Ukrainian‐polish relations between 1991 and 1998: From the declarative to the substantive

From the first days of Ukraine's independence, Poland was singled out by Kyiv to act as its ‘strategic partner’. This partnership was expected to extend to Poland helping Ukraine integrate with subregional institutions and move ever closer to regional institutions. However, up until 1994, Ukraine's hopes were frustrated — Poland's own objectives precluded it from moving too close to Ukraine. This article will argue that the demands of regional integration, in particular NATO enlargement, promoted a greater harmonisation of policy objectives between Kyiv and Warsaw (especially on the bilateral and subregional levels) from the time it was announced. The positive impact of NATO enlargement contrasts with the deleterious effects of EU enlargement, which threatened to disrupt ties between the two neighbours.     

Ukraine's relations with the west: disinterest,partnership, disillusionment

Ukraine's relations with the West have gone through three periods of development since 1992. When relations with Ukraine have improved this has tended to be at the same time as relations between the West and Russia declined, and vice-versa. The first period is disinterest during 1992–94 when the West prioritised relations with a reformist Russia. The second period was 1995–99 when Ukraine and the West developed a strategic partnership. From 2000, Ukraine's relations with the West are best described as disillusionment due to the growing gap between official rhetoric of integration into Euro-Atlantic structures and Eurasian domestic policies.     

Ukraine's relations with the West since the Orange Revolution

Abstract

This article argues that many of Ukraine's problems are long-standing and remain unresolved because government policies are virtual (i.e. do not conform to official documents or statements) thereby reducing the effectiveness of the West's (here understood primarily as NATO and the EU) engagement with Ukraine and the ability of Kyiv to pursue its declared foreign policy objectives. The article discusses Ukraine's relations with the West through cycles of Disinterest, Partnership and Disillusionment. Under Presidents Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma three cycles equated to Kravchuk's presidency (Disinterest, 1991–94), Kuchma's first term (Partnership, 1994–99) and second term (Disillusionment, 2000–04). Three cycles partially repeated itself during Viktor Yushchenko's presidency with Partnership (2005–06) after the Orange Revolution followed by Disillusionment (2007–09), often described as ‘Ukraine fatigue’. US Disinterest in Ukraine from 2009 is an outgrowth of the Barrack Obama administrations ‘re-set’ policies with Russia resembling the ‘Russia-first’ policies of the early 1990s George W. Bush administration. US Disinterest covers the late Yushchenko era and continued into the Yanukovych presidency. The West held out a hope of Partnership for Viktor Yanukovych following his February 2010 election after taking at face value his claim of becoming a more democratic leader, compared with during the 2004 elections, coupled with an expectation he would bring political stability to Ukraine. Partnership quickly evaporated into Disillusionment the following year.     

With Friends Like These: Brinkmanship and Chain-Ganging in Russia's Near Abroad

Unrecognized statelets may be forming in the Eastern Donbas region of Ukraine under the aegis of Russian protection—a “frozen conflict.” Georgia's past provides a useful cautionary tale in reference to Ukraine's probable future. The very same conceptual debates that are currently underway in the West with respect to Ukraine—“credibility of great-power security guarantees versus chain-ganging”—have, over the past twenty years, generated policies that facilitated the rise of political coalitions within Georgia that prefer war with Russia to any other outcome.     

Invest,Hold Up,or Accept?China in Multilateral Governance

China has played an inconsistent role in multilateral governance, sometimes contributing to the creation and maintenance of international regimes, sometimes free riding or even threatening to undermine multilateral regimes to improve its position. We show that the strategic context of a particular issue of international concern affects China's approach to multilateralism and argue that our approach adds additional leverage to existing theories that rely on assumptions about its inherent disposition or socialization processes. An emerging global power will be willing to invest more in supporting a regime when its outside options are relatively poor. When its outside options are good, it will free ride on the efforts of more established states if it is not a necessary player in maintaining regimes, and if it is seen as indispensable it will threaten to hold up regime support as a way to win concessions. We show that these two factors, outside options and indispensability, can help explain changes in China's strategy with respect to the issue of North Korea's nuclear program and the regulation of international finance.     

Domestic factors influencing Ukrainian foreign policy

Ukraine is currently undergoing several large‐scale transitions: political, economic and democratic. At the same time Ukraine is gaining in importance internationally. These facts make Ukraine an important country to understand. This article explores the internal factors that affect Ukraine's foreign policy decision making, with the goal of providing an insight into the Ukrainian government. Internal influences are dividing into five broad categories: military capabilities, economic capabilities, political structure, interest groups, and competing élites. It has been found that economic factors, the presidential administration, and competing élites prove to have the most influence on Ukrainian foreign policy.     

Making and Mobilizing Moderates: Rhetorical Strategy,Political Networks,and Counterterrorism

Studies of counterterrorism have argued for the importance of bolstering, or “mobilizing,” moderates in the confrontation with violent extremists. Yet the literature has not elucidated when states seek to mobilize moderates and marginalize extremists, how they do so, or when they prove successful. The received wisdom is that states should cultivate and strengthen moderate allies by reaching out to them. This approach, however, fails to grasp the political challenges confronting potential moderates, whose priority is to build and retain legitimacy within their political community. Inspired by network approaches, we maintain that moderates can more easily emerge when their political interactions with the authorities are relatively sparse. We further argue that the state's strategies, including crucially its rhetorical moves, can bolster the moderates' local legitimacy. At times, this will entail not reaching out to moderates but isolating them. Before moderates can be mobilized, they must be made, and the state's criticism, more than its love, may do much to help moderate political forces emerge. This article explains why mobilizing moderates is critical, when it is difficult, and how authorities can nevertheless play a productive role in moderates' emergence. We establish our theoretical framework's plausibility by examining two cases—India's ultimately triumphant campaign against Sikh extremists and Spain's gradual marginalization of Basque extremists. We then suggest what lessons these campaigns against ethnonational terrorism hold for the so-called War on Terror.     

Mediation and the Art of Shuttle Diplomacy

Mediation caucusing — that is, separate meetings conducted by the mediator with some, but not all, of the parties — is widely used, but it has become increasingly controversial, as some mediators advocate for a no‐caucus form of mediation using only joint sessions with all parties present. The rationale for the no‐caucus model is that caucuses give the mediator too much power at the expense of the parties, and joint sessions improve the parties' understanding of each other's views. But caucusing adds value to mediation in several ways. First, from the standpoint of economic theory, caucusing provides mediators with an important tool for overcoming two impediments to settlement — the “prisoner's dilemma” (caused by the parties' fear of mutual exploitation) and “adverse selection” (caused by the failure to disclose information). Second, caucusing can help the mediator overcome a variety of negotiation problems, such as communication barriers, unrealistic expectations, emotional barriers, intraparty conflict, and fear of losing face. Third, caucusing provides a more private setting in which the mediator can develop a deeper and more personal understanding of the parties' needs and interests. Although the no‐caucus model may be appropriate for certain types of mediation (particularly those cases in which the parties will have an ongoing relationship), some parties may prefer the efficiency that can be achieved with caucusing, even if that means sacrificing certain other values — such as greater understanding — or giving the mediator more information than the parties have, thus creating the risk of manipulation by the mediator. Moreover, the choice is not binary — numerous variations and hybrid formats can be useful, such as sessions in which the mediator meets with only the parties' lawyers or with only the parties. Choosing the best format for a mediation is more of an art than a science, and mediators should consider, with the parties, whether the parties' objectives would be best served using only joint sessions, extensive caucusing, or a combination of these approaches.     

China's Naval Rise and the South China Sea: An Operational Assessment

Over the last fifteen years, the steady rise of China's naval capabilities has received a level of attention unmatched since the Soviet navy's expansion following the Cuban Missile Crisis. Yet much of that attention has focused on what that rise has meant for Taiwan's security or a possible contest with the United States.¹ But Beijing's seaward territorial concerns also reach far into the South China Sea. And it is there that the military balance has most swiftly swung in China's favor as a result of its modernization program. This article will examine not only how the military balance has shifted, but also what Southeast Asian countries, particularly Vietnam and the Philippines, could do to best preserve their territorial interests in response to that shift.     

Confrontations on the Issue of Terrorism Between Iran and the U.S. after 1979

The issue of terrorism has been a significant source of influence on the relationship between Iran and the U.S. since the Islamic Revolution. Iran's friendship with extremist groups that are designated as terrorist groups by the U.S. State Department is seriously challenging America's foreign policy. This article attempts to explore the prospect of confrontations on the issue of terrorism between Iran and the U.S. through a detailed analysis of their different interpretations and mutual recognitions of terrorism and through an in-depth analysis of the measures each party has taken regarding this confrontation. This article argues that the confrontation between Iran and the U.S. regarding the issue of terrorism is not strictly about terrorism. Rather, it is also about the conflicts of policies that result from different security interests and political values. Resolving the issue of terrorism depends on the reconciliation of the relationship between Iran and the U.S. Without mutual trust between the two nations, Iran will continue to support extremist groups in order to increase its influence against the external and internal pressures it is currently under, and the U.S. will continue to contain Iran's regional ambitions and seek changes in its behavior.     

Stuck in the Middle: Taiwan's Semiconductor Industry,the U.S.-China Tech Fight,and Cross-Strait Stability

The Trump administration has worked to restrict the People's Republic of China's ability to manufacture and acquire semiconductor chips since 2018. Caught in the crossfire of this burgeoning tech war is Taiwan, which is home to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), the world's largest semiconductor chip manufacturer. With the United States banning companies that use U.S. technology in their chip manufacturing process from doing business with Huawei, TSMC can no longer do business with the Chinese tech company, one of its most important clients. Until the Trump administration announced the license restriction on Huawei, TSMC had managed to walk the fine line of doing business with both China and the United States, without riling either. This article argues that the TSMC example is indicative of how great power competition between the two countries will play out for the foreseeable future. TSMC has announced that it will build a new factory in Arizona as it faces Chinese firms poaching its employees and Chinese actors hacking its systems and code for trade secrets—all actions demonstrating how great power competition will play out for tech dominance. Avoiding direct live-fire conflict, China and the United States will work to restrict the other's actions and development by forcing important tech companies, such as TSMC, into picking a side.     

An unfulfilling partnership: Ukraine and the West, 1991–2001

The political crisis in Ukraine in early 2001 and then the terrorist attacks against the US and the resulting dramatic change of international setting have sealed the trend that had emerged much earlier: the once promising partnership between Ukraine and the West has ended up in mutual unhappiness. As the West is discovering new ‘geopolitical pivots’ in the aftermath of 11 September, Ukraine has almost disappeared from the radar screen of Western attention. Yet for good reasons what happens in Ukraine, a currently uncertain and weakened country with a poor international reputation, still matters for the West. There has always been a close link between Ukraine's transition and Western attitudes towards Ukraine. This might be the moment to think afresh about past and future Western policies vis‐à‐vis Ukraine.     

The Muslim Brotherhood and the Emerging ‘Shia Crescent’

To form a more prudent foreign policy toward the Muslim Brotherhood, we must understand it not only as a domestic actor, but also as a major regional player. In fact, the Brotherhood has a complex relationship with Iran and the Shias, which blurs the lines of the so-called Shia Crescent. This article addresses the Muslim Brotherhood's foreign/regional policy by analyzing its attitude toward the Shias and Iran, thus placing it within the context of the emerging regional order. Addressing the complex relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Shias/Iran will help to clarify the regional fallout were the Brotherhood to gain control of a major Sunni Arab state. This is a vital issue for policy makers who are considering the U.S. position vis-à-vis the Brotherhood.     

Level Two Negotiations: Helping the Other Side Meet Its “Behind‐the‐Table” Challenges

A long analytic tradition has explored the challenge of productively synchronizing “internal” with “external” negotiations, with a special focus on how each side can best manage internal opposition to agreements negotiated “at the table.” Implicit in much of this work has been the view that each side's leadership is best positioned to manage its own internal conflicts, often by pressing for deal terms that will overcome internal objections and by effectively “selling” the agreement to key constituencies. Far less frequently have analysts considered how each side can help the other side with its “behind‐the‐table” barriers to successful agreement. Following Robert Putnam's two‐level games schema, I characterize such “behind‐the‐table” or “Level Two” barriers more broadly, offer several innovative examples of how each side can help the other overcome them, and develop more general advice on doing so most effectively. As a fuller illustration of a Level Two negotiator helping the other side with its formidable behind‐the‐table challenges, I pay special attention to the end‐of‐Cold‐War negotiations over German reunification in which former American Secretary of State James Baker played a key role.     

Rhetoric and Reality: Can Ukraine Create an Effective Navy to Protect its Interests in the Black Sea?

Abstract

Since the ‘Orange Revolution’ Ukraine has been engaged in a comprehensive programme of naval transformation aimed at building an effective coastal defence navy able to protect its maritime interests in the Black Sea: an efficient and well run Ukrainian coastal navy that is inherently defensive in orientation can maintain good order at sea and protect Ukraine's security and can also make an important contribution to regional security and stability. Over the last few years Ukraine has been making steady progress in developing a balanced, flexible and deployable coastal navy able to engage in a full spectrum of defence activities. However, continued progress is likely to be hampered in the medium term by the high cost of naval transformation, the challenges of democratic consolidation and friction between Russia and Ukraine in the Black Sea.     

Nato Enlargement and the Spread of Democracy: Evidence and Expectations

The second enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since the end of the cold war fueled an ongoing debate over whether the alliance contributes to democratization in Europe. In the 1990s, critics warned that the 1999 NATO enlargement would cultivate a new cold war and prove irrelevant to democratic consolidation in central Europe. Events have not borne out these forecasts, however. In Poland, not only did NATO build a civilian consensus in favor of democratic control over the armed forces corresponding to NATO norms, but it also delegitimized Polish arguments for defense self-sufficiency that had derived their credibility from Poland's experience of military vulnerability and foreign domination. Such democratizing and denationalizing trends have contributed to stability in postcommunist Europe. An assessment of the seven states that joined in 2004 similarly reveals some scope for NATO's influence in all cases. The alliance's access to domestic reform processes, however, will be uneven across cases in ways largely consistent with the predictions of the theoretical framework in this article.

     

Dahl's Procedural Democracy: A Foucauldian Critique

Using Michel Foucault's insights into the operations of power this article assesses the theoretical strengths of Robert Dahl's procedural democracy. It assumes a 'perfect' procedural democracy that functions according to the ideal standards, or five criteria, that Dahl introduces. In so far as this imaginary democracy is 'perfect' it will, according to Dahl, ensure a variety of goods such as equality and freedom. Theoretically speaking the controlling mechanisms that Foucault describes will not be able to function within Dahl's model, since they tend to annihilate the goods that it is meant to secure. The article reveals two central difficulties with Dahl's account. First it shows that a range of controlling mechanisms that suppress freedom and engender inequality could legitimately function within a 'perfect' democracy. Second, it argues that within this democracy, human traits inconsistent with the values considered essential by Dahl can still be generated. On a deeper level, the article concludes that a 'perfect' procedural democracy is untenable because procedures can never be divorced from power relations.     

China's ‘Peaceful Rise’ Enters Turbulence

This article seeks to place recent developments in China in a larger context through three arguments. First, Chinese military policy has indeed made a major turning over the past decade; second, this turning is based on a fragile and unrealistic strategy that is already eliciting counterreactions that will make achievement of its apparent goals increasingly difficult. Finally, this strategy's failure will present China with unwelcome choices about how far to take her use of force. The “rise” of China is now encountering turbulence that may undo it.     

Critique,Use and World in Giorgio Agamben's Genealogy of Government

This article explores the implications of Giorgio Agamben's genealogy of government for our understanding of critique. Agamben argues that the providential government of the world of Christian theology has bequeathed to the West an ontology of will and command. Replacing the pantheistic world of Stoic late Antiquity, the Christian world must be other than it is. The lack that this introduces is central to Agamben's account of nihilism, as it was also for Nietzsche. But what does this mean for critique? Does critique belong to the nihilistic tradition of the West; occupying the still-warm seat of God inasmuch as it finds the world wanting as if from the outside? Does this mean we are left only with affirmation—passively acceding to the world as we find it? Or is this alternative of world-rejection/world-affirmation a false one? Agamben's concept of use seeks a way out of it.