Forming community councils East Kilbride

The principle of directly elected mayors forms a key part of the Labour government's strategy to modernise local democracy and strengthen accountability. First applied to London, the government has sought to extend the institution, allowing local referendums to determine whether the public favours the principle or not. This article examines the state of public opinion regarding elected mayors before reporting on the outcome of referendums held since the 2001 general election. We then consider the results of mayoral elections, specifically addressing issues of electoral participation, legitimation and partisan support. In conclusion, we consider whether its experience with both referendums and mayoral elections may have affected the government's enthusiasm for further expansion of this institution across the local government system.     

Electoral Rules,Political Competition and Fiscal Expenditures: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Brazilian Municipalities

We exploit a discontinuity in the rules of Brazilian mayoral elections to investigate whether political competition has a causal impact on fiscal policy choices. In municipalities with fewer than 200,000 voters, mayors are elected under a plurality voting system. In all other municipalities, a runoff election takes place between the top two candidates if neither achieves the majority of votes. Our results suggest that political competition induces more investment and less current expenditures, particularly personnel expenditures. The impact is larger when incumbents can run for re-election, suggesting incentives matter insofar as incumbents can themselves remain in office.     

Do the illegal and legal rents of politicians affect municipal election outcomes? Empirical evidence

This paper aims to analyse whether illegal (corruption) and legal rent extraction (high politicians’ wages) affect electoral outcomes at municipal level. We use an initial sample of 145 Spanish municipalities over 50,000 for two electoral periods: 2004–2007 (before the crisis) and 2008–2011 (during the crisis). Our findings show that neither illegal nor legal rent extraction impact on re-election in non-crisis times. However, we observe that citizens penalize legal rent extraction in the ballots during the crisis. Regarding the economic performance of the local governments, we find that its effect on re-election is important in non-crisis period. Nevertheless, in time of crisis, given that the economic situation is bad in general in the country, voters pay less attention to economic factors and focus on politicians’ behaviour.     

How do municipal amalgamations affect turnout in local elections? Insights from the 2015 municipal reform in the Austrian state of Styria

In this paper, we evaluate the effect of municipal amalgamations on election turnout in local elections. Following recent studies, we argue that municipal mergers can lead to less information about the election being made available to citizens and less influence for individual voters. That is, while citizens in the local context usually rely on their own direct contacts in local offices and among political candidates, the subsequent increase in population size due to a merger reduces opportunities for establishing such contacts and for having decisive influence on political decisions. Consequently, voters are less informed and less engaged, resulting in lower levels of electoral turnout in local elections. We test our argument empirically by using aggregate level data from the municipal level from the 2010 and 2015 local elections in Styria, Austria, which followed the amalgamation of some, but not all, municipalities in January 2015. The empirical results support our argument.     

How do mayors get elected? The causal effects of pre-electoral coalitions on mayoral election outcomes in Indonesia

ABSTRACT

What determines the election of mayors? The extent to which pre-electoral coalitions (PECs) influence mayoral election outcomes has not yet been subject to empirical analysis, despite the question’s fundamental theoretical and practical relevance. This note uses regression discontinuity methods to identify the causal effects of PECs on mayoral election results in Indonesia. The study finds that candidates backed by PECs comprising political parties that control council seat shares exceeding first-round mayoral electoral vote thresholds are 14–18 percentage points more likely to win those elections than their counterparts supported by smaller-sized PECs. The analysis determines that PECs are especially helpful in getting non-incumbent candidates elected, although they have no apparent impact on incumbents’ electoral success. PECs can assist candidates in gaining office, therefore, but they are established under corrupt conditions. Ultimately, governance issues surrounding the formation and functioning of PECs impose significant constraints on the development of local democracy in Indonesia.     

Testing for Fiscal Illusion in Wisconsin Towns

Fiscal illusion, a theory of the impact of government revenue structures on voter decision-making, has been studied extensively by economists and political scientists; however, empirical verification has been limited. This study builds on Lowery's (1987a) work by examining the relationship between suggested illusionary revenues and measures of electoral stress. Here, electoral stress is measured as constituent contacting—one possible measure of voter influence—for local government officials up for re-election. Using a combination of survey data from over 1,000 Wisconsin town board members, audited fiscal data and U.S. Census data, we were able to test for fiscal illusion. Our findings show that when looking at five revenue types (conditional grants, unconditional grants, property taxes, user fees and charges, and debt service) there is some evidence suggesting officials seeking another term in office will tend to support fees and charges as a revenue structure over other structures. Overall, there is little consistent evidence suggesting that elected officials are manipulating revenue structures for electoral gain. Revenue structures are mostly influenced by social and economic factors, such as median household income, population changes, and per capita property valuation.     

Do Electoral Risks Moderate the Effect of Partisan and Electoral Cycles on Debt-Financed Local Spending?

Governments’ use of debt as a political instrument has been widely studied from the perspective of partisan and electoral cycles, mainly concerning central government. On the whole, previous studies have attempted to determine the effects of political ideology and the proximity of elections on the opportunistic use of public spending. The current study aims to broaden the scope of attention to the effect of partisan and electoral cycles on debt, by means of a broader consideration of the motives that lead politicians to take on a deficit and that are usually linked to the associated electoral risk. More particularly, we examine whether, during the electoral period, greater confidence in re-election can modify party behaviour concerning the use of public spending, and if so, whether the change is greater or smaller depending on the ruling party’s ideology. The results obtained show that local administrations need to incur debt, although politicians take on more liability than is appropriate to their demographic and economic characteristics, especially in an election year. It was also found that political stability favours a reduction in the public deficit, a pattern that is maintained in electoral periods. This effect was found to be independent of the partisan cycle.     

Political Competition and Local Social Spending: Evidence from Brazil

Electoral theories of democracy imply electoral competition insures accountability. Using data on local elections, socioeconomic factors, and municipal budgets from more than 5,000 municipalities in Brazil for the years 1996, 2000, and 2004, we find that municipalities with more competitive elections allocate less to social spending compared to municipalities with little political competition. We argue that previous theory on political competition and public goods obscures the critical role that financial resources play in shaping the dynamics of social spending and political competition. Municipalities with small budgets lack the resources necessary to engineer convincing electoral victories. Where resources are negligible, voter turnout is low, and incumbents rarely win reelection. Incumbent parties in municipalities with large financial resources win big. Armed with adequate resources, incumbent parties mobilize voters and win by large margins. This new argument and evidence reconcile contradictory findings in the existing literature on competition and public goods.     

How single-member districts are reinforcing local independents and strengthening mayors: on the electoral reform in Polish local government

In this article, we investigate whether the design of the electoral system used in the elections of local councils affects the position of national parties and their main competitors, local independent lists. We study the case of the electoral reform enacted recently in Poland which modified the rules of council elections by introducing the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, quite rarely used in local elections. Using empirical evidence from the municipalities where FPTP replaced the open-list proportional representation (OLPR) system, we demonstrate that the introduction of single-member districts, and majoritarian rule in council elections, increased the number of single independents, unaffiliated to any party or committee, and limited the (already poor) presence of party candidates and councillors. The reform also strengthened the position of directly elected mayors, in Poland – usually independent, by assuring many of them safe majorities in councils. We found that the share of seats for the winning mayor’s list increased by 10 pp on average after the reform.     

What are the Local Political Costs of Centrally Determined Reforms of Local Government?

Taking advantage of a quasi-experimental setting and drawing upon analysis of electoral results and a survey of voters, this article explores the political costs of reform through the example of the 2009 local elections in Denmark. The article finds that the local parties of mayors were punished at the polls for implementing municipal amalgamations decided by the central government. However, the effect on the mayoral parties’ electoral result is more indirect than direct. Analyses of the electoral results demonstrates that the political parties holding the mayoralty in times of amalgamations tend to nominate very tenured mayors as candidates, thereby missing the positive first-term incumbency effect, which a new mayor could have acquired. And analyses of a survey of voters demonstrates higher levels of dissatisfaction with the municipal service in amalgamated municipalities, leading to a higher cost of ruling for mayoral parties which have led the implementation of an amalgamation.     

SEARCHING FOR AUTHENTICITY? UNDERSTANDING REPRESENTATION IN NETWORK GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF FAITH ENGAGEMENT

With the growth of network governance, non‐electoral forms of representation are of increasing significance. The claims of non‐elected representatives are potentially more specific, explicit, and flexible than those of their elected counterparts. The quality of such claims can be assessed in relation to ‘authenticity’, rather than traditional criteria of authorization or accountability. These propositions are explored through first‐hand accounts of ‘faith representatives’ involved in a variety of English urban governance partnerships. Representatives' claims expressed an aspiration to authenticity (which was not necessarily realized) in the sense of seeking ongoing and substantive consent from constituents, rather than assuming consent via a formalized and symbolic moment of election. Network governance may be best served by a mix of elected and non‐elected representation, based upon an understanding of their complementary characteristics and of representation itself as a relational and emergent property.     

The Impact of ‘Boss’ Candidates and Local Political Machines on Elections in Ukraine

The business sector has strongly influenced Ukrainian electoral campaigns since the founding post-communist elections. This article investigates the role of influential, local business-sector candidates, whom we label ‘boss’ candidates, in illicit campaign activities, using unique biographical, electoral, and crowd-sourced data from the 2012 parliamentary elections. The analysis shows that higher levels of competition among candidates with ‘boss’ characteristics are associated with elevated reports of voter manipulation, specifically vote buying. The findings add to extant research on election integrity in Eastern Europe and Eurasia, presenting quantitative empirical evidence that is consistent with narratives about Ukrainian electoral corruption.     

Myanmar’s way to democracy and the limits of the 2015 elections

The general election held on 8 November 2015 marked a significant turning point in Myanmar’s ongoing regime transition. Under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi, the National League for Democracy (NLD) overwhelmingly dominated the polls. Although the huge electoral mandate for the NLD suggests that further political liberalization in Myanmar is likely, the country is not yet undergoing a genuine democratization. Under the current constitutional framework, the military will remain a key actor within the government, thus a new power-sharing arrangement between the NLD and the military is inevitable. This article examines how Myanmar has transformed from a military regime into the military’s version of a ‘disciplined democracy’ and argues that the 2015 general election was not a precursor to a democratic government per se, but rather a re-affirmation of the military’s version of democracy, in which popularly elected civilian political parties are allowed to co-govern the country with the military.     

Modernisation or Backward Step? Women Councillors and New Decision-Making Structures in Local Government

Following the 1997 general election New Labour took power with a commitment to ‘modernising’ government, including local government. This modernisation was based upon a variety of approaches including the introduction of new decision-making structures, improving local democracy, improving local financial accountability, creating a new ethical framework for councillors and council employees and improving local services. It is with the first two of these and their potential impact upon women councillors that this article is concerned. It analyses past evidence on women's participation in local government in the UK and examines the impact of the new political structures on progression to senior posts in local government.     

How electoral incentives shape performance measurement efforts

Although scholars have assessed how the electoral connection of legislators and chief executives affects their support for performance measurement, we know less about how electoral considerations might influence agency administrators’ focus on performance measurement. I suggest that independently elected administrators’ attention to their agency's performance measurement system may be conditional on the likelihood that their efforts in this area will help them realize their electoral goals. Because there is a greater electoral incentive to focus on performance issues when government performance is deficient, elected administrators should be as likely as, if not more likely than, their non‐elected counterparts to focus on performance measurement when the government is performing poorly and less likely to do so when the government is performing well. I find evidence that supports this expectation. This article provides insight into the implications of electoral incentives for management decisions.     

DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION AND RESPONSIVENESS: A CASE STUDY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE IVORIAN COMMUNES AND THEIR CITIZENS

This study of the new Ivorian communes created in 1985 investigates the hypothesis that democratization of local government will lead to an improvement in governmental performance, particularly in its'responsiveness'dimension. It was found that although electoral participation had increased since 1985, other forms of popular engagement with the communes were low, and relationships of accountability and consultation between elected representatives and their electorates were also poorly developed. Responsiveness, defined as congruence between popular preferences and the actual policies and outputs of the communes, was generally low. It is concluded that whilst increased participation enhanced the capacity to be responsive, its impact was mediated through institutional and societal factors such as the role of the mayor, the electoral system, public expectations, continued financial and fiscal centralization and the inevitable limits on the resources and functions of the communes.     

Anti-Immigrant Parties,Local Presence and Electoral Success

Abstract

Does the local organisational presence of anti-immigrant parties affect their chances for electoral success? In order to answer this question, the article explores the potential of a supply-oriented explanation to anti-immigrant party success by examining the electoral advancements the Sweden Democrats (SD) made in the 2006 and 2010 elections. Our results indicate that traditional demand-side explanations to anti-immigrant party success can be successfully complemented by an ‘internal supply-side argument’ to make the electoral fates of these parties more intelligible. Whether the SD had a local organisational presence had a substantial effect on its results in the national election and on the probability of gaining representation in local councils. Thus, the party’s fate in the national as well as local elections was largely determined by whether or not it had a local organisational presence in Swedish municipalities.     

Surviving the political consequences of neoliberal policies

In many countries in Latin America and also western Europe, leftist parties have succeeded in winning repeated re-election even though they have implemented neoliberal economic policies when in government. According to the existing literature, these parties should suffer electoral punishment since they are diverging from their traditional policy course and their electoral promises, and their neoliberal policies are potentially costly for their core support groups. Analysing the cases of left-of-centre parties in Spain and Costa Rica, this article argues that policy implementation strategies, together with strategic use of institutional rules, help to obfuscate the policies' impact, deflect blame, and make re-election possible. The reform of welfare and the way we live now: a critique of Giddens and the Third Way     

Party manifestos and local accountability: A content analysis of local election pledges in Wales

Party manifestos are seen as an important instrument for measuring levels of accountability at central government level. In order to establish whether manifestos contribute to local accountability, a content analysis is applied to party manifestos produced for the 1995 Welsh local elections. Evidence demonstrates that during this election campaign local parties in Wales chose to focus upon policies relating to the environment and local government reorganisation, with mainly strategic pledges on social policy areas. Despite the perception of low levels of party politicisation in Wales, the majority of local pledges were found to be detailed and specific. Thus party manifestos provide a sound basis for local political accountability.     

Accountability of Public Servants under Dominant Political Settlements of China: Effects,Challenges, and Issues

Some scholars think that accountability is attainable only under the electoral political system. However, it is argued that China could achieve some weak accountability even without general election system. How could this be achieved in China? The paper attempts to analyze this question with the following steps: first, it describes the specific accountability system by categorizing different approaches based on four dimensions, then focuses on the impacts that these approaches would have, which are based on finance, fairness and efficiency. It is concluded that under a dominant political settlement, only weak accountability exists in China, not real or strong accountability.