Networking in the Shadow of the Law: Informal Access to Legal Expertise through Personal Network Ties

Civil legal problems are common in everyday life, but the costs of obtaining legal representation create barriers to legal action and contribute to disparities in access to justice. Some individuals, however, may have informal access to legal assistance through personal network ties with lawyers, enhancing their responses to justiciable problems. In this study, we draw from theories of social capital and network formation to examine the distribution and mobilization of network‐based legal expertise. Using nationally representative survey data, we find that network‐based access to lawyers is widespread, and most people who have ties to lawyers expect to informally mobilize legal assistance when facing a problem. But people who are most likely to afford formal legal representation are also most likely to have informal access to lawyers. Thus, while informal access to lawyers may shape responses to legal problems, it may also exacerbate inequalities in experiences with civil justice events.     

论受教育权的可诉性及其程度

受教育权的可诉性及其程度受到两个层次的理论和实践的深刻影响,一是国际法关于自由权和社会权的划分,二是国内法关于宪法权利和法律权利的区分。受教育权作为宪法权利,在自由权层面及形式平等方面具有直接的法律效力,具有可诉性;但在社会权层面,只有义务教育阶段的入学升学权和免费就学权具有可诉性。受教育权作为法律权利,其可诉性程度大大提高。平等主体之间的受教育权纠纷可由双方提起民事诉讼予以解决;但行政相对人向行政主体提起的行政诉讼则同样受到被侵害的受教育权性质的影响。     

Causes of Action: First Findings of the LSRC Periodic Survey

In this paper we report some of the first findings of the LSRC periodic survey of justiciable problems. We confirm the prevalence of justiciable problems amongst the general population. We identify important differences in the experiences of discrete socio–demographic populations, not only in terms of the number of problems faced, but also in terms of the perception of problems and reactions to them. We show that cost is not the principal barrier to taking action or obtaining advice across most problem categories. Other concerns, such as fear or uncertainty as to what can be done are generally more prevalent. We illustrate the range of strategies employed by those who take action, and confirm the rarity of court action. Finally we show that the basic form of Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat's aetiology of lawsuits is recognizable within our findings, although we explain that the manner and form of progression through the various stages is complex and irregular.     

In-house or in court? Legal challenges to university decisions

Every day, decisions are made in universities that affect students. When a decision adversely affects a particular student, what means of redress does that student have? The circumstances in which a student has a legal claim against their university are generally unclear. Courts have traditionally tended to draw a distinction between ‘purely academic’ decisions and disciplinary decisions. There has been reluctance on the part of courts to intervene in non-disciplinary decisions which involve academic judgment, for example, the grade to be given to a student's work. On the other hand, where the decisions are purely disciplinary, for example, in relation to a student's behaviour towards others or towards university property, the courts have made it clear that there is essentially no difference between this and disciplinary matters within any other public institution or organization. However, disciplinary decisions that are connected with allegations of academic misconduct, for example, cheating and/or plagiarism, have been more problematic for the courts. Historically, the debate was whether any such decision was justiciable in public law. Recently the question has also been whether an aggrieved student may succeed in a private law action against a university. The legal issues raised by university decisions affecting students have not yet been clearly resolved in all jurisdictions. Indeed, in some cases, judges have raised many more questions than they have answered. This article will review the framework for legal challenges to university decisions against a background of recent judicial attitudes in Australia, New Zealand, the UK and the US.     

Jury on stage: a common law play

Legal processes have a theatrical component to them. They offer an audience (the spectators) and actors (the legal parties, lawyers, as well as the jury and judge) who perform a play on the stage of the courtroom. In this paper we focus on the role of the jury, which appears to be simultaneously audience and actor. As audience, it assures that the power of the judge is limited. As actor, the jury is able to play its role in such a way as to incorporate social attitudes into the verdict. Exploring this theatrical component may shed new light on the debate whether juries are a “good” way of finding legal settlements. Further, it could indicate how legal processes are perceived by the public. As our line of argument builds on Adam Smith’s moral and legal philosophy, the analysis may also contribute to the understanding of one of the building blocks of Smith’s philosophy, namely the impartial spectator.     

Thinking like a lawyer/acting like a professional: communities of practice as a means of challenging orthodox legal education

Increasingly, there is pressure upon law schools, in Australia and elsewhere, to impress upon students the significance of the ethical and professional obligations of legal practice. The recent Carnegie Report explicitly looked to law schools “to initiate novice practitioners to think, to perform, and to conduct themselves (that is, to act morally and ethically) like professionals”. Many law students, however, have little appreciation of legal ethics and any concept they may have of professionalism tends to be envisaged as applying only after graduation. In this paper, we explore the idea of a “community of practice”. Lave and Wenger, who coined the phrase, contend that “learning is conceived as a trajectory in which learners move from legitimate peripheral participant to core participant of the community of practice”. We will argue that law students should appreciate that they are entering the legal profession's community of practice and that all aspects of their conduct relevant to professionalism – not only academic integrity, but matters such as time management, teamwork, relationships with peers and staff – relate to this transition into a legal professional community. Such an approach may not only serve to impress upon students the significance of “professionalism” and ethics, but inculcate in them a sense of belonging to a professional community.     

Bounded Discretion in EU Law: A Limited Judicial Paradigm in a Changing EU

Against the background of the reinforcement of the EU executive pursuant to the post‐2008 economic and financial market regulatory reforms, this article deconstructs the prevailing distinction between an executive body's discretion to make policy choices and its discretion when conducting technical assessments. This distinction, which arises out of the current judicial paradigm for discretion, has contributed to the re‐allocation of executive authority within the EU (sanctioned in UK v Parliament and Council and Gauweiler v Deutscher Bundestag). The article traces the distinction's roots in legal conceptions that have shaped legal‐administrative thinking since the early days of the Etat de Droit or Rechstaat. It proposes a public‐interest‐regarding conception of discretion where, in an institutional context where courts’ reviewing role may be limited, discretion's relationship to law is a matter of how legal norms may operate in the spheres of discretion that they attribute to decision‐makers, rather than how courts may review an exercise of discretion.     

Are Legal Concepts Embedded in Legal Norms?

In this paper, we discuss the problem of the relationship between legal concepts and legal norms. We argue that one of the widespread theories of legal concepts, which we call ??the embedding theory??, is false. The theory is based on the assumption that legal norms are central for any legal system and that each legal norm establishes an inferential link between a certain class of facts and a certain class of legal consequences. Alf Ross??s embedding theory was presented in his famous paper ??Tu?CTu??. According to Ross, the sole function of legal concepts is to simplify normative information. Hence, the use of legal concepts may be a matter of convenience, rather than necessity. We criticize this approach mainly by pointing to the existence of so-called second order substantive concepts, which are not reducible to any determined set of conditional sentences (inferential links). In short, second order substantive concepts play the role of general standards, and general standards are used to provide flexibility for a particular legal system. In addition, general standards are ??value loaded??, since they serve as a frame of reference for judges applying law to particular cases. To understand such general standards as a predefined set of conditionals means to overlook their ??open?? content, and thus their function. In our opinion, the acceptance of the embedding theory means to misinterpret the function of general standards. We also argue that Giovani Sartor??s idea of defective legal concepts doesn??t help to clarify or defend the embedding theory.     

On the unification of legal rules in the European Union

Unification of legal rules in Europe is not a new phenomenon. However, nowadays, Europe is still an area with many different jurisdictions. This paper studies the process of unification of legal rules in the European Union within a non-cooperative game-theoretical framework. This paper contributes to the understanding of the process by concentrating on the role of the European Commission. In the law-and-economics literature, it is argued that national legal rules will converge more or less spontaneously through the works of legislators and judges. But legal convergence in the European Union is not inevitable: preferences toward legal rules differ across nation-states; substituting a legal system for another one is costly; a coordination problem may arise. We first study the interactions of two nation-states who choose non-cooperatively their legal rules. We shall argue that the action of the Commission is, at first sight, likely to eliminate the coordination problem (under certain conditions). Two factors are at work. First, the Commission has a certain expertise which enables it to propose new and perhaps more efficient rules (so that the choice of unification does not reduce to select a particular nation-state legal system). Second, the Commission may use a system of fines that induces nation-states to abide by its rules (once these rules are adopted by nation-states). Next, we refine our first model: the process of legal unification is viewed as a game where nation-states choose the game that they will play. They choose if they will try to reach an agreement without resorting to the actions of the Commission, or if they will play the game implicitely proposed by the Commission. This captures more precisely the action of the Commission, its ‘right of initiative’’, the publication of proposals in ‘green’’ or ‘white papers’’. In this second model, a coordination problem may arise. JEL Classification C72 · K00     

Crossing Borders and Criminalizing Identity: The Disintegrated Subjects of Administrative Sanctions

This paper draws on in‐depth, qualitative interviews that examine individual experiences in two different legal contexts: deportation regimes and supermax prisons. Through putting these contexts and experiences into dialogue, we identify common legal processes of punishment experiences across both contexts. Specifically, the U.S. legal system re‐labels immigrants (as deportable noncitizens) and supermax prisoners (as dangerous gang offenders). This re‐labeling begins a process of othering, which ends in categorical exclusions for both immigrants and supermax prisoners. As individuals experience this categorical exclusion, they cross multiple borders and boundaries—often against their will—moving from prison to detention center to other countries beyond the U.S. border, and from isolation to prison to “free” society. In both cases, the state action that subjects experience as punishment is civil and, therefore, nominally not punitive. Ultimately, excluded individuals find themselves in a space of legal nonexistence. By examining these common processes and experiences, we argue that a new kind of subject is revealed: a disintegrating subject (as opposed to a juridical or disciplinary subject) whose exclusion reinforces the power of the state.     

Measuring legal implementation of the international guidelines on HIV/AIDS and human rights

With over 36 million people now living with the virus and over 21 million people dying of AIDS in the last two decades, HIV/AIDS is a global health and security problem. These shocking figures eclipse the human toll of many wars, and reveal in themselves that human rights are not being respected, protected, or fulfilled, either through negligent omissions or violations. A human rights approach to the epidemic was advocated early by advocates such as Jonathan Mann, who recognized that infections thrived in conditions of inequality. This approach was crystallized in the International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights that were developed at the Second International Consultation in 1996 convened by UNAIDS and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. The Guidelines cover three main areas: improving governmental responses in terms of multisectoral responsibility and accountability; widespread law reform and legal support services; and supporting increased private sector and community participation in effective responses to the epidemic. This article focuses on the half of the twelve Guidelines that concern rights that are justiciable and amenable to law reform. It highlights the responsibilities of States Parties to human rights treaties, as they bear the principal burden of the obligations to implement.     

Educating towards ethical lawyers: a progress report

In 2010 in a conference paper on legal education and ethics, we addressed the proposition that exempting degrees offer a unique opportunity to inculcate students with the importance of ethical considerations throughout their legal education, incorporating such considerations in an integrated academic and vocational context. The paper included a detailed analysis of the practicalities of incorporating professional legal ethics into the undergraduate exempting law degree at Northumbria University. Since 2010, there has been relatively little written from a UK perspective on incorporating teaching of legal ethics at the undergraduate stage. Here we review our progress made towards achieving that goal. The article reveals that the results have been limited; we explore the reasons for this, and consider what alternative course(s) might have been followed. As such, our experiences may offer guidance for those intending to engage with the Legal Education and Training Review (LETR) recommendations to incorporate some consideration of ethics into legal education.     

行政行为撤销要件的修订

行政诉讼法采用封闭性正面列举的立法模式,仅规定违反法定程序、适用法律错误、超越职权等五种情形为行政行为撤销的要件,致使有些违法形态难以归入其中,给司法实践和后续立法造成了困难。行政行为的撤销要件是对司法审查的指引而非制约,其构成应建立在对法律规范的分类基础上,并采用开放的立法结构。建议将来修订行政诉讼法或制定行政程序法时,增列“没有法律依据的”、“决定内容违反法律规定的”和“其他侵害公民、法人或其他组织合法权益的”三种情形为撤销的要件,以解决实践中的解释困惑,并增强这一制度的社会适应力。     

The Justiciability of Resource Allocation

A perennial problem in public law is how courts ought to deal with legal challenges to the allocation of public resources. This article explains and renders more coherent the varied approaches of English courts to the justiciability of resource allocation disputes in administrative and tort law. It draws a distinction between 'discretionary allocative decision-making' and 'allocative impact.' The non-justiciability doctrine in R v Cambridge Health Authority , ex p B is concerned with the former only. By contrast, allocative impact is a justiciable matter, but can still ultimately defeat a claim. This distinction, however, does not guide judicial approaches under the Human Rights Act 1998, where courts have chosen mostly to eschew the non-justiciability doctrine in favour of more flexibly applied notions of judicial deference. Thus while the non-justiciability doctrine has a relatively narrow scope in administrative and tort law, it has nearly disappeared under human rights law.     

Logical evaluation of evidence when a person is suspected of committing two separate offences.

We consider the problem of drawing inferences within a legal framework when a person is a suspect for two separate offences. Although we are primarily concerned with scientific evidence the issue inevitably arises as to how that evidence interacts with other, non-scientific evidence. We show that, in this particular context, the evidence can be conveniently classified into three categories that concern, respectively: the first crime only; the second crime only; and evidence that relates to similarities between the two crimes. Two case examples are considered and we consider DNA, fibres and eyewitness evidence. These are viewed from the perspective of a prosecutor who has to decide whether or not to charge a suspect with one or both crimes. Graphical sensivity analyses are presented which have features that are not intuitively obvious.     

Why a Criminal Prohibition on Sex Selective Abortions Amounts to a Thought Crime

In a sex selective abortion, a woman aborts a fetus simply on account of the fetus’ sex. Her motivation or underlying reason for doing so may very well be sexist. She could be disposed to thinking that a female child is inferior to a male one. In a hate crime, an individual commits a crime on account of a victim’s sex, race, sexual orientation or the like. The individual may be sexist or racist in picking his victim. He or she could be disposed to thinking that one race or sex is inferior to another. I argue that while a prohibition on sex selective abortions is anomalous in a liberal, criminal legal framework, hate crime legislation may not be. The former but not the latter constitutes a thought crime. I define a thought crime as one where an agent’s motivation is not just relevant but sufficient to take an act from the domain of the non-punishable to the domain of the punishable. Ignoring a woman’s sexist motivation in procuring an abortion suddenly renders her act of abortion legal. On the other hand, discounting an agent’s bias in committing a hate motivated assault or murder does not transform the act from a punishable one to a non-punishable one. Assaulting or murdering is already a crime.     

Instituting Authority. Some Kelsenian Notes

A rule of recognition for a legal order L seems utterly circular if it refers to behaviour of “officials.” For it takes a rule of recognition to identify who, for L, counts as an official and who does not. I will argue that a Kelsenian account of legal authority can solve the aporia, provided that we accept a, perhaps unorthodox, re‐interpretation of Kelsen's norm theory and his idea of the Grundnorm. I submit that we should learn to see it as the vanishing point rather than the final basis of validity in a legal order. To prepare the ground for this proposal, I will briefly explore the claim to authority that is characteristic of politics. Then I sketch a multi‐layered canonical form of the legal norm, including their “empowering” character (Paulson) in terms of performative operators. I show how it leads to a “perspectival” account of the basic norm. In conclusion, I briefly point to the example of sovereignty and acquis communautair in international law to illustrate this view     

Deficiencies in the Development of European Criminal Law

Criminal law is beginning to outgrow the shoes which were fitted to it by European law. It is seeking to come of age, to play the role in European law previously reserved to commercial law, private law, employment law, and public law in the broadest sense. Economic knowledge and legal-political organisational interests have long grouped around 'European criminal law'; a still vaguely determined object. A desire also exists to make criminal law justiciable in Europe. Thus, the ranks of the contributions to European criminal law are swelling, European associations of lawyers are developing, legal practitioners are launching appeals3 and winning influence within European institutions. These institutions themselves are beginning to accept and to use criminal law as a political option. This article aims to (I) reflect upon the contents of this development, (II) to clarify their tendencies, and (III) to examine the contents of these premised tendencies, in order to (IV) furnish a critical evaluation.     

Compatible victims? Prison overcrowding and penal reform in Belgium

The Belgian criminal justice system has recently gone through a period of unprecedented legislative reform. One of the major innovations has been the establishment of a new type of tribunal which is responsible for decision-making and follow-up related to the execution of penal sanctions (tribunal de l’application des peines/strafuitvoeringsrechtbank). This new institution is created and regulated by two pieces of legislation, formally approved in May 2006. The paper discusses the Parliamentary trajectory of this reform and pays special attention to how a victim's perspective (that is, the enactment of certain types of information and hearing rights for certain categories of victims of crime) came to be included in the new regulation. It is argued that one of the most important implications of the whole reform (that is, the future loss of Ministerial control with respect to managing the prison population) has contributed to the legal construction of the victim in the legal proposal as submitted by the Government to the Senate. The provisions in this legal proposal which related to victims of crime needed to be ‘compatible’ with an age-old problem of serious prison overcrowding. The legal proposal, therefore, was oriented towards defining victims in such a way that giving them a role in the post-sentencing phase would not hamper the smooth release of inmates out of the Belgian prison system.     

Political Self‐control and European Constitution: The Assumption of National Political Loyalty to European Obligations as the Solution to the Lex Posterior Problem of EC Law in the National Legal Orders

Current understandings of the constitutional effectiveness of EC law emphasise the European Court of Justice's (ECJ's) claims of supremacy and direct effect, and the acceptance of those claims by the national courts. However, the lex posterior problem of EC law in the national legal order—the problem whereby the application of European obligations in the national legal order could be legislated away by subsequent contrary national legislation—has been addressed not by national courts' acceptance of Costa but by national courts' assumption that national legislatures do not intend to legislate contrary to prior European obligations, often developed from separately established national doctrines which assume legislative fidelity to treaty obligations. As such, the solution to the lex posterior problem of EC law in the national legal orders rests on these national legal doctrines combined with pervasive national legislative self‐restraint. Political self‐control in the Member States supports the European legal order.