United we stand: Constituency homogeneity and comparative party polarization

We argue that party polarization is a function of parties' distances, their internal homogeneity, and their relative sizes. While existing measures in political science incorporate the first and last feature, party homogeneity is typically neglected. Since virtually all polarization measures in one way or another incorporate distance, we suggest a simple way to adjust distance measures for party homogeneity. We then examine levels and trends of polarization in nine OECD countries using a newly collected data-set which includes left–right party positions based on both expert and mass surveys.     

The probability of casting a decisive vote: The effects of a caucus

We study the effects of caucus formation upon a voting process with the aid of a Pólya-Eggenberger probability model. The model contains a parameter interpretable as cohesiveness between voters in a voting body. We examine relationships among members' voting power, satisfaction, and group cohesiveness. We also explore the likelihood of a distortion of opinion resulting from the caucus.     

Learning the structure of a simple rent-seeking game

This paper considers a form of the Tullock imperfectly discriminating rent-seeking game in which the contestants are uncertain about the value of a bias parameter in the probability of winning function. Beliefs about this unknown parameter are not constrained to be static; we consider two methods by which the players' prior beliefs on this parameter can be updated. First, we allow for information to emerge by considering the case in which the game is played twice, with the outcome of the first game known before the second begins. The identity of the winner of the first contest represents information which emerges endogenously that can be used to revise beliefs on the unknown bias parameter. Second, information can be produced outside of the model by an external agency; this gives rise to exogenous learning. We consider the consequences for rent-seeking in each of these two cases.     

A political economic analysis of labor migration and income redistribution

We present a two-country political economic model of income redistribution with internationally mobile labor. Migration can be exogenous and/or endogenous (i.e., determined by labor income differentials). Political influence is determined by the size and homogeneity of the groups, where the latter can be affected by immigration. We show that immigration can increase the transfers to, and the income of, the mobile group. We also investigate the possibility of migration regulation, tax-transfer policy competition and coordination and, finally, coordination of regulation policies. It is shown that the selection of any of those regimes will depend on the particular distribution of political influence among the relevant social groups in the two countries.

     

Corruption is bad for growth (even in the United States)

We estimate the impact of corruption on growth of output per worker in U.S. states. We improve on existing studies of the cost of corruption by using a better specified empirical model, focusing on a study population that is less likely to be affected by parameter heterogeneity, and controlling for endogeneity using political variables to instrument for corruption. We find that corruption plays a significant and causal role in lowering growth and investment across the states.     

Inferring Transition Probabilities from Repeated Cross Sections

This paper discusses a nonstationary, heterogeneous Markov modeldesigned to estimate entry and exit transition probabilitiesat the micro level from a time series of independent cross-sectionalsamples with a binary outcome variable. The model has its originsin the work of Moffitt and shares features with standard statisticalmethods for ecological inference. We outline the methodologicalframework proposed by Moffitt and present several extensionsof the model to increase its potential application in a widerarray of research contexts. We also discuss the relationshipwith previous lines of related research in political science.The example illustration uses survey data on American presidentialvote intentions from a five-wave panel study conducted by Pattersonin 1976. We treat the panel data as independent cross sectionsand compare the estimates of the Markov model with both dynamicpanel parameter estimates and the actual observations in thepanel. The results suggest that the proposed model providesa useful framework for the analysis of transitions in repeatedcross sections. Open problems requiring further study are discussed.     

Bicameral bargaining and federation formation

This paper takes a political economy approach to fiscal centralisation through federation formation. We analyse a two-region model of federalism with inter-regional policy spillovers. Departing from a state of independence with decentralised provision of public policy, we analyse the proposed formation of a federation to internalise the spillovers. We consider equilibrium allocations under alternative institutional environments involving: simple majority voting, a restriction of uniform taxation, and regional bargaining through a bicameral legislature. Bicameralism facilitates federation formation for the largest set of parameter values of the model, which is consistent with the observation that bicameralism and federalism often appear together.     

A Bayesian Change Point Model for Historical Time Series Analysis

Political relationships often vary over time, but standard modelsignore temporal variation in regression relationships. We describea Bayesian model that treats the change point in a time seriesas a parameter to be estimated. In this model, inference forthe regression coefficients reflects prior uncertainty aboutthe location of the change point. Inferences about regressioncoefficients, unconditional on the change-point location, canbe obtained by simulation methods. The model is illustratedin an analysis of real wage growth in 18 OECD countries from1965–1992.     

Rational choice theory and the analysis of political action

The rational choice approach to the analysis of political action takes as its starting point the need to construct a model of the individual actor and its choices as the basis for its investigations of the interactions of a plurality of actors. This paper questions the theoretical foundations of that approach, concentrating on its postulates of rationality, homogeneity, and individualism. It argues that the conceptualisation of actors, their decisions, and the conditions in which they are made, rasies important questions that cannot be posed within the rational choice approach. A final section indicates some of the problems with recent attempts to integrate elements of the rational choice approach into marxism.     

Party policy equilibrium for alternative spatial voting models: An application to the Norwegian storting

In recent years a lively debate has emerged concerning the empirical status of the traditional proximity spatial model versus a directional model of voter choice. The central reason for this scholarly interest concerns these models' contrasting implications for parties' policy positioning, with the directional model motivating parties to present extreme policies, but the proximity model promoting centrist positions. To this point, however, there exist no studies that compute parties' optimal strategies in historical elections, for these competing models. This article addresses this issue, by examining party policy strategies in a multiparty electorate for three different vote models: (a) the proximity model, (b) a directional model (c) a mixed model which combines proximity and directional components. Each model incorporates past voting history and the random effects of unmeasured variables. Using parameter estimates derived from analyses of survey data from the 1989 Norwegian Election Study we compute — for each of these vote models — the configuration of party policy positions that maximize each party's vote share in relation to those of the other parties. We find that for each model, such a vote–maximizing configuration exists, but — for the proximity model — represents an unrealistic, tightly clustered array. A mixed proximity–directional model, however, provides by far the most convincing account of parties' actual policy strategies with regard to dispersion and vote share.     

Party policy equilibrium for alternative spatial voting models: An application to the Norwegian Storting

Abstract In recent years a lively debate has emerged concerning the empirical status of the traditional proximity spatial model versus a directional model of voter choice. The central reason for this scholarly interest concerns these models' contrasting implications for parties' policy positioning, with the directional model motivating parties to present extreme policies, but the proximity model promoting centrist positions. To this point, however, there exist no studies that compute parties' optimal strategies in historical elections, for these competing models. This article addresses this issue, by examining party policy strategies in a multiparty electorate for three different vote models: (a) the proximity model, (b) a directional model (c) a mixed model which combines proximity and directional components. Each model incorporates past voting history and the random effects of unmeasured variables. Using parameter estimates derived from analyses of survey data from the 1989 Norwegian Election Study we compute — for each of these vote models — the configuration of party policy positions that maximize each party's vote share in relation to those of the other parties. We find that for each model, such a vote–maximizing configuration exists, but — for the proximity model — represents an unrealistic, tightly clustered array. A mixed proximity–directional model, however, provides by far the most convincing account of parties' actual policy strategies with regard to dispersion and vote share.     

Selection Bias and Continuous-Time Duration Models: Consequences and a Proposed Solution

This article analyzes the consequences of nonrandom sample selection for continuous-time duration analyses and develops a new estimator to correct for it when necessary. We conduct a series of Monte Carlo analyses that estimate common duration models as well as our proposed duration model with selection. These simulations show that ignoring sample selection issues can lead to biased parameter estimates, including the appearance of (nonexistent) duration dependence. In addition, our proposed estimator is found to be superior in root mean-square error terms when nontrivial amounts of selection are present. Finally, we provide an empirical application of our method by studying whether self-selectivity is a problem for studies of leaders' survival during and following militarized conflicts.     

Economic determinants of presidential elections: The fair model

Ray Fair has constructed a model explaining the incumbent share of the two-party presidential popular vote for the elections of 1916-1984. The economic measures of the growth rate of real per capita GNP and the absolute value of the rate of inflation are singled out as important. In addition, a time trend favoring Democrats and whether an incumbent is seeking reelection are included.I argue that the Fair model is misspecified. Including the rate of growth in the Dow Jones Industrial Averages significantly improves the fit of the model, eliminates the trend as significant, reduces the income parameter, and strengthens the inflation parameter. In addition, the model remains stable when including the 1908 and 1912 elections, and up-dating to include the 1988 election strengthens the results.The explanatory power of the model is impressive with only one missed election outcome (1976) between 1908 and 1988, and this miss is easily explained by the impact of Watergate on the Republican candidate, President Ford.     

Testing Explanations of Strategic Voting in Legislatures: A Reexamination of the Compromise of 1790

A difficult yet prevalent problem in legislative politics is how to assess explanations when observable actions may not represent true (and unobserved) legislator preferences. We present a method for analyzing the validity of theoretical/historical accounts that unifies theory, history, and measurement. We argue that approaches to testing accounts of legislative behavior which are theoretically and historically agnostic are not always best and present an approach which: (1) forms an explicit explanation of behavior (here a simple dynamic voting game) that yields estimable parameter constraints, and (2) tests these constraints using a customized empirical model that is as consistent as possible with the explanation. We demonstrate the method using legislative voting data from the first Congress (1789–1791). Using the idea of sophisticated equivalents from voting theory we subject the traditional account of the “Compromise of 1790” to a statistical test and find that there is reason to doubt the claim that legislators of the time believed the specified log roll was taking place. The results suggest that the capital location and assumption issues were resolved independently.     

The gender gap in comparative perspective

Abstract. Although the 'gender gap' in Western democratic publics has received an increasing amount of scholarly attention, one interesting anomaly has not been addressed. At the level of many specific issues, women appear to be more liberal than men. However, at the level of general ideological orientations, women are either more conservative, or there are no significant gender differences. We explore this disjuncture between levels of cognitive abstraction through the 1984 Eurobarometer data and conclude that the left-right continuum appears to have a different meaning for men and for women. Women seem much more likely to regard the left-right space as referring to 'preservationist' values of religion and cultural homogeneity, and men conceptualize the left-right space in economic and 'New Polities' terms.     

How Turnout Depends on the Number of Parties: A Logical Model

We illustrate the power of “logical models” (Taagepera, 2007 Taagepera, Rein (2007) Predicting Party Sizes: The Logic of Simple Electoral Systems (NewYork: Oxford University Press).[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) by offering a three-parameter model of the relationship between the effective number of parties and electoral turnout that makes use of the constraints on what parameter values are internally coherent given boundary conditions to specify functional form, and seeks not optimal curve fitting but rather a direct model testing. In our model, one parameter reflects an effect that generally acts to increase turnout as the effective number of parties increases, another an effect that generally acts to decrease turnout as the effective number of parties increases, while a third parameter allows for baseline variation in turnout across countries (or within countries across elections). We fit this model to district-level data from 237 elections held in 17 countries, representing a wide range of electoral system types generating multi-party contests, with over 20,000 district-election observations. The basic intuition, that turnout rises to a peak as the effective number of parties increases and then falls slowly, fits our data pretty well.     

European Integration and Citizens' Rights: A Comparative Perspective

The prospects for European Union citizenship are sometimes discountedby reference to homogeneity in the United States compared todiversity in the European Union. This article suggests thatthere may be more similarities between the two systems thanis sometimes supposed by many observers. Even though there areimportant differences, both systems have had to address similarquestions about how to combine the benefits of integration andthe protection of rights. In discussing the common and divergentfeatures, the author argues that comparison also reveals thepossibility that it is diversity, not homogeneity, that is necessaryto the protection of citizenship's rights.     

Two hypotheses about the emergence of a post-national European model of citizenship

Citizenship is not just a status (defined by a set of rights and obligations), it is also an identity that expresses membership in a political community. It also has a substantive political dimension of active participation in the public sphere. Traditionally, collective identity and the membership dimensions of citizenship have been seen as intrinsic to the nation-state. The processes of globalization that have undermined the sovereignty of the nation-state make it necessary to reconceptualize citizenship in light of a ‘post-national’ framework. At the same time, however, the ‘culturalization’ of the social and the ‘multiculturalization’ of societies are putting into question the homogeneity of a collective identity. According to a recent hypothesis, a new post-national model of citizenship is emerging, one of European construction. In seeking to explore this position, the paper advances two additional hypotheses: (i) EU policy-making and governance are likely to foster a post-national European civil society with multi-level citizenship participation; and (ii) European anti-discrimination regulations are likely to accelerate the emergence of an alternative model to multiculturalism that can address differences within a universal framework of rights.     

Strategic ratification

Previous models of ratifier effects have relied on restrictive assumptions regarding the dimensionality of the choice space and the preferences and rationality of actors. These assumptions can lead to an underestimation of the importance of ratifiers and a mischaracterization of their role. A model presented here responds to these concerns and finds that when ratifiers are strategic, ratification requirements consistently aid negotiators in settings where previous models find no effects. Furthermore, new relations between the types of ratifier and the strength of their influence are identified. Negotiators benefit from in-group homogeneity on dimensions along which negotiators agree and from internal dissension on dimensions along which negotiators disagree.