Public choice and tort reform

The common law originally was thought to be immune to rent seeking. More recently, scholars have recognized that attorneys are engaged in exactly that activity. Rent seeking by the legal profession has greatly expanded the scope of US tort law, and generated efforts to reverse its expansion. Organized groups (attorneys, businesses and doctors) are active on both sides of the issue and the partisans have numerous tools available for advancing their agendas, such as litigating, lobbying for favorable rules and attempting to elect sympathetic legislators and judges. All of this creates an ideal setting for public choice analysis.     

Public choice principles of redistricting

This paper uses fundamental principles of public choice, mainly the median voter theorem, to develop a simple theory of redistricting. The focus is on how closely policy outcomes correspond to majority rule. The main results are: (1) Potential policy bias in favor of nonmajority groups is structurally linked to the number of legislative seats and the population, and the structure of most states puts them very close to the theoretically maximum bias. (2) Random districting, which might seem like the essence of neutrality, does not eliminate policy bias on average. (3) Traditional principles of compact, contiguous districts that respect existing political boundaries, stressed in the Supreme Court’s Shaw v. Reno decision, minimize the chance of nonmajoritarian outcomes. Our analysis also offers a gerrymandering explanation for the positive relation between seats and spending that is usually taken as support for the “Law of 1/n.”     

Public choice theory and antitrust policy

We survey the pioneering contributions of Robert Tollison to the theory and practice of antitrust law enforcement. Inspired by his period of service during Ronald Reagan’s first administration as Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Economics, Tollison was the first scholar to apply public choice reasoning to the question why antitrust frequently fails to achieve its stated goal of protecting consumers against unwarranted exercises of market power. In supplying evidence that the outcomes of antitrust processes are shaped more by special interests than by the public’s interest, he was instrumental in launching a wholly new research program.     

Public choice in private markets

He has written widely on social and economic issues.     

Valence politics and economic crisis: Electoral choice in Canada 2008

This paper investigates factors affecting voting behavior in Canada’s October 2008 federal election. The election was held in the context of a rapidly worsening financial crisis that threatened to become a global economic meltdown. National survey data gathered in the 2008 Political Support in Canada Study reveal that the deteriorating economy trumped the opposition Liberal Party’s Green Shift Program as the major campaign issue by a huge margin. Damage done to the governing Conservatives by the economic crisis was limited by perceptions of their leader, Prime Minister Stephen Harper. Analyses of a mixed logit model of electoral choice shows that although the Conservatives had a relatively small share of party identifiers and Harper was widely disliked, his image as “safe pair on hands” helped his party weather the political storm generated by the flood of bad economic news.     

Public choice in local judicial systems

For their contributions to earlier drafts, acknowledgements are extended to Webb Smathers, Ron Faas, Rod Ziemer and other reviewers.     

Public choice in a federal system

Except for the mobility constraints imposed on political decisions of lower-level governments, public choice analysts assume that the working of the political process under federalism remains the same at all levels of governments as under unitary state. This paper argues that one dimension of the political process in a federalist framework lends itself to specific economic analysis, namely the fact that, once constitutional limits break down and functions overlap, two or more levels of government compete for the same voters in the supply of services in a given territory. Viewing votes as inputs in the production of political outputs, the conventional analysis of allocation under common-property rule should shed light on the outcome of this process. The analysis shows that it is in the interest of both suppliers to seek to gain the votes in being first to implement programs. There are thus two forces operating in a typical federalist system, an expansionist one rooted in the political dynamics analysed here, and a restrictionist one based on the mobility of resources among decentralized entities. This may explain why the empirical record is rather mixed on the contribution of federalism to containing government growth. The consequences of this process are derived and possible avenues for improvement are explored.     

Public choice in the new century

This special issue of Public Choice was designed to afford leading scholars the opportunity to summarize the current state of the public choice literature in key areas of public policy concern and to offer their thoughts about future directions of research. By laying out public choice frameworks for analyzing some of the major challenges confronting democratic governments at the dawn of the 21st century, the issue’s overarching goal is to demonstrate the vibrancy and continuing relevance of the public choice research program.     

The ethical poverty of cost-benefit methods: Autonomy,efficiency and public policy choice

The principle of efficiency holds as the basic standard of market decision-making. Routinely however, it has been applied as a standard of judgement to public choices as well. This essay proceeds on the basis of four assumptions. First, that efficiency, outside the market context, has two manifestations (Cost-Effectiveness Analysis and Cost-Benefit Methods) which are made distinct by one's concentration on judging the most cost-effective means to policy ends otherwise arrived at, and the other's use of efficiency to judge both the means and end of policy choice. Second, that although efficiency is a fit primary decision standard within a competitive market a principle with more distinctly moral weight is needed to judge ends outside of markets. Third, that one possible source of this moral weight is individual autonomy or freedom that is a fit ethical principle upon which to set the ends of public policy. Fourth, that the use of cost-benefit methods rather than cost-effectiveness analysis implies that it can satisfy the requirements of both efficiency and autonomy. If the efficient policy choice also provided protection of individual autonomy then cost-benefit methods could be used for the analysis of public policy ends, but if it fails to have a deeper moral justification then the role of efficiency in the public sector must be limited only to its judgement of cost-effective means to policy ends arrived at by a non-efficiency standard. I will argue that the autonomy of individual choice in a market is a thin and morally impoverished ethical standard of judgement that adds no additional moral weight to market efficiency for the judgements of policy ends. This conclusion limits efficiency to the consideration of public means alone, eliminating cost-benefit methods as a fit approach to policy analysis while simultaneously promoting cost-effectiveness analysis and the search for an independent moral standard for the assessment of public ends.This essay was originally prepared for the 1989 meeting of the APSA in Atlanta and I wish to thank all those who read and commented on my work at that time. In addition, I would like to thank those who participated in its evolution to this form: Douglas MacLean, Mark Sagoff, Brian Barry, Alan Donagan, Russell Hardin, Maurice Wade, Andy Gold, Thomas Reilly, Diana Evans, an anonymous reviewer at Policy Sciences and its two editors, William Ascher and G. Brewer.