Ideology and Interests in the Political Marketplace

I develop a statistical method to measure the ideology of candidates and political action committees (PACs) using contribution data. The method recovers ideal points for incumbents that strongly correlate with ideological measures recovered from voting records, while simultaneously recovering positions for PACs, unsuccessful challengers, and open‐seat candidates. As the candidate ideal points are estimated independently of voting records, they represent a useful new resource for testing models of legislative behavior. By incorporating nonideological covariates known to influence PAC contributions, the method also shows promise as a platform for furthering our understanding of PAC contribution behavior.     

Organizational variables and contribution behavior of large PACs: A longitudinal analysis

Although there has been a good deal of research on PAC contribution behavior, to date there has been no effort to systematically evaluate the impact of various organizational characteristics of PACs on their contribution behavior over time. Using data from a newly released longitudinal file from the Federal Election Commission, I examine the impact of organizational variables on the contribution behavior of large PACs in three election cycles, and on changes in contribution behavior between these elections. I find that PAC type, size, age, and the presence of a Washington office are all important determinants of PAC contributions. Changes in organizational characteristics, particularly growth in revenues, are weakly related to change in contribution behavior, which seems to be primarily a response to changes in the strategic environment.     

X-efficiency and technical efficiency

This paper examines the relationship between campaign contributions from savings and loan and finance industry PACs and membership on the House Banking Committee. The distinguishing features of this paper are that we focus on campaign contributions at an industry level, and we use regression analysis to determine whether membership on the House Banking Committee, the committee with oversight responsibility for the savings and loan industry, influences the level of contributions received by an individual legislator. We find that members of the House Banking Committee do receive significantly greater contributions from the savings and loan and finance PACs than do other members of Congress and that being chairman of the House Banking Committee also pays a dividend.     

Political Action Committee Spending and Senate roll call voting

This paper addresses how PAC spending affects the roll call voting behavior of U.S. Senators. Using a theoretical framework which draws broadly on the voting literature, we develop models that explain Senatorial voting behavior in a pre-PAC and post-PAC world. Testing both models we find weak support for a Downs-Black view of voting participation in the first model. The second model supports the alteration of voting incentives resulting from PAC spending. We find that PACs have a positive effect on voting participation. The conjecture remains whether PACs change voting outcomes, but it is clear that they buy voting participation.     

False advertising and experience goods: the case of political services in the U.S. senate

This study uses the voter-shopping construct to analyze signaling of moderateness in the U.S. Senate. We compare legislator-provided signals (advertising)—such as membership in the U.S. Senate’s Centrist Coalition—with actual voting histories in order to characterize these types of advertising cues as sincere or insincere. Following recent research indicating that moderate legislators receive greater financial support, we test whether or not Political Action Committees (PACs) are willing to support financially those who send false signals of moderateness. Our results show that the mean level of real PAC contributions garnered by non-moderate Democrats who send false signals exceeds that of the non-moderate Democrats who do not do so by $182,078. This figure is about 74% of mean level of real PAC contributions for those non-moderate Democrats who do not send false signals.     

Looking for leverage in PAC markets: Corporate and labor contributions considered

In this paper we explore the popular perception that political action committees (PACs) have substantial influence over elected legislators. We question whether the leverage in the PAC market is on the side of the contribution-maker or the contribution-taker. Analysis of the structure of PAC markets suggests most markets are sellers' markets, not buyers' markets. PAC contributions then may be more like protection money than attempts to buy votes or access. The leverage of the politician (seller) may be tempered if a substantial number of large PACs have homogeneous interests, and the ability to concentrate their contributions to the same legislators. This contention is supported by analysis of differences in labor and corporate PAC giving in the 1980 and 1984 general elections. Labor PACs, which are much larger than corporate PACs, have more homogeneous interests, give virtually all of their money to one party, and appear to have more discretion in making contribution decisions than do corporate PACs. An implication of this analysis for corporate executives is that using political action committees at the federal level may not be a strategy where corporations have a comparative advantage. — Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan.) — Senator Thomas Eaglecton (D-Mo.)     

Ideology,voting, and shirking

Since we first raised the issue in 1979, scholars have addressed two questions regarding ideology and congressional voting. Does ideology have an impact on such voting? Do representatives shirk by voting their own ideology rather than their constituents' interests? For the first question, it appears that there is a consensus that ideology does matter, although we present some confirming evidence for 1980. The second question has been confused; some think that ideology and shirking are identical, although they are logically separate categories. We show that even if ideological shirking exists, it is relatively unimportant. We also show that self interested (non-ideological) shirking exists. We conclude that research efforts to untangle constituents' and representatives' separate ideologies have been misguided and that further efforts to examine the determinants of constituent ideology should be pursued.     

Political action committees at the state level: Contributions to education

This paper examines campaign contributions from educational political action committees (PACs). Using a new and unique data set of political activity of the educational PACs across the fifty states and throughout the decade of the nineties, the authors describe the contributions' patterns of these groups. The authors argue that teachers occupy a low cost position for organizing. Approximately 90 percent of educational PAC spending is on behalf of teachers' organizations. Generalized least squares analysis of the state-year variance in contributions indicate that competition between teachers' groups and other education interest groups is a significant factor that influences the educational PACs expenditures.     

Ideology in Policy Debates: Congress and the S&Ls in the 1980s

Is a national value such as free enterprise relevant to congressional debates of important economic policy bills? This question was examined using debates of three reform bills that dealt with savings and loan industry problems in the 1980s. To employ free enterprise concepts in justifying policy stands challenged legislators because industry problems contrasted sharply in the early 1980s (overregulation) and later (excesses under deregulation). Research demonstrated, however, that free enterprise concepts dominated the earlier discussions and, intriguingly, were at the center of the 1989 debate about bailing out the industry and reforming it. The conclusion elaborates free enterprise's role and speculates about the influence of another national value on the S & L discussions. Enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery Enforcement Act of 1989¹ capped a decade of congressional struggle with the question of how to treat the problems of federal savings and loan institutions. Popularly known as “thrifts” or “S & Ls,” their status became a matter of increasing concern to Congress as the 1980s unfolded and public indignation over a prospective government bailout of unprecedented proportions mounted. This article focuses on an aspect of this struggle that has a larger significance, namely, the place of national values2 in the genesis of important economic policy statutes. Given the predilections of American society, the value that tends to loom largest in major economic policy debates is popularly know as “free enterprise” or “the market economy.” One may reasonably object that U.S. capitalism operates under a “mixed economy” whose features include enterprises owned or sponsored by the federal government as well as government subsidies and regulation of private businesses. The short answer to this objection is that the term free enterprise is used here in a mythic sense and “myths are an essential starting place for insights into how values shape policy…” (de Neufville and Barton, 1987). In essence, this article examines the following questions: (1) Did congressional debates on proposed statutes relate provisions of the 1980, 1982, and 1989 bills to free enterprise concepts? (2) If so, what adjustments were made in these concepts for the sharply contrasting circumstances encountered by S & Ls in the course of the decade? and (3) How was the peculiar relationship of government deposit insurance of S & L accounts to free enterprise treated in the bills? Two background sections introduce the discussion.     

States and PACs: The legacy of established decision rules

The growth of political action committees (PACs) and their growing role in campaign finance have led to calls for placing limits on campaign contributions by PACs. State decisions regarding whether to limit PAC contributions appear to result from established policy orientations regarding other campaign finance issues: states with a history of previous efforts to regulate campaign finances are more likely to limit PAC contributions.     

PACs,lobbies and political conflict: The case of gun control

Previous research has shown that PAC contributions from the National Rifle Association as well as letters and lobbying by Handgun Control, Inc. significantly affected Congressional voting on the Firearms Owners Protection Act of 1986, holding constant ideology, party, constituency characteristics, and a proxy for prior position on the issue. Using data from that study, this paper shows that contributions have a somewhat different effect than lobbying. Contributions from NRA were primarily targeted at NRA supporters and had the net effect of making the progunners even more so. Contributions from Handgun Control, while they did not significantly reinforce the proclivities of the gun controllers, were directed only at that group. At least in this case, money appears to exacerbate conflict. By contrast, the police lobby directed its attention at both gun controllers and pro-gunners; the lobby effectively induced pro-gunners to moderate their position. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that PACs associated with membership groups, which seek to retain members whose primary reason for joining is self-expression, are likely to allocate monies in such a way as to exacerbate policy conflict and to allocate lobbying activities so as to induce moderation. Nonetheless, because the gun issue is unidimensional, the finding that money fosters conflict implies only that Congress will be noisy, but not in disequilibrium.     

Pivotal power brokers: Theory and evidence on political fundraising

This study examines the campaign fundraising success of Senate incumbents that have a unique, pivotal status (legislatively) in the Senate with regards to parliamentary procedures (e.g., the filibuster). Regression estimates place the fundraising advantage, in favor of certain pivotal moderates over all other Senators, at about $2.12 million (in real terms) in total contribution per 2-yr election cycle. Pivotal status is even more significant in explaining variations in PAC contribution in the U.S. Senate, given that individuals who make contributions are not likely to be as interested as PACs in ‘buying policy.’ The results also suggest that Krehbiel’s Pivotal Politics (Krehbiel, K. (1988). Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. lawmaking. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago press.) construct warrants modification, given that it offers prediction about policy outcomes and gridlock intervals without fully incorporating interest group politics of the ‘vote-buying’ or ‘policy-buying’ variety.     

The rational behavior theory of voting participation: Evidence from the 1970 and 1982 elections

In recent years a substantial literature on the determinants of voting participation has been developed. In many of these studies voting is assumed to be an expression of rational behavior. That is, people vote when they expect that the benefits will exceed the related costs. Voting is largely an act of consumption based upon the widely held belief that one should vote to fulfill a civic duty or upon some combination of personal characteristics which is sufficiently vague to make precise measurement impossible. The rational behavior theory, however, holds that voting is influenced at the margin by personal and environmental factors which incrementally affect expected benefits and costs, making the act of voting more or less rational. Those factors which increase expected benefits will, ceteris paribus, enhance the probability that one will vote. Those factors which increase expected costs will, of course, have the opposite effect. This study is presented as a primarily empirical contribution to the literature which assumes that, since voting is an expression of rational behavior, it can be modeled and tested using standard economic analysis and methodology. The study is designed to fulfill several purposes. First, we update previous empirical work using data from the 1980 census and from the 1982 congressional elections. The results of our regressions strongly support the rational behavior theory. In addition, we test to determine whether it is less rational for southern blacks to vote as compared to their white counterparts. Our results suggest that the answer is affirmative. Tests of parameter equivalency between the 1970 and 1982 congressional elections are performed with some interesting results. Finally, tests for specification error provide evidence that the rational behavior model and congressional district data generate statistically valid estimates of the determinants of voting participation.     

Finance industry PAC contributions to U.S. Senators, 1983–88

In this paper, I examine the relationship between campaign contributions from PACs representing the finance industry and membership on sixteen standing committees in the Senate. I hypothesize that finance industry PACs will contribute more to the Banking committee, the Senate committee with the greatest responsibility for developing public policy that affects the finance industry. My results indicate that committee assignment does influence the distribution of finance industry PAC money; the finance industry does give significantly more to members of the Senate Banking committee. This is the first study to find this relationship between PAC contributions and committee membership in the Senate.     

Economic interests and voting on the omnibus trade bill of 1987

This paper presents an econometric analysis of the votes on five pivotal amendments to the omnibus foreign trade bills of the U.S. House and Senate in 1987. Probit estimation is used to identify the relationships between geographic variations in employment in trade-sensitive industries and congressional voting on changes in foreign trade policy procedures. The implied pattern of expected net benefits for the industries from the five amendments is highly consistent with qualitative evidence on the costs and benefits at stake. Two general conclusions stand out: (1) Procedural foreign trade policy proposals can have very specific beneficiaries. (2) Diffuse export interests can be influential in opposition to procedural protectionism.     

PART in Retrospect: An Examination of Legislators' Attitudes Toward PART

This research adds insight into the congressional reaction to the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) by exploring the influence of individual legislators' personal experiences and ideological position on their attitude toward PART. Specifically, the factors explored include ideological position held by legislators, level of business experience, level of campaign financing received from political action committees (PACs), years spent in Congress, seniority, and congressional chamber. The results indicate that legislators with higher levels of business experience generally were more supportive of PART and that the length of time they had served in Congress and the amount of campaign contributions they had received from PACs were negatively related to PART support. The study also provides insights into legislators' overall exposure and sentiment toward PART. The data indicates that only a small proportion of legislators clearly expressed positive or negative opinions toward PART, despite widespread exposure to the tool. These findings are important in that they contribute toward a more comprehensive understanding of the congressional reaction to PART and offer further insights into the challenges of securing congressional buy‐in for executive performance budgeting initiatives.     

REPRESENTATIVE IDEOLOGY AND THE VOTE FOR WELFARE REFORM

This article examines the congressional vote for HR3734, The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. The primary concern is to identify the factors that had a significant influence over the voting decision, paying special attention to representative ideology measured by Americans for Democratic Action and American Conservative Union voting scores. An empirical model is developed and estimated using logistic regression. The model incorporates proxies for representative ideology, constituent ideology, constituent economic interests, and the potential for legislative shirking. The results indicate that representative ideology was an important factor in the vote, but that constituent ideology and interests were also influential. Knowledge of the pattern of voting on the original legislation should prove useful to policymakers as the need for further refinement of the welfare system becomes evident, as it almost surely will.     

Explanations of protectionism in international trade votes

In this study, we analyze the voting records of U.S. senators on three recent international trade bills. Our objective is to assess the importance of ideology and constituent interest as forces that influence protectionist vs. free trade voting behavior. The methodology uses discriminant analysis supplemented with expert judgement. The first conclusion is that ideology is the more important force in generic protectionism issues, and local constituent interests are more important for commodity-specific issues. Second, we find that protectionism is especially associated with liberal ideology, high import impact, and low export dependence. Although the discriminant analysis outperforms expert judgement in classifying protectionist vs. free trade votes in two of the three bills studied, the best explanation is obtained by using both methods together.We are indebted to Dennis Quinn, Tom Brewer, Michael Czinkota, Karen Gaertner, Annette Shelby, and Melanie Hayes. Errors remain our responsibility.     

Ideology and the size of US state government

This paper theorizes that the impact of ideology on the size of US state governments increases with state income. This idea is tested using state-level ideology data derived from the voting behavior of state congressional representatives. Empirically the interaction of ideology and mean income is a key determinant of state government size. At 1960s levels of income the impact of ideology is negligible. At 1997 levels of income a one standard-deviation move towards the left of the ideology spectrum increases state government size by about half a standard deviation. Estimated income elasticities differentiated by state and time are found to be increasing with ideology and diminishing with income, as predicted by the theory.     

Bailout for sale? The vote to save Wall Street

This paper provides a public choice analysis of the 2008 banking bailout in the United States. The paper introduces heterogeneity of congressional districts into the common agency problem in special interest politics. District heterogeneity implies district-specific electoral constraints on legislators’ ability to collect rents from, and cast dissonant votes in support of, special interests. An empirical analysis examines legislative voting on the initial bailout proposal, using campaign contributions to legislators from special interest groups and the importance of financial services for employment within congressional districts as the main explanatory variables. The empirical analysis corrects for possible endogeneity bias, using valid instruments, and considers several intuitive sub-sample estimations as alternative methods for addressing the endogeneity issue. The paper provides empirical evidence that campaign contributions from the financial services sector influenced legislative voting on the banking bailout.