A 'European' Conception of Legal Consciousness: Rediscovering Eugen Ehrlich

This paper discusses the present ‘legal consciousness’ literature and seeks to identify two different conceptions of legal consciousness. Most of this literature originated in the United States, but there has also been a growing interest in issues of legal consciousness in Europe. The use of the term ‘legal consciousness ’ in these European discussions is, however, remarkably different from its use in the United States literature. It is argued that the most commonly used ‘American ’ conception of legal consciousness reflects important ideas of Roscoe Pound and asks: how do people experience (official) law? By contrast, a European conception of legal consciousness, which was first introduced by the Austrian legal theorist Eugen Ehrlich, focuses on: what do people experience as ‘law ’? After both perspectives are applied in a case‐study of a run‐down neighbourhood in the Netherlands, it is concluded that future studies of legal consciousness may benefit from an integration of the two conceptions.     

Law and Morality: A Critical Relation*

Abstract. The article deals with the difference between some forms of legal positivism. It is argued that, even in continental legal systems which are typically “rule bound,” there is some space left for principles in the legal system. The author tries to explain how this space can be filled and what methods should be used by a judge to do so.     

The Inevitability and Indeterminacy of Game‐Theoretic Accounts of Legal Order

How is legal order possible? Why do people comply with law when it prevents them from doing what they think best? Two important books show how these questions can—and from some methodological perspectives must—be answered in the form of game‐theoretic accounts that show how legal compliance can be compatible with the broad self‐interest of officials and citizens. Unfortunately, however, these books also serve to demonstrate that game‐theoretic accounts along these lines lack the resources to explain how real‐world legal systems emerge and evolve or the various institutional shapes these systems take. The fundamental limitation of game theory, in this context and more generally, is its inability to predict or explain the size and shape of cooperative equilibria.     

Juvenile Justice in Scandinavia

The main issue is the legal protection of children and juveniles suspected of or convicted for crime. The age of criminal responsibility is 15 years in the countries concerned. Particular juvenile justice systems do not exist in Scandinavia. There are, however, exceptions from the general system in order to maintain needs, interests and rights of children and juveniles. Some common characteristics are described, for instance diversion of juveniles from prison into social welfare measures and the prohibition of placing children in jail. Individual characteristics are pointed out as well. Introduction of secure social institutions as an alternative to imprisonment in Sweden and Denmark is one, mediation processes with children as parties in Finland and Norway is another. It is argued that from the point of view of legality the demands for legal rights are of greatest importance in prosecution and punishment matters, whereas social welfare support is not to the same degree concerned about such questions. Furthermore it is argued that in spite of good intentions the Scandinavian countries challenge the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, by not definitely prohibiting the possibility of a juvenile serving a prison sentence together with adults. It is stated that the distance between constructive pragmatism and destructive loss of principles as legality, equality and proportionality may be short. Crime trends are not linked to the politics: there is no relation between crime rates and political attention to crime. Juvenile justice has increasing political attention these years while the crime rates tend to be stable. In relation not solely to the economy and the Convention but first and foremost in the interest of children and juveniles more thought should be given to scientific experiences about early and appropriate prevention.     

Should the EU Protect Democracy and the Rule of Law inside Member States?

Against the background of recent developments in Hungary, the article discusses the question whether the European Union ought to play a role in protecting liberal democracy in Member States. First, it is argued that the EU has the authority to do so, both in a broad normative sense and in a narrower legal sense (though the latter is more likely to be disputed). The article then asks whether the EU has the capacity to establish a supranational militant democracy; here it is argued that at the moment both appropriate legal instruments and plausible political strategies are missing. To remedy this situation, the article proposes a new democracy watchdog, analogous to, but more powerful than, the Venice Commission. Finally, it is asked whether EU interventions would provoke a nationalist backlash. There is insufficient evidence to decide this question, but the danger of such a backlash probably tend to be overestimated.     

Trajectory of Reform: Catholicism,the State and the Civil Society in the Developments of LGBT Rights

This paper examines legislative variations in LGBT identities, addressing the question: why and how do two largely Catholic states—Italy and Spain—endow different legal treatment to LGBT identities? Italy and Spain present important similarities in their legal, social and historical backgrounds. The legal cultures of both of these states have legal frameworks decriminalizing homosexuality. Nevertheless, they have approached same-sex unions in quite different ways. Spain has introduced same-sex marriage. Italy has hindered, consequently legal recognition remains fiercely contested and unrealized. Overall, it is argued that it is in the area of same-sex unions that some of the most significant changes have taken place in family law over the past decade in a number of jurisdictions. The paper argues that legal reforms in family law must be understood in terms of relation between society and law and must draw upon the concept of “culture”. The two jurisdictions appear to support the theoretical perspective that reforms and lack of reforms in family law are inspired by a number of contexts such as religious values, ideas of political morality and State interests.     

Rethinking the one-stop-shop mechanism: Legal certainty and legitimate expectation

This paper aims to contribute to the discussion concerning the one-stop-shop mechanism proposed in the General Data Protection Regulation (hereinafter “GDPR”). The choice of regulation as the instrument to legislate on data protection is already an unmistakable indication that unification and simplification (together with respect of data subjects' interests) shall be the guide for every legal discussion on the matter. The one-stop-shop mechanism (hereinafter “OSS”) clearly reflects the unification and simplification which the reform aims for. We believe that OSS is logically connected with the idea of one Data Protection Authority (hereinafter “DPA”) with an exclusive jurisdiction and that this can only mean that, given one controller, no other DPA can be a competent authority.² In other words, OSS implies a single and comprehensive competent authority of a given controller. In our analysis we argue that such architecture: a) works well with the “consistency mechanism”; b) provides guarantees to data subjects for a clear allocation of powers (legal certainty); and c) is not at odds with the complaint lodging procedure. Our position on fundamental questions is as follows. What is the perimeter of competence of the DPA in charge? We believe that it should have enforcement power on every issue of the controller, including issuing the fines. How to reconcile such dominant role of one DPA with the principle of co-operation among DPAs? We do not consider co-operation at odds with the rule that decisions are taken by just one single authority. Finally, we share some suggestions on how to make the jurisdiction allocation mechanism (the main establishment criterion) more straightforward.     

Toward an integration of economic and sociological approaches?

This article answers the question whether sociology of law and law and economics can be unificd into one integrated science. First, it is argued that an integration process inside law and economics has taken place, integrating most schools and partial analyses into one mainstream law and economics. Second, it is argued that there are no natural barriers against an integration of sociology and economics. Purely economic theories cannot and do not exist. What is calledeconomic analysis of law is basically a mixture of, for instance, 70 percent economics, 10 percent sociology, 10 percent psychology, and 10 percent other sciences. In addition, there is no such a thing as a purely sociological concept; concepts are sociological only in the sense that they are invented by people who call themselves sociologists.Nevertheless one should not expect that such a richer social science will lead to fundamentally different predictions and policy recommendations than those derived from the current simplistic economic analysis of law. The aspects studied by sociologists but assumed away by legal economists to date have in most cases no influence on the determination of (optimal) legal rules or on the long-run effects of legal rules.     

Child witnesses and the confrontation clause

InMaryland v. Craig, the United States Supreme Court relied heavily on a brief prepared by a committee of the American Psychology-Law Society on behalf of the American Psychological Association (APA). The APA brief concluded that sexually abused children may be particularly vulnerable to distress in the legal process, especially when forced to confront the defendant face to face, and that such acute distress may be inconsistent with the state's interests in promotion of reliable testimony and child welfare. APA also argued that psychological theory and research provide foundations for individualized determination of the need for measures to protect children from face-to-face confrontation. *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** AFE06051 00002     

Battered women who kill their abusers: an examination of commonsense notions, cognitions, and judgments

It has been argued that battered women who kill their abusers represent a special class of defendants being unfairly treated in the legal system. As a result, commentators have argued for reforms to permit the judicial system to respond more fairly. Researchers have investigated the influences of these prescribed legal modifications and the possible influence of various demographic and psychological factors on legal reforms. However, social scientists have not yet asked some fundamental, psychological questions. Is the law consistent with what society believes is right and just? Is there a commonsense notion of justice in these cases? What factors constitute cognitive decision rules and influence judgments in cases of battered women who kill their abusers? This study uses a basic, psychological method to identify psychological factors that are important in judgments regarding battered women who kill and to better understand commonsense notions of justice in these cases.     

INFORMATION COSTS AND LEGAL SERVICES

Most of the current debate on the effective provision of legal services ignores the centrality of information costs. It is argued that conventional controls do not address this issue, especially where clients are infrequent users of legal services and the services required are nonroutine. In this segment of the market for legal services there is an "adverse selection" problem that will drive down the quality of legal services. Existing methods of ensuring quality legal services to this segment of the market are unlikely to be effective. It is suggested that only legal agents with incentives and opportunities to acquire information can mitigate the adverse selection problem. The English bifurcation of lawyers into barristers and solicitors partly performs such a function and provides a model for possible innovations in the North American context.     

Nocebo Effects and Mild Traumatic Brain Injury: Legal Implications

Expectations may play a large role in health-related outcomes, but they may not be fully addressed or considered in medical–legal contexts. Contextual factors can influence a patient’s expectations for recovery following a concussion, including explicit or implicit messages from the media, healthcare providers and systems of care, and the forensic arena. This article discusses these factors as nocebo effects, that is, various inherently “inert” factors may create negative expectancies for recovery and therefore impede a given patient’s progress and recovery. It is argued that the negligence theory upon which the legal system is based tends to compound these nocebo effects. In accident-related concussions, both the accident itself and subsequent nocebo effects including potential healthcare and medical–legal provider negligence can create legal liability.     

Exploring System Boundaries

Autopoiesis is normally considered to be the systems theory in law. In this paper complexity theory is presented as an alternative systems approach. In order to position complexity theory as a plausible alternative to autopoiesis I discuss the differing understanding of boundary within each theory, and use this as a vehicle to critique autopoiesis. My critique is situated within systems theory thinking but is external to both autopoiesis and complexity theory (although I must oscillate between the two objects of critique). Because both approaches possess an understanding of boundary it provides an effective tool to contrast their differences, while permitting each to be described in its own language. It is argued that complexity theory offers an approach to boundaries as contingent, emergent interfaces, which the autopoietic construction of boundary can learn from in several ways. More generally it is suggested that the complexity approach to boundaries offers lawyers engaging with systems theory a new critical perspective to assess legal constructions.     

The concept of free will and forensic psychiatry

This text examines how conceptions of free will impact on legal systems and forensic psychiatry: free will is generally regarded as a prerequisite for responsibility, criminal responsibility included, while forensic psychiatry to a large extent deals with the limits imposed on responsibility by mental disorder. First we discuss the question of whether there is and has been such an impact. The answer is yes: different conceptions of free will have inspired different systems of law and forensic psychiatry, as becomes clear when looking at the accountability doctrine as compared to the unique Swedish system rejecting this doctrine. However, there is no necessary connection between doctrines of responsibility and conceptions of free will, since the former primarily says something about when someone should be held responsible and the latter says something about when someone really is free in a sense relevant to responsibility. This leads to the second question: should conceptions of free will have an impact on law and forensic psychiatry? We argue: that they should not, given the implausibility the normative theory retributivism, which posits a direct connection between free will and punishment. More importantly, questions of free will are complicated and unresolved philosophical issues that are better left out of the everyday decision-making incumbent on the legal and psychiatric systems. Instead, we recommend using an empirically useful and gradual conception of autonomy to facilitate the determination of legal responsibility. This autonomy conception, being neutral on the question of free will, eliminates the need to take a stand on it.     

Allocating climate adaptation finance: examining three ethical arguments for recipient control

Most agree that large sums of money should be transferred to the most vulnerable countries in order to help them adapt to climate change. But how should that money be allocated within those countries? A popular and intuitively plausible answer, in line with the strong standing of the norm of ownership in development aid circles, is that this is for the recipient country to decide. The paper investigates the three most important types of ethical arguments for such ‘recipient control’: the epistemic argument, the entitlement argument, and the legitimacy argument. It is argued that there is a good case for recipient control in democratic countries, because such countries can be expected to act in the name of the people to whom adaptation finance is ultimately owed. However, the three arguments do not support, even if taken jointly, recipient control in nondemocratic countries. This is a significant result seeing as the majority of the most vulnerable countries are nondemocratic.     

Improving APA science translation amicus briefs

This commentary uses APA's brief inPrice Waterhouse v. Hopkins to examine a number of issues concerning such briefs submitted to appellate courts: What are the purposes of APA's science translation briefs? What role conflicts emerge between legal advocates and empirical scientists? In what ways are these exacerbated or lessened by the respective duties of advocates and scientists? In what ways may the conflicts be compelled by differences between legal and empirical questions? How adequate are Brandeis briefs as a tool for communicating empirical research findings to appellate courts? Are any of the usual adversarial protections maintained? What is the question the court might look to the brief, and to the field, to answer? What is the role for meta-analyses? For what interests might APA as an amicus advocate? In addition to organizational self-interest and the public interest, does it ever make sense to advocate, in a purported science translation brief, on behalf of an ultimate issue in the case or for one of the parties to the litigation? To these difficult problems, I suggest a potentially simple solution.     

The Concept of Entrapment

Our question is this: What makes an act one of entrapment? We make a standard distinction between legal entrapment, which is carried out by parties acting in their capacities as (or as deputies of) law-enforcement agents, and civil entrapment, which is not. We aim to provide a definition of entrapment that covers both and which, for reasons we explain, does not settle questions of permissibility and culpability. We explain, compare, and contrast two existing definitions of legal entrapment to commit a crime that possess this neutrality. We point out some problems with the extensional correctness of these definitions and propose a new definition that resolves these problems. We then extend our definition to provide a more general definition of entrapment, encompassing both civil and legal cases. Our definition is, we believe, closer to being extensionally correct and will, we hope, provide a clearer basis for future discussions about the ethics of entrapment than do the definitions upon which it improves.     

Prolegomenon to a Southern Jurisprudence

It is good to take stock from time to time and to see how things stand in jurisprudence. So, what is the relationship of doctrine and theory with jurisprudence? Is private law theory apolitical while public law contains politics for the very many constitutional ends in the Global South? In India, legal theorist Chhatrapati Singh very originally asked if legal systems and normative systems were the same? Chhatrapati’s enquiry was however a species of the classical approach to the law that promotes the law’s purity. On the contrary, the postcolonial approaches account for the historical life as well as the political proclivities of the law. The private law theory often seen as impersonal and non-imperial comes under scrutiny in the postcolonial approaches. Duncan Kennedy and Roberto Unger notably problematized contract theory, while Upendra Baxi argued for mass tort as public law—contract and tort are both private law—to offer, if you will, a jurisprudence of the South. A southern jurisprudence essentially rejects an impersonal reading of the private law.

     

The Case of <Emphasis Type="Italic">variae lectiones</Emphasis> in Classical Islamic Jurisprudence: Grammar and the Interpretation of Law

The qirā?āt or variae lectiones represent the vast corpus of Qur?ānic readings that were preserved through the historical processes associated with the textual codification and transmission of the Qur?ān. Despite the fact that differences among concomitant readings tend to be nominal, others betray semantic nuances that are brought into play within legal discourses. Both types of readings remain important sources for the history of the text of the Qur’ān and early Arabic grammatical thought. While some recent scholars have questioned the historical function and nature of the corpus of qirā?āt, others have argued that specific types of variant readings were the resultant products of attempts to circumvent legal inconsistencies which were found in text of the Qur?ān or were generated through legal debates. Following a preliminary review of the historical framework of the genesis of qirā?āt through reference to early grammatical literature, an attempt will be made to shed some light on the role that semantic variation among concomitant readings played in the synthesis and interpretation of law. The aim will be to draw attention to the subtle theoretical frameworks employed by jurists for their contextualization and analysis. This will also include a review of attitudes towards the forms of qirā?āt that classical scholarship designated as being anomalous or shādhdha.     

Jhering's Philosophy of Authority

This article offers a critical reassessment of the jurisprudenceof Rudolf von Jhering. During the 20th century, Anglo-Americanlegal philosophers who drew inspiration from Jhering's workusually lauded him either as a German forerunner to Americanlegal realism or as an early proponent of a jurisprudence ofinterests. These representations of his work do not do justiceto Jhering's jurisprudential project. This study demonstratesthat he sought to explain how legal systems originate and howthey maintain authority. It is shown that his explanation oflegal authority depends not only upon familiar jurisprudentialnotions such as reciprocity and positional duty, but also uponthe concept of Rechtsgefühl—namely, the idea thatauthority is conditioned by citizens’ feelings of whatis right or just. Jhering, it is demonstrated, believed thatthe authority of a legal system depends very much on its abilityto negotiate and accommodate struggles based upon feelings ofright—struggles between citizens, between citizens andState, and between States. It is also argued that the mannerin which Jhering relies on the idea of Rechtsgefühl underminesthe received wisdom that he was an interest theorist.