Selling the 'Decent interval': Kissinger,triangular diplomacy,and the end of the Vietnam war, 1971-73

With the help of recently declassified documents, this article examines the link between triangular diplomacy and the Vietnam War. It argues that from the summer of 1971 to the conclusion of the Paris Agreements in January 1973 Kissinger tried to 'sell' a peace agreement to his Soviet and Chinese inter locutors by stressing the American willingness to accept a 'decent interval' solution: that is, the United States would not reenter the war provided that the collapse of the South Vietnamese goverment did not occur immediately after the last US ground troops returned home. While such a posture played a significant role in increasing Sino-Soviet pressure towards a negotiated settlement, Kissinger's policy also served to bolster the subsequent competition between Moscow and Beijing over influence in Indochina.     

韩国出兵越南对其国家发展的影响

参加越南战争对于韩国来说是一次经济发展的有利时机.在与美国关于越南战争问题的讨价还价之中,韩国不仅获得了大量的美国战争补贴,还获得了企业开拓市场的机会,同时在政治上增强了自身的国际地位和与美国讨价还价的砝码.因此,韩国出兵越南参加越南战争成为推动国家发展的一把利剑.     

A ‘missed opportunity’ for peace? Harold Wilson,British diplomacy,and the sun flower initiative to end the Vietnam war,February 1967

This article examines Harold Wilson's attempts to promote a peaceful solution to the Vietnam war during his first term in office as Britain's Prime Minister, with particular reference to his discussions with the Soviet Premier, Alexei Kosygin, in London in February 1967. Wilson's diplomatic efforts were influenced by his intention to improve Anglo-Soviet relations, and by his belief that the United Kingdom could help develop East-West contacts and facilitate the process of detente. In conclusion, this article argues that the failure of the Sunflower initiative in February 1967 was due not to the intervention of American ‘hawks’, as Wilson supposed, but to the convoluted clash of interests of the powers involved either directly or indirectly in the Vietnam war – the USA, USSR, China, and North Vietnam – which handicapped third-parry peace initiatives.     

Major-General Sir Douglas Gracey: Peacekeeper or Peace Enforcer?

Current events in Afghanistan have once again placed the political context of British forces acting in difficult circumstances under the global microscope. This article focuses upon the high policy difficulties of administering peacekeeping duties by examining the controversial role of Major-General Gracey in South Vietnam and Cambodia in 1945. Gracey's British and Indian troops were deployed in French Indo-China to oversee the surrender of Japanese forces and the liberation of the Axis occupied territory. But they quickly became entangled in peacekeeping duties between the returning French colonial regime and the emergence of various Vietnamese groups determined to take advantage of the power vacuum. By examining both primary and secondary sources and scrutinising Gracey's private papers this article attempts to reappraise a difficult period in British history.     

The 2008 Russian–Georgian war via the lens of Offensive Realism

Abstract

The Russian intervention in Georgia's breakaway republic of South Ossetia in August 2008, Moscow's first-ever use of military force against a sovereign state in the post-cold war period, deserves a theoretical explanation. By following the tenets of Offensive Realism, this article will argue that the US–Russian competition in the South Caucasus is the main cause of the 2008 Russian–Georgian war. During the 1990s, the USA passed the buck to Turkey to contain Russian influence in the South Caucasus. In the early to mid-2000s, however, the Russian–Turkish relations were improved so rapidly that the USA opted, through NATO expansion, to step in as an offshore balancer. Following Bush administration's decision to support the Georgian candidacy for NATO membership and Georgia's ill-fated attempt to seize South Ossetia, Moscow went to war to re-establish hegemony in the South Caucasus. In this way, as the theory of Offensive Realism claims, the Kremlin believes that Russian state will enhance its chances of survival in the anarchical international system.     

美国因素和1962年《日内瓦协议》以后老挝内战的重启

日内瓦协议签署以后，美国并没有停止对老挝事务的干涉。美国政府在继续援助老挝反共力量的同时，进一步采取了促进老挝中立派与右派势力合作的战略。美国对日内瓦协议的公然违背造成了老挝政治力量的再次分化与重组。老挝再次陷人内战的同时，美国也对老挝事务进行了直接的军事干涉，使老挝最终成为越南战争的真正战场。     

对越南在抗美战争中采取与美国“边打边谈”斗争策略的探析

在1965~1975年5月的越南抗美救国战争中,越南劳动党明确一个总方针：战斗和谈判相结合是越南抗美救国战争的基本战略,并在1968年实现了＂边打边谈＂斗争策略,以解决越南问题。本文对越南在抗美救国战争中采取与美国＂边打边谈＂斗争策略作一探析。     

冷战后东南亚国家南海政策的发展动向与中国的对策思考

本文主要从南海争端方国家、非南海争端方国家、东盟3个层次分析了冷战后东南亚国家南海政策的发展动向。对于南海争端方国家，重点分析了越南、菲律宾、马来西亚、印度尼西亚的南海政策；对非南海争端方国家重点分析了新加坡和泰国的南海政策；对于东盟的南海政策，本文指出协调成员国在南海问题上的立场，发表联合声明表达对南海问题的立场，直接就南海问题与中国进行对话，通过东盟地区论坛讨论南海问题构成了东盟对南海问题施加影响的主要方式。在对策思考方面，本文指出中国未来的南海政策应该侧重以下几点：继续将“搁置争议，共同开发”作为解决南海问题的基本原则；坚持“双边协商”的具体策略，力避南海问题的国际化；保持与东盟在南海问题上的沟通，确保东盟不致形成在南海问题上对中国不利的一致立场；在南海区域安全机制的构建和海洋安全维护方面发挥更大的作用。     

Henry Kissinger: Realism,Domestic Politics,and the Struggle Against Exceptionalism in American Foreign Policy

Henry Kissinger was the single most controversial diplomat of the 20th century. This article explores Kissinger's approach to the philosophy of realism in international affairs, his role in Vietnam policy making, and his most recent engagement in the debate over the Iraq War. It argues that Kissinger's realism, although philosophically consistent and having roots within his own life's experience, was always tempered by his desire to exercise influence within the American political system. Once in office under Richard Nixon and then Gerald Ford, Kissinger came to recognise how significantly domestic politics shaped American foreign policy. His involvement in the Vietnam War demonstrates this, and one lesson he took from that conflict was the hope that Americans could be persuaded to move away from their convictions about American exceptionalism and recognise the limits of American power.     

India's Role in the South China Sea: Geopolitics and Geoeconomics in Play

This article looks at the South China Sea, an area of dispute between China and other littoral states, as a new area of geopolitical and geoeconomic interest for India. The article follows the strategic discourse on the South China Sea circulating in the Indian government and wider strategic community, and brings in Chinese responses and interpretations of India's involvement. India's role in the South China Sea is four-fold: first, naval deployments; second, increasing strategic-military links with littoral states like Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam; third, economic involvement of Indian energy companies in South China Sea waters; and fourth, discussions between India and other regional and extra-regional China-concerned powers about the South China Sea. India's involvement in the South China Sea represents a new development in its Look East Policy, a new balancing factor in the interplay of actors within these waters, and a new friction factor within India-China relations.     

Provisional IRA Attacks on the UDR in Fermanagh and South Tyrone: Implications for the Study of Political Violence and Terrorism

This article continues a discussion begun in the 1990s on the degree to which Provisional Irish Republican Army activities were sectarian. Henry Patterson's recent contribution raises issues that concern not only interpretations of the Irish conflict but also have implications for the more general study of the causes and consequences of political violence and terrorism. After addressing some of these issues, Patterson's contribution is placed more firmly into the framework of the previous discussion. Then follows a careful examination of Irish Republican Army attacks on the locally recruited security forces in Fermanagh and South Tyrone, from the 1950s to today.     

Sitting on the Balcony: American Responses,Strategic Dilemmas,and Swedish Criticism of the Vietnam War

Small states often seek power by exercising authority beyond their borders. Sweden, a prominent protagonist of the global projection of moral values, established itself as a champion of humanitarian internationalism in the post-Second World War period, especially during the Vietnam War. By voicing criticism of the American war effort and putting moral purposes beyond itself, Sweden tried to change American policy. Years of vehement criticism provoked strong reactions in the United States, leading to bilateral diplomatic crises and long-lasting political conflicts. Even though part of a wave of international criticism and based on the power of the better argument and conveyed through open advocacy, Sweden's public diplomacy had little bearing. Its confrontational style was counter-productive; its content badly synchronised with the domestic American debate and lacking originality and centrality; and the criticism generally considered irrelevant. Attention fell on Swedish verbal activism when more conspicuous elements of Swedish Vietnam policy were in focus.     

‘Unlawful Combatants’: The West's Treatment of Irregular Fighters in the ‘War on Terror’

The West's treatment of irregular fighters in the “war on terror” was highly problematic. This article contends that we must look beyond the assumption that political and strategic considerations compromised the law and led to the “invention” of the category of the “unlawful combatant.” Rather, the law of armed conflict itself includes strong exclusionary mechanisms towards irregular fighters. These exclusionary strands in the law came to dominate the West's strategic decision-making on the treatment of irregular fighters. Moreover, the fact that irregular fighters became such a vital issue post-9/11 was not a result of the war on terror being a new kind of war, as has often been argued. Rather, this article suggests that it reflects an identity crisis of the West's regular armed forces at the start of the twenty-first century.     

Normative power and organized hypocrisy: European Union member states' arms export to Libya

The 2011 Libyan civil war prompted a reassessment of the normative foundation of the EU's conventional arms export control regime as armaments manufactured in Europe were used by Gaddafi's forces during the war. The EU's foreign policy identity is based, partly, upon a common approach to arms export involving respect for common criteria for export licences. Yet, prior to the civil war, considerable amounts of military equipment had been exported by member states to Libya, notwithstanding grounds for restraint on the basis of several of the criteria. This article traces member states' arms export to Libya during 2005–2010 to explore whether member states favoured restraint or export promotion. It concludes that although aware of the risks of exporting, in a competitive market for military goods, member states sought commercial advantage over restraint, and comprehensively violated export control principles. This casts doubts on assertions of the EU acting as a “normative power”.     

China on the Horizon: India's ‘Look East’ Policy Gathers Momentum

While the world has been focusing on China's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, Beijing and Delhi are also engaged in a quiet struggle in the contested waters. By putting up for international bidding the same oil block that India had obtained from Vietnam for exploration, China has thrown down a gauntlet.¹ By deciding to stay put in the assigned block, India has indicated it's ready to take up the Chinese challenge. At stake is Chinese opposition to India's claim to be a regional power in the larger Asian strategic setting. India is trying to emerge as a credible regional balancer but it has a long way to go.     

Bearing their share of the burden: Europe in Afghanistan

Abstract

This article assesses the relative burden European members of NATO are bearing in the war in Afghanistan. Some argue that the current contribution of European forces is on par with the American contribution. However, current studies do not analyze Europe's ISAF contribution in comparison to some benchmark by which relative burden-sharing can be accurately determined. This article compares Europe's involvement in the war in Afghanistan to past missions, current contributions and in light of the benefits each country is likely to enjoy. The quantitative and qualitative findings show that there is an extensive amount of free-riding occurring both in terms of hard and soft power, although it varies across time and even within NATO Europe. Inadequate forces provided by European NATO countries jeopardize the likelihood of success in Afghanistan.     

孙中山在越南的影响

孙中山即孙逸仙（1866-1925年）是中国近现代史上一位伟大的民主革命家和首屈一指的人物。1905年孙中山提出著名的三民主义，即民族主义、民权主义和民生主义，同时成立中国革命同盟会组织，以推行三民主义和宣传、动员群众。孙中山是辛亥革命的组织者，并成为中国第一个民主共和国领导人。     

Reputation and U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq

The need to demonstrate America's resolve is a major argument among those who oppose a premature U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. According to this argument, a quick exit from Iraq would be a major blow to U.S. credibility and embolden the forces of radical Islam in their war against the United States. This article assesses this “reputational” argument and concludes that evidence from radical Islamists’ pronouncements gives the argument significant and unprecedented forcefulness. These pronouncements unmistakably call into question the United States’ resoluteness by pointing to America's past withdrawals from theaters of war and declare Iraq as the central front, raising the reputational stake of a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq considerably. The potency of the reputational argument is also unprecedented when it is compared to its similar formulation during the Vietnam War, when it was vague and short of supporting evidence. The reputational argument may play an important rationale in maintaining a substantial level of American forces in Iraq for years to come.     

试论加拿大越战政策从默认到自主的转变——以希伯恩使团活动为中心

越战前期,加拿大默认并配合了美国军事介入越南,但随着美国军事行动日益升级,它逐渐显示出更加自主的和平外交姿态,还试图在美国与北越之间进行斡旋.为此,加拿大派遣希伯恩使团负责沟通双方,并力促和谈.加拿大总理皮尔逊还发表坦普尔讲话,明确反对战争扩大化.加拿大从默认到自主的越战政策,是国际冷战局势重大变化在西方阵营内的折射,预示着加拿大将走向更独立的外交立场.越战时加美关系的演变是西方非对称性联盟固有结构性矛盾的一个缩影.     

Collateral Damage? “Marigold,” Franco–American Relations,and Secret Vietnam Peace Diplomacy, 1966–1967

The Vietnam War exacerbated the already tense relationship between Charles de Gaulle and Lyndon B. Johnson; and Franco–American relations reached a nadir in winter 1966–1967 when de Gaulle vetoed a proposed visit to Hanoi by Jean Sainteny, a former colonial official, who Washington had desired to probe North Vietnam’s position. This analysis adds a new wrinkle to the story. Building on research for Marigold: The Lost Chance for Peace in Vietnam (2012), the author reveals that French knowledge of only the Polish version of that peace initiative’s failure, fully blaming the Americans, further soured de Gaulle’s view of Johnson’s handling of the war and American sincerity in seeking peace. The analysis also unveils a new dimension of Henry Kissinger’s involvement in Vietnam diplomacy—prior to the Nixon White House—missing from earlier accounts.