Workers' compensation: coverage, benefits, and costs, 1985

The 84.3 million workers protected by workers' compensation laws in 1985 represented 87 percent of all wage and salary workers in that year. Both the amount of benefits paid to workers and the cost of the program to employers rose substantially from 1984 to 1985. Benefit payments totaled $22.5 billion-14.1 percent higher than in 1984 and the largest annual increase since 1978-79. About two-thirds of the payments in 1985 were money payments ($15.1 billion) and the remainder ($7.4 billion) went for medical care for disabled workers. Private insurance companies made nearly three-fifths of these payments and State funds and self-insured employers each paid about one-fifth of the total benefit amount in 1985. For the first time since 1978, the annual growth in employer costs exceeded the growth in workers' benefits, resulting in a slight decrease in the loss ratio for 1984-85. Employer costs were up nearly 17 percent from the previous year, reaching an estimated $29.3 billion. Covered payrolls increased by 7 percent in that same period. Total benefit payments as a percent of payroll also increased noticeably in 1985.     

The evolution of Japanese employer-sponsored retirement plans

This article examines the development of Japanese voluntary employer-sponsored retirement plans with an emphasis on recent trends. Until 2001, companies in Japan offered retirement benefits as lump-sum severance payments and/or benefits from one of two types of defined benefit (DB) pension plans. One type of DB plan was based on the occupational pension model used in the United States before the adoption of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), but lacked the funding, vesting, and other protective features contained in ERISA. The other type of DB plan allowed companies to opt out of the earnings-related portion of social security, commonly referred to as "contracting out." Landmark laws passed in 2001 introduced a new generation of occupational retirement plans to employers and employees. One law increased funding requirements and enhanced employee protections for employer-sponsored DB plans, while a second law introduced defined contribution (DC) plans for several reasons, chiefly to increase retirement savings and help boost Japanese financial markets. These laws complemented earlier changes in the tax code and financial accounting standards already affecting employer-sponsored retirement plans. As a result, new retirement plan designs will replace most prereform era company retirement plans by 2012. In 2001, the experience of 401(k) plans in the United States, where 42 million participants had accumulated more than $1.8 trillion in assets over 20 years, attracted considerable attention among Japanese lawmakers finalizing provisions of the DC pension law. Even with government support and encouragement from the financial services industry, Japanese companies have not adopted these new DC plans in large numbers. As a result, occupational retirement plans in Japan have remained predominantly DB-a surprising development in light of the shift in a number of countries from DB to DC plans observed in recent decades. However, recent proposals to make DC plans more attractive to employers in Japan are likely to be implemented in the near future. This article summarizes the Japanese retirement system, with an emphasis on private-sector employees, and the complementary role played by voluntary employer-sponsored retirement plans; describes the financial pressures that faced retirement plan sponsors in the late twentieth century and the factors motivating the reform of Japanese voluntary retirement plans; examines the 2001 legislative changes that have transformed company retirement plans; and concludes with a review of trends and recent developments in employer-sponsored retirement plans since the implementation of the 2001 pension laws.     

Pension sponsorship and participation: trends and policy issues

Employment sector and employer size account for substantial variation in workers' participation in employer-sponsored retirement plans. Other things being equal, employees in the public sector--that is, federal, state, and local governments--are much more likely to be offered a retirement plan than workers in the private sector. Within the private sector, workers in firms with 100 or more employees are significantly more likely than workers in smaller firms to have the opportunity to participate in a retirement plan. This situation has prompted Congress to seek ways of reducing small businesses' obstacles to pension coverage. For example, Congress has authorized retirement plans that have fewer reporting requirements and less stringent contribution rules than those imposed on larger employers. Evaluating the effect of these laws on pension coverage is complicated by the many other variables that affect an employer's decision to sponsor a retirement plan and a worker's decision to participate in it. Nevertheless, data collected in national surveys of employers and households can be used to establish a baseline against which future changes in retirement plan sponsorship and participation can be measured. Recent surveys of employers and households reveal that: During the 1990s, participation in retirement plans rose among workers in firms with fewer than 100 employees but remained steady among workers in larger firms. The 1990s saw a substantial shift from defined benefit retirement plans to defined contribution plans. Despite increases in participation, workers in firms with fewer than 100 employees are only about half as likely as those in larger firms to participate in an employer-sponsored retirement plan. In both the public and private sectors, part-year or part-time workers are much less likely than year-round, full-time workers to be offered an opportunity to participate in an employer-sponsored retirement plan.     

Can New York and Los Angeles learn from Kumasi and Bangalore? Costs and benefits of rent controls in developing countries

Abstract

This article presents comparative static estimates of the costs and benefits of rent controls for four developing‐country cities: Cairo, Egypt; Kumasi, Ghana; Bangalore, India; and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The results are compared with those from four U.S. cities: New York; Los Angeles; Santa Monica; and Washington, DC.

Rent control regimes and their effects vary widely across cities and countries. Whatever the “average” cost or benefit of controls, all markets have large variances about the average, and the variation is rarely strongly related to income or other household characteristics in a way most people would find desirable. In the countries for which there was direct evidence, landlords were richer than tenants on average, but not remarkably so, and there was considerable overlap in the two income distributions. In Cairo, where there was direct evidence, key money made up much of the difference between controlled rents and market rents. In very strict regimes, substantial reductions in rents were sometimes largely or completely offset by losses in consumer's surplus (Kumasi). Controls that give differential treatment to favored groups like civil servants were found to distribute substantial benefits to those groups without much benefit to others (Bangalore). In countries willing to incur substantial transactions costs of indexation and renegotiation of rents for leases beyond market periods, control may make little difference on average, although a wide variance of benefits remains (Rio).     

State health reform: Effects on labor markets and economic activity

Individual states are actively weighing health care reform proposals and their potential impacts on many levels, including states' own economies. This article considers the effects on state economies of two instruments of health reform: employer mandates and cost containment. The literature suggests that an employer mandate will reduce employees' wages in the long run. In the short run, however, to compensate for the costs associated with mandated health care insurance for their employees, firms may raise their prices to consumers, reduce the number of employees or allow a drop in profit margins. By increasing health care spending and the number of insured persons, mandates would also increase states' levels of economic activity. Though cost containment may dampen the stimulative effects of expanded coverage, resources not spent on health care as a result of effective cost containment might be redistributed to other sectors in a state's economy.     

Medicare utilization by disabled-worker beneficiaries: a longitudinal analysis

Medicare eligibility for Social Security disabled-worker beneficiaries begins after 2 years of cash benefit receipt. Extension of the current coverage is often proposed as a way to encourage beneficiaries to return to work. Little is known, however, about the long-run Medicare costs for the disabled and how costs vary by demographic and health characteristics. This article describes Medicare utilization and reimbursement amounts for 1974-81 for a cohort of disabled-worker beneficiaries under age 62 and first entitled to cash benefits in 1972. The data come from a first-time linkage of Disability Insurance program data with data on Medicare utilization. The tables provide a detailed look at several factors that are associated with variation in Medicare costs among beneficiaries and over time.     

Older workers' progression from private disability benefits to Social Security disability benefits

People with medical conditions that limit their ability to work tend to receive short-term disability benefits initially and may then move to long-term and eventually to permanent disability benefits. The progression of older workers (those aged 55 to 64) along that continuum of benefits is documented here with data from a large disability insurance company. The data show that older workers who receive short-term medical disability benefits are three times as likely as younger workers to progress to receipt of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits, although a slight reversal of that trend occurs as workers pass age 62. Musculoskeletal conditions are the most frequent basis of short-term disability claims among older workers, with circulatory conditions running a close second. Furthermore, although all medical conditions are more likely to lead to SSDI benefits among older workers, circulatory conditions do so most frequently. This article discusses industry standards for the management of disability claims at each level of severity. It also addresses common and emerging disability management practices that may reduce the likelihood of impaired workers developing long-term or permanent financial dependence on disability benefits programs.     

Recent trends in workers' compensation

Workers' compensation provides cash benefits and medical care to employees who are injured on the job and survivor benefits to the dependents of workers whose deaths result from work-related incidents. Workers' compensation programs in the 50 states and the District of Columbia and federal programs together paid $56.0 billion in medical and cash benefits in 2004, an increase of 2.3 percent over 2003 payments. Of the total, $26.1 billion was for medical care and $29.9 billion was for cash benefits. Employers' costs for workers' compensation in 2004 were $87.4 billion, an increase of 7.0 percent over 2003 spending. Workers' compensation programs and spending vary greatly from state to state. As a source of support for disabled workers, workers' compensation is currently surpassed in size only by Social Security Disability Insurance (DI), which covers impairments of any cause that are significant, long-term impediments to work. Although most recipients of workers' compensation recover and return to work, those with lasting impairments may become eligible for DI benefits, subject to an offset to avoid excessive wage replacement from both programs.     

Federal Employees' Retirement System Act of 1986

In June, President Reagan signed the Federal Employees' Retirement System Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-335), which establishes the Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS) for employees hired after December 31, 1983. The program, which goes into effect on January 1, 1987, features a defined benefit retirement plan to augment mandatory coverage under social security. It also permits FERS participants to contribute up to 10 percent of their earnings, on a tax-deferred basis, to a thrift savings plan, with partial matching by the Government. This article describes the provisions of the new system, including survivor annuities and disability benefits. It also explains how employees covered under the Civil Service Retirement System may freeze their earned benefits under that program and transfer to FERS during the period July-December 1987.     

Alternative Methods of Experience Rating Unemployment Insurance Employer Taxes

For most states the methodology used for assigning Unemployment Insurance tax rates to employers arose when the program was first established in 1935. More than 80 years later, with evolving employment relationships, state systems have become outmoded. This paper critiques current experience rating methods and presents new methodologies that are much easier to operate and that improve the incentives for employers to increase employment. The proposed methods would assess taxes based on employment or payroll variation such that growing firms would have lower taxes. A simulation analysis illustrates the impact of the new methods on employer groups.     

Progress toward Pay Equity in State Governments?

Are state governments fulfilling their responsibilities to be model employers of women and minorities? Using U.S. Census Bureau data on individual employees from 1980 to 2015, this article looks at how much progress state governments have made toward eliminating racial and gender pay differences. It examines whether differences in education, age/experience, citizenship, English ability, hours worked, and occupation explain the pay differences. Patterns and explanations vary substantially by group, but state governments are doing a better job than private firms of closing pay gaps on almost every measure .     

Determinants of Business Response to Government Tax Incentives for Privately Financed Termination Benefit Programs

This study examines the industry and organizational factors that determine the likelihood of business response to government tax incentives for privately financed termination benefit programs and the substitution problems confronting government programs that use tax incentives to encourage businesses to provide these benefits to their employees. It concludes that government tax incentives will likely have marginal effects on the private provision of termination benefits, especially in large firms in industries with a strong market presence from government. These programs most likely will get high participation from large firms which already provide these benefits to salaried and hourly workers resulting in high substitution effects. They also are likely to extend benefits to hourly employees in firms that already provide similar benefits to salaried workers. However, these tax incentives are likely to have very limited inducement effects on small and medium-sized firms resulting in low overall target efficiency for these programs.     

Political Positions,Hierarchies and Political Markets: Towards a New Theory on Political Recruitment*

This article adresses itself to the problem of political recruitment. Most recruitment studies are based on models of recruitment where the model presupposes more candidates than positions. Studying local committees we cannot presuppose excess demand for political positions. The article tries to introduce economic theory into the study of political recruitment. With concepts of market, supply, demand and prices, the article discusses recruitment to various types of positions. When we have extreme market conditions with either excess demand or lack of demand, the recruitment processes can best be understood in terms of hierarchical forces. The sales of less important positions in a situation with low demand for these positions could best be understood in terms of market mechanism. Comparing an economic market with a political market, the article finds variation in the transaction structure. The economic markets have a specific transaction structure, with specific obligations linked to transactions, while the political markets have a more unspecified transaction structure with more unspecified obligations linked to the transactions. A less specified transaction structure has lower transaction costs in a hierarchy than in a market. This, the author believes, could explain why some transactions take place in markets while others take place in hierarchies.     

Welfare-State Expansion and Conflicts in the Nordic Countries: The Case of Occupational Health Care

The development of occupational health Services in the Nordic countries varied considerably in terms of coverage, content and conflicts during the period 1980–90. The focus is on differences in conflicts resulting from state intervention into the sphere of private employers analysed from three perspectives: policy ambitions, institutional arrangements and employer reaction. The main finding is that the high level of conflict in Norway is related to higher state ambitions, more fragmented institutions and more direct economic costs to the employers than those found in the other Nordic countries. The higher policy ambitions and resulting adversary processes in providing occupational health Services seem to be fundamentally rooted in specific egalitarian values inherent in the Norwegian welfare state in general and the trade union movement in particular.     

Comparing replacement rates under private and federal retirement systems

One measure of the adequacy of retirement income is replacement rate - the percentage of pre-retirement salary that is available to a worker in retirement. This article compares salary replacement rates for private-sector employees of medium and large private establishments with those for federal employees under the Civil Service Retirement System and the Federal Employees Retirement System. Because there is no standard benefit formula to represent the variety of formulas available in the private sector, a composite defined benefit formula was developed using the characteristics of plans summarized in the Bureau of Labor Statistics Medium and Large Employer Plan Survey. The resulting "typical" private-sector defined benefit plan, with an accompanying defined contribution plan, was then compared with the two federal systems. The Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) is a stand-alone defined benefit plan whose participants are not covered by Social Security. Until passage of the 1983 Amendments to Social Security Act, it was the only retirement plan for most federal civilian employees. Provisions of the 1983 Amendments were designed to restore long-term financial stability to the Social Security trust funds. One provision created the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS), which covers federal employees hired after 1983. It was one of the provisions designed to restore long-term financial stability to the Social Security trust funds. FERS employees contribute to and are covered by Social Security. FERS, which is a defined benefit plan, also includes a basic benefit and a 401(k)-type plan known as the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP). To compare how retirees would fare under the three different retirement systems, benefits of employees retiring at age 65 with 35 years of service were calculated using hypothetical workers with steady earnings. Workers were classified according to a percentage of the average wage in the economy: low earners (45 percent), average earners (100 percent) high earners (160 percent), and maximum earners (earnings at the taxable maximum amount). Overall, this analysis found that: Excluding Social Security benefits and TSP and defined contribution annuities, CSRS retirees have a higher pre-retirement salary replacement rate than either FERS or private-sector retirees. Private-sector retirees, however, have higher replacement rate than their FERS counterparts. Including Social Security benefits but not TSP and defined contribution plan annuities, CSRS retirees who are maximum earners have a higher pre-retirement salary replacement rate (despite receiving no Social Security benefits) than FERS retirees with the same earnings. Private-sector retirees in all earnings categories have a higher replacement rate than federal retirees with the same earnings. Including Social Security and TSP and defined contribution plan annuities, private-sector retirees in all earnings categories have a higher replacement rate than federal retirees, but their rate is close to that of FERS retirees. The rate is higher for FERS retirees than for CSRS retirees in all earnings categories. This analysis shows that replacement creates could exceed 100 percent for FERS employees who contribute who contribute 6 percent of earnings to the TSP over full working career. Private-sector replacement rates were quite similar for those with both a defined benefit and a defined contribution pension plan. Social Security replacement rates make up the highest proportion of benefits for th private sector's lowest income quartile group. The replacement rate for 401(k) plans and the TSP account for a higher proportion of benefits than does Social Security for all other income groups, assuming the absence of a defined benefit plan.     

Developments in the Law: Garcetti v. Ceballos and the Workplace Freedom of Speech Rights of Public Employees

On May 30, 2006 the Supreme Court handed down a 5–4 decision in the case of Garcetti v. Ceballos, announcing that "when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, they are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline." Previously, the Court had held in Pickering v. Board of Education (1968) that the First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech generally prohibited public employers from firing or disciplining employees for speaking out on matters of "public concern." The Pickering decision established a two-part test that first required federal courts to determine whether the employee had spoken out on a matter of public concern and then whether the disruptive impact of the employee's statement justified the disciplinary action. This article argues that the Garcetti decision may deter many public employees from disclosing governmental inefficiency and misconduct and presenting dissenting viewpoints on matters of clear public concern. Consequently, the decision may make it more difficult for the leadership of public agencies to uncover inefficiency and misconduct.     

Will employers hire welfare recipients? Recent survey evidence from Michigan

In this paper we present data from a survey of 900 employers in Michigan during 1997. The survey was designed to gauge employer demand for welfare recipients. The results show that, given the tightness of labor markets there, the prospective demand for recipients is quite high—employers report that 3 percent of all jobs currently, and almost 9 percent over the following year, might be available to unskilled recipients. On the other hand, prospective employment is quite highly correlated with measures of unmet labor demand, implying that much of it could disappear during the next recession. Many of the prospective jobs are also found in establishments to which innercity minorities might have limited access, such as small or suburban establishments that receive few black applicants or that recruit informally. Absenteeism and basic skill readiness are potential problems, based on jobs filled by recipients to date or those that are potentially available. The effects of a variety of potential policy responses targeted at private employers (such as job placement efforts and tax credits for employment or training) are considered as well. © 1999 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Applying for entitlements: Employers and the targeted jobs tax credit

The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) is probably the most outstanding example of a generous entitlement program with a very low participation rate. Only about 10 percent of eligible youth hired are claimed as a tax credit by their employers. The causes of the low participation rates are analyzed by estimating a Poisson model of the number of TJTC-eligibles hired and certified during 1980, 1981, and 1982. Information costs, both fixed and variable, are found to be key barriers to TJTC participation. The cost-effectiveness of TJTC is low because of the stigma attached and the very high recruitment costs of hiring additional TJTC-eligibles. Because employers find it relatively cheap to certify after the fact eligible new employees who would have been hired anyway, this passive mode of participating in TJTC predominates.     

Sharing the Rewards,Dividing the Costs? The Electoral Consequences of Social Pacts and Legislative Reform in Western Europe

Do electoral pressures provide an explanation for why governments offer pacts to unions and employers rather than acting through legislation when faced with the need to pass potentially unpopular reforms to welfare policies, wages, and labour markets? This article addresses that question by analysing whether governments’ pursuit of pacts affects their vote share and increases the probability that they gain re-election for 16 West European countries between 1980 and 2012. It is found that the presence of social pacts has a significant and positive effect on incumbents’ vote shares at the next election and also results in a higher probability of re-election. These results are conditioned by government type: While all types of governments benefit electorally from pacts, the electoral penalties from the pursuit of unilateral legislation on policy reforms harm single-party majorities the most, minority governments moderately, and coalition majorities the least.     

Damned If You Do and Damned If You Don’t: Title VII and Public Employee Promotion Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact Litigation

What has been the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Ricci v. Destefano on the selection and promotion practices of public employers?; Relying solely on circumstantial evidence, the Supreme Court held that the Civil Service Board of New Haven, Connecticut, had engaged in Title VII disparate treatment discrimination by refusing to certify the results of a promotion examination that led, in turn, to a disparate impact on African American firefighters. To limit the discretion of public employers to disregard such selection and promotion exam results, the Ricci majority held that a public employer must “have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate‐impact liability if it fails to the take the race‐conscious discriminatory action.” This article argues that the decision effectively prohibits public employers from rejecting the results of selection and promotion instruments, even though there is evidence that screening instruments inequitably affect protected groups. It also forces public employers to become more careful in developing selection and promotion examinations or face the possibility of costly Title VII litigation.