, yet the prospect of more mayors – with enhanced powers – remains firmly on the policy agenda.

Drawing from a decade of research, this paper considers reasons for the persistence of the mayoral experiment, the importance of local factors in the few areas where mayors hold office and the link to current policy debates. Using the authors’ analytical leadership grid, this paper links the governmental, governance and allegiance roles of mayors to the problematic nature of local leadership. It then draws tentative conclusions about the strange case of the elected mayor in England.     

IMPLEMENTING WELFARE REFORM IN MICHIGAN: THE ROLE OF STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRATS[1]

ABSTRACT

This study examines the implementation of welfare reform policies enacted by the state of Michigan. In particular, it focuses on how welfare policy is altered as it devolves from state policy makers to street-level bureaucrats in three local welfare agencies in Michigan. The analysis reveals that street-level bureaucrats in local welfare offices are in a position to interpret broadly stated goals handed down from officials, and, in some cases, to manage and greatly influence the delivery of services when messages are mixed. The study also suggests that the actual policies or services delivered by front-line workers in welfare offices do not completely correspond with the policy directives issued by state officials.     

Directly Elected Mayors: A Tonic for Local Governance or Old Wine in New Bottles?

The introduction of directly elected mayors into the landscape of English local politics has the potential to change the dynamics of local political leadership and the relationship between citizens and local government. The paper explores whether the conditions exist locally for such potential to be realised. It focuses on the reaction to the mayoral experiment of both mayors and the councillors that sit on mayoral authorities, as it is the reactions of the latter, as well as the actions of the former, that indicate the success or failure of mayoral governance. The paper also assesses the way in which political parties and party groups have accommodated the mayoral experiment and changed or maintained patterns of political behaviour and organisation.     

Is Local Development Good Politics? Local Development Expenditures and the Re-Election of Governors in the Philippines in the 1990s

Abstract

Are incumbent governors who put more weight on development spending likely to be re-elected? To answer this question, an economic model of a re-electionist local chief executive is introduced and validated with a panel data of provincial governors who ran for another term of office during the election years 1992, 1995 and 1998 in the Philippines. It is found that incumbent governors improve their re-election chances with higher spending on economic development services, other things being constant. Moreover, governors who are members of political clans also have higher development spending especially when faced with rival clans. Thus, elections are still an effective disciplining device, more especially when rivalry is intense among political clans. The policy implication then is to enhance political competition rather than just ban political dynasties to improve the performance of elected officials under decentralization.     

ELECTED MAYORS: LESSON DRAWING FROM FOUR COUNTRIES

Countries can and sometimes do copy the institutions and practices of other countries in order to address problems and issues that they have in common with them. The office of directly elected mayor has become an increasingly common feature of local government throughout the developed democracies, spreading from its largely American origins to a range of European states. This paper develops a matrix for the analysis of elected mayors in different countries using as its horizontal axis the formal, informal and individual attributes of elected mayors and, on the vertical axis, their governmental, governance and allegiance roles. The matrix is then applied to analyse studies of elected mayors in four countries: the United States, England, Germany and Greece, in an attempt to derive comparative lessons applicable to the countries included in the analysis, as well as to countries considering or in the process of developing directly elected executive mayors. The issues examined include improving the internal co‐ordination of local authorities’ departments, the need for network management in increasingly fragmented or ‘hollowed out’ local government systems and the ways in which mayors attempt to secure their political survival and that of the offices they hold, by securing and retaining the allegiance of voters and stakeholders. It also explores the benefits and dangers of concentrating much formal power and informal influence in a single pair of hands. Its conclusions are offered both to demonstrate ways in which comparative studies of political institutions can be developed and in the hope that they may be of use to mayors and those concerned with the development and reform of local government and governance.     

Friends or Foes? Nonstate Public Goods Providers and Local State Authorities in Nondemocratic and Transitional Systems

Ordinary citizens often welcome nonstate provision of public goods and social welfare, but government officials, particularly in nondemocratic and transitional systems, may view nonstate actors as political competitors. Drawing on a combination of qualitative and quantitative data from rural China, this paper finds that some kinds of nonstate participation in public goods and social welfare provision can actually make local officials more optimistic about their ability to implement state policies and elicit citizen compliance. Local officials often believe that coproduction of public goods and services with community groups in particular, often with community actors taking the lead, can build trust and social capital that can spill over into increased citizen compliance with state demands, a central element of state capacity. Simply increasing levels of public goods provision, however, is not associated positively with optimistic perceptions of local state authority and capacity. Moreover, other forms of nonstate participation such as coproduction between private businesses and local officials or substitutive provision by nonstate actors have less potential for building trust between officials and citizens and are not seen by officials as beneficial for increasing citizen compliance.     

Size and Local Democracy: the Case of Czech Municipal Representatives

The municipal structure of the Czech Republic experienced a wave of fragmentation after the fall of the communist regime. As a result, most Czech municipalities today have populations of only a few hundred inhabitants. This situation creates specific conditions for the democratic functioning of local representative bodies. In this paper we focus on two features of Czech local government. First, we deal with electoral competitiveness in Czech municipalities; second, we analyse councillors' accountability to voters, their readiness to stand for re-election and their electoral success in successive elections. Based on an analysis of data on individual candidates and elected councillors in four successive terms, we demonstrate that the willingness to stand for election and re-election does not decrease over time; however, the choice among different candidates is limited in the smallest municipalities. Thus, the data show a reduced willingness to stand for re-election and an extraordinarily high chance of re-election in smaller municipalities. This finding weakens the general assumption about higher accountability of elected officials in small municipalities. On a more general level, we conclude that Czech local government has some features of small political systems with infrequent occurrence of major election conflicts.     

Independent Mayors and Local Lists in Large Polish Cities: Towards a Non-partisan Model of Local Government?

The enormous success of local independent lists and independent mayors in Poland suggests it is important to examine their distinctive features, analyse the place they occupy in local politics, and explore the model of local government they encourage. This paper deals with these topics by investigating some extreme cases of non-partisanship at the local level. Research was conducted in three arbitrarily chosen Polish cities governed by independent mayors and dominated by independent lists in the local legislatures. Mixed quantitative and qualitative methods were used: a survey among city councillors; and individual key-informant interviews (IDI). Non-partisans appear to be a separate category of local politicians, different in terms of their views on politics. They explain their non-partisanship using anti-partisan, historical or tactical justifications. It seems that non-partisanship can be a means of institutionalising a particular manner of understanding and engaging in politics. Local lists organised by independent mayors are informal, concentrating on the leader and performing only some of the traditional functions of parties. This paper demonstrates that, due to the vague nature of the links between local politicians and their administration, independent councillors may serve only as a ‘democratic addition’ to a local administration headed by a skilful manager.