The Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on the Financial Condition of Municipal Government

This study examines the effect of fiscal decentralization between states and their local governments on the financial condition of municipal governments. There are strong theoretical arguments on both sides of the federalism debate about the benefits for and against decentralization. Most of the research in this area investigates economic and social welfare consequences of fiscal decentralization. There is limited research, however, on the effects of fiscal decentralization on the financial health of local governments. Using data from the nation’s 150 largest cities, this study finds that intrastate fiscal decentralization results in weaker financial condition for municipalities in those states.     

Incumbents and Innovations under Decentralization: An Empirical Exploration of Selected Local Governments in the Philippines

Abstract

Like in other developing countries, many local governments in the Philippines have become innovative under decentralization. We investigate here the drivers of local innovations, with focus on quality of incumbent leaders, their political incentives and fiscal resources. We applied Poisson regressions on a survey data comprising 209 innovations introduced in 48 cities and municipalities during the period June 2004–June 2008. The statistically significant factors are the mayor's competence (age, educational attainment), re-election status and term in office. Innovations appear to increase with local fiscal resources but at decreasing rate. Access to information appears not to matter much. However, these factors, including poverty rates, vary in relative importance in explaining innovations in expenditure services, and in revenue and public administration services. Some policy inputs are suggested.     

Subnational governments in a stabilization program: lessons learned in Argentina

Autonomous subnational governments pose a serious challenge to national stabilization strategies. As illustrated by the case of Argentina, fiscal reforms that have been successfuly implemented at the national level have proved to be much harder to induce among subnational governments. Provincial reform is still largely pending and provincial governments continue to generate large public deficits, posing a threat to the success of Argentina's overall reform program in the medium and long term.

This paper provides a retrospective on Argentina's reform program with a focus on subnational governments. It identifies elements within the reform program itself, such as windfall increases of guaranteed central transfers, that systematically undermined early efforts to induce provincial reform. It also examines the government's strategy to neutralize their effects through the decentralization of services and the negotiation of two fiscal pacts, as well as its success in introducing major reforms by capitalizing on the financial pressure that resulted from the Mexican crisis. Finally, it draws lessons of experience that may be useful for policy makers faced with the similar challenge of inducing fiscal reform within autonomous subnational goverments.     

Fiscal Capacity Equalisation in Tanzania

Fiscal equalisation aims at enabling decentralised governments to supply similar services at similar tax rates. In order to equalise fiscal disparities, differences in both fiscal capacities and in fiscal needs have to be measured. This paper focuses on the measurement of fiscal capacity in a developing country. The current intergovernmental transfer system in Tanzania does not take differences in fiscal capacity into account. As a result, local governments in rich areas are able to generate considerably more revenue per capita than those in poor areas. Public services in poor areas are hard to finance. We propose a way of measuring fiscal capacities of local governments in Tanzania using poverty data. We use this measure to derive an equalisation grant that would support local governments that have a low fiscal capacity.     

FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION: AN EFFECTIVE TOOL FOR GOVERNMENT REFORM?

The theory of fiscal federalism asserts that fiscal decentralization increases government effectiveness, reduces government budgets, and reduces corruption when used as a means of government reform. However, counter‐arguments have been made that such an approach has diverging effects according to the level of national development. We have attempted herein to carry out an empirical analysis to examine these theories. Data from 17 developed and 17 developing states were obtained in order to conduct a regression analysis of various indicators. The results revealed that fiscal decentralization reduced government effectiveness in developed countries. Important determinants for government effectiveness were the quality of regulation and the rule of law. When responsibility for expenditure and revenue were devolved, budgets expanded in both developed and developing countries. Fiscal decentralization deterred corruption in advanced states, whereas greater autonomy in spending increased malfeasance in the developing world.     

Performance Management and Deficit Adjustment in U.S. Cities: An Exploratory Study

Performance management or PM has been promoted as a tool to transform government. Claims that PM will enable governments to “do more with less,” “increase efficiency,” provide “value for money,” and make “rational budget decisions” abound. Has PM helped city governments in the United States cope with the effects of the 2007–2009 Great Recession? Theory suggests that PM can provide the informational and analytical foundation necessary for city officials to implement comprehensive but conflictive budget-cutting and revenue-raising strategies. By facilitating deep expenditure cuts and tax increases, PM can indirectly influence budget deficits. Using data from a national survey of city governments and multiyear audited financial reports, the empirical analysis shows that PM cities favored what are essentially decremental responses to fiscal crises that lead to marginal changes in revenues and expenditures. Not surprisingly, there is no evidence that PM influences the size and change in budget shortfalls.     

Local Fiscal Stress in Sub‐Saharan Africa: The Kenyan Example

Abstract

This article identifies the fiscal weaknesses of local government in Africa, with concentration of the fiscal stress that is endemic to their condition. It then examines Kenya, as a case study in sub‐Saharan Africa. It continues to focus down on three Kenyan cities—Nairobi, Mombasa, and Kisumu, and identifies their six major revenue sources: land based revenues, regulatory revenues, income‐based taxes, service revenues, user charges, and government grants. Although some of the data is problematic, it is possible to determine several reasons for local fiscal stress. These reasons include limited access to stable financial resources, unstable national economic performance, centralized governmental control, mixed results of decentralization, and institutional and managerial weaknesses, including corruption in the collection and use of resources. Four recommendations are advanced to help these local governments: the development of local credit systems, the use of non‐governmental organizations, the clarification of the use of foreign aid, and the development of a greater capacity for governance. This articles main theoretical contribution is the development of an analytic framework for examining the reasons for fiscal stress in sub‐Saharan Africa. By examining revenue and expenditure patterns of the three localities, the article develops a data set that highlights some of the reasons for local government financial problems—the governments do not know how much revenue can be collected from a particular revenue source, they do not have records of existing sources of revenue, and they only collect about 40–60% of their estimated collections.     

Level of services,spatial dependence and allocative efficiency in local governments

In the public economics literature expenditure needs, allocative efficiency and spatial dependence of local governments costs have been widely analysed separately implying bias estimations of the expenditure needs at local level. An original procedure that simultaneously takes into account the standard level of services, the allocative efficiency and the spatial proximity among Municipalities, has been proposed. The estimation strategy has been applied on a very detailed database of more than 4,000 Italian Municipalities for the year 2013.     

A comprehensive model for the evaluation of standard expenditure needs and standard level of local services

ABSTRACT

This paper addresses the problem of the simultaneous evaluation of local governments’ standard expenditure needs together with the related level of standard public services proposing a new approach to fiscal equalisation based on quantitative methods. Standard expenditure needs are estimated using quantile regression, moreover robust non-parametric methods are employed for the computation of composite indicators of demand and supply factors. Data from English local authorities over the period 1997–2006 have been used to test the internal and external validity of the model.     

Identifying and Coping with Fiscal Emergencies in Ohio Local Governments

Abstract

This study examines the reasons fiscal emergencies occur in Ohio local governments and the strategies that local governments use to recover. In Ohio, fiscal emergencies have regularly occurred predominantly at the local level. This study aims to reveal the internal process that both bring on and ameliorates fiscal emergencies. Previous studies failed to differentiate between fiscal stress and fiscal emergencies and did not include the role of the Ohio Fiscal Emergency Law in assisting local governments in restoring long term fiscal health. This study finds fiscal emergencies in Ohio were caused by: (1) the increased costs associated with unfunded state-mandated programs and, (2) major economical downturns brought on by local plant closings. Local governments were found to have responded in the short run by strategies such as targeted expenditure cuts and in the long run by increased the use of economic development.     

Decentralised governance and empowerment of county governments in China: betting on the weak or the strong?

Decentralised economic development initiatives empowering local governments have gained currency in both developed and developing contexts. The empowerment of county governments in China is a case in point. This study uses difference-in-differences (DID) and the fixed-effects model with panel data (1997–2008) in counties in Zhejiang Province to empirically investigate the different impacts of the empowerment reform on county economies and fiscal revenue (FR). The results reveal that the reform has not promoted county economies as expected but has significantly increased FR. The reform has had a larger impact on less developed counties than on developed ones, which suggests a positive outcome of this decentralisation policy in China with regard to revenue generation. This study on county empowerment in Zhejiang Province provides some policy implications for other regions in China or developing countries.     

Local government fiscal reform: principles and options for the future

U.S. local governments in the 1980s were under increasing fiscal stress. The fiscal outlook is not particularly bright because of projected rapid growth of certain expenditures and the slow growth of most local revenue sources. Potentially major changes in fiscal responsibilities at the federal and state levels may call for local government fiscal reform in the future. This article uses a case study of Broome County, New York, to illustrate the difficulties local governments face and then suggests a series of revenue reforms that can enhance equity, efficiency, revenue productivity, and administrative simplicity.     

Expenditure Inflexibility in the State Budget: The Fiscal Policy Latitude of the Council of State in Finland

This paper deals with expenditure inflexibility, which has a crucial bearing on the fiscal latitude which the government has in the preparation of the Finnish state budget. The government’s fiscal latitude, i.e. the possibilities available to the government to increase, decrease or change state expenditures is restricted by vari‐ous mechanisms. The source material used in this study consists of budget documents and interviews with officials involved in preparing the budget; use was also made of earlier studies relating to this subject. Our major findings fall into three groups. (i) If the degree of inflexibility is used as a basis for classification, four classes of expenditure can be identified in the Finnish state budget: expenditure controlled by statute, expenditure controlled by agree‐ment, expenditure controlled by authorization and expenditure without formal con‐trol. (ii) In the budget for 1996, 92 per cent of expenditure was controlled in various ways, leaving only 8 per cent that was flexible. The conclusion can be drawn from this that without changing the mechanisms that bind expenditures, the govermment’s ability to alter fiscal policy in the budget of a single year is very limited. In the 1990s the proportion of statute‐controlled expenditures has decreased and the proportion of agreement‐controlled and authorization‐controlled expenditures has increased. Nevertheless fiscal latitude has grown. (iii) The material used for comparison showed that there is a similar problem in other countries, but that the mechanisms governing expenditure inflexibility and the fiscal latitude that governments may enjoy can vary.     

Fiscal Stress Management During the Financial and Economic Crisis: The Case of the Baltic Countries

The Baltic countries—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—were severely hit by the global financial and economic crisis in 2008–2011. In response to the crisis, all three states chose to undertake extensive fiscal consolidations. This article examines the strategies adopted by the Baltic governments for managing fiscal stress and consolidating their budgets in the light of the existing literature on cutback budgeting. In all three countries, the governments combined expenditure and revenue measures, with a larger share of adjustment taking place on the expenditure side. Among expenditure measures, a mix of across-the-board and targeted cuts was adopted, though the importance of targeted cuts increased over time. The case studies also indicate that although the theoretical propositions of the cutback budgeting literature point to the correct directions overall, further refinement is needed in several theoretical issues.     

An empirical assessment of local autonomy and special district finance in the US

In this article, we interpret local autonomy as a dimensional concept that includes local government importance, local government discretion, and local government capacity. Using longitudinal data from 1962 to 2012 covering all 50 states in the US, we examine how different dimensions of local autonomy affect the expenditure levels and debt levels of special districts. We find that the levels of debt and spending in special districts are lower when local governments have greater revenue diversification. However, fiscal decentralisation in the dimension of local government importance promotes the growth of special district finance. Moreover, our findings on local government discretion suggest that imposing too many fiscal constraints can affect the fiscal independence and capacities of local general-purpose governments. These constraints may also lead to the more extensive use of the fiscal power of special districts that are not subject to fiscal limits.     

The impact of revenue diversification on municipal debts: comparing short-term and long-term debt levels

The extant literature has offered two competitive implications of revenue diversification: revenue stabilisation and fiscal illusion. Stabilisation helps governments have less revenue volatility, while fiscal illusion expands tax burdens through the increase in expenditure. The competitive views on revenue diversification leave a niche to explore the association between revenue diversification and debt levels in local governments. We estimate the static and dynamic effects of revenue diversification on both short-term and long-term debt levels in 150 fiscally standardised cities. Our findings show that local governments with greater revenue diversification are more likely to reduce short-term debts while expanding long-term debts. The findings imply that a stabilised revenue structure helps local governments better manage operational budgets but also invest in capital projects with greater debt capacity.     

The challenge of design of intergovernmental relations in economies in transition

The governments of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are at a crucial juncture in their movement from highly centralized command economies to more decentralized market economies. While there is a belief in these countries that decentralization brings greater economic efficiency, the reality is that such a transition is a difficult process. This paper examines what types of administrative reforms are needed for the decentralization process, how far along the countries are with respect to these reforms, and what reforms are missing. As we discuss, many of the necessary administration reforms are missing and we argue that more attention must be paid to these elements for successful decentralization of these governments.

This paper examines the recent experience and reform needs of the key administrative aspects of the design of intergovernmental relations in countries in transition in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union. There is a widespread realization in all of these countries that decentralizing government will help increase efficiency in the public sector just as privatization will improve efficiency in their economies. Decentralization of government operations is also attractive as a way to cement a democratic form of government. Despite the appearances of the existence of an already decentralized system, such as in the case of the Soviet Union, this experiment started in practically all cases with a lack of institutions and experience on how decentralized government operations should be organized.

As different as these countries are, there are many similarities in the reform process they are following in order to decentralize government structure. While the basic components of a decentralized system of government are emerging in many of these countries the structure of government has not fully evolved in a manner that can support such a decentralized system. Often, governments remain structured along a vertical hierarchy: information, budgetary authority, and revenue pass from the central government down to subnational levels of government while little communication or interaction exists at a horizontal level. In general, the assignment of revenue and expenditure has not been clearly defined among the two or three levels of government, central government transfers continue to occur in a relatively ad hoc manner, and the entire budgeting system still rests in many cases on more or less formal system of negotiations and bargaining among the different levels of government. There has been some change in this structure in certain countries. Over the last three years, both Poland and Hungary have legally increased the automony of subnational governments. In 1994 in Russia a new and more transparent system of intergovernmental grants has been established between the federal government and the regions. In 1994 also, Latvia introduced a more transparent formula-driven, transfer formula for the regional and municipal governments.

The focus of this paper is to develop a “blue print” for necessary changes in organization and administration of intergovernmental relations in countries in transition. While many experts have recently been discussing the public finance policy components of this new, evolving relationship among levels of government, less attention has been paid to the structural and administrative challenges and the information design issues that must be met in order to develop and support a system of intergovernmental relations.

The paper is organized as follows: First we review the major responsibilities and their allocation among levels of government, the assignment of revenue sources, and the system of transfers. We then turn to a discussion of the current experience of Eastern European and NIS countries in the context of the structural components of an intergovernmental fiscal system. Next, we analyze the organizational reforms that are necessary for the efficient functioning of a decentralized system of government in the economies in transition. Finally we “rate” the transition economies in relation to their current design of the system of intergovernmental relations and support mechanisms.     

U.S. treasury department studies of federal- state-local fiscal relations: the context,the major themes,and the outcome

This article provides an assessment of the condition of the literature on several major issues of Federal-State-local fiscal relations. The assessment is provided in the context of a three-volume report on Federal-State-local fiscal relations recently published by the U.S. Treasury Department. The author was a major participant in the studies who generally views them favorably, but who also raises his real concerns about a number of matters.

This article summarizes and evaluates certain aspects of the economic theory of federalism, the intellectual underpinnings of the report. This article addresses the institutional context in which the report was written, which helped shape its approach, content, and conclusions. The report itself generally lacks detailed recom-mendations.

Three main themes of the report are addressed in detail in this article. These are: (a) issues relevant to programs of general-purpose fiscal assistance, which include the adequacy of any potential improvements that might be made in measures of the fiscal capacity of State and local governments; (b) the role, if any, for tax subsidies to State and local governments through the deductibility of State and local taxes in the computation of individual Federal income taxes, and the exemption from Federal income taxes of interest paid on bonds and notes issued by State and local governments; and (c) the projection of the long-term outlook for the fiscal condition of the State-local sector on a current services basis, compared with projections of the long term outlook for the Federal government.     

Political Consensus and Fiscal Outcomes

It is becoming difficult to maintain consensus in a period of economic austerity, and this possibly challenges the ability of democratic institutions to take decisions on tough economic questions. In order to find out how political consensus influences fiscal outcomes, this article sets out to analyse the association between political consensus and public expenditure growth. The results show that political consensus is positively associated with both budgeted and actual expenditure growth, but also negatively associated with budget overruns. This indicates that political consensus comes at a cost, while at the same time politicians may be better at sticking to budgets if political consensus exists. The analysis is based on a pooled regression analysis of the local governments in Denmark in the years 2008 and 2009 using a data set combining survey data with administrative data on the local governments.     

How does ethnic diversity shape the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations? Evidence from China

This study examines how ethnic diversity shapes the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations in regimes such as China, where local accountability and resident mobility are largely absent. We argue that in these regimes, ethnic diversity largely captures potential social conflicts and instability, consequently requiring a higher level of fiscal centralization and regional equalization from upper-level governments to preserve social stability. Using provincial and sub-provincial level panel data from China for 1995–2019, we find strong supporting evidence that an increase in a province's ethnic diversity significantly increases fiscal centralization and the provincial government's fiscal equalization efforts. We also show that these effects tend to be stronger in provinces whose leaders have closer ties with the central authority and where local capture is less serious. Our study contributes to a better understanding of ethnic diversity's consequences on the policy choices governments make.