CIVIL SERVICE REFORM IN THE USA: PROMISE VERSUS REALITY*

Abstract: The 1978 Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) mobilized changes to the basis and structure of the federal service which are the most far-reaching since those installed by the Pendleton Act in 1883. Several of the 1978 provisions were directed toward encouraging a more incentive-oriented approach to personnel matters. Other measures involved the dismantling of the Civil Service Commission, the installation of new mechanisms to handle labour-management relations, the codification of merit principles, and the delegation to individual agency managements of wider personnel responsibilities. This paper raises the question of whether, four years after the passage of CSRA, there are indications that the legislation is living up to its earlier promise. Attention focuses upon the character of the 1978 measures and how well the federal service is coping, or is being allowed to cope, with the private sector-style, rewards-sanctions approach to personnel matters which was embraced by the Carter proposals. To a very significant degree the 1978 Act's provisions in that respect concentrated upon the more senior managerial and supervisory levels. It is less surprising, therefore, that many of the difficulties now associated with CSRA's implementation also are concentrated among those same groups (Senior Executive Service and merit pay). The salary and other incentives available to career executives for outstanding job performance have been eroded by Congress; the sanctions for poor performance remain, however, while worries persist about the possibilities of manipulating the new performance appraisal procedures in order to harass or remove career government officials. Meanwhile, the bulk of the federal service is, in practice, largely unaffected by the new performance appraisal arrangements. Many of the concerns about CSRA have been reinforced by the actions of the Reagan Administration and the 97th Congress. The bonus system for career executives remains under siege, the pay cap remains intact, while there are more general doubts about the Reagan Administration's commitment to civil service reform. The locus of responsibility for overseeing CSRA's implementation remains unclear, while there is evidence in some agencies that Reagan political appointees have attempted deliberately to exclude career executives from the policy process. Thus, despite the probably well-intentioned initiatives enshrined by CSRA, the US federal service still finds itself beset by problems of identity and support. It still feels vulnerable, too, to the types of political abuse from which the 1978 measures were supposed to afford protection.     

Congressional responsiveness to presidential popularity: The electoral context

A number of recent studies have reported that the influence of the president's public approval rating on congressional support is not substantial. We hypothesize that this unexpected finding might be the result of the inappropriate application of an approval-driven model of legislative voting to the entire Congress. Specifically, we argue that members from certain kinds of electoral contexts—constituencies where the president's, or their own, electoral standing is in doubt—should be especially likely to vary their support for the president with changes in his approval rating. Although the patterns of presidential support scores between 1977 and 1991 do not confirm our specific hypotheses, they do suggest that the electoral context from which a legislator emerges does shape his or her responsiveness to changes in national presidential approval.     

Electoral and structural losers and support for a national referendum in the U.S.

The U.S. is one of only a few democracies in the world never to hold a national referendum. Recent national surveys reveal that a majority of respondents approve of a national referendum both cross-nationally and in America is relatively stable. Building on previous work (Bowler and Donovan, 2007), we find public opinion on a reform proposal is fluid and responsive to electoral politics, rather than stable as reported in earlier work. In this paper, we argue that contemporary support for a national referendum in the U.S. is contingent on whether a citizen is a short- or long-term “winner” or a “loser” when it comes to electoral politics. We expect that public support for a national referendum in the U.S., where legislation referred by Congress would be subject to a popular vote, may vary at the individual level because of short-term electoral fortunes as well as long-term structural conditions. Strategic voting as well as losing in candidate races and policy issues may be important, but so might be partisanship, with non-partisans the most likely to benefit from citizen law-making at the national level. Support for a national referendum might also be contingent upon state context, that is, upon use of direct democracy in the state where a person lives, as well as the population of a state. The results based on a natural experiment and 2008 panel survey data provide an important window into understanding public opinion on institutional change more broadly.     

The Public Cost of Unilateral Action

Scholarship on democratic responsiveness focuses on whether political outcomes reflect public opinion but overlooks attitudes toward how power is used to achieve those policies. We argue that public attitudes toward unilateral action lead to negative evaluations of presidents who exercise unilateral powers and policies achieved through their use. Evidence from two studies supports our argument. In three nationally representative survey experiments conducted across a range of policy domains, we find that the public reacts negatively when policies are achieved through unilateral powers instead of through legislation passed by Congress. We further show these costs are greatest among respondents who support the president's policy goals. In an observational study, we show that attitudes toward unilateral action in the abstract affect how respondents evaluate policies achieved through unilateral action by presidents from Lincoln to Obama. Our results suggest that public opinion may constrain presidents' use of unilateral powers.     

Collaborative Behavior and the Performance of Government Agencies

ABSTRACT

While collaboration among individuals, work groups, and organizations is central for understanding the performance of public agencies, most studies have focused on collaboration between organizations or sectors. We develop a model that focuses on two types of collaborative behavior: between persons (both horizontal and vertical) and between work units. We empirically test our hypotheses using data on work collaboration and perceptions of public agency performance from the United States federal government. We introduce a method for estimating the impact of different types of collaborative behavior that also accounts for nonlinear effects and a dependent variable that takes ordered values. We find that intra-organizational collaborative behavior has a large impact on organizational performance and that horizontal collaborative behavior between workers has the greatest impact among the specific types.     

Comparing Competing Theories on the Causes of Mandate Perceptions

The discussion of presidential mandates is as certain as a presidential election itself. Journalists inevitably discuss whether the president-elect has a popular mandate. Because they see elections as too complex to allow the public to send a unitary signal, political scientists are more skeptical of mandates. Mandates, however, have received new attention by scholars asking whether perceptions of mandate arise and lead representatives to act as if voters sent a policy directive. Two explanations have emerged to account for why elected officials might react to such perceptions. One focuses on the president's strategic decision to declare a mandate, the second on how members of Congress read signals of changing preferences in the electorate from their own election results. We test these competing views to see which more accurately explains how members of Congress act in support of a perceived mandate. The results indicate that members respond more to messages about changing preferences than to the president's mandate declaration .     

Democracy and Deceit: Regulating Appearances of Corruption

While corruption has long been recognized as an appropriate object of regulation, concern with appearances of corruption is of recent origin, coinciding with declining trust in government in the mid- to late-1960s. The reasoning that would support regulations of appearances, however, remains flawed, as it depends upon a "public trust" model of public service that is incomplete and often misplaced when applied to political representatives. The justification for regulating appearances is unambiguous, however, from the perspective of democratic theory. Democratic institutions of representation depend upon the integrity of appearances, not simply because they are an indication of whether political representatives are upholding their public trust, but because they provide the means through which citizens can judge whether, in particular instances, their trust is warranted. Representatives, institutions, and ethics that fail to support public confidence in appearances disempower citizens by denying them the means for inclusion in public judgments. These failures amount to a corruption of democratic processes.     

Performance Measurement in Budgeting: A Study of County Governments

This article focuses on the use of performance measurement in public budgeting. Based on a national survey of county governments, it finds that governments use performance measurement in a wide range of budgeting areas. The results also show that performance measurement users are experiencing technical obstacles in conducting performance analysis and obtaining support from legislatures and citizens. The article concludes that analytical competency and political support increase the use of performance measurement in budgeting, which leads to a more efficient, effective, and accountablegovernment.     

Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth: Challenges in Managing Philanthropic Support for Public Services

Collaborations between nonprofit and public sector organizations have become an increasingly important phenomenon in state and local public service delivery since the publication of the Winter Commission report in 1993 . This article focuses on one of the less studied types of public–nonprofit collaborations, those in which philanthropic support from nonprofit organizations supplements the resources and activities of public agencies. Drawing on the case of “nonprofit‐as‐supplement collaborations” that support park services in New York City, this article documents the benefits and drawbacks associated with such collaborations. While they can provide increased resources and encourage management innovations, they also can lead to inequities in the availability and quality of services, the preponderance of particularistic goals over the broader public interest, and the politicization of previously bureaucratic decision making. The authors offer two strategies for public managers to realize more effectively the benefits yet mitigate the shortcomings of these collaborations.     

INTRODUCTION: WATER RESOURCES AND PUBLIC POLICY

Research in water resource policy historically has reflected more general trends in public policy analysis. This symposium focuses more narrowly upon a sample of some contemporary issues.     

The Responsible Party Government Model in House and Senate Elections

Responsible party government theory requires that voters hold parties electorally accountable for their performance in control of government. Existing literature suggests that voters do this only to a limited extent—holding the presidential party's candidates responsible for government performance on Election Day. While this method of voting may hold the executive accountable for his performance, it is not really an effective way to hold the party in control of Congress accountable for its performance. The method falls short particularly when Congress is controlled by a different party than the president, but also whenever a Congress controlled by the same party pursues policies different from the president's. Using surveys of voters leaving the polls in the 1990, 1994, and 1998 midterm congressional elections, this study tests whether voters' evaluations of Congress's job performance also affect their support for majority party candidates in House and Senate elections, during both unified and divided government .     

Public attitudes toward Social Security

In the early years of the Social Security program, public support for old-age pensions was high but knowledge and understanding about benefits and taxes were low. Understanding has greatly increased, even though the program has expanded, and support for Social Security has remained high. Data from the surveys and polls examined in this article indicate that support for Social Security was strong even during the late 1970's and early 1980's, when a fiscal crisis generated a crisis of confidence in the public's perception of the system's ability to pay benefits in the future. The proportion of the American public declaring confidence in the program declined sharply from a large majority with confidence (63 percent) in 1975 to a minority with confidence (39 percent) in 1978. Following the restoration of program financing through the provisions in the 1983 amendments, the trend has reversed. By 1988, nearly one-half of the public expressed confidence in the future of the Social Security program. For the most part, other aspects of public opinion regarding Social Security have shown great stability over the years. The program is popular and has been well-supported. Support for the Government to spend more for Social Security has been consistently high, as has support for benefits to increase with inflation and for benefits to increase even if it means higher taxes. Many individuals rely on income from Social Security or expect to rely on it when they retire. It is clear that the public wants the program to continue. If participation were optional, about three-fourths of the population would stay in the program.     

Habermas and Oppositional Public Spheres: A Stereoscopic Analysis of Black and White Press Practices

Drawing upon Jürgen Habermas's discourse-based theoretical approach, this article argues that his thesis regarding the bourgeois public sphere needs to be redirected so as (1) to show how sources of communicative action may have dried up within the bourgeois public sphere and (2) to explore real emancipatory alternatives that spring up as oppositional voices of subaltern groups, oriented to understanding, and expressed in contexts wherein people's upward struggles against power and domination have not yet been completed. In support of the argument, a stereoscopic analysis is conducted that focuses on public sphere practices and counter-practices – specifically those of The New York Times as exemplar participant of bourgeois publicness and the black-owned and operated New York Amsterdam News as its oppositional counterpart.     

Seeking Quality in Training Public Financial Managers: The Place for Certification

The search for quality in public management has been provoked in recent years, mainly by the decline in the public's trust of government and by the growing interest in the development of performance measures. A general assumption that certification of public financial managers will enhance the quality of public management and will thus return public trust in government and the respect for its servants underlies the issues discussed in this article. It focuses on the endeavors to link certification and credentialing of financial managers to broader alternative strategies for assuring quality. The strengths and weaknesses of three major strategies and the available resources for their implementation are discussed: (1) promoting quality within public management education and training; (2) promoting quality within the environment where managers work; and (3) promoting quality of skills held by individual managers themselves.     

Public support for European defence: Does strategic culture matter?

This article identifies previously ignored determinants of public support for the European Union's security and defence ambitions. In contrast to public opinion vis‐à‐vis the EU in general, the literature on attitudes towards a putative European army or the existing Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) suggests that the explanatory power of sociodemographic and economic variables is weak, and focuses instead on national identity as the main determinant of one's support. This article explores the possible impact of strategic culture, and argues that preferences vis‐à‐vis the EU's security and defence ambitions are formed in part through pre‐existing social representations of security. To test this proposition, ‘national’ strategic cultures are disaggregated and a typology is produced that contains four strategic postures: pacifism, traditionalism, humanitarianism and globalism. Applying regression analysis on individual‐level Eurobarometer survey data, it is found that strategic postures help explain both the general level of support for CSDP and support for specific Petersberg tasks.     

Economic openness, policy uncertainty, and the dynamics of government support

Does globalization affect popular support for national governments? This article contends that exposure to the world economy obscures mass–elite linkages in developed democracies. Market interdependence, I argue, sends a signal to citizens that the policymaking environment has become more complex. As a consequence, publics are less certain of how to evaluate policymaker performance when exposure to the world economy increases. Informed by research on the role of uncertainty in public evaluations, I test this proposition by modeling the volatility of aggregate government popularity as a function of economic openness in four advanced industrial democracies. Results show that globalization increases the volatility—and, hence, the uncertainty—of public assessments of government performance. The implications for the political economy of advanced capitalist democracies and for models of collective public opinion are discussed.     

Output–Purchase Funding and Budgeting Systems in the Public Sector

Output–purchase funding systems are systems in which payments made to service delivery agencies by government are an explicit function of quantities of outputs delivered by those agencies. This article considers the feasibility of such systems for the funding of tax–financed public services. It focuses on the implications of key characteristics of public sector outputs and specifically upon the prevalence of heterogeneous outputs, the predominance of services (as opposed to physical goods), and the presence of many "contingent capacity services."     

Welfare Dualism in Two Scandinavian Welfare States: Public Opinion and Party Politics

Recent research on the legitimacy of the welfare state has pointed to a potential negative impact of immigration. While much of this research has been concerned with a possible weakening of the general support for economic redistribution, this article analyses popular support for the introduction of a two-tier (dualist) welfare system, and focuses on the interplay between public opinion and party competition. It uses survey data from Denmark and Norway: two similar welfare states where elite politics on migration and welfare dualism has been markedly different over the last decade. It finds that the level and structure of popular support for welfare dualism are fairly similar in the two countries, but that attitudes toward dualism have a stronger impact on left–right voting in Denmark where the politics of welfare dualism has been actively advocated by the populist right party and pursued by a right-wing coalition government.     

I Get By with a Little Help from My Friends: Leveraging Campaign Resources to Maximize Congressional Power

Central to the study of Congress is the study of relationships among members. Electoral collaboration is a function of a member's position in the broader congressional power network. It allows members to leverage their campaign resources to achieve the four classic goals of members of Congress: reelection, making good public policy, obtaining power within the institution, and having one's party in the majority. Using nearly 3.2 million FEC records from 2010 to 2016, we explore the dynamics that influence electoral collaboration. We find members are most likely to collaborate electorally with other members from the same state, party, and committee, and the most electorally vulnerable. Further, party leaders share most frequently with the rank and file. These findings build upon our expanding understanding of congressional collaboration, the networks members of Congress form, and the congressional power structure members operate within.     

EMS-based Environmental Regimes as Club Goods: Examining Variations in Firm-level Adoption of ISO 14001 and EMAS in U.K., U.S. and Germany

This paper examines variations in firm-level adoption of environmental management systems (EMS) – ISO 14001 and the European Union's Eco-Audit and Management Scheme (EMAS) – in the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States. Drawing on insights from club theory, institutional theory, and stakeholder theory, it argues that despite the fact that these EMS are created by supranational organizations (one regional and one international), firms' perceptions of their costs and benefits are largely determined by domestic factors. In particular, these perceptions are shaped by how EMS are promoted and information about them is disseminated in each country (supply aspects) and how the constellation of stakeholders (suppliers, environmental groups, regulators, general public) support their introduction (demand aspects). The paper concludes that there are numerous ways governments and interested stakeholders can encourage companies to adopt voluntary environmental codes. The key is to find the right mix of incentives for specific national contexts.