Do politicians anticipate voter control? A comparative study of representatives’ accountability beliefs

Representation literature is rife with the assumption that politicians are responsive to voter preferences because their re-election is contingent upon the approval of those voters, approval that can be won by furthering their desires or, similarly, that can be threatened by ignoring their wishes. Hence, scholars argue that the anticipation of electoral accountability by politicians constitutes a crucial guarantor of (policy) responsiveness; as long as politicians believe that voters are aware of what they do and will take it into account on election day, they are expected to work hard at keeping these voters satisfied. If, on the other hand, politicians were to think what they say and do is inconsequential for citizens’ voting behaviour, they may see leeway to ignore their preferences. In this study, we therefore examine whether politicians anticipate electoral accountability in the first place. In particular, we ask 782 Members of Parliament in Belgium, Germany, Canada and Switzerland in a face-to-face survey about the anticipation of voter control; whether they believe that voters are aware of their behaviour in parliament and their personal policy positions, are able to evaluate the outcomes of their political work, and, finally, whether this knowledge affects their vote choice. We find that a sizable number of MPs believe that voters are aware of what they do and say and take that into account at the ballot box. Still, this general image of rather strong anticipation of voter control hides considerable variation; politicians in party-centred systems (in Belgium and some politicians in Germany that are elected on closed party lists), anticipate less voter control compared to politicians in more candidate-centred systems (Canada and Switzerland). Within these countries, we find that populist politicians are more convinced that voters know about their political actions and take this knowledge into account in elections; it seems that politicians who take pride in being close to voters (and their preferences), also feel more monitored by these voters. Finally, we show that politicians’ views of voter control do not reflect the likelihood that they might be held to account; politicians whose behaviour is more visible and whose policy profile should therefore be better known to voters do not feel the weight of voter control more strongly.     

The causes of legal rents extraction: evidence from Spanish municipalities

This paper analyzes the causes of legal political rent extraction by using a direct measure of it, namely, local top politicians’ wages. In particular, we investigate whether local politicians’ incentives to extract rents by setting their own wages are influenced by the degree of political competition and voter information. We use a sample of the largest Spanish municipalities over the years 2008–2010. The results indicate that weaker political competition and lesser voter information are related to more rent extraction. In an additional analysis, we show that higher wages do not ensure better financial management. These findings confirm that when politicians can set their own salaries, higher wages do not mean better management, but they are just political rents.     

Do local leaders know their voters? A test of guessability in India

Prominent theories of clientelism—the exchange of benefits for political support—depend on the assumption that politicians, through local agents immersed in local social networks, possess detailed information on voters’ political preferences prior to targeting. This article provides the first direct test of this assumption. It develops a behavioral measure, guessability, which gauges the ability of elected village leaders, who often function as brokers and prominent vote mobilizers, to correctly identify the partisan vote intentions of voters in their locality. It then develops a method to estimate added informational value, which compares the performance of local leaders to low-information benchmarks that capture guessability rates that can feasibly be achieved by outsiders. Original data from surveys of voters and elected village politicians across 96 village councils in Rajasthan, India indicate that while these village leaders out-perform low-information benchmarks with respect to co-partisans, they perform no better than this baseline vis-à-vis non-co-partisans.     

Electoral Competition, Participation, and Government Responsiveness in Mexico

In this article I test two competing visions about how democracy produces responsive government. Electoral theories of democracy posit that elected governments are responsive to public demands because citizens are able to sanction bad politicians and select good ones. Participatory theories attribute responsiveness to a citizenry's ability to articulate demands and pressure government through a wider range of political action. I test hypotheses derived from these two approaches, using an original dataset that combines electoral, socioeconomic, and public-financial indicators for Mexico's 2,400 municipalities, from 1989 to 2000. The data show that electoral competition has no effect on municipal government performance. But the results are consistent with the hypothesis that nonelectoral participation causes improved performance. Thus, I suggest that the quality of municipal government in Mexico depends on an engaged citizenry and cooperation between political leaders and their constituents, rather than the threat of electoral punishment. I recommend that scholars broaden the study of government responsiveness to account for participatory strategies of political influence and critically assess the claims of those who would promote elections as a cure-all for poor democratic performance.     

The Local Political Business Cycle

Although local political leaders have fewer policy instruments available than national politicians, they nevertheless engage heavily in the creation of political business cycles, i.e. they try to locate and time the costs and benefits of government policies in such as way as to optimize voter support. The study, which is based on data from the four Nordic countries and Italy and France, shows that expenditures tend to grow faster the closer the local election, while political action to increase local taxes is generally taken only in mid-term years. If one wants to predict how local tax rates and expenditures change, it is as important to know the number of years' to the next election as it is to know the change in the fiscal capabilities of local governments.     

Migrants' remittances and economic voting in the Mexican countryside

This study advances and tests hypotheses about the effects of migrants' remittances on political behavior. Analyzing new survey data from Mexico, I find that despite being very poor, respondents who receive remittances tend to view their income as more stable than neighbors who do not receive this money. As a result, remittance recipients have relatively fewer economic grievances and tend to feel more optimistic about economic matters than neighbors who do not receive remittances. According to the economic voter thesis, citizens who are more satisfied with the economy are also less likely to pressure and oppose politicians, particularly incumbents. Analyses indicate that respondents in this sample who receive remittances are indeed less likely to lobby local officials for economic assistance. They were also less likely to mobilize against and punish the incumbent party in the 2006 Mexican presidential election.     

The Issue Agenda,Party Competence and Popularity: An Empirical Analysis of Austria 1989–2004

This article analyses the effects of the issue agenda and of party competence on party popularity. Based on the salience and the issue ownership literatures, shifts in party support may be attributable to two factors: changing voter perceptions of issue salience and shifts in perceived party competence. We thus hypothesize that (1) a party's popularity increases if the public issue agenda changes in its favour such that its “best” issues become more important to voters and (2) that voters' changing perceptions of party competence account for shifting party popularity. Using annual macro data on voter perceptions of the issue agenda, party competence and popularity in Austria, we find no support for the first hypothesis. Rather, voter perceptions of party issue competence vary considerably and this variation accounts for the parties' level of popular support. This suggests that party competition plays out more by what politicians actually do and what impression they give about their deeds and competence than by exercising influence on the issue agenda.     

LOCAL TAXES AND LOCAL EXPENDITURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING THE WICKSELLIAN CONNECTION

Many countries are decentralizing in various ways. Decentralization is often intended at least partly to make government more efficient, flexible, and responsive. Many studies have evaluated the effects of decentralization on the provision of such services as health and education as well as on corruption, stability, and growth. Because what governments do and how well they do it is inseparably entangled with the question of how they are financed, this article outlines why and how a key element in a sound decentralization program should be to strengthen the linkage between local expenditures and local revenues—called here the Wicksellian Connection. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Community of Choice or Ghetto of Last Resort: Community Development and the Viability of an African American Community1

The viability of local government‐sponsored community development of poor ethnic enclaves hinges on the perceptions of residents. If residents view the enclave in which they live as their “community of choice,” they will be more likely to join with local government to coproduce community improvement. Residents who see their enclave as their community of choice tend to hold positive perceptions of neighbors and neighborhood and are less fearful of crime. Conversely, those who see the enclave where they live as a “ghetto of last resort” commonly are not meeting their economic expectations, are uneasy about race related issues, and are concerned about the desirability of their neighborhood. Government should not employ a community development strategy to preserve a “ghetto of last resort” where most residents remain because they feel they have few options. The vast majority of the residents examined here view the enclave where they live as their community of choice.     

Targeting the lobbying effort: The importance of local government lobbying

Abstract Local government is subject to extensive lobbying, which is reasonable given the greater importance of the local public sector in large welfare states. Most of the scholarly attention has been focused on lobbying at the national level, often addressing the impact of interest groups on public policies. This article discusses a decision–making model where interest groups optimize their lobbying efforts given the way that different local governments and individual politicians respond to these activities. A number of propositions are tested on the basis of data from Norwegian local government. Contrary to prior theorizing, we do not find that representatives seeking re–election are contacted more frequently by interest groups. Interest groups target their lobbying activities toward politicians who are members of the relevant council committees, and they exert stronger pressure on members of the executive board and active representatives who perceive themselves as influential. Inter–municipal differences are also of importance: The lobbying activities are more intensive where electoral participation is low and in the larger urban municipalities, while the size of legislatures and the strength of the local political leadership affect lobbying efforts negatively. Interest groups tend to be more active in the richer local governments. The demands of the residential population impact weakly on lobbying efforts.     

What have public affairs and advertising got in common?

The author argues that to be successful companies need to adopt a stakeholder view of how they interact with society—in short their communications need to be integrated. Rather than focusing purely on their consumer markets, advertisers should be aware of the impact of their messages on public opinion, pressure groups, politicians and others that make up the ‘political market’. Equally, public affairs practitioners should be more involved in the commercial activities of their colleagues in advertising and marketing. Integrated communications, in the author's view, is not only an operational necessity for companies, but a strategic imperative for sustainable success in a global world with differing local expectations. Copyright © 2002 Henry Stewart Publications.     

Romanticizing bureaucratic leadership? The politics of how elected officials attribute responsibility for performance

A core task for elected officials is to hold bureaucratic leaders responsible, but how do they determine if public managers actually influence outcomes? We propose that partisan and leadership heuristics affect how politicians apply a logic of individualized responsibility, that is, focus on individual bureaucrats rather than situational factors to explain organizational outcomes. We match survey data of local elected officials in Denmark with individual partisan variables and objective performance data about the schools they oversee. We provide evidence that partisan beliefs matter, with conservative elected officials more willing to pursue a logic of individualized responsibility. We also find that elected officials are more likely to assume that bureaucratic leaders determine organizational outcomes where performance is very high or low, a leadership attribution heuristic previously established in private sector studies. We argue that our findings have important implications for contemporary governance, given the growing reliance on performance metrics to assign responsibility.     

Local Government Responses to Fiscal Stress: Evidence from the Public Education Sector

This article investigates local government responses to fiscal stress through the lens of the K–12 public education sector, examining two major policy options available to school districts for managing fiscal hardship: (1) cutting costs, especially through layoffs, and (2) raising revenues locally through voter referenda. The article employs district‐level administrative and survey data from California and Indiana to examine whether school districts exhibit features of a rational or natural system—in which their behaviors largely reflect fiscal pressures only—or whether they exhibit features of an open system in which nonfinancial factors also shape responses. In Indiana, district fiscal characteristics explain differences in cost‐cutting and revenue‐raising behaviors; there is little empirical evidence that school districts exhibit features of an open system. In California, both fiscal and environmental attributes, including poverty characteristics, average student achievement levels, and the enrollment of English learner students, explain school district behaviors.     

Targeting the lobbying effort: The importance of local government lobbying

Local government is subject to extensive lobbying, which is reasonable given the greater importance of the local public sector in large welfare states. Most of the scholarly attention has been focused on lobbying at the national level, often addressing the impact of interest groups on public policies. This article discusses a decision–making model where interest groups optimize their lobbying efforts given the way that different local governments and individual politicians respond to these activities. A number of propositions are tested on the basis of data from Norwegian local government. Contrary to prior theorizing, we do not find that representatives seeking re–election are contacted more frequently by interest groups. Interest groups target their lobbying activities toward politicians who are members of the relevant council committees, and they exert stronger pressure on members of the executive board and active representatives who perceive themselves as influential. Inter–municipal differences are also of importance: The lobbying activities are more intensive where electoral participation is low and in the larger urban municipalities, while the size of legislatures and the strength of the local political leadership affect lobbying efforts negatively. Interest groups tend to be more active in the richer local governments. The demands of the residential population impact weakly on lobbying efforts.     

Reframing Democracy: Governance, Civic Agency, and Politics

Developments in public affairs that stress governance— not simply government—hold possibilities for reframing democracy. Governance intimates a paradigm shift in the meaning of democracy and civic agency—that is, who is to address public problems and promote the general welfare? The shift involves a move from citizens as simply voters, volunteers, and consumers to citizens as problem solvers and cocreators of public goods; from public leaders, such as public affairs professionals and politicians, as providers of services and solutions to partners, educators, and organizers of citizen action; and from democracy as elections to democratic society. Such a shift has the potential to address public problems that cannot be solved without governments, but that governments alone cannot solve, and to cultivate an appreciation for the commonwealth. Effecting this shift requires politicizing governance in nonpartisan, democratizing ways and deepening the civic, horizontal, pluralist, and productive dimensions of politics.     

Lobbying with conflicting interests: Norwegian local-central relations

Abstract.  The costly lobbying model of Potters and van Winden is confronted with data on lobbying interactions between local assemblies and the national assembly in Norway. A total of 239 interactions are studied. Survey responses by a large number of voters and politicians, as well as registry data on fiscal standing, demographics and elections are utilised. Two of the main predictions of the costly lobbying model gain support in the data. The probability of obtaining substantial discretionary funding from the central level increases: with decreasing conflict of interest between local and central politicians; and with the lobbying cost incurred by local politicians. For a given conflict and cost, however, the rate of lobbying success depends crucially on structural characteristics of the municipality. In particular, the success rate is significantly higher for poor municipalities located in national electoral districts with many seats per voter than for rich municipalities located in districts with few seats per voter.     

The demand for local government goods

Abstract. This paper analyses the spending preferences of local government elected politicians. It is argued that the median voter model is inappropriate in multi-party systems that provide multiple government services, and that the preferences of the representatives are consequential to local resource allocation. We develop a micromodel in which service demand is conditioned by exogenous public revenue, prices, and demographic factors. We hypothesise that politicians demands are affected by party affiliation, public sector occupation and committee assignment. The estimates of the micro demand functions are based on data pertaining to Norwegian local governments. It is found that the estimated income elasticities correspond approximately with elasticities of output studies. Party affiliation has an impact on demand patterns, while government occupation and committee appointment are major determinants of politicians desired allocation of public services. Further analyses reveal that the numerical strength of parties impacts weakly on the actual service allocation, whereas the representation of government employees has occasional effect. The budgetary allocations are imperfect expressions of the elected council's underlying preferences.     

Do They Really Know? On Party Representatives’ Knowledge of the Extent to Which Their Parties Make Election Pledges

The assumption that representatives hold knowledge about their parties’ programmes underlies models of representative democracy. However, representatives’ party knowledge is rarely discussed in theoretical detail, nor is it often systematically empirically investigated. This article takes the first steps and discusses what type of knowledge of their parties representatives need and what knowledge they actually have. Specific focus is given to parties’ election pledge‐making. By comparing the number of parties’ pledges in Swedish election manifestos to Swedish party representatives’ perceptions of the extent to which parties make pledges, the article presents empirical evidence indicating low levels of knowledge. Knowledge is higher among top‐level politicians and politicians who trust parties to generally keep their pledges, but the main conclusion is that research should not assume detailed knowledge of pledge‐making in manifestos among elected representatives, which has not previously been shown in systematic studies.     

Politicians,Scandals, and Trust in Government

In this paper we examine the role that political scandals play in eroding regard for government and political institutions in general. We know that scandals can lower regard for individual politicians and government leaders. Yet, less is known about how scandal influences attitudes toward institutions and the political process. It has been widely assumed that such attitudes are influenced by factors that lie largely beyond the control of individual politicians. Using data from the U.S. and the U.K. we show that scandals involving legislators can have a negative influence on their constituent's attitudes toward institutions and the political process. One consequence of this finding is that, instead of looking for scapegoats in Hollywood or among the failings of voters themselves, politicians should first get their own House in order.     

Standing apart and sitting together: Enforcing coalition agreements in multiparty systems

Abstract.  One of the most obvious questions to be asked about coalition governments is what these governments do, but this question has received little systematic attention from coalition researchers. A key element of coalition governance that may inform our empirical knowledge of the actions of government – their origin, organization and results – is coalition agreements. Party leaders negotiating a new government invest time in writing coalition agreements, and they do this because they expect beneficial effects: more efficiency in coalition policy making, and more peace in the government. Written coalition agreements are considered to reduce uncertainty and mistrust, and this is why they have become institutionalized in countries with coalition governments. This article presents an approach to the comparative study of coalition conflicts as they emerge during government formation, the management of this conflict through drafting coalition agreements and the effects of this during coalition life. The article sets out a number of expectations about the effects of types of deals that parties make; and asks what types of conflict management are most effective and what are the conditions for enforcement – structural and strategic? In recent comparative work, the features of coalition agreements and mechanisms of coalition governance in Western Europe have received attention. This article sets out, with empirical material, how further comparative research on coalition governance may be developed.