Die Einflussmöglichkeiten der Europäischen Kommission auf die europäische Politik

The means of the European Commission to influence European policies are being discussed predominantly with view to its agenda-setting powers. Institutionalist analyses have shown how the Commission can use agenda setting to bring to bear its own political preferences on the Council. With view to other Commission rights, in contrast, there have not been similar systematic analyses to show the Commission’s impact on European policies. In this article it is shown how the Commission can use its rights following from its role as a guardian of the Treaty and from competition law strategically. By simultaneously imposing threats on the Member States, the Commission can present its proposals to the Council as a “lesser evil”, pressurizing the Council into acceptance. The paper shows the scope and limits of this strategy and takes into consideration how other studies discussing the Commission’s powers fit into this framework of analysis.     

Zur Theorie der Interessenvermittlung: Ein Netzwerkansatz dargestellt am Beispiel der Gemeinsamen Europäischen Agrarpolitik

Recent policy network studies contribute significantly to the theory of interest mediation. Despite this contribution policy network approaches still contain major theoretical deficiencies and a lack of empirical application can be observed. In this context a typology of systems of interest mediation is theoretically derived on the basis of new developments in the political exchange theory (Pappi/Henning 1998a). Analogously to the typology of economic markets, the typology corresponds to the social organization of political exchange in policy networks. Further, it is demonstrated that in contrast to conclusions found in the literature no general correspondence of specific types of interest mediation and policy-outcomes in terms of weak versus strong states, efficient versus inefficient economic policies and biased versus unbiased mediation of societies interests can be expected. In the empirical part of the paper the typology is applied to the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) using policy network data. In particular, a block model analysis is applied aggregating a set of multiple network relations among a multitude of public and private actors operating in the CAP to identify whether the overall social macro structure corresponds to national clientelism or supranational pluralism.     

Die Deutschen und die Türkeifrage: eine Analyse der Einstellungen zum Antrag der Türkei auf Mitgliedschaft in der Europäischen Union

In this paper, I examine the sources of support for Turkey’s EU-entry in the German public. I propose several models and explore their respective empirical validity using survey data gathered in May and June 2005. The analysis shows that neither trust in the federal government nor evaluations of the EU institutions play a role in attitudes toward Turkey’s bid for membership. By contrast, attitudes towards this issue are considerably affected by preferences about EU enlargement and, more strongly, by beliefs about whether Turkey at least partly belongs to Europe. Likewise, when forming attitudes towards Turkey’s bid for EU membership, Germans appear to consider the presumed consequences of including Turkey in the EU. Both East and West Germans are particularly likely to take consequences for regional security into account. The paper concludes with a discussion of several implications for German public opinion on this EU issue.     

Von der Zweiparteiendominanz zum Pluralismus: Die Entwicklung des deutschen Parteiensystems im westeuropäischen Vergleich

With the federal election of 2009, the German party system no longer belongs to the party systems with two-party dominance but to the pluralistic systems. The article develops a typology of party systems, decribes the change of the type of Germany's party system, shows that the development of the German party system is an exception in Western Europe and argues that the change in the structure of the system casts a return to two-party dominance into doubt.     

Politische Theorie und Ideengeschichte, Politisches System der Bundesrepublik, Politische Soziologie, Vergleichende Politikforschung, Europäische Union, Internationale Politik, Historische Politikforschung

Inhaltsübersicht   (RezensentInnen in Klammern) Literaturbericht    J?rg Faust / Stefan Leiderer: Zur Effektivit?t und politischen ?konomie der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit Politische Theorie und Ideengeschichte    Bluhm, Harald, und Jürgen Gebhardt: Politische Ideengeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert. Konzepte und Kritik (Philipp H?lzing) • Dryzek, John S., Bonnie Honig und Anne Phillips (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory (Johannes Schmidt) • Ke?ler, Mario: Ossip K. Flechtheim. Politischer Wissenschaftler und Zukunftsdenker (1909–1998) (Wilhelm Bleek) • Priester, Karin: Populismus. Historische und aktuelle Erscheinungsformen (Florian Hartleb) • S?llner, Alfons: Fluchtpunkte. Studien zur politischen Ideengeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts (Michael Becker) • Williams, Bernard: In the Beginning Was the Deed. Realism and Moralism in Political Argument (Carsten Quesel) • Doppelrezension: Henning, Christoph: Philosophie nach Marx. 100 Jahre Marxrezeption und die normative Sozialphilosophie der Gegenwart in der Kritik; Henning, Christoph (Hg.): Marxglossar (Felix Heidenreich) • Doppelrezension: Mouffe, Chantal: über das Politische. Wider die kosmopolitische Illusion; Nonhoff, Martin: Politischer Diskurs und Hegemonie. Das Projekt "Soziale Marktwirtschaft" (André Brodocz) Politisches System der Bundesrepublik    Van Ooyen, Robert Chr., und Martin H. M?llers (Hg.): Das Bundesverfassungsgericht im politischen System (Hubert Woltering) Politische Soziologie    Dolata, Ulrich, und Raymund Werle (Hg.): Gesellschaft und die Macht der Technik. Sozio?konomischer und institutioneller Wandel durch Technisierung (Georg Simonis) Vergleichende Politikforschung    Castles, Francis G. (ed.): The Disappearing State? Retrenchment realities in an age of globalization (Marius R. Busemeyer) • Clasen, Jochen, und Nico A. Siegel (eds.): Investigating Welfare State Change: The 'Dependent Variable Problem' in Comparative Analysis (Marius R. Busemeyer) Europ?ische Union    Huget, Holger: Demokratisierung der EU. Normative Demokratietheorie und Governance-Praxis im europ?ischen Mehrebenensystem (Andreas Wimmel) Internationale Politik    Eder, Franz, Gerhard Mangott und Martin Senn (eds.): Transatlantic Discord. Combating Terrorism and Proliferation, Preventing Crises (Alexander Siedschlag) • Marx, Johannes: Vielfalt oder Einheit der Theorien in den Internationalen Beziehungen. Eine systematische Rekonstruktion, Integration und Bewertung (Ralf J. Leiteritz) • Schmidt, Siegmar, Gunter Hellmann und Reinhard Wolf (Hg.): Handbuch zur Deutschen Au?enpolitik (Helga Haftendorn) • Wolter, Detlev: A United Nations for the 21st Century: From Reaction to Prevention. Towards an Effective and Efficient International Regime for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (Andreas Heinemann-Grüder) • Young, Brigitte (Hg.): Die Politische ?konomie des Dienstleistungsabkommens (GATS). Gender in EU und China (Eva Hartmann) Historische Politikforschung    Kaelble, Hartmut: Sozialgeschichte Europas 1945 bis zur Gegenwart (Siegfried Weichlein) • Doppelrezension: Andres, Jan: "Auf Poesie ist die Sicherheit der Throne gegründet". Huldigungsrituale und Gelegenheitslyrik im 19. Jahrhundert; Schwengelbeck, Matthias: Die Politik des Zeremoniells. Huldigungsfeiern im langen 19. Jahrhundert (Rainer Schmidt)     

Die Eigendynamik zur Eindimensionalität des Parteienwettbewerbs: eine Simulationsstudie

While German ideological space is often characterized with two dimensions, empirical estimation demonstrates that party positions can be placed on a uni-dimensional scale. This seems to be inconsistent with conventional spatial models of party competition, since parties should, accordingly, exhaust the two-dimensional space to maximize their votes. This paper suggests an alternative spatial model which adjusts or removes some restrictive assumptions of the conventional models. Most importantly, the model suggested here allows parties to influence the salience and (non-)separability of both dimensions at voters’ decision processes. The simulation results demonstrate that the vote-maximizing parties can coordinate themselves in favor of inequality of the salience or non-separability of both dimensions. This, in turn, leads to a certain level of unidimensionality of party positions.