Terrorism,Dynamic Commitment Problems,and Military Conflict

Since 9/11, several states have initiated military conflicts in the name of fighting terrorism. However, studies indicate that the costs of terrorism are insignificant compared to the damage created by war. This raises the question: Why do states initiate costly wars when the risk posed by terrorism appears marginal? This study presents two explanations. First, we argue that while terrorists frequently fail to achieve their strategic objectives, terrorists can accomplish tactical objectives and may transition to insurgencies by seizing control of pockets of territory. States may respond by initiating preventive wars to stop terrorists from consolidating control over their strategically valuable territories (e.g., resource‐rich areas). Second, rival states may opportunistically exploit terrorist violence by declaring that the government is a “weak state.” This allows rivals to seize portions of the government's territory under the cover of fighting terror. We test these hypotheses using post–Cold War African dyads from 1990 to 2006.     

The Myth of the Failed State and the War on Terror: A Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom

Abstract

A central hypothesis in the articulated rationale inspiring the war on terror suggests that failed states play a key role in the international terrorist nexus and require external intervention and guided democratization. This logic is based on two related premises; first that there is a direct link between failed states and international terrorism, second that democratic governance reduces the recourse to terrorism. This article suggests that there is no causal link between failed states and international terrorism and that the asserted ability of democratic governance to catalyze a reduction in terrorism is exaggerated if not wholly inaccurate.     

Blood and ink! The common-interest-game between terrorists and the media

It has often been pointed out in the literature that a symbiotic relationship exists between terrorist groups and the media. As yet, however, no formal model has been built based on this issue and only very little empirical research has been done in this field. The present contribution builds a simple game theoretic model, focussing on the strategic interactions between terrorists and the media. The model has features of a common-interest-game and results in multiple equilibria. After a discussion of the policy implications of the model, an empirical analysis is performed. Using newspaper coverage, terror incidents and terror fatalities data, it is shown that media attention and terrorism do mutually Granger cause each other, as predicted by the model. Moreover, it is explained why terror attacks tend to be “bloodier” in developing countries than in Europe and the United States.     

The friend of my enemy is my enemy: International alliances and international terrorism

Terrorism is an instrument for groups that cannot achieve their political goals legally. One important strategic function of terrorism is to weaken the government – either directly by attacking representatives or supporters of the government or indirectly by causing a political response that is unpopular among the population. Often, however, political stability of the home government is buttressed by foreign powers. In this case, the terrorists can have a strategic interest in attacking nationals of these foreign countries. This article analyses this logic by looking at international alliances as a proxy for international support. If the friend of my enemy is my enemy, then terror entrepreneurs, which seek to overthrow their home country's government (the enemy), may find it attractive to target nationals of the foreign allies of their country (the friends of the enemy). The theory in this article predicts that attacking nationals of a foreign ally is particularly attractive if this ally is militarily more powerful than the home country. Moreover, the combined effect of alliance and relative power differentials becomes stronger the more democratic the ally and becomes weaker the more democratic the terrorists' home country. Empirical support for the hypotheses in this article is found in an analysis of a directed country dyad sample of international terrorism.     

Escaping the merchant/missionary dilemma: an imperial policy for the Asia-Pacific

The Asia policy of the Bush administration follows from two principles: its preference for ‘hub-and-spoke relationships’ led from Washington, and the restored priority of security issues over the mixture of trade interests and human rights that was the hallmark of the Clinton presidency. The initial focus of the administration on the restoration of political and strategic ties with old allies such as Japan, and on strategic competition, has been mitigated by another realistic approach: the need to seek new allies and partnerships. This policy was already evident towards India before September 11, 2001, but has been magnified with the onset of a coalition against terrorism, and almost as importantly, against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The resumption of strategic and military ties with China, the priority of anti-terrorist cooperation over human rights issues with Southeast Asia, the increased support for India that is of more strategic value than America's tactical involvement with Pakistan, are developments that overshadow the US relationship with traditional allies such as Japan or the European Union. The major weakness of the Bush Asia policy, however, is its relative neglect of major economic and social issues in the region. Although support for some weakened ASEAN economies has increased, there is neither a more intense coordination of economic policies with Japan, in spite of initially declared intentions, nor a major economic and social strategy for Southeast and South Asia that would support the fight against terrorism.     

It can happen here: the impact of the Mumbai terror attacks on public opinion in Western Europe

Do terror attacks have an impact on public opinion, even if the terror attacks happen far away? We exploit the fact that the fourth round of the European Social Survey was conducted in several West European countries at the time of the 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai, India, in order to identify the causal effect of the Mumbai attacks on public opinion. We identify a clear jump in fear of terrorism at home as a consequence of the terror attacks, but despite the increase in fear of terrorism, we find no significant effect of the attack on support for illiberal interrogation techniques or for liberal immigration policies. We do find indications of a shift in conservative direction on the left–right scale, but this shift is not significant in all time windows. Our findings suggest that a terror attack needs to have a very large impact on the fear of terrorism before people change their policy preferences.     

Terrorism and systems terror

In this paper we discuss the censorship of political statements sympathetic to terrorism as an instance of what Lyotard calls ‘terror’. Our claim is that the traditional approach to questions of censorship of ‘subversive’ politics only captures part of the story; what is at stake is not merely the censorship but at a deeper level, the withdrawal of the possibility to challenge the censorship. This two-tier logic of silencing is what we explore with the help of Lyotard's earlier and later work, first by relying on his analysis of ‘terror’ in the framework of ‘agonistics’, then of ‘terror’ as différend'.     

The politics of warning: Terrorism and risk communication

The problem of risk communication in the context of imperfect intelligence regarding a prospective, rather than actual, terrorist attack is examined in order to assess recommendations for precise guidance for the public. Particular problems are noted with the iterative quality of risk communications about terrorism, as they allow the terrorists to change their behaviour, the difficulty of offering tactical warning without a prior strategic analysis, and the tendency to focus on the vulnerabilities of a society rather than the intent of the terrorists. These issues are assessed through a case study of the Bali attacks of 2002, before an analysis of the American experience following the attacks of 9/11. This experience confirms the difficulties of attempting to convey risks to the public by altering public alert levels.     

World Risk Society and War Against Terror

I interpret the 'war against terror', declared following September 11 2001, as adopting concepts drawn from the work of Ulrich Beck, as a projection of world risk society. Despite its global character, war against terror is constructed through outmoded vocabularies of national security and sovereignty, within which the reasoned negotiation of risk is marginalized. This exclusion contributes to the intensification rather than reduction of terror and terrorism. In so doing the moment of violence inscribed within the concept of the political resurfaces in the constitution of war against terror, Homeland Security, and the identities and anxieties that they reproduce. Contrary to Slavoj Žižek's claim that risk society is incapable of resolving the dilemmas that it exposes, Beck's approach cuts across established ideological and methodological boundaries, anticipating key transformations of discourse required to address the prevailing global predicament through the vocabularies and logic of cosmopolitan risk, rather than those of absolute security, terror and war.     

Governance of Terror: New Institutionalism and the Evolution of Terrorist Organizations

A preoccupation with network approaches in terrorism studies has inadvertently marginalized the fact that terrorist groups are subject to many of the same bureaucratic forces that impact all purposeful organizations. Because typical organizations are subsumed in the concept of networks, it is curious that scholars have been so quick to bypass more traditional models of organizations and bureaucracy that may help us understand network topology. This article relies on the new institutional approach to organizational behavior. Using the Coase theorem to explain the costs and benefits associated with different organizational structures, it follows that counterterrorism efforts may drive some groups toward greater autonomy while compelling others to adopt common bureaucratic processes, often referred to as isomorphism. By exploring the different costs that terror groups face and examining the characteristics of terrorists associated with different groups, organizational theory can help explain a divergent trend in terrorism research: leaderless jihad and increased bureaucratization.     

Can Terrorism Abroad Influence Migration Attitudes at Home?

This article demonstrates that public opinion on migration “at home” is systematically driven by terrorism in other countries. Although there is little substantive evidence linking refugees or migrants to most recent terror attacks in Europe, news about terrorist attacks can trigger more negative views of immigrants. However, the spatial dynamics of this process are neglected in existing research. We argue that feelings of imminent danger and a more salient perception of migration threats do not stop at national borders. The empirical results based on spatial econometrics and data on all terrorist attacks in Europe for the post-9/11 period support these claims. The effect of terrorism on migration concern is strongly present within a country but also diffuses across states in Europe. This finding improves our understanding of public opinion on migration, as well as the spillover effects of terrorism, and it highlights crucial lessons for scholars interested in the security implications of population movements.     

Rewarding Bad Behavior: How Governments Respond to Terrorism in Civil War

Although violent organizations often use terrorism as a means to achieve political aims, recent studies suggest the tactic is ineffective because it fails to help groups gain concessions. While focused exclusively on concessions, these studies overlook other important markers of success, specifically whether groups are invited to participate in negotiations as a result of their use of terrorism. Extant studies also conduct statistical analyses on overly aggregated data, masking any effect terrorism has on important bargaining outcomes. Using new monthly data on the incidence of negotiations and the number of concessions offered to groups involved in African civil wars, this paper demonstrates that rebel groups are both more likely to be granted the opportunity to participate in negotiations and offered more concessions when they execute a greater number of terror attacks during civil wars.     

Extremism, suicide terror, and authoritarianism

This paper studies extremist behaviour, and its connection to authoritarianism. I divide extremists into two groups, leaders, who demand extremist acts such as assassinations, suicide terror or other forms of political violence from followers, who supply them. I assume that both the leaders of extremist groups and their followers are rational. The paper looks at three examples: Communism, Nationalism and Islamic Fundamentalism. I show that leaders with extreme ideologies also tend to adopt violent methods when there is an indivisibility between the intermediate goal of the group and its ultimate goal. Turning to followers, the most important innovation of the paper is a simple model which explains how it is possible for a person to rationally commit suicide to further the goals of a group. The most important policy implications of the paper are, firstly, that one should look at the goals of extremist group in order to understand their actions. If one can un-bundle the goal or make the indivisible divisible, then there may be ways to provide these goals in a way which satisfies some of the potential supporters of the group and thus dries up support for the grander ambitions of the leaders of extremist groups. Secondly, the provision of programs which foster social cohesion tends to dry up an important motive for extremist activity: the desire for solidarity. Thirdly, policy towards terrorists should combine the use of “carrot” and “stick”. Finally, I argue that authoritarian regimes rather than democracies or totalitarian regimes are the most likely sources of suicide terror. So democracy is indeed part of the solution to the problem of suicide terrorism.     

Covert action and the Pentagon

The White House and the Pentagon have designated the military's Special Operations Command as the lead organization in the ‘war on terror’. As the military has become more involved in fighting terrorism since 9/11, special operations forces have become increasingly active in the covert, or unacknowledged, operations that have traditionally been the CIA's bailiwick. This article examines the turf battles caused by the Pentagon's new covert profile, as well as its ramifications for congressional oversight.     

Splitting the Tactical Vote? Coordination Problems with Polling Model-Driven Tactical Voting Websites

The 2019 general election gave prominence to tactical voting advice websites, particularly those projecting constituency-level results using national polling data and sophisticated multi-level regression and poststratification (MRP) polling models. We see tactical voting as an example of a coordination game and argue that polling-model driven advice websites are disruptive to the existing focal points for strategic voting. Although such websites may well help identify the strongest candidate based on constituency demographics, the article argues they are unlikely to coalesce support behind that single candidate, a prerequisite for successful tactical voting. In practice, there are multiple competing models and websites as well as other key sources of information to voters. Furthermore, the heuristic of relying on tactical voting websites is vulnerable to strategic action by partisans. In short, it is argued that the emergence of these websites risks muddying the waters further for electors seeking to vote tactically, potentially splitting the tactical vote rather than unifying it.     

Taps and Terrorism: A German Approach?

The United States is more than six years into its global war on terrorism, relying ever more on expanded wiretapping powers to halt its spread. However, looking at Germany, a country which has made far more extensive use of wiretaps for a far longer period of time, suggests that reliance on wiretaps, while not entirely ineffectual, might be more of a panacea to make people feel they are being protected than a fully functional tool in breaking up terror plots. Should the United States keep investing in these programs, or should it consider other weapons against terror?     

Preferences,Knowledge, and Citizen Probability Assessments of the Terrorism Risk of Nuclear Power

How does the American public assess risk when it comes to national security issues? This paper addresses this question by analyzing variation in citizen probability assessments of the terrorism risk of nuclear power plants. Drawing on the literature on how motivated reasoning, selective information processing, and domain‐specific knowledge influence public opinion, we argue that heterogeneous issue preferences and knowledge of nuclear energy and homeland security have important explanatory power. Using original data from a unique 2009 national survey in the United States, we show that Americans are divided in their probability assessments of the terrorism risk of nuclear power plants. Consistent with our theoretical expectations, individuals who support using nuclear power to meet rising energy demands, who are generally less concerned with terrorism, or who are more knowledgeable about terrorism and nuclear security tend to provide lower assessments of the likelihood that nuclear power plants increase terrorist attacks, and vice versa. The findings have implications for the literature on public opinion, risk assessment, energy policy and planning, and homeland security.     

After Brussels: understanding and countering ISIS's strategy

The recent attacks in Brussels confirmed Islamic State's strategy of supplementing its flagging effort to establish a Middle East caliphate with an out-of-area campaign of urban terror focusing on Europe. Unity among Europe's policymakers remains key to securing the continent against terrorism and addressing the root causes of Muslim radicalisation.     

Terrorism,anti-terrorism and the normative boundaries of the US polity: The spatiality of politics after 11 September 2001

Both terrorism and governmental anti-terrorist actions affect spatial structures and their boundaries, such as the state and the distinction between public and private spaces. Those spatial structures also articulate the normative dimensions of human life, which include the ethical principles and constitutional rights that orient behaviour and thought. By affecting the spaces, places and scales of life, (anti-)terrorism potentially can generate a new normativity. A new normativity would be manifested in changes to spatial structures and thereby would indicate that the content of political rights like personal freedom had been changed in practice. This paper addresses the possible emergence of a new normativity via an examination of how spatial structures are affected—specifically, their permeability and plasticity—by terrorist and anti-terrorist activities within a US context.     

Policy Lessons from Iraq on Managing Uncertainty in Intelligence Assessment: Why the Strategic/Tactical Distinction Matters

This paper focuses on how pre-existing policy priorities and goals among policy elites in the US, UK, and Australia encouraged the blurring of strategic and tactical intelligence assessment as a mechanism for legitimising the Iraq invasion. Through the selective use and interpretation of sometimes vague or unsubstantiated tactical and technical intelligence and the many uncertainties it contained, proponents of the war were able to undermine existing strategic assessments on Iraq by introducing a range of possible, but largely unsubstantiated, threat scenarios as justification for military action. The paper argues that in so far as intelligence reforms are needed, they should be focused primarily on the interface between analysis and policy making, and the issue of how policy makers interpret and understand the uncertainties that intelligence assessments necessarily contain.