Atoms and democracy: Political transition and the role of nuclear energy

Under periods of political change from authoritarianism to democracy, why does nuclear energy become a catalyst for political protest in some countries and not others? This study investigates the link between anti‐nuclear protest and democratization, arguing that the extent to which a high‐risk technology becomes a target of democratization movements is a function of the institutional characteristics of the technology generated under the preceding authoritarian regime. In the case of nuclear energy, where authoritarian states have built an institutional foundation for the technology rooted in national identity and technical prestige, political opposition during subsequent periods of democratization will be weaker than if they had relied on its instrumental utility and on regulatory power. Such institutional claims make it difficult to attack the technology without appearing to oppose progress or the aspirations of the nation itself. During periods of political change, variations in technological institutions and their resulting legitimacy will have a dramatic effect on the strength and content of anti‐nuclear activity.     

核“动”东南亚的原因及挑战

本文旨在探讨东南亚发展核能的动机与挑战。东南亚多国积极发展核能的表面理由是能源短缺,但东南亚却又是少有的能源丰富地区,积极发展核能的几个东南亚国家中还有几个能源出口国;因此,发展核能的政治动机不容忽略。东南亚发展核能所面临的挑战也是多方位的,除了如火山、地震等自然灾害可能会危及核能设施安全外,东南亚多个积极发展核能国家的管理效率则可能是东南亚国家发展核能所面临的最大安全挑战。     

Perception and Politics in Intelligence Assessment: U.S. Estimates of the Soviet and "Rogue-State" Nuclear Threats

United States estimates of Soviet nuclear goals and capabilities and the current "rogue-state" nuclear threat reflected prevailing beliefs about threat within the U.S. government and the relative influence of agencies charged with threat assessment. This article establishes that the patterns in formal Soviet threat assessment: (i) did not reflect a uniform response to "external threat," (ii) were inevitably tied to underlying assumptions about adversary intent, and (iii) were susceptible then to perceptual, organizational, and/or political influences within government. Thus, threat assessments reflected the optimism and pessimism—and political interests and ideologies—of those who participated in the estimating process. The article concludes by examining these lessons in light of the experiences and challenges of assessing threat from small states harboring nuclear ambitions.     

From Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un: nuclear impasse or diplomatic opportunity?

The recent death of Kim Jong Il and the succession of his son, Kim Jong Un, as Supreme Leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea leaves the Northeast Asian region at a crossroads. Given the younger Kim’s lack of political experience, it is reasonable to believe that his priority will be on consolidation of his political and military power base in Pyongyang. More recently, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has sent mixed signals with regard to its intentions. On the one hand, North Korea has agreed to a moratorium of its nuclear activities and has even invited the IAEA to inspect its nuclear facilities; at the same time, however, the DPRK has also announced its plan to launch a satellite in mid-April, using technology derived from the Taepodong missile. Set against this backdrop, we underline and comparatively assess the importance of the USA, the Republic of Korea, and China, all of which will be going through a political transition in 2012. We conclude that Seoul and Beijing are in the best position to reopen the process of dialogue with the DPRK.     

Protecting people's livelihoods,restarting nuclear reactors: ‘risk recalibration’ in Prime Minister Noda's 8 June 2012 national address

Given popular concerns about nuclear accidents in the wake of the Fukushima disaster, the Japanese state shut down the last of its fifty-four reactors for inspections on 5 May 2012, the first time the country had been without nuclear energy since May 1970. However, on 8 June 2012, in a nationwide address, Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko justified a resumption of nuclear power generation at the Oi nuclear plant in Oimachi, Fukui Prefecture. This article examines Noda's speech as an example of ‘risk recalibration’. The first section outlines the underlying theoretical assumptions, while the second section provides the context behind the speech. This involved the input of political, economic and social actors as they vied for policy influence. The third section then analyses the risk rationality used in the speech itself. The argument is that while the speech is an important example of risk rationality operating through discourse as a medium of power, the overall ‘recalibration’ runs contrary to what recent studies have shown in other areas. In short, it is held that the speech follows a more traditional paternalistic logic of centralized risk management rather than a neoliberal logic of ‘individual responsibility’.     

Weapons as political symbolism: the role of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

This study evaluates the role of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) for NATO today. Historically, TNWs fulfill five objectives. First, they provide a deterrent by denial capability. Second, TNWs serve to deter TNWs by other countries. Third, as the most ‘useable’ of nuclear weapons, they offer militaries solutions to a small target set of hardened targets. Fourth, they bridge the interface between nuclear and conventional forces, maintaining linkage up the ladder of escalation. Fifth, they serve as a powerful political symbol of an extended deterrent commitment. While the perception is that their utility for NATO in plausible European contingencies is low, we argue that there is variation in the political and military roles of TNWs. We submit that, in general, the first role has lost its significance but the other objectives remain relevant to NATO's present political circumstances, especially as a symbol of the transatlantic relationship and as a safeguard against Russian belligerence. Accordingly, TNWs remain a significant part of NATO's capabilities and should remain deployed in Europe.     

Trust deficit: Japanese communities and the challenge of rebuilding Tohoku

Abstract

Trust between civil society and the state is a necessary pre-condition for successful public policy in advanced industrial democracies. It is all the more important following a mass catastrophe that affects hundreds of thousands and upends the rhythms of daily life across the country. Choices made by the Japanese government and energy utilities during and after the compounded 11 March 2011 disasters damaged relationships between civil society, utility firms, and the government. This article looks at how decision makers in Japan continue to struggle with a trust deficit and how that gap has altered the behavior of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society as a whole. Residents will continue to resist what they see as flawed disaster recovery and nuclear restart processes unless the political system undergoes major reform.     

Transatlantic cooperation,alliance politics and extended deterrence: European perceptions of nuclear weapons

This article discusses the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) debate regarding American nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) in Europe, given the broad spectrum of views on nuclear issues when comparing individual member states. What is striking is the gap between public attitudes – which are broadly hostile to keeping NSNW in Europe – and elite opinion, which privileges the maintenance of NATO commitments to preserve alliance cohesion. To better understand this tension, this article dissects the elements of extended nuclear deterrence in Europe, addressing the difficulties associated with current nuclear-sharing arrangements. For some NATO states, the alliance's nuclear weapons are a political liability, since nuclear sharing clashes with international disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. For other NATO members, maintaining the status quo is preferable, as long as there is no alliance-wide consensus on the question of NSNW. These debates have been put to rest, for now, with NATO's Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, which reaffirmed the purpose of the alliance's nuclear weapons. However, these divisive debates point to more fundamental issues in alliance management, namely the credibility of American commitments, the sustainability of extended nuclear deterrence in Europe and the inevitable political tensions these questions provoke at the domestic level for NATO allies.     

Islamic extremism and the peace process

This article first discusses the negative attitude of Islamic radical groups toward Israel and the peace process. It then presents an assessment of the long run potential of the Islamic radicals, as well as their present politico‐military capabilities to harm the peace process. The article focuses on the capacity of Islamic radicals to subvert or intimidate the pro‐peace Arab regimes, wage war and develop nuclear capabilities. It ends with some observations on how the activities of Islamic extremists influence the ongoing political debate in Israel on the future of the peace process.     

Missile Defenses and Mother Russia: Scarecrow or Showstopper?

Abstract

Missile defenses will neither derail the post-Cold War political relationship between the US and Russia nor repeal the existence of mutual deterrence as between their respective nuclear arsenals. Because politics rules strategy and strategy must pay homage to the realities of physics, missile defenses will emerge into arsenals gradually, if at all. Whether missile defenses exacerbate political tensions, or can be deployed cooperatively by the United States and/or NATO and Russia, is not a technological given, but a political decision point that will require care taking by the current and prospective administrations in Washington and Moscow.     

美朝核风波的实质与六方会谈的出路

美朝核风波再起的实质是美国霸权与朝鲜生存权的又一次政治博弈,美朝核风波的实质看成是生存权与霸权的政治博弈。进而为此展开的六方会谈框架又成为一组多方政治博弈平台。在美朝核风波愈演愈烈、几近战争临界值之际,中国从维护地区安全出发,积极出面斡旋,经三方会谈而达成了六方会谈框架。六方会谈的达成意义重大,舒解了“战争临界”;彰显了“中国作用”;取得了可视化成果。不应否认,六方会谈框架存在某种不足,却仍是解决朝核问题的最现实、最可行的方式。     

Ceci n'est pas une…American nuclear weapon in Belgium

There is hardly anybody in Belgium who publicly defends the continued deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons on Belgian territory. The longer these weapons stay, the more the existing nuclear weapons policy and by extension North Atlantic Treaty Organization itself will be regarded as illegitimate. While one should not expect massive demonstrations similar to that at the beginning of the 1980s, the pressure to protest increases. By describing the different societal and political actors in Belgium and their respective views on the possible withdrawal of US tactical nuclear weapons, this article tries to explain the gap between policymakers and citizens on this issue. The main explanatory variables are a low-profile diplomatic culture and the lack of a strong link between the anti-nuclear movement and the political parties in power, resulting in the absence of political leaders at the governmental level, who clearly speak out in favor of withdrawal.     

The EU–China energy cooperation: toward a reciprocal partnership?

The EU–China energy relationship had long been characterized by the “donor–recipient” paradigm, whereby the EU provided official development assistance to China. The EU’s assistance of China’s energy sector had been driven by normative, political, and commercial considerations. Today, the normative and political momentum in their energy relationship has been undermined, while energy investment and trade remain a difficult issue. Although the EU has been endeavoring to shape an overall “reciprocal” relationship with China, and stressing energy market access and reciprocity, China is not rushing into anything. The EU and China need to make greater efforts to find impetus for their energy cooperation, for which the involvement of business and industry actors is key. Until this is done, their energy partnership would likely remain a commitment to be fulfilled.

     

The Limited Test–Ban Agreement: Emergence of New Knowledge Structures in International Negotiation

An analysis of cognitive maps constructed from exchanges between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev on the test–ban issue suggests cultural differences in the basic knowledge structures used to represent political reality. Soviet negotiators, including Premier Khrushchev, use"processual"representations, while U.S. negotiators, including President Kennedy, use"procedural"representations. A comparison of the negotiations over time reveals the emergence of new knowledge structures that were hypothesized to facilitate an agreement on nuclear testing. A related discovery, that Kennedy and Khrushchev"translate"each other from procedural to processual and vice versa, provides additional evidence for the shared reality–building process that may be a precondition for successful negotiation.     

Public resistance to privatisation in water and energy

Since the 1990s, development agencies and international institutions have promoted private-sector involvement in infrastructure, assuming that this would inject both investment and efficiency into the under-performing public sector. In the water and energy sectors, these expectations have not been fulfilled. Private-sector investment in developing countries is falling, multinational companies have failed to make sustainable returns on their investments, and the process of privatisation in water and energy has proved widely unpopular and encountered strong political opposition. This paper examines the role of this opposition in delaying, cancelling, or reversing the privatisation of water and energy. Local civil society has successfully mobilised highly effective political activity, its opposition being based on the perceived conflicts between privatisation and equity, and over the role of the state and community in these sectors. Such opposition has involved dynamic interactions with existing political parties and structures, including the use of existing electoral and judicial mechanisms. Its success poses challenges for the multilateral and donor community, NGOs, the opposition campaigns themselves, and the future of national systems of electricity and water.     

A blessing in disguise? Scottish independence and the end of the UK nuclear posture

This article examines the implications of Scottish independence for the UK's nuclear posture. It is argued here that a vote for independence will critically undermine this posture. Since the UK nuclear force operates entirely out of Scotland, and since the Scottish government continues to assert its intention to see nuclear weapons removed from an independent Scotland, it is overwhelmingly likely that a ‘Yes’ vote will prompt a demand for the drawdown of the UK nuclear force in Scotland. If it wished to maintain its nuclear capability, the UK government would then have to make alternative basing arrangements. It is argued here that a host of legal, financial and political difficulties may preclude any such relocation and that Downing Street may ultimately be left with little option but to surrender the UK's nuclear capability. This article concludes that far from weakening the UK, a surrendering of its nuclear posture would result in a stronger and more functional UK military footprint and would bolster the UK's standing in the international arena.     

The petroleum factor in Sino-Japanese relations: beyond energy cooperation

China and Japan used to have good energy cooperation beforeChina switched into a net oil importer in the mid-1990s, butthe recent years have witnessed an increasingly intensive competitionbetween the two countries over petroleum supplies. While manysaw such competition as inevitable with China's growing energydemands, the paper argues that the energy relationship betweenthe two countries was never separated from political and strategicconcerns, and heavily affected by the concern of ‘relativegains’, as suggested by the neorealists. Like the caseprior to the mid-1990s when the non-energy factors underpinnedthe Sino–Japanese energy cooperation, the key factorsthat prevented the two from continuing energy cooperation todayalso lay in political and strategic aspects. Being two regionalpowers in East Asia, China, and Japan need to recognize thefact that their lack of energy cooperation due to mutual politicaldistrust will not only impair their own energy security, butmay also have negative implications on regional stability.     

Politics,proximity and paranoia: the evolution of Kashmir as a nuclear flashpoint

This article traces the evolution of Kashmir as a “nuclear flashpoint,” and the relationship between Kashmir, nuclear weapons, and regional security. The first section discusses the concept of a geopolitical flashpoint, providing a definition and a series of historical examples. The Kashmir issue and its role in the broader Indo-Pakistani conflict fit reasonably neatly into this definition. A second section briefly traces the history of nuclear weapons programs in the region, as the potential for nuclear escalation by competing powers or their allies is a key factor in defining nuclear flashpoints (a post-1945 phenomenon). The third section examines the evolution of the Kashmir issue and successive Indo-Pakistani crises within a nuclearized regional environment from 1984 to 2003. The final section assesses the prospects for Kashmir in the near future, and concludes that due to underlying political factors, Kashmir will remain a nuclear flashpoint for the foreseeable future.     

Reconsidering the ontological foundations of international energy affairs: realist geopolitics,market liberalism and a politico-economic alternative

Accounts of international energy affairs often present a divergence between geopolitical/realist and liberal market-based approaches. This article suggests that this state of affairs reflects the (often implicit) legacies of realist and rationalist international thought in the study of energy affairs and the corresponding political and economic ontological hierarchies of analytical frameworks employed in different accounts of energy politics. Consequently, this article recommends a greater explicit attention to scientific ontological foundations in studies of energy relations and, in line with the calls of Keating et al. and Strange, suggests an approach based in the literature on I/GPE, which merges political and economic ontological axioms, as most apposite for the study of energy affairs. Building on this framework, and giving particular examples from the context of Eurasian energy politics, this article then outlines a number of politico-economic heuristic models (structural diversity, territorial non-coincidence, milieu-shaping and market-authority bargains) that are particularly useful concepts in helping to explain the intricate interactions of international energy relations.     

试论泰国政治发展的经验

政治发展是指政治系统的正向变迁过程,目的是社会价值的公正、公平的分配。在这个过程中,政治的诸要素得以改变以适应这个目标的实现。泰国正处在一个政治发展的新阶段,其社会政治力量在分化组合,政治文化也在转型,政治体制的调整日益到位。泰国的政治发展虽有着自己独特的历程,但其经验也值得发展中国家借鉴。这些经验包括:政治发展必须以合法性为阶段性目标;政治稳定至关重要;军队地位的适当与否,影响政治发展;政治发展应该有相应的政治文化支撑;国家整合是政治发展的必要前提等。